ORDER R.S. Jha, J. 1. The aforesaid petitions have been filed by the Petitioners on similar facts and grounds involving similar issues and relief and, therefore, these petitions are heard conjointly and decided by this common order with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The Petitioners have filed these petitions being aggrieved by the rejection of their application forms for recruitment on the post of Clerk-Steno/ Assistant Grade-III. 3. The case of the Petitioners before this Court is that they had applied for the aforesaid post pursuant to an advertisement published in the newspaper on 03.01.2010. 4. It is stated that the Petitioners are all holders of Diploma in Computer Application but their forms have been rejected by the Respondent/ authorities on the ground that the certificates of diploma have not been issued by a University recognized by the UGC or by the Department of Electronics and Accreditation for Computer Courses (hereinafter referred to as the "DOEACC") or by a Government Polytechnic College. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that at the time the advertisement was issued, such conditions were not incorporated therein but subsequently by issuance of clarification dated 12-6-2009 the aforesaid requirements were prescribed by the State Government. It is stated that the Respondent/authorities could not have changed the conditions of the advertisement by issuance of a letter subsequently and, therefore, the rejection of the Petitioner's forms on the ground of not possessing diplomas from the institutions specified later on by the State Government is contrary to law. 5. Per contra, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents that the advertisement published in the "Rojgar Aur Nirmaan", dated 03.01.2010 clearly mentions that the person must possess a diploma from an institution recognized/approved by the State of M.P. It is stated that the State Government vide its letter/communication dated 12.06.2009 had clearly specified that a person who applies for the post of Assistant Grade-Ill must produce a diploma issued either by any of the Universities recognized by the UGC, by any Open University recognized by the UGC, open DOEACC or from a Government Polytechnic College. It is stated that the said letter/ communication of the State was issued prior to the issuance of the advertisement and was, therefore, forms part of the same as the approved/ recognized institutions in respect of which reference was made in the advertisement, automatically refers to the aforesaid four institutions. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the petitions filed by the Petitioners deserve to be dismissed. 6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents has also pointed out that a similar issue arose before this Court in W.P. No. 8419/2009, Neelesh Shukla and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors., and its connected petitions and this Court, after considering all aspects has dismissed the petitions filed by the Petitioners and, therefore, the present petitions be also dismissed. 7. I have heard the learned Counsels for the parties at length and perused the records. 8. It is apparent from a perusal of the documents on record that the clarification in respect of the recognized/approved institutions was issued by the State Government on 12-6-2009, i.e., much prior to the date of publication of the advertisement in the "Rojgar Aur Nirmaan" on 31 2010 and, therefore, the contentions of the Petitioners that the eligibility conditions in respect of the Diploma Certificate were changed by subsequently issuing a clarification is factually misconceived. It is also to be noted that the advertisement itself mentioned that the Diploma in Computer Application must be from a Government approved institution which had been previously specified by a circular dated 12.06.2009 and in such circumstances the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that their forms have been rejected on the basis of a subsequent clarification or by adding new conditions which amounted to modification of the terms of the advertisement is factually incorrect and deserves to be rejected. 9. I am also of the considered opinion that as the advertisement specifically mentioned that the Diploma Certificates must be obtained from Government approved/recognized institutions, which institutions had been previously specified by circular dated 12-6-2009, the specification in respect of the institutions has to be read as part and parcel of the advertisement itself and, therefore, contentions to the contrary of the Petitioners deserve to be and are hereby rejected. 10. 10. This Court, while dealing with the similar issue relating to appointment of Patwaris has examined the provisions of law and come to a conclusion that in view of the provisions of law, i.e., M.P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam and the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995, the affiliated institution has no power or authority to issue diplomas and it is only the concerned universities that can issue the diplomas in respect of the Computer Application and on that ground while dismissing the petition has held as under: 19. The next aspect which requires to be dwelled upon is whether there has been a change of condition in the advertisement by issuing the letter-circular. The instructions for holding the Patwari Examination has been brought on record as Annexure P-16. The question arises whether the instructions run counter to the Rules, 2008 or the Advertisement. The relevant portion being translated into English read as under 3. The DCA certificates submitted by the candidates were sent by some Collectors to this Office which were forwarded to the University concerned for verification and requisite information as regards their veracity was sought. It was apprised by the Universities that even if an institution is recognised/affiliated/ registered affiliated with the University then too it has no right to issue any kind of certificate. The DCA certificates if issued by an institute under its seal and signature are invalid. The certificate issued only by the University under its seal and signature are valid. Similarly, the DOEACC Society has informed that for computer the 'O' Level Certificates issued by the DOEACC Society Delhi are valid. The certificates issued by an institution affiliated with DOEACC are invalid. 4. Hence, it is instructed that only those DCA certificates of the selected candidates for the post of 'Patwari' shall be valid which have been issued by the University under its seal and signature. The DCA certificates containing seal and signature of the institutes which are registered/recognized/affiliated by the University, being illegal shall be held invalid. Similarly, if any institute which is affiliated with DOEACC then the 'O' Level Certificate issued only by the DOEACC Society, Delhi under its seal and signature shall be held valid but not the certificates issued by the affiliated institute. 20. Similarly, if any institute which is affiliated with DOEACC then the 'O' Level Certificate issued only by the DOEACC Society, Delhi under its seal and signature shall be held valid but not the certificates issued by the affiliated institute. 20. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the Rule prescribes for obtaining of 'O' Level Certificate from DOEACC/IETE or one year Diploma in Computer Application (DCA) from an institute run by registered/recognised/affiliated to UGC recognised University or higher education n computer and that means a registered and recognised institute can issue a Diploma in Computer Application and that having been produced the same should suffice, whereas vide letter circular dated 27-7-09 it is mandated the certificate given by the institute is not to be accepted and it has to be given by the institute with seal and signature of the Competent Authority of the University. Similar prescription is also there from DOEACC Society, New Delhi. Thus, what is provided in the letter-circular is that the seal and signature of the Competent Authority of the University. As has been submitted by Mr. Shukla, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, the same runs counter to the Rules if the Rule is held valid. It is contended by him that an additional qualification is required as per the said letter-circular which is not in existence in the Rule. The learned Counsel submitted that even if a qualification is prescribed in the form of an advertisement the same cannot be materially changed by latter executive instructions. 21. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the decision in Dr. Chetkar Jha v. Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Verma and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 1832 , wherein the Apex Court has held as under: 12... Admittedly, the Vice-Chancellor had obtained such approval for filling up the vacancy by direct recruitment and also for the advertisement in terms of the Statute laying down the qualifications for the post. Once, therefore, such an approval had been obtained, no further approval would be necessary for the various consequential steps which would have to be taken to bring about the appointment and fill in the vacancy. Furthermore, the revision in the advertisement became necessary because the advertisement given by the Commission was not in conformity with the University Statute and the requisition made by the Vice-Chancellor for which he had already obtained the Chancellor's approval. Furthermore, the revision in the advertisement became necessary because the advertisement given by the Commission was not in conformity with the University Statute and the requisition made by the Vice-Chancellor for which he had already obtained the Chancellor's approval. In other words, he had the advertisement revised so as to bring it in accord with his requisition which was sanctioned by the Chancellor. That could only be done by removing the limitation under which contrary to the Statute only candidates with M.A. Degrees in Political Science could apply. The Chancellor, therefore, was in error in holding that the revised advertisement required his approval and that in the absence of such approval it was invalid or that the Commission's recommendation and the appointment by the Syndicate based thereon were bad in law on that account. 22. In N.T. Bevin Katti, etc. v. Karnataka Public Service Commission and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 1233 , it has been held as follows: 13... Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and Government orders and any amendment of the rules or the Government order pending the selection should not affect the validity of the selection made by the Selecting Authority or the Public Service Commission unless the amended rules or the amended Government orders issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate that amended Rules shall be applicable to the pending selections. See: P. Mahendra v. State of Karnataka, JT (1989) (4) 459 : AIR 1990 SC 405 . 23. In Gopal Krushna Rath v. M.A.A. Baig (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2093 , the Apex Court has ruled thus: 6. When the selection process has actually commenced and the last date for inviting applications is over, any subsequent change in the requirement regarding qualification by the University Grants Commission will not affect the process of selection which has already commenced. Otherwise it would involve issuing a fresh advertisement with the new qualifications. When the selection process has actually commenced and the last date for inviting applications is over, any subsequent change in the requirement regarding qualification by the University Grants Commission will not affect the process of selection which has already commenced. Otherwise it would involve issuing a fresh advertisement with the new qualifications. In the case of P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 1 SCC 411 : AIR 1990 SC 405 , this Court has observed: 'It is well settled rule or construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have restrospective effect.' The Court further observed that: 'Since the amending rules were not retrospective, it could not adversely affect the right of those candidates who were qualified for selection and appointment on the date they applied for the post, moreover, as the process of selection had already commenced when the amending Rules came into force, the amended Rules could not affect the existing rights of those candidates who were being considered for selection as they possessed the requisite qualifications prescribed by the Rules before its amendment'. 7. In the present case, therefore, the Appellant possessed the necessary qualifications as advertised on the last date of receiving applications. These qualifications were in accordance with the rules/guidelines then in force. There is also no doubt that the Appellant obtained higher marks than the original Respondent No. 1 at the selection. There is no challenge to the process of selection, nor is there any allegation of malafides in the process of selection. 24. In Sonia v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2007) 10 SCC 627 , the Apex Court referred to the decision rendered in N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 , and expressed the view thus: 10. In N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, this Court has held that where selection process has been initiated by issuing an advertisement inviting applications, selection should normally be regulated by the rule or order then prevalent and also when advertisement expressly states that the appointment shall be made in accordance with the existing rule or order, subsequent amendment in the existing rule order will not affect the pending selection process unless contrary intention is expressly or impliedly indicated. 25. In Mohd. 25. In Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University and Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 555 , Their Lordships relying on the decision rendered in A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna, (2005) 4 SCC 154 , and expressed the view as under: 28. In A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna, at Para 14, it was held by this Court that norms of selection cannot be altered after commencement of selection process and the rules regarding qualification for appointment, if amended, during continuation of the process of selection do not affect the same. 29. Further at Para 15 of B. Swapna case, it was held that the power to relax the eligibility condition, if any, to the selection must be clearly spelt out and cannot be otherwise exercised. The said observations are extracted herein below: (SCC pp. 159-60, Paras 14-15) '14. The High Court has committed an error in holding that the amended rule was operative. As has been fairly conceded by learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 applicant it was the unamended rule which was applicable. Once a process of selection starts, the prescribed selection criteria cannot be changed. The logic behind the same is based on fair play. A person who did not apply because a certain criterion, e.g. minimum percentage of marks can make a legitimate grievance, in case the same is lowered, that he could have applied because he possessed the said percentage. Rules regarding qualification for appointment if amended during continuance of the process of selection do not affect the same. That is because every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the rules showing the intention to affect existing rights the rule must be held to be prospective. If the rule is expressed in a language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be considered as prospective only. (See: P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka and Gopal Krushna Rath v. MAA Baig.) 15. Another aspect which this Court has highlighted in scope for relaxation of norms. Although the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields, it cannot abdicate its functions of ushering in a society based on the rule of law. Another aspect which this Court has highlighted in scope for relaxation of norms. Although the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields, it cannot abdicate its functions of ushering in a society based on the rule of law. Once it is most satisfactorily established that the Selection Committee did not have the power to relax essential qualification, the entire process of selection so far as the selected candidate is concerned gets vitiated. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, this Court held that once it is established that there is no power to relax essential qualification, the entire process of selection of the candidate was in contravention of the established norms prescribed by advertisement. The power to relax must be clearly spelt out and cannot otherwise be exercised. 26. The present controversy is to be tested on the anvil of the aforesaid pronouncement of law. The question that emanates for consideration is whether the letter-circular in effect runs counter to the Rule and whether it travels beyond the stipulations in the advertisement. Before we delve into factual scenario in this contextual set up and the submissions proponed by the learned Counsel for the parties, we think it apposite to notice a few decisions in the field. In Union of India and Ors. v. Sh. Somasundaram Vishwanath and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 2255 , it has been held as follows: 6... If there is a conflict between the executive instructions and the rules made under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the rules made under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India prevail, and if there is a conflict between the rules made under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the law made by the appropriate Legislature the law made by this appropriate Legislature prevails.... 27. In Senior Supdt. of Post Office and Ors. v. Izhar Hussain AIR 1989 SC 2262 , a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has stated thus: ...A statutory rule cannot be modified or amended by executive instructions. A valid rule having some lacuna or gap can be supplemented by the executive instructions, but a statutory rule which is constitutionally invalid cannot be validated with the support of executive instructions. The instructions can only supplement and not supplant the rule. 28. A valid rule having some lacuna or gap can be supplemented by the executive instructions, but a statutory rule which is constitutionally invalid cannot be validated with the support of executive instructions. The instructions can only supplement and not supplant the rule. 28. In Ram Dayal Prajapati v. State of M.P. and Ors. AIR 2003 MP 171 , it has been held as under: 14. In the case of Additional District Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. v. Shri Ram AIR 2000 SC 2143 , it has been stated that it is a well recognized principle of statute that conferment of rule making power by an Act does not enable the rule making authority to make rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto. 15. In the case of Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 2502 , it was laid down that if a delegated legislation creates a legal fiction which is beyond the scope of principal Act the same has to be regarded as ultra vires. 29. The submission of Mr. Shukla, learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the Rule 1.8 basically stipulated a certificate of one year diploma from an institute and the advertisement also stipulated accordingly. Clause 1.8 of Chapter I of the advertisement has been pressed into service. The same being translated into English reads as follows: 1.8. Educational qualifications.-- Passing of Higher Secondary or High School (10 + 2) is necessary. In addition, 'O' Level Certificate from DPEACC/IETE or one year Diploma from an institute run by a registered/recognized/affiliated with the University recognized by the UGC or higher education in computer. 30. From the aforesaid it is perceptible that what has been really stipulated is that a candidate must have one year Diploma in Computer Application (DCA) from an institute affiliated/ registered/recognised by a University which is recognised by the University Grants Commission. The letter-circular provides that the certificate issued by a University containing seal and signature would be valid. The certificate issued by the institute on its own seal and signature of its authority is not to be accepted. The submission of Mr. Deepak Awasthi and Mr. The letter-circular provides that the certificate issued by a University containing seal and signature would be valid. The certificate issued by the institute on its own seal and signature of its authority is not to be accepted. The submission of Mr. Deepak Awasthi and Mr. Avinash Zargar is that the rule and the advertisement are absolutely clear that the Diploma course should be form an institute run by a recognized/registered and affiliated by a University which is recognized by the University Grants Commission. It is their stand that it is the University which issues a degree or diploma. In this context, we may refer with profit to Section 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 which deals with the powers of the University. Sub-section (9) empowers the University to institute degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions. Sub-section (10) empowers the University to confer degrees and other academic distinctions on the basis of examinations, evaluation or any other method of testing. Sub-section (12) confers power on the University to withdraw degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions for good and sufficient reasons. Thus, from the said enactment it is clear crystal that it is the University which confers diplomas, degrees, certificates and other academic distinctions. 31. Be it noted, many of the candidates had produced certificates from the institutes run under the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995, which is an Act to establish and incorporate a University in the State of Madhya Pradesh and to provide for education and prosecution of research in Vedic learnings and practice and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The University as has been defined under the Act means the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic University established under this Act. Section 4 of the Act deals with powers of the University. Sub-Section 4(i)(a) of Section 4 read as under: 4. (i) (a) grant, subject to such conditions the University may confer degrees or other academic distinctions on the basis of examination, evaluation or any other method of testing on, persons and withdraw any such diplomas, certificates, degrees or other academic distinctions for good and sufficient cause. Section 2(1) defines 'institution'. It reads as under: Institution" means an academic institution, not being a college, maintained by the University. Section 2(o) defines 'recognised institution' which is as under Recognized institution" means an institution of higher learning recognised by the University. 32. Section 2(1) defines 'institution'. It reads as under: Institution" means an academic institution, not being a college, maintained by the University. Section 2(o) defines 'recognised institution' which is as under Recognized institution" means an institution of higher learning recognised by the University. 32. Thus, it is evincible that Section 4 of the Act deals with powers of the University. Sub-section (vi) empowers the University to establish and maintain colleges, institutions and Halls. The institutions are established by the University but the diplomas are eventually conferred by the University itself. What is required by the letter-circular is to produce diplomas or certificates with the seal of the University and with the signature of the Competent Authority of the University. Hence, there is no change in the terms incorporated in the advertisement. It does not remotely transgress the stipulation in the Rule. What the letter-circular postulates is only the method how the certificate is to be produced as per law. It is in accord with the Rule and the advertisement. Therefore, we are unable to accept the spacious submissions raised by learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the same transgresses the Rule or the advertisement. 33. Consequently, we perceive no merit in the writ petitions and accordingly, they are dismissed without any order as to costs. 11. From a perusal of the diploma certificates filed by the Petitioners it is clear that most of them have been issued by Rajeev Gandhi Saksharta Mission run by the Sanatan Charitable Trust, affiliated to the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic University same as the case before the Division Bench in the case of Neelesh Shukla (supra). Other certificates are also issued by private organizations affiliated to various Universities or Government organisations. From a perusal of the certificates it is clear and apparent that none of them have been issued by the affiliating institutions, i.e., the concerned Universities, the DOEACC or the Government and, therefore, none of them conform to the requirements of law as laid down by this Court in the case of Neelesh Shukla (supra). 12. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the aforesaid decision of a Division Bench of this Court by which I am respectfully bound, no fault can be found with the act of rejection of the Petitioners' forms by the Respondents. Consequently, I do not find any merit in these petitions which are accordingly dismissed. 13. 12. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the aforesaid decision of a Division Bench of this Court by which I am respectfully bound, no fault can be found with the act of rejection of the Petitioners' forms by the Respondents. Consequently, I do not find any merit in these petitions which are accordingly dismissed. 13. A copy of this order be placed in the records of W.P. Nos. 4306/2010, 4770/2010, 4667/2010, 5292/2010, 5461/2010, 5466/2010, 5441/2010, 5608/2010, 5830/2010 and 5838/2010.