JUDGMENT S.K. MISHRA, J. : The convict in Sessions Case No.13 of 2000 assails his conviction for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’ for brevity and sentence of imprisonment for life in this appeal. 2. The prosecution case bereft of unnecessary details, is that the deceased migrated to village Telan and settled there with his family. He stayed there about ten years. He reclaimed a piece of jungle land and cultivated it. It is alleged that the accused asked him to part with it and as he refused, the accused bore grudge on him. On 06.01.1999 around 3 P.M. accused called the deceased to his house. When the deceased went there the accused assaulted him by means of a ‘Kotari’, as a result of which he fell down with serious bleeding injuries on cheek and neck. He was shifted to the hospital but he died later on. Initially, a case under Sections 326/307 of the IPC was registered, but on completion of investigation the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Section 302 of the IPC. 3. The accused took the plea of denial. The case went to trial and the prosecution examined 11 witnesses out of whom, P.W.3 is the solitary eye witness. Rest of the non official witnesses speak about post occurrence scenario, seizure, etc. P.W.8 is the doctor, who had examined the deceased at the hospital before his death. P.W.9 is the doctor, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased. The defence did not examine any witness on its behalf. 4. After considering the materials on record of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nabarangpur came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt, and therefore, held that the accused, i.e. convict-appellant, Nirgat Gond committed murder of the deceased by in¬flicting blows by means of a ‘Kotari’ (M.O.I.) on 06.01.1999 at about 3 P.M. in village Telari. Thereafter, he sentenced the appellant to undergo life imprisonment. 5. In course of hearing learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the conviction cannot be sustained on the ground that there is only one witness to the occurrence. Secondly, it is stated that no independent witnesses have been examined and only relation of the deceased has been examined. 5. In course of hearing learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the conviction cannot be sustained on the ground that there is only one witness to the occurrence. Secondly, it is stated that no independent witnesses have been examined and only relation of the deceased has been examined. It is further submitted that the weapon of offence was seized from a different person and the scribe of F.I.R. was not examined. On the basis of such contention, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appeal should be allowed and the accused should be acquitted. Learned Addl.Government Advocate, on the other hand, sup¬ported the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and urged that the appeal be dismissed. 6. Coming to the Ist contention regarding solitary eye witness, this Court takes note of the Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’ for brevity Section 134 of the Evidence Act lays down that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for proof of any fact. Such provision came for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed that as a general rule a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness without corroboration. One credible witness even out weights the testimony of a number of other witnesses of different character. Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon on the facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. 7. In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81 , the Supreme Court has held that it is well settled principle in law that evidence is to be considered on the basis of its quality and not the quantity Section 134 of the Evidence Act is a pointer in this regard. This provision follows the maxim that evidence is to be weighed and not counted in State of M.P. v. Lakhan, (2009) 14 SCC 433 , similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court. This provision follows the maxim that evidence is to be weighed and not counted in State of M.P. v. Lakhan, (2009) 14 SCC 433 , similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court. Thus, it is the quality of the evidence which is material not the quantity. 8. Coming to the case at hand the evidence of P.W.3 shows that P.W.3 is the daughter-in-law of the deceased. She stated that the occurrence took place about 1 and ½ years before her evidence in Court in the month of ‘Pausa’ on Wednesday around 3 to 4 P.M. At that time she had gone to the village well, which situates near the house of the accused. She further stated at that time near the front gate house of the accused, the accused assaulted her father-in-law by a ‘Kodara’ as a result of which her father-in-law fell down with severe bleeding injuries. M.O.I. was identified by her to be the said weapon of offence (a sickle like weapon having a long wooden handle) She further stated that P.Ws.1 and 2 were in near by jungle. She rushed to them and informed that the accused assaulted her father-in-law. They came to the spot with her and the deceased was removed from the place to the hospital. In cross-examination she has stated that she was alone near that well at the time of assault. She categorically stated to have seen the accused assaulting her father-in-law by M.O.I. Her father-in-law did not loose his senses after falling on the ground. That well situates about 20 yards from the house of the accused. She further stated that there was dispute between the accused and her father-in-law prior to the occurrence regard¬ing settlement of land. She denied the suggestion that the ac¬cused was not present at the time of occurrence and had gone to nearby village. 9. Her evidence does not suffer from any contradictions. The cross-examiner has not stipulated in the cross-examination that she contradicted herself with respect to the statement given by her under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’ for brevity. So, on the face of it, a ring of truth appears in the evidence of this witness. 10. Her evidence receives corroboration from the testimony of the doctor, i.e., P.W.9. So, on the face of it, a ring of truth appears in the evidence of this witness. 10. Her evidence receives corroboration from the testimony of the doctor, i.e., P.W.9. He stated that he had conducted post-mortem on the dead body of the deceased-Sambaru Panaka and found three incised injuries on the left side of the neck one below the chin and one on the face of the deceased. He has stated that the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and the deceased died due to shock and haemorrhage due to incised wound, especially the fist injury, i.e. cutting of jugular vein. He has also opined that M.O.I. could cause the aforesaid injuries. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the weapon of offence was not seized from the accused. The Investi¬gating Officer has stated that he seized the weapon of offence, M.O.I. on production by one Sri Gupta Santa. This seizure was witnessed by P.W.7. He has further stated that the I.O. seized the blood stained cloth of the accused in his presence. All these materials were sent for chemical examination. The chemical exami¬nation report which has been marked as Ext.1, reveals that the weapon of offence was stained with blood though no opinion could be gathered regarding origin of blood. However, human blood was found on the Gamucha seized from the possession of the accused. 12. Another important evidence which is forthcoming in this case, is that the blood stained earth was seized from the spot and it was found to be stained with human blood. Thus, the seizure of the blood stained earth from the spot and the report of the chemical analyst objectively determines spot of occur¬rence, which in turn lends support to the case of the prosecu¬tion, which is forthcoming from the solitary testimony of P.W.3. 13. The evidence of the solitary eye witness fits into the anvils of the objective circumstances of this case. There is no reason to disbelieve such a witness. The contention that she being related to the deceased her evidence should not be acted upon without corroboration is also without substance. There is no rule of evidence that a witness, who is a relative to the victim, should be viewed with suspicion. There is no reason to disbelieve such a witness. The contention that she being related to the deceased her evidence should not be acted upon without corroboration is also without substance. There is no rule of evidence that a witness, who is a relative to the victim, should be viewed with suspicion. On the contrary, if the witness happens to be the relation of the victim, then she would not depose falsehood to implicate a person, who has no connection with the crime, and spare the real culprit. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishnapal and others, (2008) 16 Supreme Court Cases 73 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there is distinction between the “interested witnesses” and “related witness”. ‘Rela¬ted’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives same benefit from the result of litigation, in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be ‘interested’. The observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the reported case is squarely applicable to this case. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that P.W.2 has stated that the eye witness (P.W.3) informed that the accused killed the deceased by means of a tangia whereas P.W.3 herself states that the deceased was assaulted by means of a ‘Kotari’. This is a very minor discrepancy. In such cases, it is the duty of the Court to shift the evidence carefully in terms of the felicitous metaphors. Shifting of evidence in this case shows that the minor contradiction appearing in the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is of no importance, especially in view of the fact that the defence has not stipulated in the cross-examination of P.W.3 that she re¬vealed before P.W.2 that her father-in-law assailed by means of an axe (Tangia). Furthermore, in this case, the weapon of offence i.e., Kotari has been seized and produced in the Court as M.O.I. was found to be stained with blood. 15. Furthermore, in this case, the weapon of offence i.e., Kotari has been seized and produced in the Court as M.O.I. was found to be stained with blood. 15. Residual question that requires adjudication is whether the deceased was murdered or as the learned counsel for the appellant submits that this is a case of culpable homicide is not amounting to murder “Culpable homicide” has been defined in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code as whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. In the 1st Explanation, it is provided that a person, who causes bodily injury to another who is laboring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death. In Explanation-2 it has been provided that death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. Explanation-3 provides that causing of death of child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child if any operate of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code defines murder which provides that except in the cases thereafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or- Secondly. - If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or - Thirdly - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be in¬flicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or. Fourthly - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 16. Section 300, I.P.C. provides for 5 exceptions which are not relevant in the present case, as appellant does not submit to come within the exception as provided under Section 300, I.P.C. Thus, it is seen that culpable homicide is genus and murder is the specie. Generally speaking culpable homicide without the special characteristics of murder is homicide not amounting to murder. The question whether an offence is homicide amounting to murder or not amounting to murder is always a vital one and many a time it created complicities and vexed the Courts Distinction has been brought out lucidly in the following comparisons quoted from 4th Edition of Law of Crimes by Justice Raghavan. Differences between Sections 299 and 300, I.P.C. Section 299 Section 300 (Subject to certain exceptions) 17. It is argued in this case that the accused has no intention of committing the murder of the deceased. On the con¬trary, the learned counsel for the State submitted that this case is falling within the Clause-thirdly of Section 300. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 this question has been very lucidly dealt with by Justice Vivian Bose. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has at paragraph-12 observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S.300 “thirdly”. “First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above it sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above it sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Holding thus, the Apex Court went to observe as follows : “Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S.300 “thirdly”. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two) It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is suffi¬cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences, and they can only escape if it can be shown or reasonably deducted that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional xxx” 18. The Supreme Court in Budhi Lal v. State of Uttarakhand, (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 647 has observed about the three degrees of homicide. It is apt to quote. “This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of IPC culpa¬ble homicide is the genus and ‘murder’, its specie. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable’ homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable’ homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called,d ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the [gravest] from of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” 19. Applying the aforesaid principle to the case in hand, it is seen that in this case there are three injuries on the deceased on the face, neck and chin and the injuries were caused by a sharp cutting weapon and the first injury found on the neck, resulting in cutting of the jugular vessel has caused death. Thus, this case comes squarely within the four corners of “third¬ly” of Section 300, I.P.C. There were injuries on the deceased. The nature of injury has been established to be ante mortem and fatal. There is no suggestion that the injuries were inflicted accidentally or unintentionally. Moreover, the injury No.1 is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This being the factual position, it is held that the accused has the intention of causing bodily injury and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Thus the accused is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 20. Keeping all these factors in mind, this Court comes to the conclusion that the learned trial Court had a perspicuous view of evidence on record and correctly appreciated the evidence keeping in view the defence case suggested and has come to a just and proper conclusion. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. Thus, the appeal has no merit and as such it fails. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. Thus, the appeal has no merit and as such it fails. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. PRADIP MOHANTY, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.