( 1 ) HEARD Shri Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Km. Manisha Ambwani holding brief of Shri Navin Sinha learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. ( 2 ) BY this writ petition the petitioner who has been working as an Officer in the Bank (Middle Management Grade Scale-Ill) has challenged the punishment order dated 11. 8. 1986 and the orders rejecting the appeal and review as well as the order dated 21. 11. 1983 by which the petitioners recommendation regarding suitability for promotion were kept under the sealed cover. A mandamus has also been prayed for claiming a direction to the respondents to promote the petitioner w. e. f. 1. 8. 1982 to Senior Management Grade, Scale-IV with all consequential benefits. ( 3 ) BRIEF facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding the issues raised in the writ petition are: The petitioner joined the service of the State Bank of India in the year 1959. He was promoted to Staff Officer, Grade-Ill w. e. f. 1. 8. 1977. The next promotional post was the post of Senior Management Grade, Scale-IV. The petitioner was posted as Branch Manager, Deoria during the period 7. 8. 1981 to 9. 7. 1983. Certain complaints were received against the petitioner. A preliminary fact finding inquiry was conducted by the Bank and a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 25. 7. 1983 which was replied by the petitioner. The disciplinary authority being not satisfied with the reply took a decision on 10. 11. 1983 in writing for initiating major penalty proceeding against the petitioner in terms of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. The Departmental promotion Committee met on 21. 11. 1983 to consider the petitioner for promotion in Grade Scale-IV w. e. f. 1. 8. 1982, the recommendation regarding the petitioner were kept in the sealed cover. The petitioner was thereafter served with a charge-sheet dated 4. 4. 1984. The petitioner replied to the charges. Disciplinary proceedings were held and the Inquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report holding all the charges as mentioned in various paragraphs of statement of imputations of misconduct, except those mentioned in Para 1 (i) and 1 (ii) to be proved. A note was put up before the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority vide order dated 11. 8. Disciplinary proceedings were held and the Inquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report holding all the charges as mentioned in various paragraphs of statement of imputations of misconduct, except those mentioned in Para 1 (i) and 1 (ii) to be proved. A note was put up before the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority vide order dated 11. 8. 1986 awarded the penalty of reduction of 2 stages in the scale of pay of the petitioner. Petitioner filed an appeal against the said order which appeal was also rejected vide order dated 27. 8. 1991 by the appellate authority. Petitioner submitted a review petition. The review committee considered the review petition of the petitioner and vide it proceedings dated 8. 7. 1993 decided to reject the review petition. Petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid actions has come up before this Court by filing this writ petition praying for the following reliefs: (i) to issue a writ or certiorari, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of the case and quashing the impugned order of penalty dated. 11. 8. 1986 as contained in Annexure XII and the orders dated 27. 8. 1991 and 8. 7. 1993 passed on the petitioners appeal and Review Petition as contained in Annexure No. XIII and XVI respectively. (ii) to issue a writ or certiorari, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of the case and quashing the order dated 21. 11. 1983 (Annexure No. VII) in so far as it relates to the placing of the findings in regard to the suitability of the petitioner under sealed cover. (iii) to issue a writ or certiorari, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of the case and quashing the order dated 8. 4. 1988 as contained in (Annexure No. XXXIV ). (iv) to issue a writ of mandamus, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to promote the petitioner forthwith w. e. f. 1. 8. 1982 to Senior Management Grade, Scale-IV with all consequential benefits. ( 4 ) SHRI Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the sealed cover procedure adopted in the case of the petitioners promotion in Grade scale-IV was invalid since the charge-sheet was served to the petitioner on 4. 4. 1984 i. e. subsequent to adoption of sealed cover procedure. ( 4 ) SHRI Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the sealed cover procedure adopted in the case of the petitioners promotion in Grade scale-IV was invalid since the charge-sheet was served to the petitioner on 4. 4. 1984 i. e. subsequent to adoption of sealed cover procedure. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. K. V. Jankiraman and others, 1991 (4) SCC 109 Shri Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the enquiry against the petitioner can be treated to have been initiated only after service of the charge-sheet, hence there was no valid ground for adopting the sealed cover procedure for petitioners promotion on 21. 11. 1983 when the Departmental Promotion Committee met. He submits that the adoption of sealed cover procedure itself being illegal, petitioner is entitled for quashing the order dated 21. 11. 1983, insofar as it relates to placing the finding with regard to the suitability of the petitioner under the sealed cover. ( 5 ) SHRI Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the charges against the petitioner were with regard to release of various instalments of loans which was sanctioned to one Ram Gopal Goyal. Shri Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the loan was sanctioned much before the petitioner joined the Branch and the charges found proved on various counts were not sustainable. He further submitted that no charges pertaining to integrity and honesty stood proved, hence the petitioner was not liable for any penalty. Shri Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority v. H. C. Khurana, 1993 (3) SCC 196 and Bank of India and another v. Degala suryanarayana, 1999 (5) SCC 762 . ( 6 ) KM. Manisha Ambwani, holding brief of Shri Navin Sinha learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Bank did not commit any illegality in adopting the sealed cover procedure on 21. 11. 1983 since before that date the decision in writing has already been taken for holding a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. 11. 1983 since before that date the decision in writing has already been taken for holding a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. It is further contended that the action of the Bank was in accordance with the Banks circular pertaining to sealed cover procedure (As introduced w. e. f. March, 1983 ). Km Manisha Ambwani appearing for the respondents further contended that the order of disciplinary authority in writing for disciplinary proceedings is a sufficient ground for sealed cover procedure. Replying to the judgment in K. V. Jankiramans case (supra) it has been submitted that in the said case the Apex Court had considered the Office Memo dated 30. 1. 1982 and subsequent Office Memo dated 12/1/1988 and the judgment of the Apex Court was given in view of the specific procedure/provision provided in the said circular. ( 7 ) WE have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. ( 8 ) THE first submission of Shri Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to challenge to the sealed cover procedure adopted by the Bank on 21. 11. 1983. In view of the imposition of penalty in consequence to the disciplinary proceedings the sealed cover was not to be opened, hence Shri Prabodh Gaur learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the very adoption of the sealed cover procedure. ( 9 ) IN the present case, the disciplinary authority had although passed an order in writing on 10. 11. 1983 for initiating major penalty against the petitioner, but the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 4. 4. 1984, where as the departmental Promotion committee met on 21. 11. 1983. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to look into the relevant procedure applicable in the Bank for adoption of sealed cover procedure. In the counter affidavit filed by the Bank, the bank has brought on record the revised sealed cover procedure applicable in the bank as circulated by circular dated 18. 2. 1991, Annexure CA-1. In the circular dated 18. 2. 1991, the sealed cover procedure for all officers in the Bank in Junior management Grade Scale-1 to Senior Management Grade Scale-V as applicable w. e. f. 1. 3. 2. 1991, Annexure CA-1. In the circular dated 18. 2. 1991, the sealed cover procedure for all officers in the Bank in Junior management Grade Scale-1 to Senior Management Grade Scale-V as applicable w. e. f. 1. 3. 1983 has also been annexed as Anexure-Aand extract of the relevant part of the circular as contained in Anexure A is as follows: " (i) The procedure is applicable in respect of promotions to the next higher grade/scale and confirmation in the banks service to the following cases of officers in JMG Scale-I to SMG Scale-V: (a) Officers against whom disciplinary proceedings have been ordered and/or where a prima facie disciplinary case is in existence in the option of the Disciplinary Authority and an order to this effect has been recorded in writing (in this context kindly refer to paragraph-V, below ). (b) Officers against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and are in progress/pending and/or prosecution has been launched in a Court of Law, and (c) Officers who have been placed under suspension. (iv) (a) Where the departmental proceedings have ended with imposition of a minor penalty viz. censure, recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the bank, withholding of increments of pay or withholding of promotion, the decision of the Promoting Authority, in favour of the employees, kept in the sealed cover is not to be given effect to. (Prior to introduction of sealed cover procedure, Officers punished on the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings were not considered during the period of the penalty i. e. during the period of rigour. This practice is still being followed.) (b) In the case of imposition of major penalties, all sealed covers are rendered infructuous. (c) Insofar as the confirmation of an officer in similar circumstances is concerned, the Competent Authority is required to review the case for confirmation immediately after conclusing of the disciplinary proceedings and if the findings held in sealed cover are in favour of the officer, he will be confirmed in the relative grade or scale from a prospective date, subject to the provisions of Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service Order, 1979. (v) In respect of officers whose conduct is under investigation or in contemplation of such investigation either departmentally or by outside agencies, the sealed cover procedure is applied only after the conclusion of the investigation and where the Competent Authority on consideration of the report of the investigation has formed the opinion and has recorded his orders to the effect that the officer is to be charge-sheeted for departmental action or a decision is taken and recorded by the Competent Authority to permit prosecution when such prosecution is proposed. Until the Competent Authority arrives at such a decision and records his orders in writing, the officer is treated at par with others in the matter of consideration for promotion and confirmation. " ( 10 ) THE above circular clearly indicates that the ground of disciplinary proceedings having been initiated and are in progress/pending is a separate ground to one as contained in para i (a ). Para i (a) uses the word "an order to this effect has been recorded in writing. " Thus, an order in writing ordering disciplinary proceedings is a separate ground for keeping the proceedings in a sealed cover. ( 11 ) APART from that the petitioner was punished in the disciplinary proceedings on 11. 8. 1986 we have also noticed that petitioner even after his punishment was considered for promotion in the Grade-IV in 1989 to 1995, but he could not be found suitable for promotion since he failed to achieve the cut of marks. ( 12 ) IN the supplementary counter affidavit, the order dated 10. 11. 1983 in paragraph 3 has been quoted which is to the following effect : "the allegation of bribery was not found substantiated, but keeping in view the serious lapses of wilful negligence on the part of Sri Sarbhai and the resultant loss, the Bank has been put to, I am of the considered opinion that the major penalty proceedings be initiated against Shri Sarabhai in terms of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. " ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the Government of India office Memo dated 30. 1. 1982 in K. V. Jankiramans case (supra ). The Supreme court considered the question as to when for the purpose of sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to have been commenced. " ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the Government of India office Memo dated 30. 1. 1982 in K. V. Jankiramans case (supra ). The Supreme court considered the question as to when for the purpose of sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to have been commenced. Following was laid down in paragraph 16 of the said judgment which is quoted below: "16. On the first question, viz. , as to when for the purposes of the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to have commenced, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to prepare and issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the purity of administration to reward the employee with a promotion, increment etc. does not impress us. The acceptance of this contention would result in injustice to the employees in many cases. As has been the experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordinarily it should not take much time to collect the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a, remedy. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a, remedy. " ( 14 ) THE view of the Full Bench of the Tribunal that it is only when a charge memo in a disciplinary proceedings or charge sheet in the criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that a departmental proceedings/ criminal proceedings is initiated against the employee has been approved by the apex Court in the above case. ( 15 ) IN Delhi Development Authority (supra) the judgment of K. V. Jankiramans case was noticed and explained. In paragraph 8 of the judgment it was held that on a decision being taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings the guidelines attract the sealed cover procedure. Following was laid down in paragraphs 7,8 and 9 which are quoted below: "7. Before we refer to Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010 , we may advert to clause (ii) of para 2 of 0. M. dated 12-1 -1988 which was the guideline applicable at the material time, in the present case, and is as under: " (ii) Government servants in respect of whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings;" (Emphasis supplied)8. These words clearly indicate that the, sealed cover procedure was applicable, in cases where the disciplinary proceedings are pending in respect of the Government servant; or a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Thus, on a decision being taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the guidelines attract the sealed cover procedure. The reason is obvious. Where a decision has been taken to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant, his promotion, even if he is found otherwise suitable, would be incongruous, because a Government servant under such a cloud should not be promoted till he is cleared of the allegations against him, into which an inquiry has to be made according to the decision taken. In such a situation, the correctness of the allegation being dependent on the final outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, it would not be fair to exclude him from consideration for promotion till conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, even though it would be improper to promote him, if found otherwise suitable, unless exonerated. To reconcile these conflicting interests, of the government servant and public administration, the only fair and just course is, to consider his case for promotion and to determine if he is otherwise suitable for promotion, and keep the result in abeyance in sealed cover to be implemented on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings; and in case he is exonerated therein, to promote him with all consequential benefits, if found otherwise suitable by the Selection Committee. On the other hand, giving him promotion after taking the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, would be incongruous and against public policy and principles of good administration. This is the rationale behind the guideline to follow the sealed cover procedure in such cases, to prevent the possibility of any injustice or arbitrariness. 9. The question now, is: What is the stage, when it can be said, that a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings? We have no doubt that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot be subsequent to the issuance of the charge-sheet, since issue of the charge-sheet is a consequence of the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Framing the charge-sheet, is the first step taken for holding the enquiry into the allegations, on the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The charge-sheet is framed on the basis of the allegations made against the government servant; the charge-sheet is then served on him to enable him to give his explanation; if the explanation is satisfactory, the proceedings are closed, otherwise, an enquiry is held into the charges; if the charges are not proved, the proceedings are closed and the Government servant exonerated; but if the charges are proved, the penalty follows. Thus, the, service of the charge-sheet on the Government servant follows the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and it does not precede or coincide with that decision. Thus, the, service of the charge-sheet on the Government servant follows the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and it does not precede or coincide with that decision. The delay, if any, in service of the charge-sheet to the Government servant, after it has been framed and despatched, does not have the effect of delaying initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, inasmuch as information, to the Government servant of the charges framed against him, by service of the charge-sheet, is not a part of the decision-making process of the authorities for initiating the disciplinary proceedings. " ( 16 ) THE Apex Court in the case of Bank of India and another (supra) followed the judgment of Apex Court in Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman (supra ). ( 17 ) IN the case of Bank of India, the employee was considered for promotion w. e. f. 1. 1. 1986 and was found fit for promotion, the finding of the Departmental promotion Committee was not being given effect to on account of the pendency of the criminal cases which subsequently ended in acquittal of the respondents. Following was laid down in paragraph 14 of the judgment : "14. However, the matter as to promotion stands on a different footing and the judgments of the High Court have to be sustained. The sealed cover procedure is now a well established concept in service jurisprudence. The procedure is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him and hence the findings as to his entitlement to the service benefit of promotion, increment etc. are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over (see Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010 , 2113 : 1991 AIR SCW 2276 : 1991 Lab IC 2045 ). As on 1. 1. 1986 the only proceedings pending against the respondent were the criminal proceedings which ended into acquittal of the respondent wiping out with retrospective effect the adverse consequences, if any, flowing from the pendency thereof. The departmental enquiry proceedings were initiated with the delivery of the charge-sheet on 3. 12. 1991. In the year 1986-87 when the respondent became due for promotion and when the promotion committee held its proceedings, there were no departmental enquiry proceedings pending against the respondent. The departmental enquiry proceedings were initiated with the delivery of the charge-sheet on 3. 12. 1991. In the year 1986-87 when the respondent became due for promotion and when the promotion committee held its proceedings, there were no departmental enquiry proceedings pending against the respondent. The sealed cover procedure could not have been resorted to nor could the promotion in the year 1986-87 withheld for the D. E. proceedings initiated at the fag end of the year 1991. The High Court was therefore right in directing the promotion to be given effect to which the respondent was found entitled as on 1. 1. 1986. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of punishment made in the year 1995 cannot deprive the respondent of the benefit of the promotion earned on 1. 1. 1986. " ( 18 ) A three judge Bench had an occasion to consider the entire issue again in union of India and another v. R. S. Sharma, 2000 (4) SCC 394 . ( 19 ) IN the above case, the Apex Court was considering the office memo dated 12/1/1988 as amended on 31/7/1991. Referring to the ratio laid down in K. V. Jankiramanss case following was laid down in paragraphs 16 and 17 which is quoted below: "16. Learned counsel for the respondent made an endeavourto contend that in the light of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. K. V. Janakiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109 : 1991 AIR SCW 2276 : AIR 1991 SC 2010 : 1991 Lab IC 2045 the Sealed Cover Procedure can be resorted to only after charge Memo is received or a charge-sheet is filed and that unless such an event had happened at the relevant time the Government employee cannot be denied of his promotion, if he is otherwise entitled to it. Learned counsel also submitted that Janakiraman was since followed in Union of India v. Dr. Sudha Salhan, (1998) 3 SCC 394 : 1998 Alr SCW 884 : Alr 1998 SC 1094 : 1998 Lab IC 957; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 Alr SCW 2529 : Alr 1999 SC 2407 :1999 Lab IC 2819. The clauses of second paragraph of the Sealed Cover Procedure considered in Janakiraman were not those involved in the present case and hence that decision is of no avail to the respondent. The clauses of second paragraph of the Sealed Cover Procedure considered in Janakiraman were not those involved in the present case and hence that decision is of no avail to the respondent. In the other two decisions the facts warranted application of the ratio contained in Janakiraman. The added factor in these two cases was that the public servant concerned had been exonerated of the charges framed by the criminal Courts. In the present case the respondent is still facing the trial for serious offences, and hence the situation is different. 17. We may also point out, in this context, that in Delhi Development authority v. H. C. Khurana, (1993) 2 JT (SC) 695 : (1993 AIR SCW 1417 : AIR 1993 SC 1488 : 1993 Lab IC 1143) and Union of India v. Kewal Kumar, (1993)JT (2) (SC) 705 : (1993 AIR SCW 1737 : AIR 1993 SC 1585 : 1993 Lab IC 1317) this Court found that the ratio in Janakiraman (1991 AIR SCW 2276 : air 1991 SC 2010 : 1999 Lab IC 2045) is applicable only to the situations similar to the cases discussed therein, and hence the Sealed Cover Procedure resorted to by the DPC in those two cases was upheld by this Court. " ( 20 ) AGAIN the Apex Court considered the sealed cover procedure in Union of ha and others v. Sangram Keshan Nayak, 2007 (6) SCC 704 circular letter ted 21. 1. 1993 came up for consideration. After review of all its earlier judgments, lowing was laid down in paragraphs 16 and 18 which is quoted below: "16. Serious allegations of financial misdemeanours were made against the respondent therein. Central Bureau of Investigation took up investigation. He was suspended on 10. 3. 1988. Although the said order of suspension was revoked, investigation continued. The DPC considered his case for promotion on 3. 04. 1991 and resorted to sealed cover procedure. Only in the aforementioned situation, K. V. Janakiraman (supra) and other decisions following the same stood distinguished opining that paragraph 7 of the said office memorandum would be attracted, which is in the following terms: "sealed cover applicable to an officer coming under cloud before promotion. 04. 1991 and resorted to sealed cover procedure. Only in the aforementioned situation, K. V. Janakiraman (supra) and other decisions following the same stood distinguished opining that paragraph 7 of the said office memorandum would be attracted, which is in the following terms: "sealed cover applicable to an officer coming under cloud before promotion. A government servant, who is recommended for promotion by the Departmental promotion Committee but in whose case any of the circumstances mentioned in para 2 above arise after the recommendations of DPC are received but before he is actually promoted, will be considered as if his case had been placed in a sealed cover by DPC. He shall not be promoted until he is completely exonerated of the charges against him and the provisions contained in this OM will be applicable in his case also. " it was held: "one is that, what the Department did not do is not the yardstick indicated in para 7 of the Sealed Cover Procedure, what is mentioned therein is that it cannot apply to the government servant who is not "actually promoted" by that time. Second is that, the stand taken up by the Department is that in spite of deletion of clause (iv) of the second para, the recommendations of dpc must remain in the sealed cover on account of the conditions specified in clause (iii) of the said paragraph by virtue of the operation of para 7 thereof. We cannot say that the said stand was incorrect and, therefore, we are unable to blame the Department for not opening the sealed cover immediately after 31-7-1991. " 18. In H. C. Khurana (supra), the question was as to what would be the meaning of the word issued when a disciplinary proceeding had been initiated by framing, the chargesheet and the same had been despatched. Paragraph 2 of the circular letter in question was similar to the case of R. S. Sharma (supra ). It is in that context, what would be the meaning of the word issued when the decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceeding came up for consideration. As the circular contained a provision of that nature which is absent in the present case, the said decision, in our opinion, also has no application in the instant case. It is in that context, what would be the meaning of the word issued when the decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceeding came up for consideration. As the circular contained a provision of that nature which is absent in the present case, the said decision, in our opinion, also has no application in the instant case. " ( 21 ) FROM the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above case, it is clear that the terms and conditions as incorporated in different circulars has bearing on the adoption of sealed cover procedure. In Union of India and others v. Sangram keshan Nayak. (supra) the Apex Court distinguished the decisions of H. C. Khurana and R. S. Sharma holding that the circulars contained in the aforesaid cases is absent in the case in hand have the decisions were distinguishable. Thus, for taking decisions for adopting the sealed cover procedure, relevant provisions/ circulars regulating the procedure has to be looked into which shall be decisive of the issue. ( 22 ) IN the present case, as noticed above, we are considering the adoption of sealed cover procedure of State Bank of India. The procedure as applicable for adoption of Sealed cover procedure of SBI w. e. f. March, 1983 has been extracted above. There is a separate and independent ground for adoption of sealed cover procedure applicable with the SBI i. e. ground i (a) which contains a ground that when disciplinary proceedings have been ordered against an officer and an order to this effect has been recorded in writing. ( 23 ) IN the present case, in the supplementary counter affidavit order dated 10. 11. 1983 where decision to hold disciplinary authority was recorded in writing has been brought on record. Thus, we find no illegality in the Departmental promotional Committee keeping the petitioners recommendation in the sealed cover on 21. 11. 1983 when the petitioners case for promotion was considered. ( 24 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion the first submission of the petitioner that adoption of sealed cover procedure was illegal cannot be accepted. ( 25 ) NOW comes the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the disciplinary proceedings on merit. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the loan was sanctioned by Varanasi Zonal Office prior to petitioners posting at Deoria. ( 25 ) NOW comes the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the disciplinary proceedings on merit. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the loan was sanctioned by Varanasi Zonal Office prior to petitioners posting at Deoria. The loan was disbursed under the authority of the petitioner. ( 26 ) CHARGE No. 1 (i) and Charge No. 1 (ii) were not found proved by the Inquiry officer. Charge No. 1 (iii) to Charge 1 (xi) were found proved. Charge No. 2 was also proved. The Inquiry Officer while considering the each respective charges has relied on the documents produced by the Presenting Officer and other materials on the record. The finding of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer cannot be said to be without any basis nor it can be said to be perverse. Charges 1 (iii) to 1 (xi) and Charge 2 were as follows: "1 (iii) He did not obtain equitable mortgage of the properties of sufficient value to secure the loan. The title deeds in respect of the house belonging to s/shri Ram Gopal Goyal and Ram Avtar Goyal were accepted without assessing its value and without obtaining the lawyers report to ensure that the owners possess clear and marketable title. 1 (iv)He did not ensure investment of Rs. 2,67,000/- being the land owners equity in the project before permitting the first withdrawal of Rs. 25,000/- on 24. 11. 81, that too without specific request 1 (v) He released a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 11. 12. 81 without any request from the land owners and allowed the proceeds to be transferred to Savings bank A/c. No. 10911 of Shri Ram Gopal Goyal; thus he did not ensure the end-use of the loan amount. 1 (vi) He disbursed a sum of Rs. 1 lac on 6. 1. 82 at the request of the land owners for purchase of 2 truck loads of timber and one truck load of iron bars, without ascertaining the need of those items at that stage. He also did not ensure even subsequently that these items of construction were actually purchased. 1 (vii) Without ensuring the end-use of Rs. 1 lac disbursed on 6. 1. 82, Shri sarebahi allowed another withdrawal of Rs. 1 lac for purchase of iron bars on 2. 2. 82 by issuing 2 bank drafts Nos. 036006 and 036007 of Rs. He also did not ensure even subsequently that these items of construction were actually purchased. 1 (vii) Without ensuring the end-use of Rs. 1 lac disbursed on 6. 1. 82, Shri sarebahi allowed another withdrawal of Rs. 1 lac for purchase of iron bars on 2. 2. 82 by issuing 2 bank drafts Nos. 036006 and 036007 of Rs. 50,000/- each, drawn on Kanpur and Lucknow respectively, in favour of Shri Ram Gopal goyal. Here again, he did not ensure the end-use of funds in as much as one of the 2 drafts viz. 036007 was allowed to be paid in cash by cancellation on 10. 2. 82. 1 (viii) The land-owners had sought a sum of Rs. 1 lac on 24. 2. 82 for purchase of 140 tonnes of cement allotted by district authorities which was disbursed by Shri Sarebahi on the same day but he did not ensure that the cement under the aforesaid allotment order was actually purchased and used in the construction of the Banks building. It was subsequently revealed that cement was not in fact purchased and the Banks funds were diverted. 1 (ix) The land owners had advised the Branch Manager on 24. 2. 82 that they had invested a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- in the project till that day whereas the total disbursement of the loan also amount to Rs. 3,75,000/ -. Thus knowing full well that they had not investd any amount of their own, he allowed further withdrawal aggregating Rs. 1,20,000/- to the borrowers subsequently violating the initial instructions issued to him by the Regional Office. 1 (x) He permitted from the building loan account payment of a cheque no. BH/25/752402 for Rs. 1,108/- dated 27. 11. 81 issued by Shri Ram Gopal goyal in favour of National Insurance Consolidation Officer this was in no way connected with the construction of the Banks building. 1 (xi) He did not report the progress of construction to the controlling authority until 8. 5. 82 by which time a loan of Rs. 4,96,108/- had already been disbursed to the borrowers. This was in flagrant violation of the instructions contained in the sub-paragraph (2) (ii)- (2) of Varanasi Regional Office special letter No. 18/1673 dated 10. 11. 81 requiring him to advise the progress at fortnightly intervals. 2. 5. 82 by which time a loan of Rs. 4,96,108/- had already been disbursed to the borrowers. This was in flagrant violation of the instructions contained in the sub-paragraph (2) (ii)- (2) of Varanasi Regional Office special letter No. 18/1673 dated 10. 11. 81 requiring him to advise the progress at fortnightly intervals. 2. He did not carry out periodical inspection of the stocks held in the banks godowns during his entire period of stay at the Branch in contravention of the instructions contained in codified Circular SSI/8 of 1977, as a result shortages in the following godowns could not be detected and timely action initiated: (i) M/s J. K. Industrial Corporation. (ii) M/s Bharat Electricals (iii) M/s Natraj Engineering Works (iv) M/s Sanjay Metal Works. " ( 27 ) THE Disciplinary Authority concurred with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and decided to punish the appellant by reduction of two stages in the scale. The appellate authority passed a detailed order considering all the submissions raised in the appeal. The appellate order is a detailed order. No error of procedure or violation of any statutory provision has been pointed out by the petitioner in the inquiry proceedings. The charges having been found proved by the Inquiry Officer the petitioner has been punished accordingly. ( 28 ) SCOPE of judicial review in the disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The Apex Court in State Bank of India and others v. Samarendra Kishore Endow and another, 1994 (2) SCC 537 , had an occasion to consider the scope of judicial review by the High Court of disciplinary proceedings. The Apex Court held that the tribunal or the High Court shall not interfere with the disciplinary matters like an appellate authority. Following was laid down in paragraphs 11 and 12 which are quoted below: "11. Now, coming to the power of the Court exercising judicial review to interfere on the question of penalty, it was held by Constitution Bench in state of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra thus: "but the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were unassilable, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the inquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. " This principle was reiterated in Raiway Board, Delhi v. Niranjan Singh. The same view was reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Parma Nanda. It was an appeal from the judgment and order of an Administrative Tribunal. K. Jagannatha shetty, J speaking for the Bench observed in the first instance that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ proceeding and then dealt with the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned Judge referred to the holding in State of orissa v. Bidyabhushan Moihapatra (quoted by us hereinabove) and after referring to several other judgment of this Court, concluded thus:"we must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an inquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. " 12. It is significant to mention that the learned Judge also referred to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of H. P and held, on a consideration of the facts and principle thereof, that, "this decision is, therefore, no authority for the proposition that the High Court or the Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. " And then added significantly "it may be noted that this Court exercised the equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 (in Bhagat Ram) and the High Court and Tribunal has no such power or jurisdiction". The learned Judge also quoted with approval the observations of Mathew, J in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur to the following effect:"now it is settled by the decision of this Court in Sfafe of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra that if the order of apunishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established. " ( 29 ) WE have perused the inquiry report, the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. The punishment of reduction of two stages below have been imposed by the disciplinary authority on proved charges. There is no error in procedure or conduction of the inquiry. The finding recorded by the Inquiry officer cannot be said to be based on no evidence or perverse. No ground has been made out to interfere with the punishment order. ( 30 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, no case has been made out by the petitioner for grant of any relief in this writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. .