ORDER Sri Ourga Malleswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam at Vijayawada (for short 'the Devasthanam') is one of the ancient and most important shrines in the State of Andhra Pradesh. As in the case of any other important religious institutions, the Devasthanam is endowed with vast extent of movable and immovable properties. Two such items are Ac.8.22 cents in KS.No.76 of Mogalrajpuram, Vijayawada Town (first bit) and Ac.5.98 cents in R.S.No.17 of Patamata, Vijayawada Town (second bit), (for short 'the lands’). The lands were under lease in favour of certain individuals. The' provisions of the A.P (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act were being applied to the lands held by religious institutions also, in case they were given on lease. 2. The income from the lands towards lease or maktha was meagre. The Devasthanam was finding it difficult to evict the tenants. At that stage, the petitioner herein, an educational society, stepped in. It appears that the petitioner negotiated and made efforts for eviction of the then tenants with the consent of the Devasthanam and to get the lands leased in its favour. 3. Various aspects relating to the religious institutions were governed by the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short 'the 1951 Act.), till it was repealed through A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (for short 'the 1966 Act'). According to the relevant provisions of the 1951 Act and the Rules made under that Act, in exercise of power under Section 102 thereof (for short 'the Rules'), permission of the Government was necessary, and certain restrictions were imposed for grant of leases beyond three years. Though the 1951 Act was repeated through the 1966 Act, no corresponding Rules were framed under the 1966 Act, particularly in relation to administration of immovable properties. By operation of sub-section (2) of Section 100 of the 1966 Act, the Rules made under the 1951 Act, to the extent they are not inconsistent, are treated as if they are made under 1966 Act. 4. The petitioner was granted lease over the lands, initially for a period of three years, in the year 1975, for establishment of educational institutions. It appears that, difficulties were found in extending the lease, beyond the period of three years. 4. The petitioner was granted lease over the lands, initially for a period of three years, in the year 1975, for establishment of educational institutions. It appears that, difficulties were found in extending the lease, beyond the period of three years. The Commissioner of Endowments, the 2nd respondent herein, addressed letter dated 27-12-1977 to the Government, the 1st respondent, with a request to exempt the lands from the operation of the Rules. The Government acceded to the request and issued two separate Orders, viz., G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, Revenue (Endowments-1) Department, dated 02-02-1978, in respect of two bits of land. The G.Os provided for grant of lease for a period of 50 years, renewable thereafter. The rent for the first bit of land was fixed at Rs. 7,500/- and for the second bit, it was stipulated at Rs. 6,000/-; per annum. Enhancement of Rs. 1,000/- per year was provided for, after expiry of a span of every ten years. 5. The petitioner states that it has constructed buildings for establishment of degree colleges, etc., in the lands, and that the institutions are admitted to grant-in-aid by the Government. 6. About a decade after the leases commenced, the A.P. State Legislature enacted the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short 'the Act'), in the place of the 1966 Act. Section 82 of the Act brought about a statutory termination of leases, in respect of agricultural lands held by Hindu Religious Institutions. In Samadhi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1) 1990 (1) ALT 237 (D.B), a Division Bench of this Court held that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 82 of the Act, in so far as it brings about statutory termination of leases are void and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That judgment became the subject-matter of a Civil Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of A.P. v. Nallamilli Rami Reddy (2) AIR 2001 SC 3616 . The judgment of the High Court was reversed. It was held that Andhra Area Tenancy Act does not apply to the lands held by Hindu Religious Institutions. 7. The Vigilance Wing of the Endowments Department verified the records of the Devasthanam, with special reference to the revenue derived from the properties leased by it. The judgment of the High Court was reversed. It was held that Andhra Area Tenancy Act does not apply to the lands held by Hindu Religious Institutions. 7. The Vigilance Wing of the Endowments Department verified the records of the Devasthanam, with special reference to the revenue derived from the properties leased by it. The income derived from the two bits of land was found to be too meagre and the loss of revenue to the Devasthanam was estimated at Rs. 7.42 crores. It was pointed out that the lands are being put to commercial use also. Thereafter, consultations and correspondence ensued among various authorities of the Government. A joint meeting was held on 27-04-2003 with the participation of the District Revenue Authorities, the officials of the Devasthanam and representatives of the petitioner. A request made for enhancement of the lease was turned down by the petitioner. 8. In view of this development, the 151 respondent has decided to cancel the orders issued in G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978, and to take necessary steps under the Act. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent issued a show cause notice dated 23-03-2005 to the petitioner, directing it to explain as to why G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978 be not cancelled, and why the possession of the land be not resumed to the Devasthanam. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply, raising several legal and factual grounds. The 151 respondent considered the reply, and not being satisfied with the same, it issued G.O.Ms.No.412, Revenue (Endowments-IV) Department, dated 01-04-2006, cancelling the orders in G.O.Ms. Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978. The 2nd respondent was directed to take necessary action. Writ Petition No.20953 of 2006 is filed assailing G.O.Ms.No.412, dated 01-04-2006. 9. After the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.412, dated 01-04-2006, the Devasthanam initiated proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Kakinada under Section 83 of the Act for eviction of the petitioner. They were taken up as O.A.Nos.33 and 34 of 2006. The petitioner opposed the same. Through separate, but similar orders dated 26-03-2007, the Deputy Commissioner held that the petitioner is encroacher in respect of the two properties and directed its eviction. Writ Petition Nos. 10328 and 10332 of 2007 are filed against the two orders. 10. They were taken up as O.A.Nos.33 and 34 of 2006. The petitioner opposed the same. Through separate, but similar orders dated 26-03-2007, the Deputy Commissioner held that the petitioner is encroacher in respect of the two properties and directed its eviction. Writ Petition Nos. 10328 and 10332 of 2007 are filed against the two orders. 10. The petitioner contends that the lease in its favour was granted strictly in accordance with law, and the respondents have no right to terminate or alter the same, till the contracted period thereof, expires. It is also stated that the lands were put to non-agricultural use, with the consent of both the parties, and Section 82 of the Act has no application to the leases. The further contention of the petitioner is that the educational institutions are being run on a non-profitable basis, and eviction of the petitioner would adversely affect the interests of thousands of students and hundreds of staff members associated with the institutions. 11. On behalf of the respondents, counter-affidavits are filed, referring to each and every step relating to the grant of lease in favour of the petitioner, and the subsequent cancellation thereof. According to them, irrespective of the circumstances under which a lease in respect of an agricultural land, held by Hindu Religious Institutions came to be granted, and irrespective of the duration of such leases, all of them stand cancelled and terminated by operation of Section 82 of the Act. It is pleaded that even where a lease is otherwise valid, legal and is in the interest of the institution, the inescapable conclusion is that it gets cancelled through a legislative act, and neither party has any right to keep it alive, except through the process of granting a fresh lease, in accordance with law. The respondents have also pointed out the extent of loss incurred by the Devasthanam and the reluctance on the part of the petitioner to be realistic and practical. 12. Sri C. Kondanda Ram, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that ever since the inception of lease in favour of the petitioner in the year 1975, there existed a consensus ad idem, as regards these, to which the lands have to be put, and both the parties agreed that it is only for nonagricultural purpose. 12. Sri C. Kondanda Ram, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that ever since the inception of lease in favour of the petitioner in the year 1975, there existed a consensus ad idem, as regards these, to which the lands have to be put, and both the parties agreed that it is only for nonagricultural purpose. By referring to the relevant provisions of the 1951 Act, the Rules made thereunder, the 1966 Act, and ultimately, the Act, the learned Senior Counsel contends that, at no point of time there existed any illegality in the matter of granting leases to the petitioner, and that G.O.Ms.Nos. 285 and 286, date 02-02-1978 have lost their relevance, once the leases were granted. On this basis, learned counsel submits that mere cancellation of two GOs at this length of time does not entail any legal consequences. According to him, the subject-matter of the leases in favour of the petitioner gets attracted by sub-section (4) of Section 82 of the Act, and that the provision guarantees the continuation of leases, till the expiry of the period, mentioned in the lease deeds. 13. Learned Senior Counsel has also referred to the background in which Section 82 of the Act came to be legislated and contends that it was never the intention of the Legislature to terminate nonagricultural leases. He has placed reliance upon several decided cases, in support of his contentions. 14. Learned Government Pleader for Endowments, and learned Standing Counsel for the Devasthanam submit that the land that was leased to the petitioner was purely agricultural in nature, and that the mere fact that it was put to a different use does not change the character. They contend that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 82 of the Act unequivocally bring about a statutory termination of leases, in respect of agricultural lands and thereby, the lease in favour of the petitioner stood terminated. They further plead that the Devasthanam is put to loss of income to the tune of several crores, on account of the paltry sum being paid by the petitioner, even though, part of the property was put to commercial use. They submit that the very issuance of G.O.Ms. Nos.285 and 286, in the year 1978, was not at all in the interest of the Devasthanam, and that remedial steps were taken in accordance with law. They submit that the very issuance of G.O.Ms. Nos.285 and 286, in the year 1978, was not at all in the interest of the Devasthanam, and that remedial steps were taken in accordance with law. Learned counsel further plead that the procedure prescribed by law was meticulously followed and that the impugned proceedings do not warrant any interference. 15. The background of the case, in brief, has been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Two items of land, referred to above, were under leases in favour of agriculturists, for quite some time. By 1975, the administration and management of the Hindu Religious Institutions was governed by the provisions of the 1966 Act. Section 70 of that Act dealt with the transfer of immovable properties held by the charitable institutions. The provision reads as under: "Sec.70 (1): Any lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift, sale, exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for the support or maintenance of a charitable or religious institution or endowment or for the performance of a religious or public charity or service, shall be null and void unless any such transaction, not being a gift is effected with the prior sanction of the Government. (2) Such prior sanction may be accorded by the Government where they consider that the transaction is- (i) necessary or beneficial to the institution or endowment, (ii) consistent with the objects of the institution or endowment, and (iii) the consideration therefor is reasonable and proper. (3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any inam land in the Andhra area of the State". 16. Inam lands were dealt with under Section 71. No Rules were framed under the 1966 Act, particularly as regards grant of leases. By operation of Section 109 (2), of that Act, the Rules made thereunder, the 1951 Act continued to apply, notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act. By legal presumption, the Rules under the 1951 Act were deemed to have been framed under the 1966 Act. 17. In this context, it becomes necessary to refer to the purport of the Rules framed under the 1951 Act. Section 29 of the 1951 Act maintains a dichotomy between the alienation of immovable trust properties, on the one hand, and immovable properties endowed for performance of charity and service, on the other hand. 17. In this context, it becomes necessary to refer to the purport of the Rules framed under the 1951 Act. Section 29 of the 1951 Act maintains a dichotomy between the alienation of immovable trust properties, on the one hand, and immovable properties endowed for performance of charity and service, on the other hand. The former was dealt with under Section 29, and the latter under Section 35. For lease of the properties, covered by Section 29, exceeding five years, prior sanction of the Commissioner was mandatory, whereas any kind of transfer whatever, for the properties endowed for performance of the charity and service confirmed by the Government was declared as null and void. 18. The Government framed Rules for effective implementation of Section 29(1) and (3) of that Act. A detailed procedure was prescribed before a lease is granted. This included publication of notices, inviting objections. The ultimate power rested with the Commissioner. 19. After the then existing tenants over the land were evicted, the petitioner approached the Devasthanam for grant of long lease in respect of the lands, in the year 1975. Initially, the lease was sanctioned for three years. The Commissioner addressed letter dated 27-12-1977 to the Government with a request to approve the proposal for leasing out the lands, duly indicating the conditions of lease. On a consideration of the proposal, Government issued G.O.Ms. No.285, Revenue, Endowments Department, dated 02-02-1978. The operative portion reads as under: "In exercise of the powers conferred under section 108 read with section 109 of the Andhra Pradesh Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1966 (Act 17 of 1966) the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby exempts Sri Durga Malleswara Swamy Devasthanams, Vijayawada from the operation of the lease rules framed under Section 100 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 so as to enable the said Devasthanam, to lease out an extent of Ac.8.22 cents in R.S.No.761, Moghalrajpuram, Vijayawada in question in favour of the Academy of General and Technical Education, Vijayawada for a period of 50 years as resolved by the Board of Trustees of the subject Devasthanam in its resolution No.3, dt.03-11-1977 subject to the conditions specified by the Government in this behalf". 20. G.O.Ms.No.286, was issued in relation to the other bit of land. Reference in the notification to Section 109 of the Act appears to be out of context. 20. G.O.Ms.No.286, was issued in relation to the other bit of land. Reference in the notification to Section 109 of the Act appears to be out of context. Sections 108 and 109 of the 1966 Act read as under: "See.108: The Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, exempt from the operation of any of the provisions of this Act or any of the rules made thereunder. (a) any charitable institution or endowment the administration of which is for the time being vested. (i) in the Government either directly or through a committee or Treasurer of Endowments, appointed for the purpose; or (ii) In the Official Trustee or in the Administrator-General; or (b) any charitable institution or endowment founded for education purposes; or (c) any religious institution or endowment; any may likewise vary or cancel such exemption. Sect.109: (1) The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Wakf Regulation, 1349 Fasli are hereby repealed. Sect.109: (1) The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Wakf Regulation, 1349 Fasli are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal- (a) all rules made, notifications or certificates issued, orders passed, decisions made, proceedings taken, and other things done by any authority or officer under the repeated Act or Regulation as the case may be, shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act be deemed to have been made, issued, passed, taken, or done by the appropriate authority or officer under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall have effect accordingly until they are modified, cancelled or superseded under the provisions of this Act: (b) all powers conferred and all duties imposed by any scheme in force before the commencement of this Act on any court or judge or any other person or body of persons, not being a trustee, an honourary officer or servant of the charitable or religious institution or endowment shall be exercised and discharged by the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Act: (c) all proceedings pending before the Government any officer or authority, or a trustee under the provisions of the repealed Act or Regulation at the commencement of this Act may, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be continued by the appropriate authority under this Act; (d) any remedy by way of right of application, suit, or appeal which is provided by this Act; shall be available in respect of proceedings under the repealed Act or Regulation pending at the commencement of this Act, as if the proceedings in respect of which the remedy is sought had been instituted under this Act. (3) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Sections 8 and 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891, with regard to the effect of repeals". 21. Be that as it may, the purport of G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978 is only to exempt the two bits of land, mentioned therein, from the operation of the lease Rules made under 1951 Act. 21. Be that as it may, the purport of G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978 is only to exempt the two bits of land, mentioned therein, from the operation of the lease Rules made under 1951 Act. It has already been mentioned that the approval of the Commissioner for granting lease of endowed lands beyond five years was necessary and the Rules of 1951 prescribe a detailed procedure. It becomes debatable as to whether it was competent for the Commissioner, at all, to submit proposals to the Government even before the Devasthanam was exempted from the operation of the Rules. Equally debatable is the exercise undertaken by the Government in according approval under the 1966 Act, and exempting the Devasthanam from the operation of 1951 Rules, later, or at least simultaneously. 22. The fact however remains that the lease deeds were executed in favour of the petitioner, on 6-12-1978, to be in force for 50 years, and it became operational. 23. The State Government appointed a Committee headed by a Former Chief Justice of this High Court, to suggest changes in the law relating to the Hindu Religious Institutions, with a view to strengthen them. The committee undertook a detailed exercise and submitted a report. It was opined that the tenants of agricultural lands belonging to Hindu Religious Institutions were taking shelter under the provisions of the A.P (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, and it became just impossible for the Institutions to recover the lands, which were leased out decades ago, at paltry rents. The matter of serious concern, which attracted the attention of the committee was, the inability of the institutions to recover the lands owned by them from the hands of the lessees. Changes were also suggested on various other aspects. It was in this background, that the Act came to be enacted in the place of the 1966 Act. An important provision incorporated in the new enactment is Section 82. It reads asunder: "Sec.82: (1) Any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given or endowed or the purpose of any institution or endowment subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, held by a person who is not a landless poor person stands cancelled. It reads asunder: "Sec.82: (1) Any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given or endowed or the purpose of any institution or endowment subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, held by a person who is not a landless poor person stands cancelled. (2) In respect of leases of agricultural lands held by landless poor person for not less than six years continuously, such person shall have the right to purchase such lands for a consideration of seventy five per centum of the prevailing market value of similarly situated lands at the time of purchase and such consideration shall be paid in four equal installments in the manner prescribed. Such sale may be effected otherwise than by tender-cum public auction: Provided that if such person fails to purchase the land in accordance with this sub-section or is unwilling to purchase the land, the lease shall be deemed to have been terminated. Explanation:- For the purpose of this sub-section "landless poor person" means a person whose total extent of land held by him either as owner or as cultivating tenant or as both does not exceed 1.011715 hectares (two and half acres) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (five acres) of dry land and whose monthly income other than from such lands does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees per mensum or three thousand rupees per annum. For the purposes of computing the extent of land 0.404686 hectares (one acre) of wet land shall be equal to 0.809372 hectares (two acres) of dry land. (3) The authority to sanction the lease or licence in respect of any property or any right or interest thereon belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institutions or endowment, the manner which and the period for which such lease or licence shall be such as may be prescribed. (4) Every lease or licence of any immovable property, other than the Agricultural land belonging to, or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution or endowment subsisting on the date of the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be in force subject to the rules as may be prescribed under subsection (3)". 24. (4) Every lease or licence of any immovable property, other than the Agricultural land belonging to, or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution or endowment subsisting on the date of the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be in force subject to the rules as may be prescribed under subsection (3)". 24. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of this provision were challenged before this Court in Samadhi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1 supra). The Division Bench of this Court held the provision, in so far as it brings about termination of leases, by operation of law, as unconstitutional. It was also held that the provisions of the A.P (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, and A.P (Telangana Area) Tenancy Act would continue to apply to the lands held by Hindu Religious Institutions. 25. The matter thereafter landed in the Supreme Court. In State of A.P. v. N. Ram Reddy (2 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 82 of the Act. The Supreme Court has taken into account, the report submitted by the Committee to ascertain the circumstances under which, Section 82 came to be enacted. Para 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under: "Para 5: The legislation in question is preceded by a report made by a Commission headed by Justice C. Kondaiah, former Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It was noticed in para 1.18.1 of the said report as under: "It is stated that all concerned who are interested in the charitable or religious institutions have stated that the temple authorities are facing innumerable difficulties in the management of the landed properties of the institutions. The income is very meager, not worth-mentioning, and in some cases it is nil, although the institution owns large extent of lands. Reasons thereof is the provisions of the Tenancy Act, attitude of the persons in possession and enjoyment for several years, the lands belonging to these institutions are 'mostly in the hands of the rich and powerful sections against whom the concerned authorities are experiencing difficulties to dispossess them from the lands'. The trustees or archakas are in enjoyment of the lands kept Benami in the names of their relations, etc. the authorities also are in the collusion with them. The trustees or archakas are in enjoyment of the lands kept Benami in the names of their relations, etc. the authorities also are in the collusion with them. The rents paid by the tenants are nominal fixed decades back. The Estimates Committee also expressed the same opinion." 26. Though with some delay, the respondents initiated steps, vis-a-vis the lands leased to the petitioner, placing reliance upon Section 82 of the Act. It all started with the verification of the records of Devasthanam by the Vigilance Enforcement Department. The rent derived from the lands leased to the petitioner was found to be too meagre. Obviously, taking into the fact that buildings are constructed and college is being run, proposal was mooted by the Devasthanam for enhancement of the rent. The petitioner flatly refused to enhance the rent and insisted that the rights that have accrued to it under leases, are inviolable. The matter was examined by the Government, in detail, and the 1st respondent issued memo dated 14-02-2005, taking a provisional decision to cancel the G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978. The Commissioner of Endowments was directed to issue show cause notice to the petitioner. Show cause notices were issued accordingly and the petitioner submitted detailed explanation on 14-04-2006. After taking the same into account, the 151 respondent issued the impugned G.O., canceling G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286, dated 02-02-1978 and directed resumption of the land. 27. An Important contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that Section 82 (1) and (2) of the Act has no application to the leases in question, since they are not for agricultural purposes. According to them, the subject-matter is governed by subsection (4) of Section 82 of the Act, which directs that leases covered by that provision shall continue, till the date of their expiry. Learned Senior Counsel elaborated this submission by stating that the object underlying sub-sections (1) and (2) was only to terminate the leases, which are granted for agricultural purposes. 28. Section 82 has already been extracted in the preceding paragraphs. The very opening words of the Section refer to the "lease of agricultural land". It is this expression that becomes relevant. What becomes important and relevant to attract sub-sections (1) and (2) is that the land must have been agricultural in nature, at the commencement of lease. 28. Section 82 has already been extracted in the preceding paragraphs. The very opening words of the Section refer to the "lease of agricultural land". It is this expression that becomes relevant. What becomes important and relevant to attract sub-sections (1) and (2) is that the land must have been agricultural in nature, at the commencement of lease. The emphasis is on the subject-matter of the lease in contradistinction to the purpose of lease. A clear distinction is maintained between the character of the land and purpose of lease. Once the land is agricultural in nature, at the commencement of the lease, the fact that it was put to a different use, with or without the permission of the lessee (sic. lessor) does not make any difference for the operation of that provision. The contention of the petitioner would have been accepted, had the expression used in the provision been, "lease for agricultural purposes". 29. If one goes by the circumstances under which the Legislature has decided to terminate the leases, it becomes clear. Therefore, it has advisedly chosen the expression "agricultural lands". It was conscious of the fact that lands, which were leased for agricultural purposes, were put to different purposes, and any effort to terminate the leases would be thwarted, unless attention is focused upon the nature of the land, at the commencement of the lease, irrespective of the use, to which it was subsequently put. The Legislature was also aware of the fact that vast extents of the lands held by Hindu Religious Institutions were leased or otherwise alienated, indiscriminately. Its effort was to retrieve such of the lands which were agricultural in nature at the commencement of the lease. 30. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner made strong effort to convince the Court that the expression "agricultural land" must be read in the context of the purpose for which the lands have been leased. He placed reliance upon the provisions of the General Clauses Act, and precedents, in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Prathap Singh (3) AIR 1955 SC 84 ; The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardhan Ramachandra Kulkarni and others (4) AIR 1960 SC 794 ; Commissioner of Income. tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons (5) (1987) 3 SCC 516 ; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amritlal and Co. tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons (5) (1987) 3 SCC 516 ; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amritlal and Co. and others (6) (2001) 8 SCC 397 = 2002 (1) ALT 11.3 (DNSC); Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Government of A.P. (7) 1996 (1) ALT 33 (SC) = (1996) 3 SCC 75 ; Veena Kumari Tandon v. Nellam Bhalla (8) 2007 (8) SCJ 282 = (2007) 12 SCC 764 , Sant Saran Lal v. Parsuram Sahu (9) AIR 1966 SC 1852 ; and Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. (10) (2000) 3 SCC 40 . 31. In this context, it needs to be observed that the necessity to interpret the words chosen by the Legislature to mean something, other than what they ordinarily mean, would arise, if only an absurd situation would arise, in case the ordinary meaning is adopted. The petitioner is not able to demonstrate as to how any absurdity would result in ascribing ordinary and grammatical meaning to the words "agricultural lands". The words to be interpreted are not technical in nature, nor are capable of being understood in other way. The object of the Legislature in employing those terms was also clear and unequivocal, as is evident from the portion of the report that was extracted in the preceding paragraphs. 32. Whenever Courts are faced with the problem of interpreting words employed by the Legislature, their first inclination is to go by the golden rule of construction. Explaining this doctrine, Lord Wensleydale, said, in Grey v. Pearson, way back in 1857; "I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted - at least in the courts of law in West-minister Hall-that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but further." (See Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition by S.G.G. Edgar page-84) 33. Similarly, Lord Justice Lindley L.J, in The Duke of Buccleuch said in 1889, as under: "You are not so to construe the Act of Parliament as to reduce it to rank absurdity. Similarly, Lord Justice Lindley L.J, in The Duke of Buccleuch said in 1889, as under: "You are not so to construe the Act of Parliament as to reduce it to rank absurdity. You are not to attribute to general language used by the legislature in this case, any more than in any other case, a meaning which would not carry out its object, but produce consequences which, to the ordinary intelligence, are absurd. You must give it such a meaning as will carry out its objects." (See Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition by S.G.G. Edgar page 85) 34. This principle was followed by Indian Courts with honour and respect, in Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cattail Co. Ltd., (11) AIR 1955 SC 376 , the Supreme Court held as under: "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction". 35. Similarly, in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata (12) AIR 1987 SC 117 , the Supreme Court observed: "In finding out the meaning of the expressions used, the Courts must find out what is legal, not what is right. It may not be inappropriate to refer to the observations of Burger, C.J. in TVA v. Hill, U.S. Supreme Court Reports (1978) 57 Law Ed. 2d 117, 119 at 146, as follows: "Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto". "On the other hand, it is apparent that this literal construction and reading of the statute as a whole is in consonance with the mischief intended to be avoided". (Paragraphs 64 and 65) 36. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto". "On the other hand, it is apparent that this literal construction and reading of the statute as a whole is in consonance with the mischief intended to be avoided". (Paragraphs 64 and 65) 36. Authorities can be multiplied on this. Assuming that the construction to be placed on the words "agricultural lands" would lead to hardship to the petitioner, it must be said that it is no concern of the Court, once the Legislature has chosen a particular course of action and the relevant provision of that law was upheld by the highest Court of the land. 37. Here itself, it is necessary to deal with the contention of the petitioner that their case is governed by sub-section (4) of Section 82 of the Act. That provision is in relation to other leases of immovable property, such as buildings, god owns, tanks, etc. At the cost of repetition, it needs to be observed that once the land was agricultural in nature, at the commencement of the lease, the fact that it has been put to a different use, with or without permission of the lessee (sic. lessor), does not change the character of the land, nor does it stop the operation of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 82 of the Act. Sub-section (4) does not operate in respect of the same land. Admittedly, the land is agricultural in nature, when it was leased to the petitioner. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the lease stood terminated, by operation of Section 82 (1) and (2) of the Act. 38. It is urged that the 1st respondent has taken irrelevant facts into consideration for terminating the leases, and that the institutions, that are being run in the buildings constructed over the land, and that thousands of students and hundreds of staff members would be adversely affected, on account of the termination of the lease. He has placed upon Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that the G.O.Ms.No.412, through which the G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286 were cancelled is not properly worded. He has placed upon Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that the G.O.Ms.No.412, through which the G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286 were cancelled is not properly worded. Strictly speaking, once it emerges that the lease in favour of the petitioner stood terminated, by operation of Section 82 (1) and (2), there was no necessity for separately and independently cancelling the leases or the G.Os, through which they came into existence. The memo dated 14-02-2005 has clearly stated the circumstances under which the land is proposed to be resumed. In clear and unequivocal terms, it invoked Section 82 of the Act. Once the lease is terminated by operation of law, hardly there exists any occasion to consider the merits or demerits of the lease. 39. It may be true that on account of the termination of the lease, the institutions would put to hardship and inconvenience. However, it must be noted that the petitioner is a service oriented society and the buildings were constructed by raising donations from the philanthropic people. When one speaks in terms of loss and hardship, the one, incurred by the Devasthanam cannot be ignored. By moderate estimates, the loss incurred by the time the Vigilance Department submitted the report i.e. 2001, was to the tune of Rs.7 crores. Almost one decade has elapsed. The value of the land has increased in geometrical proportions, since then. Generous gesture from the Devasthanam for permitting the institutions to run on enhanced rent did not yield positive response. The Petitioner may have its own justification, in not agreeing for enhancement of the rent. At the same time, the Devasthanam which serves a higher public interest, cannot be denied its genuine, legal and inherent rights. 40. It cannot be said that there is no basis for the Government in canceling G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286. It has already been mentioned that, every enactment, be it, the 1958 (sic. 1951) Act, and the Rules made thereunder, or the 1966 Act, contained elaborate provisions to be followed, in the matter of granting leases beyond five years. In the relevant enactments, the Legislature has taken utmost care, and added sounds of caution to the effect that the concerned authority must ensure that the grant of any long lease is in the interest of the institution. In the relevant enactments, the Legislature has taken utmost care, and added sounds of caution to the effect that the concerned authority must ensure that the grant of any long lease is in the interest of the institution. Mechanism was evolved for ascertaining the views of the persons interested in the institutions, viz., by publishing notices inviting objections. The views to be expressed by the Trust Board or the Institutions, assumes significance. 41. If one reads G.O.Ms.Nos.285 and 286 in this background, it becomes clear that there are several abnormalities and violations: The first is that the G.Os did not exempt the Devasthanam from the operation of Section 70 of the 1966 Act. That provision mandates that the "prior sanction of the Government is necessary" for any lease, exceeding six years. However, what the Government did through the said G.Os is, to accord approval for the proposal. These two expressions have their own different connotations. Secondly, before according sanction under sub-section (1) of Section 70, the Government is required to satisfy itself, that the transaction is necessary or beneficial for the institution, consistent with the objects of the institution and consideration therefore is reasonable. There is not even a whisper in the said G.Os, that the Government bestowed its attention to these aspects. 42. Further, the Government did nothing more than putting its seal of approval on the so-called proposals, said to have been submitted by the Commissioner. No effort was made to ascertain the views of the Board of Trustees, or the persons interested in the Devasthanam. It is not without reason that the Vigilance Department stated that the loss suffered by the Devasthanam is to the tune of Rs.7 crores. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the impugned order. 43. On facts, the lease does not accord with any of these ingredients. Firstly, it was neither necessary nor beneficial for the Devasthanam. The lease was not consistent with the objects of the Devasthanam, and the consideration therefor was miserably low. It is evident from the fact that, for the first six years, the rent was Rs. 6,000/- per year, for about six acres of land, and the enhancement for that property was just Rs. 1,000/- after a span of a decade. By the end of 50 years, the rent did not even double. 44. It is evident from the fact that, for the first six years, the rent was Rs. 6,000/- per year, for about six acres of land, and the enhancement for that property was just Rs. 1,000/- after a span of a decade. By the end of 50 years, the rent did not even double. 44. In the context of the hardship pleaded by the petitioner, on account of the premature termination, it needs to be observed that the lease deeds themselves provided for the vesting of the buildings constructed by the petitioner in the Devasthanam, on conclusion of lease. Except that the lease came to an end by operation of law, that too, after about three decades after its commencement, no radical change as to the conditions of the lease can be said to have taken place. Further, the petitioner is also running the institutions, as an activity of social service. The judicial notice can be taken of the facts, wherein several religious institutions of considerable reputation are running educational institutions by allocating funds and allotting properties. These, however, are matters, which need to be considered by the Devasthanam, as and when it gets into possession of the property. 45. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate Authority, vis-a-vis the administrative actions and exercise. Even if a second view is possible, on merits, the Courts would respect the decision of the Authority, which is conferred with the power, as long as the decision making process is not defective. The Court is always competent to see, whether there was proper application of mind, at all, while exercising power, in terms of relevant provision. 46. In this case, the occasion to verify whether the Authorities acted fairly or arbitrarily does not exist. The reason is that, leases stood terminated by operation of law, and not on account of the acts or omissions of the parties. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the orders passed by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.412, dated 01-04-2006. 47. Once the leases stood terminated, the petitioner answers the description of encroacher, vis-a-vis the land. The proceedings initiated against it, under Section 83 of the Act are just consequential. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the orders passed therein. 48. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are dismissed. 47. Once the leases stood terminated, the petitioner answers the description of encroacher, vis-a-vis the land. The proceedings initiated against it, under Section 83 of the Act are just consequential. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the orders passed therein. 48. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.