Judgment :- 1. Being aggrieved by the finding regarding negligence and the quantum of compensation of `64,500/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, the State Transport Corporation has filed this Appeal. 2. It is the case of the Respondent/Claimant that on 11.5.1997, when he was riding a TVS-50, bearing Registration No.TN-01-D-1425, slowly and cautiously, a Transport Corporation bearing Registration No.TN-32-N-0182, driven by its driver, in a rash and negligent manner, which came from behind, knocked him down and in the result, he sustained crush injury in the left thigh, injury in the head, dislocation of knee and other bodily injuries. He was treated as inpatient between 11.5.1997 & 25.5.1997. PW.2, Doctor, who examined the Respondent/Claimant, with reference to Ex.P1-Discharge Summary, dated 25.5.1997 and Ex.P4-X-Ray, assessed the disability of 40%. According to the Respondent/Claimant, he was a TV mechanic and due to the injuries and treatment, he lost his earning capacity. 3. Disputing the manner of accident, the Appellant-State Transport Corporation has contended that on 11.5.1997, When the above said bus was proceeding slowly on the Bracer Road, near Broadway bus stand to Chunambedu from Chennai, the Respondent/Claimant tried to overtake the bus and in the result, the motorcycle hit the rear portion of the right side of the bus, fell down and sustained injuries. The Transport Corporation further submitted that the accident has occurred solely due to the rash and negligent of the Respondent/Claimant. Without prejudice to the above, they disputed the age, income and the compensation claimed under various heads. 4. Before, the Tribunal, the Respondent/Claimant examined himself as PW.1 and reiterated the manner of accident. PW.2, is the Doctor, Ex.P1-Discharge Summary, issued by the Government Hospital, Ex.P2-True copy of the driving licence, Ex.P3-Disability Certificate and Ex.P4-X-ray were marked on the side of the Respondent/Claimant. RW.1 is the driver of the bus owned by the Appellant-Transport Corporation. On behalf of the Appellant-Transport Corporation, Ex.R1-True copy of the FIR was marked. 5. On evaluation of pleadings and evidence, the Tribunal found that the driver of the bus was responsible for the accident and quantified the compensation at `64,500/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, as apportioned hereunder: 6. Inviting the attention of this Court to the contents of Ex.R1-FIR, Mr. 5. On evaluation of pleadings and evidence, the Tribunal found that the driver of the bus was responsible for the accident and quantified the compensation at `64,500/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, as apportioned hereunder: 6. Inviting the attention of this Court to the contents of Ex.R1-FIR, Mr. G. Muniratnam, learned Counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation submitted that on the basis of the Complaint given by a passenger, who travelled in the bus, a Criminal case was registered against the Respondent/Claimant and when the oral testimony of RW.1, driver of the bus is corroborated by Ex.R1-FIR, the finding of the Tribunal, solely based on the oral evidence of PW.1, not supported by oral or documentary evidence, is erroneous and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the claim petition, holding that the rider of TVS-50 as responsible for the accident, by applying the Principles of Preponderance of Probability. He further submitted that the impact on the rear side of the right side of the bus, with the motorcycle would have come to light, had the Respondent/Claimant marked the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s Report. The omission to place the said document would clearly show that the Respondent/Claimant has intentionally suppressed the fact, regarding the manner of accident. 7. Placing reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in K. Nandakumar v. M.D. Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation, 1996 (1) CTC 505 (SC) and Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Premalatha Shukla, 2007 (2) TN MAC 106 (SC) : 2007 ACJ 1928 , learned Counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation submitted that the proof of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle is sine qua non for maintaining a Claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. He further submitted that except the oral evidence of the Respondent/Claimant, no other supportive material was placed before the Tribunal to prove the manner of accident, as alleged by him and therefore, the Tribunal has grossly erred in rejecting the case of the Appellant-Transport Corporation, which is corroborated by Ex.R1-FIR. 8. On the quantum of compensation, learned counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation submitted that the injuries, alleged to have been sustained, are crush injuries and dislocation of knee, for which, assessment made by PW.2, a General Surgeon, is on the higher side. 8. On the quantum of compensation, learned counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation submitted that the injuries, alleged to have been sustained, are crush injuries and dislocation of knee, for which, assessment made by PW.2, a General Surgeon, is on the higher side. He further submitted that a General Surgeon is not a Specialist in Orthopedics and therefore, the extent of disability assessed by him, is erroneous. It is his further contention that the Respondent/Claimant is not entitled for compensation for Loss of Future Earning. 9. Refuting the contentions of the learned counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation, Mr. V. Mohan Choudary, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Claimant submitted that Ex.R1-FIR has been given by a third party and unless the author of the document was examined before the Tribunal, the same cannot be treated as substantive evidence. He also submitted that if the Respondent/Claimant, could be blamed for non-production of the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s report, nothing prevented the Appellant-Transport corporation from producing the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s Report, pertaining to the Transport Corporation to prove their case. He therefore submitted that since the contents of Ex.R1-FIR, were not spoken to by the author of the document or any independent witness, the same can be taken only to set the Criminal law in motion and it cannot be treated as substantive evidence. According to him, the Tribunal has properly arrived at a proper finding regarding negligence and it does not require interference. According to him, when the version of the Respondent/Claimant, regarding the manner of accident is different, than the one projected by the Transport Corporation, the Claimant does not wholly relying on the FIR given by a third party, who has not been examined. 10. On the quantum of compensation, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Respondent/Claimant has sustained a degloving injury and dislocation of knee is always painful and on account of the same, the Respondent/Claimant has suffered 40% disability, as assessed by PW.2, Doctor. According to him, at the time of accident, the Respondent/Claimant was a TV Mechanic and the grievous injury in the left leg, would certainly affect his future earning. For the above said reasons, he prayed to sustain the award. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. Ex.R1-FIR, has been given by one Mr. For the above said reasons, he prayed to sustain the award. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. Ex.R1-FIR, has been given by one Mr. S. Kumar, said to be a passenger in the bus, alleged to have involved in the accident on 11.5.1997. In his Complaint to the Police, he has stated that when he was travelling as a passenger in the bus, near Bracer Bridge, he heard a noise on the right side of the bus. When he along with other passengers raised an alarm, the bus was stopped by the driver. On the basis of the Complaint, FIR has been registered against the Motorcyclist, who rode the vehicle, TVS-50, bearing Registration No.TN-01-D-1455. Though a Criminal case has been registered against the motorcyclist, the result is not known. 12. Registration of FIR is required to set the Criminal law in motion and even if the culpability of the accused is not proved or in other words, even if the driver, against whom, rash and negligence is alleged, is acquitted, it is the bounden duty of the Tribunal to independently assess the evidence to arrive at the conclusion, regarding negligence. 13. In the case on hand, both the Appellant-Transport Corporation as well as the Respondent/Claimant have failed to mark the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s Report of the respective vehicles. Whether the bus suffered any damages on the right side, has not been proved by the Appellant-Transport Corporation by marking the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s Report, pertaining to the bus. The driver of the bus has not witnessed the accident, i.e., he did not see the Motorcyclist hitting the bus on the right side of the bus and only when he heard the alarm, he stopped the vehicle. The author of Ex.R1-FIR was also not examined to prove the contents. Therefore, at best, it can be taken on record to prove that there was an accident on 11.5.1997 and by registering a crime, the investigation was set in motion. Now, what remains to be considered is the oral testimony of the Respondent/Claimant against that of the driver of the State Transport Corporation. In such circumstances, this Court deems it fit to consider the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. 14. Now, what remains to be considered is the oral testimony of the Respondent/Claimant against that of the driver of the State Transport Corporation. In such circumstances, this Court deems it fit to consider the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. 14. In K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd., 1996 (1) CTC 505 (SC) : 1996 ACJ 555, the Appellant therein was injured in a motor accident. The accident took place by a reason of a collision between the Motorcycle, which the Appellant was riding and a bus, belonging to the Respondent-Corporation. When a claim was made, the Respondent-Corporation contested the claim and alleged that it was the Appellant, who was negligent. The contention of the Transport Corporation was upheld by the Tribunal and the High Court. What was put to challenge before the Supreme Court was the finding of the High Court that even if the Appellant suffered permanent disability, the Appellant was not entitled to ‘No Fault Liability’ compensation under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, which deals with, “Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault”. The High Court held that the Appellant was not entitled to compensation, as he was found to have been negligent. Holding that the High Court had not interpreted Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, in proper perspective, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal and held that the Appellant was entitled to compensation only to the extent of `7,500/- under No Fault Liability. The above said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla, 2007 (2) TN MAC 106 (SC) : 2007 ACJ 1928 , the deceased was travelling in a Tempo Trax from Bhopal to Allahabad. It collided with a truck. The registration number of truck could not be traced. FIR was lodged by one of the occupants of Tempo Trax. A case under Section 304-A, I.P.C. was registered against the driver of the truck. During investigation, the truck could not be traced out and that the case was closed. A Claim Petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal against the driver, owner and the Insurance Company with which, Tempo Trax was insured. A case under Section 304-A, I.P.C. was registered against the driver of the truck. During investigation, the truck could not be traced out and that the case was closed. A Claim Petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal against the driver, owner and the Insurance Company with which, Tempo Trax was insured. The Tribunal, on analysis of evidence, including FIR, arrived at the finding that the driver of the Tempo Trax was not responsible for the accident and accordingly, dismissed the Claim Petition. Being aggrieved by the finding, the Claimants preferred an Appeal to the High Court. The High Court reversed the finding, holding that inasmuch as the FIR having been legally not proved, the driver of the Tempo Trax should be held guilty of driving rashly and negligently. On Appeal, the Insurance Company contended that as the Claimants/Respondents themselves have relied on the First Information Report, alleging rash and negligent driving, against the driver of the Truck, the High Court ought not to have ignored the same. Per contra, it was contended on behalf of the Respondent/Claimant that merely because, the FIR was relied upon for the purpose of proving the accident, the contents thereof ipso facto cannot be said to have been proved. In the above pleadings, the Supreme Court, after considering a decision in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003 (8) SCC 745 , at Paragraphs 13 & 14, held as follows: “13. Having, the factum of an accident could also be proved from the First Information Report. It is also to be noted that once a part of the contents of the document is admitted in evidence, the party bringing the same on record cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved. Both the parties have relied thereupon. It was marked as an Exhibit as both the parties intended to rely upon them. 14. Once a part of it is relied upon by both the parties, the learned Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any illegality in relying upon the other part, irrespective of the contents of the document been proved or not. It was marked as an Exhibit as both the parties intended to rely upon them. 14. Once a part of it is relied upon by both the parties, the learned Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any illegality in relying upon the other part, irrespective of the contents of the document been proved or not. If the contents have been proved, the question of reliance thereupon only upon a part thereof and not upon the rest, on the technical ground that the same had not been proved in accordance with law, would not arise.” 16. As stated supra, in the case on hand, though Ex.P1-FIR, has been relied on by the Appellant-State Transport Corporation, the contents of the same have not been proved by any supportive evidence, either marking the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s Report, pertaining to the bus or by letting in evidence through any independent witness examined on behalf of the Appellant-Transport Corporation. The version of the Respondent/Claimant regarding, manner of accident, is different and does not bank on the FIR. Even perusal of the contents of Ex.P1-FIR, does not in clear terms attribute negligence on the part of the motorcyclist/Claimant and therefore, merely because, a Criminal case has been registered, against the motorcyclist by the police, that alone is not a substantive evidence before the Tribunal to hold him negligent. The relevant portion of the FIR is extracted hereunder: (LANGUAGE) 17. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to extract a passage from the Supreme Court on the issue of negligence, where the Transport Corporation buses was involved. 18. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1354 , the driver of the bus hit an over-hanging high tension wire, resulting in 26 casualties, out of which, 8 proved to be instantaneously fatal. However, he was acquitted on the ground that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Accidents Claims Tribunal held that despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous over-hanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spot, which resulted in the accident. The High Court confirmed that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of driver of the bus and consequently, the Transport Company was held vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The High Court confirmed that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of driver of the bus and consequently, the Transport Company was held vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimants. Aggrieved by the same, the Transport Company went on Appeal to the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that Criminal case had ended in acquittal and that therefore, the civil Suit must follow Suit. While testing the correctness of the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court opined that,-- “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their ‘neighbour’. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practiced by Tribunals. We must remember that Judicial Tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The states must appoint sufficient number of Tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many states are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 19. The states must appoint sufficient number of Tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many states are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 19. In Virat Sama v. Mohan Lal, 1994 ACJ 432, while dealing with the ground taken before the tribunal, for not awarding compensation that in the police report, negligence was not attributed to an auto rickshaw driver, alleged to have caused the accident, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, held that, -- “In accident cases, FIR is often lodged in a haste and the same cannot be a substitute for the evidence giving exhaustive version of the occurrence. The statements before the Tribunal are made on solemn affirmation, whereas the FIR is never lodged on solemn affirmation.” 20. It is well settled that evidence in the Criminal case is not ipso facto proof of negligence in claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Further, the best person to throw light as to how the accident actually took place is the driver of the vehicle. The contents of FIR need not be wholly true. The object of lodging an FIR in the ordinary course, would be only to the limited extent of setting the Criminal law in motion. FIR and police papers are not substantive piece of evidence. They are only documents for the purpose of corroboration and/or contradictions and cannot take the place of substantive evidence recorded during trial in the claim cases. 21. Therefore, considering the object of the beneficial legislation, this Court is of the considered view that the approach of the Tribunal, in determining negligence, cannot be said to be manifestly illegal, warranting interference. Hence, the finding regarding negligence, is confirmed. 22. On the aspect of quantum of compensation, perusal of Ex.P1-Discharge Summary shows that the Respondent/Claimant was admitted in the hospital on 11.5.1997 and discharged on 25.5.1997. There was a degloving injury in the left thigh extending upto left hip, exposing tendon and avulsion injury, exposing bone. There was dislocation of left knee. Avulsion injury in the left thigh had been sutured and dislocation of left knee had been corrected. On the date of discharge from Taruma Ward of the Government General Hospital, the Respondent/Claimant has been advised daily dressing, physiotherapy in the left hip and left knee, after four weeks. 23. There was dislocation of left knee. Avulsion injury in the left thigh had been sutured and dislocation of left knee had been corrected. On the date of discharge from Taruma Ward of the Government General Hospital, the Respondent/Claimant has been advised daily dressing, physiotherapy in the left hip and left knee, after four weeks. 23. PW.2, Doctor, who examined the Respondent/Claimant with reference to Ex.P1-Discharge Summary and Ex.P4-X-Ray, has deposed that due to the degloving injury, there was reduction in flexion by 20 Degrees, for which, he has assessed the disability at 40% and issued Ex.P3-Disability Certificate. 24. Though the Respondent/Claimant has contended that he earned `100/- per day, as TV Mechanic, in the absence of any proof and having regard to the age of the Respondent/Claimant, the Tribunal fixed his monthly income of the Respondent/Claimant at `1,500/-. A sum of `500/-has been awarded for Medical Expenses. 25. The nature of injuries clearly shows that they were grievous and required continuous dressing. For the above said injury, the Respondent/Claimant would have experienced severe pain and suffering and therefore this Court is of the considered view that a sum of `7,000/- awarded for Pain and Suffering is inadequate and it is enhanced to `11,000/-as claimed. 26. Certainly, injuries would have immobilized the Respondent/Claimant for a period of four months and therefore, a sum of `6,000/-for Loss of Earning, cannot be said to be excessive. However, compensation of `1,000/-awarded for Nutrition is inadequate and it is enhanced to `3,000/-. 27. Though the learned Counsel for the Appellant-Transport Corporation has contended that PW.2, Doctor, is not a specialist and therefore, his assessment is incorrect, there is no hard and fast rule that only Orthopedician can assess the extent of disability. However, perusal of the disability Certificate shows that PW.2, Doctor, is a qualified Orthopedician and was earlier, an Orthopedic Surgeon in Government Hospital. Therefore, the above said contention does not merit consideration. 28. A person, who has sustained a serious degloving injury and avulsion exposing bone, would have necessarily engaged a motor vehicle to visit the hospital. Though the Tribunal has failed to award any compensation for the same, this Court deems it fit to award a sum of `2,000/- under the head, “Transportation”. 29. Ex.P1-Discharge Summary shows that the Respondent/Claimant was hospitalized for 15 days and that he was advised daily dressing and physiotherapy of left hip and knee. Though the Tribunal has failed to award any compensation for the same, this Court deems it fit to award a sum of `2,000/- under the head, “Transportation”. 29. Ex.P1-Discharge Summary shows that the Respondent/Claimant was hospitalized for 15 days and that he was advised daily dressing and physiotherapy of left hip and knee. Medicine T.Overin has also been prescribed. Though medical bills have not been filed before the tribunal, having regard to the nature of injuries and period of treatment, it could be reasonably presumed that the Respondent/Claimant would have taken continuous treatment, as per the medical advice and incurred medical expenses. Therefore, a sum of `3,000/- can b awarded towards Medical Expenses, in addition to the award granted by the tribunal and the same is justified in the light of the decision of this Court in Nesamony Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Chenthilathiappan and another, 2000 (1) ACC 332, wherein, this Court held that if there is evidence to show that the injured was hospitalized, then it could be presumed that the injured would have incurred considerable medical expenses. 30. Though an award of `10,000/- for Future Loss of Earning is contrary to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Cholan Roadways Corporation Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi, 2006 (2) TN MAC 342 (FB) : 2006 (4) CTC 433 , the said amount can be adjusted as stated supra. Hence, the quantum of compensation of `64,500/- awarded by the Tribunal is sustained. 31. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed.