Judgment Bankim. N. Mehta, J.—The appellants – original defendants have preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC on the following substantial questions of law:— “(A) Whether the appellate Court has committed erred of law in allowing the appeal by quashing and setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on factual aspects which are decided by the Trial Court after examining oral and documentary evidence led by all the parties? (B) Whether the appellate Court has committed erred of law in not considering the principles of “easement by necessity” and “easement by usage” in favour of the defendants? (C) Whether the appellate Court has committed erred of law in holding that the defendants cannot interfere and disturb possession of the plaintiff because he is in the capacity of the owner” (D) Whether the appellate Court has committed erred of law in not considering at all the oral as well as documentary evidence of the defendants?” 1.1 Learned Advocate for the appellants places on record additional substantial question of law by way of draft amendment. The same is allowed. The additional question of law is as under:— “Whether there is a breach of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 30,31 of the Code of Civil Procedure?” 2. It was the case of the respondent plaintiff before the trial Court that disputed open land of city survey No. 3810 paiki 371.61 sq mtr being the suit property was earlier survey No. 1113A belonged to the ownership of the plaintiff. The suit property with survey Nos. 3805 to 3809 originally belonged to the ownership of one Sundarlal Harjivandas Mapara, Kumudben Manharlal and their family as co-owners. The respondent plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 91 of 1988 in the Court of learned civil Judge (JD), Pardi for permanent injunction restraining the original defendants from making construction of compound wall on their land and also restraining them from obstructing his possession in respect of the suit property. 3. According to the plaintiff, land bearing survey No. 3810 paiki, 37.61 sq mtr of Mauje Pardi, Kasba City belonged to his ownership and the same is in his possession since 15.10.1987. Earlier the suit property belonged to the ownership of Sundarlal Harjivandas Mapara, Kumudben Manharlal, Manishkumar Manharlal, Dipti Manharlal, Darshana Manharlal and Bhakti Manharlal. It comprised of four parts. 3. According to the plaintiff, land bearing survey No. 3810 paiki, 37.61 sq mtr of Mauje Pardi, Kasba City belonged to his ownership and the same is in his possession since 15.10.1987. Earlier the suit property belonged to the ownership of Sundarlal Harjivandas Mapara, Kumudben Manharlal, Manishkumar Manharlal, Dipti Manharlal, Darshana Manharlal and Bhakti Manharlal. It comprised of four parts. The defendants are doing business in part of survey No. 3809 and were tenants of Sundarlal. The plaintiff wanted to make construction on their land of survey No. 3810 and to make compound wall. The defendant gave threats to demolish the compound wall constructed by the plaintiff and therefore, the suit was filed for permanent injunction and an application Exh-5 for temporary injunction was also filed. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendants had filed reply at Exh-13 to the injunction application. Subsequently, a pursis was filed adopting the reply of injunction application as written statement and the defendants denied the averments made in the plaint. It was contended that the original owner Sundarlal Harjivandas had given part of the property bearing survey No. 3809 on rent in December 1980 at the rent of Rs. 235/- per month to them and there was an open land on the northern side of said property, which is the suit property. The defendants used the suit property to keep their material of business and were carrying out their work on the same. Around 1983, Sundarlal Harjivandas raised objection with regard to their use of suit property on the ground that it was not rented out to them and demanded rent for use of suit property. Therefore, the defendants agreed to pay rent for suit property and rent of Rs. 40/- per month was fixed for the suit property. The said rent was added to Rs. 235/- and thereby, the rent was increased to Rs. 275/- per month. Accordingly, the defendants were paying rent at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month from 1.2.1983. Thereby, the defendants are using the suit property with other property as tenants. The other tenants of Sundarlal are using the suit property as a passage to go the Lavatory situated on the northern side of the suit property. 275/- per month. Accordingly, the defendants were paying rent at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month from 1.2.1983. Thereby, the defendants are using the suit property with other property as tenants. The other tenants of Sundarlal are using the suit property as a passage to go the Lavatory situated on the northern side of the suit property. Said Sundarlal was recovering rent @ 275/- per month till they sold suit property to the plaintiff and it was clarified when the suit property was sold to the plaintiff that they have to pay Rs. 235/- per month to Sundarlal and Rs. 40/- per month to the plaintiff. Therefore, it is not true that the defendants have no right in respect of the suit property. It was also contended that if the plaintiff is permitted to make construction in the suit property by making compound wall, their right to passage would be destroyed and therefore, the suit is required to be dismissed and the plaintiff is required to be restrained from making any construction or obstructing their possession of the suit property. 5. After recording of the evidence and hearing learned advocates for the parties, the Court by judgment dated 29.2.1996 dismissed the suit and granted injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any construction and also restraining him from obstructing the possession of the defendants in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by filing Regular Civil Appeal No. 176 of 2002 (Old No. 31 of 1996) in the Court of learned Principal District Judge, Valsad. The first appellate Court, after hearing the learned advocates for the parties, by judgment dated 31.1.2009 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit passed by the trial Court. Being aggrieved b y the said decision, the appellants have preferred this second appeal. 6. I have heard learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the appellants and Mr. JB Pardiwala for the respondent at length and in great detail. 7. Learned advocate Ms. Shah has submitted that the trial Court was justified in accepting the plea that the appellants were tenant in respect of the suit property. 6. I have heard learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the appellants and Mr. JB Pardiwala for the respondent at length and in great detail. 7. Learned advocate Ms. Shah has submitted that the trial Court was justified in accepting the plea that the appellants were tenant in respect of the suit property. She has also submitted that the appellants were in possession of suit property since 1980 and were using the same as tenant and in view of their occupation of the suit property as tenant, the earlier landlord had increased the rent from Rs. 235/- to Rs. 275/- and thereby, recovery of rent of Rs. 40/- per month was towards use of suit property. She has also submitted that the documentary evidence in the form of entries made in the Account Books also indicate that the rent includes suit property and therefore, the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit, but the first appellate Court committed error in interpreting the evidence. She has also submitted that there is non-compliance of provisions of Order 41 Rule 30 and 31 of CPC, as the first appellate Court has not formulated points for determination as required and therefore, the impugned judgment is required to be set aside. 8. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Pardiwala has submitted that the first appellate Court on appreciation of evidence has recorded finding of fact and this Court exercising power under Section 100 of the CPC cannot re-appreciate the evidence. He has also also submitted that there is no cogent and reliable evidence produced on record by the appellants to establish that they are tenant in respect of the suit property. Even, the defendants’ witness has also admitted in his evidence that he has no documentary evidence to establish right of tenancy in respect of the suit property and therefore, the judgment of the first appellate Court does not require any interference. He has also submitted that the first appellate Court has in detail scrutinized the evidence and has recorded the finding, therefore, there is substantial compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC and therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court. 9. I shall first deal with the contention about non-framing of proper points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 by the first appellate Court advanced by learned advocate Ms. 9. I shall first deal with the contention about non-framing of proper points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 by the first appellate Court advanced by learned advocate Ms. Shah for the appellants. It is true that the first appellate Court has framed only two points for determination. Under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC, the judgment of the appellate Court shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for decision. On perusal of the judgment of the first appellate Court, it appears that the Court has framed two general points for determination, but the learned Judge has in detail discussed the evidence produced before the trial Court. The learned Judge has also considered the arguments advanced by learned advocates for the parties and has assigned reasons for his findings. In the decision of Nopany Investments (P) Ltc. vs. Santokh Singh (HUF) reported in (2008) 2 SCC 728 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when findings arrived at by first appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial Court were neither cryptic nor based on non-consideration of arguments advanced by parties before it and when all the issues involved in the matter and the evidence is re-appreciated as provided under Order 41 Rule 31, the judgment cannot be interfered with on the plea of non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC by first appellate Court. In another decision of G. Amalorpavam and others vs. RC Diocese of Madurai and others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if it is possible to make out from the judgment of appellate Court that there is substantial compliance with requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 and that justice has not thereby suffered and where entire evidence has been considered and discussed in detail and conclusions and findings are supported by reasons even though no point has been framed, there is substantial compliance with provisions of Order 41 Rule 31. As observed earlier, in the instant case, the first appellate Court has in detail considered the arguments advanced by learned advocates for the parties, also appreciated the evidence produced before the trial Court and recorded findings assigning reasons. Therefore, there was substantial compliance of provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. 10. As observed earlier, in the instant case, the first appellate Court has in detail considered the arguments advanced by learned advocates for the parties, also appreciated the evidence produced before the trial Court and recorded findings assigning reasons. Therefore, there was substantial compliance of provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. 10. It appears from the substantial questions of law formulated by the appellants that the questions are the questions of fact. Learned advocate Ms. Shah has not pressed question (B) as substantial question of law. Looking to the substantial questions of law which have been formulated by the appellants, in my view, such questions being questions of fact cannot be formulated while exercising power under Section 100 of the CPC. The questions also are vague. They also do not indicate as to what error is committed in considering the oral as well as documentary evidence of the defendants. On the contrary, the first appellate Court has observed that there is no cogent, convincing and reliance evidence on record to prove that the defendants were tenant in respect of the suit property. The defendants claimed that their earlier landlord Sundarlal had given the suit property on rent and was recovering Rs. 40/- per month as rent. The defendants did not produce any rent receipt showing that the rent was being paid to Sundarlal. The plaintiff examined Sundarlal Harjivandas Mapara at Exh-86. The witness has denied that the appellants were tenants in respect of the suit property. Even the defendants’ witness Yogeshbhai examined at Exh-103 has also stated that he is not in possession of any documentary evidence to show that he is paying rent in respect of the suit property. The findings recorded by the learned first appellate Judge also indicate that there was no evidence of payment of rent of Rs. 40/- per month in respect of the suit property. Therefore, the learned first appellate Judge was justified in reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court. 11. In view of above, the appellants have failed to satisfy me that the substantial questions of law as formulated arise for determination by this Court and hence, this appeal cannot be entertained and it is required to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and stands dismissed with no order as to costs. 13. 11. In view of above, the appellants have failed to satisfy me that the substantial questions of law as formulated arise for determination by this Court and hence, this appeal cannot be entertained and it is required to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and stands dismissed with no order as to costs. 13. In view of dismissal of main appeal, CA does not survive and is disposed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. No costs.