Elipe Dharma Rao.J:-By this Writ Appeal, we are called upon to examine as to whether there could be any unilateral alteration of the terms of settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, by the Government. 2. For appreciation of the above legal question, the necessary facts, in brief, are as follows: A settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act was arrived at between the Management of the erstwhile Ramanathapuram District Central Cooperative Bank and its workmen represented by the Employees Association/Union for a period of five years from 1.7.1989 to 30.6.1994, as per the recommendations of the first streamlining committee, which were accepted by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.747, Cooperation, dated 9.8.1990. Upon expiry of the said period, various Employees Unions have submitted fresh charter of demands on the Managements of all the District Central Cooperative Banks and the Secretary to Government, Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, seeking upward revision in wages and conditions of service of the employees working in all the District Central Cooperative Banks in Tamil Nadu. Pursuant thereto, the Government, appointed a Committee to streamline the pay scales and service conditions of various categories of the staff in District Central Cooperative Banks in G.O.2D No.71, Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 7.10.1994 and the Government passed orders in respect of various recommendations of the second streamlining committee in G.O.Ms.No.161 Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 5.9.1996. The Registrar who was requested to take necessary action to implement the orders of the Government has also issued various instructions to the District Central Cooperative Banks in his letter dated 15.10.1996. The Government, by G.O.No.6 Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 8.1.1997, issued revised orders in respect of certain recommendations of the Second Streamlining Committee and the Registrar was requested to take necessary action to implement the said G.O., dated 8.1.1997. Thereupon, conciliation talks were held between the Management and the above said three Unions before the Labour Officer, Virudhunagar, which culminated in arriving at a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on 5.3.1997. The settlement includes various service conditions, including the one regarding 'gratuity' in Term No.17. Thereupon, conciliation talks were held between the Management and the above said three Unions before the Labour Officer, Virudhunagar, which culminated in arriving at a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on 5.3.1997. The settlement includes various service conditions, including the one regarding 'gratuity' in Term No.17. Since the present dispute revolves around this part of the settlement, we shall now extract hereunder the said term: "Gratuity: The present system of a Group Linked Insurance Scheme in collaboration with the Life Insurance Corporation of India will continue. Arrears of Gratuity of any, payable to the employees arising out of this settlement, shall be paid by the Bank. It is also mutually agreed that for purpose of calculation of Gratuity 26 days will be reckoned as a month not only for arriving at pay, but also for calculation of length of service." 3. While so, under the impugned order, dated 18.9.2002, the second respondent has sought to amend the G.O.No.161, dated 5.9.1996 on the ground that the agreement to treat 26 days as a month for the purpose of gratuity, is contrary to the meaning of the term 'year' as understood under the Payment of Gratuity Act and as defined under the General Clauses Act and gives an impractical/different meaning leading to have more than 12 months per 365 days. This action of the second respondent has been challenged by the appellant/Employees Union by filing W.P.No.40604 of 2002 before this Court and the learned single Judge has dismissed the same on the ground that the subject matter of challenge was covered by the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Tamil Nadu Vatta Kooturavu Veetu Vasathi Sangangalin Anaithu Paniyalargal Madya Sangam (rep.by its General Secretary, R.Raghavendran) vs. The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies (Housing) Cuddalore Circle and others reported in 2008 (2) L.L.N. 236. It is against this order of the learned single Judge of this Court that this Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant/Employees Union on the ground that the judgment of the Division Bench relied on by the learned single Judge is totally on a different issue and thus the matter should have been decided by the learned single Judge on its own merits. 4. 4. Mr.G.Masilamani, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would argue that the judgment based on which, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge has no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case since it deals with a fresh settlement whereas, in the case on hand, the terms of the settlement were already in existence and therefore, the learned Single Judge has committed a legal error in dismissing the writ petition. 5. In this backdrop, before proceeding to discuss the other aspects of the case, we have to see whether the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Vatta Kooturavu Veetu Vasathi Sangangalin Anaithu Paniyalargal Madya Sangam (rep.by its General Secretary, R.Raghavendran) vs. The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies (Housing) Cuddalore Circle and others reported in 2008 (2) L.L.N. 236, based on which the writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge, has any application to the facts of the case. 6. On a thorough reading of the entire judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, cited above, we are able to see that it was a case pertaining to a fresh settlement entered into between the Management and the employees under Section 18(1) Settlement. But, in the case in hand, the issue is entirely a different one, in the sense the terms of the settlement entered into between the employer and employee, during conciliation proceedings, under Section 12(3) of the I.D. Act were sought to be altered unilaterally by the employer, the legality of which is under challenge. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the learned single Judge is not right in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that it is already covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred case. 7. Having held so, now, we have to see whether there could be any unilateral alteration of the terms of settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, by the Government. 8. The learned senior counsel for the appellants would argue that any change in terms of settlement could only be by way of another settlement to be arrived at between the parties. The learned senior counsel, in support of his arguments, would rely on the following judgments: 1. 8. The learned senior counsel for the appellants would argue that any change in terms of settlement could only be by way of another settlement to be arrived at between the parties. The learned senior counsel, in support of his arguments, would rely on the following judgments: 1. M/s.Shukla Manseta Industries Pvt. Ltd vs. The Workmen Employed Under It [ AIR 1977 SC 2246 ]; 2. The Life Insurance Corporation Of India vs. D.J.Bahadur And Others [ AIR 1980 SC 2181 ]; 3. The Workmen And Others vs. M/s.Hindustan Lever Ltd. [ (1984) 1 SCC 728 ]; 4. Christine Hoden (India) (Private) Ltd. vs. State Of Goa And Others [2002 (1) LLN 943]; 5. Thanthai Periyar Pokkuvarathu Kazhagha Oozhiyar Sangam vs. Management Of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Villupuram, Ltd. [2005 (2) LLN 860]. 6. An unreported judgment delivered by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.Nos.2069 of 2005 and 2364 of 2009, dated 25.11.2009 [C.Kuttiappan and others VS. The Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act and others] 7. Another unreported judgment of delivered by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.Nos.38830 of 2003, 5546 and 5547 of 2004, dated 30.3.2010 [The Management of the Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Limited VS. Joint Commissioner of Labour and others]. 9. In the first judgment cited above, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2246 , the Honourable Apex Court has held that: "Section 19(2) does not entitle a party to a settlement to repudiate the settlement while the same is in operation." 10. In the second judgment cited above also, reported in AIR 1980 SC 2181 , a Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'settlements remain operative till replaced by fresh settlement.' 11. In the third judgment cited above, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 728 , another Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'unilateral repudiation of an agreement between employer and workmen by one of the parties does not result in termination of the agreement.' 12. In the third judgment cited above, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 728 , another Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'unilateral repudiation of an agreement between employer and workmen by one of the parties does not result in termination of the agreement.' 12. In the fourth judgment cited above, reported in 2002 (1) LLN 943, a learned single Judge of the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that 'there is no law in force which allowed amendment to the terms of settlement by notice under S.9A of Industrial Disputes Act and in the absence of any amendments to the existing settlement or unless a new settlement on the revised terms was signed, no facility which was already there could be withheld.' 13. In the other reported and unreported judgments delivered by the learned single Judges of this Court, cited above, also it was held in the same lines. 14. Although on the part of the second respondent Bank it has been tried to be argued that this writ petition filed against the cooperative society is not maintainable, we are not able to appreciate the same as we are of the considered view that alteration of terms of settlement, that too unilaterally, do fall within the scope of writ petition, falling in tune with the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in K.Marappan vs. The Deputy Registrar Of Cooperative Societies [ 2006 (4) CTC 689 ]. Therefore, we need not have to go further deep into this aspect urged on the part of the second respondent. 15. The settlement arrived at in the instant case under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act was in the course of the conciliation proceedings, as a product of collective bargaining and therefore, it carries a presumption that it is just and fair and is entitled to due weight and consideration. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the dispute relates and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that establishment. 16. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the dispute relates and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that establishment. 16. In the latest judgment in Gujarat Agricultural University vs. All Gujarat Kamdar Karmachari Union [ (2009) 15 SCC 335 ], the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'the contract of service or the conditions of service provided in the settlement holds the field until new lawful settlement is brought into being'. This judgment of the Honourable Apex Court would be the straight answer to the legal question involved in this writ appeal and squarely applies to the case on hand. 17. Further, in the case on hand, while the employees are enjoying the benefits as per the settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the move of the Government to unilaterally change the terms of the settlements cannot be appreciated, particularly in the absence of any new settlement entered into between the employer and employees, to alter the terms of settlement. 18. Therefore, on a complete analysis of the legal aspect, in the light of the judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, cited and referred supra, we have no hesitation to hold that the contract of service or the conditions of service provided in the settlement (in the case on hand entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act) holds the field until new lawful settlement is brought into being and the unilateral attempt on the part of the Government to change such of the terms of the settlement, without entering into new settlement is illegal. Since in the case on hand, the second respondent has attempted to unilaterally alter the terms of settlement, without entering into new settlement, the same is illegal and needs to be set aside. 19. One more aspect to be pointed out is that under G.O.Ms.No.161, Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 5.9.1996, orders have been issued by the Government, by the order of His Excellency the Governor, accepting the recommendations of the Committee for streamlining the pay scales and service conditions of the employees of Central Coopertive Banks. 19. One more aspect to be pointed out is that under G.O.Ms.No.161, Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 5.9.1996, orders have been issued by the Government, by the order of His Excellency the Governor, accepting the recommendations of the Committee for streamlining the pay scales and service conditions of the employees of Central Coopertive Banks. As has already been observed supra, the terms and conditions entered into by the employer and employees as an agreement under Section 12(3) have been given effect to and the employees are enjoying the benefits accrued thereunder. While so, by the impugned order, the second respondent has attempted to alter the terms of the settlement and G.O.Ms.No.161, dated 5.9.1996. The G.O.No.161, dated 5.9.1996 having been issued by His Excellency The Governor, the second respondent cannot alter the same since being bereft of power or authority to do so. Under the executive instructions, statutory provisions cannot be altered or changed. It is worthwhile, at this juncture, to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Manager, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs. Laxmi Devi And Others reported in (2009) 7 SCC 205 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that 'executive instructions cannot run contrary to the statutory provisions'. Therefore, if at all the Government wants to alter the terms, it must be only by scrupulously following the well established principles of law and in matters of settlement, like the one in the case on hand, by entering into new settlement. Since the impugned order is illegal, the same is liable to be quashed. For all the above reasons, this writ appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order dated 18.9.2002 made in R.C.No.1386/2000-2001/E.1 by the second respondent. No costs.