Judgment Bankim N. Mehta, J.—The appellant has preferred this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code on the following substantial question of law. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Lower Courts were right in law in holding that the plaintiff’s father was not adopted child of deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai? 2. The appellant-original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 502 of 1978 for partition of the suit property claiming his 1/4th undivided share and account of the rent received by the Respondent-original defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from the tenants of the suit premises. 3. According to the Appellant-plaintiff, he is the Manager of his guardian branch and Karta and Manager of heirs and Respondents-defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of Respondent-defendant No. 1 and Respondent-defendant No. 4 is his brother. The Respondents-defendant Nos. 5 and 6 are the sons of the Respondent-defendant No. 4. The suit property is situated at Indarpura, Golwasd, Taluka : Choryasi of Surat city, in Ward No. 3 registered as Nondh No. 1226 admeasuring about 105 Square Yards and each branch has 1/2 undivided share therein. Thereby plaintiff and his branch has 1/4th undivided share and defendant No. 4 and his branch has also undivided 1/4th share. The defendant No. 1 and his branch has 1/2 share. 4. According to the Appellant-original plaintiff, deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai had daughter namely Manguben by his previous marriage and after the death of his first wife, Nathubhai Durlabhbhai remarried to Revabai who had a son namely Tulsidas from her previous marriage. After the marriage, Revabai came to reside with Nathubhai Durlabhbhai with her son Tulsidas and Tulsidas was brought up as son by Nathubhai Durlabhbhai. Said Tulsidas got married with Bai Narmada by Nathubhai Durlabhbhai and Bai Reva. Tulsidas was father of the Appellant-original plaintiff and Respondent- defendant No. 4. Nathubhai Durlabhbhai died during the life time of Bai Reva and, thereafter, Tulsidas also died. Two sons were born to Bai Reva on account of marriage with Nathubhai Durlabhbhai. Out of that one son had died when he was minor and Respondent-defendant No. 1 is the other son. Thereby, Respondent-defendant No. 1, Tulsidas and Shivdas are brothers and were being brought up by Nathubhai Durlabhbhai and Bai Reva. Bai Reva executed a Will on 2nd January, 1950 and it was registered with Sub Registrar, Surat on 4th January, 1950. Out of that one son had died when he was minor and Respondent-defendant No. 1 is the other son. Thereby, Respondent-defendant No. 1, Tulsidas and Shivdas are brothers and were being brought up by Nathubhai Durlabhbhai and Bai Reva. Bai Reva executed a Will on 2nd January, 1950 and it was registered with Sub Registrar, Surat on 4th January, 1950. On account of such Will, Appellant-plaintiff and Respondent-defendant No. 4 have acquired right in respect of the suit property. Deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai administered the suit property as family property and after his death, Bai Reva was considered as an owner. The suit property was mortgaged by registered document dated 13th January, 1960.The said property was redeemed by document dated 11th December, 1976 and the consideration was paid out of the estate of deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai and deceased Bai Reva. Therefore, even assuming that the consideration was paid by Respondent-defendant No. 1, the parties are entitled for their shares and Respondent-defendant No. 1 cannot become the owner of the suit property. The appellant also claimed that there were tenants in the part of the suit property and Respondents-defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are receiving rent from them and, therefore, he is entitled for the account and share therein. Therefore, the suit was filed claiming relief as mentioned hereinbefore. 5. The Respondents-defendant Nos. 1 to 3 filed written statement at Exh.21 raising various contentions and disputing the claim made by the Appellant-plaintiff. The Respondents-defendant Nos. 4 to 6 also filed written statement at Exh.19 supporting the Appellant-plaintiff. 6. After considering the pleadings, the trial Court framed the issues and the parties adduced the evidence. At the end of trial, the Court by judgment dated 30th March, 1983 dismissed the suit. Therefore, the Appellant-plaintiff preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 208 of 1983 in the Court of learned Joint District Judge, Surat. The first Appellate Court, after hearing the Learned Advocates for the parties, by judgment dated 7th January, 1986, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 7. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the Appellant-plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal on the substantial question of law as formulated hereinabove. 8. I have heard Ms. Lopa Bhatt, learned Advocate for Mr. B.D. Desai, Learned Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. S.J. Gayakwad, Learned Advocate for the Respondents. 9. Ms. Lopa Bhatt, learned Advocate for Mr. 7. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the Appellant-plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal on the substantial question of law as formulated hereinabove. 8. I have heard Ms. Lopa Bhatt, learned Advocate for Mr. B.D. Desai, Learned Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. S.J. Gayakwad, Learned Advocate for the Respondents. 9. Ms. Lopa Bhatt, learned Advocate for Mr. B.D. Desai, learned Advocate for the Appellant has submitted that on the basis of the Application at Exh.45 filed by the Respondent-defendant No. 1, it becomes clear that Tulsidas was adopted by deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai and, therefore, it can be presumed that necessary ceremony was performed for adoption of Tulsidas. Therefore, the Courts below were not justified in discarding the evidence of application at Exh.45. She has also submitted that Bai Reva had executed a Will, which was duly proved and, therefore, Appellant-plaintiff and Respondent-defendant No. 4 had become the owners of the suit property and, therefore, the Courts below have no right to discard the evidence. She has relied upon the decision in case of Voleti Venkata Ramarao vs. Kesaparagada Bhaskararao, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1359 . Lastly, she has submitted that the present Second Appeal is required to be allowed. 10. Mr. S.J. Gayakwad, Learned Advocate for the Respondents has submitted that the substantial question of law has no foundation laid in the pleadings by the Appellant-plaintiff. He has also submitted that as there was no pleading, the trial Court had no occasion to frame the issues and record the finding with regard to adoption of Tulsidas. Therefore, the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit as well as appeal He has also submitted that the procedure of adoption is required to be proved to establish valid adoption, but as no such evidence was adduced before the trial Court, the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit as well as appeal and, therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment. He has relied upon the decision in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs., reported in (2001) 2 SCC 179. 11. Order 14 of CPC provides for settlement of issues and determination of the suit on issues of law or on issues agreed upon. Rule 1 provides that issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by other party. 11. Order 14 of CPC provides for settlement of issues and determination of the suit on issues of law or on issues agreed upon. Rule 1 provides that issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by other party. Sub-rule (2) provides that material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. Order 14, Rule 3 reads as under :— “R.3 The Court may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials:— (a) allegations made on oath by the parties, or by any persons present on their behalf, or made by the pleaders of such parties; (b) allegations made in the pleadings or in answers to interrogatories delivered in the suit; (c) the contents of documents produced by either party. In view of the above, it is clear that the Court is required to frame the issues on the basis of materials produced by the parties. Therefore, when a material preposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other party, the Court is required to frame issue with regard to such fact or law. 12. It appears from the averments made in the plaint that the Appellant-plaintiff did not plead material preposition of adoption of Tulsidas, the father of the Appellant-plaintiff by deceased Nathubhai Durlabhbhai. Therefore, there was no material before the trial Court to frame issue with regard to adoption of Tulsidas and the trial Court had no occasion to deal with the preposition of fact of adoption. It appears from the judgment of the trial Court also that this contention of adoption was not agitated and it was raised for the first time in appeal. It is true that the first Appellate Court being Court of fact, such contentions can be raised. But it is settled preposition that a contention has to be raised on the basis of foundation. Therefore, in absence of foundation, the first Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the contention with regard to adoption of Tulsidas by deceased Nathubhai. 13. It also appears from the impugned judgment that as there was no pleadings, no evidence with regard to adoption was adduced. Therefore, in absence of foundation, the first Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the contention with regard to adoption of Tulsidas by deceased Nathubhai. 13. It also appears from the impugned judgment that as there was no pleadings, no evidence with regard to adoption was adduced. Therefore also, the first Appellate Court was justified in not accepting the case of the Appellant-plaintiff. In the decision of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that to be a question of law ‘involving the case’ there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. As observed earlier, there is no foundation in the pleading and, therefore, there was no question of law involved in the matter and the first Appellate Court was justified in not accepting the case of the Appellant-plaintiff. 14. Learned Advocate for the Respondents has also submitted that the substantial question of law formulated by the Court is not substantial question of law and, therefore, the Court should not exercise power to entertain the present Second Appeal, relying upon the decision of Santosh Hazari (Supra). 15. In the decision of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Para -12 as under :— “12. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying ‘question of law’, means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of ‘substantial question of law’ by suffixing the words ‘of general importance’ as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta vs. T. Ram Ditta, the phrase ‘substantial question of law’ as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amended Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal vs. Mehta & Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao vs. Noony Veeraju: “When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial.” “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 16. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 16. Learned Advocate for the Appellant-plaintiff has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Voleti Venkata Ramarao vs. Kesaparagada Bhaskararao, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1359 it is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 17. In view of above, I accept the submission of Respondents that the question formulated is not a substantial question of law and, therefore, the appeal is required to be dismissed. 18. In the result, the substantial question of law formulated by the Court is not a substantial question of law and, therefore, it is not required to be answered and the Second Appeal is required to be dismissed. Accordingly, this Second Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs.