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2010 DIGILAW 5217 (MAD)

Gumani Bai v. K. Muthusamy

2010-12-01

T.S.SIVAGNANAM

body2010
Judgment :- 1. This Revision has been filed under Section 25(1) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act’) against the fair and final order dated 21.10.2005 in R.C.A. No.18 of 2005 on the file of the Appellate Authority cum Subordinate Judge, Udhagamandalam, confirming the fair and final order dated 13.4.2005 made in R.C.O.P No.19 of 1996 on the file of the Rent Controller cum District Munsif, Coonoor. 2. The Tenant is the Revision Petitioner and the Respondent is the Landlord. The tenancy is in respect of a non-residential premises bearing Door No.21, V.P. Street Coonoor, herein after referred to as the petition premises. For easy reference, the parties shall be referred to as the Landlord and Tenant. 3. The Landlord filed a Petition for eviction under Section 10 (2)(1) of the Act, alleging willful default in payment of the monthly rent of Rs.300/-. The period of default was from 1.4.1995 to 30.6.1996. Initially the Eviction Petition was filed against one N. Prasenchand. Since after filing of the Revision Petition, he died, his legal heirs namely his widow Mrs. Renuga and his mother N. Gumanibai were impleaded as Respondents by an order dated 30.3.2000 in I.A. No.71 of 1999 and by an order dated 19.9.2002 in I.A.No.80 of 2001 respectively. Earlier the Eviction Petition was taken on file by the learned Rent Controller and notice was issued to the Tenant returnable by 17.9.1996. On the first hearing date, the Counsel for the Tenant undertook to file vakalat and counter by 24.9.1996 and on 24.9.1996, vakalat was filed and time for filing the Counter was extended till 14.11.1996. On 14.11.1996, Counter was filed, the matter was posted for enquiry on 10.1.1997 and on the same day a sum of Rs.5,400/- was paid towards arrears of rent which was received by the Landlord without prejudice his rights and the payment was recorded by the learned Rent Controller. 4. On 14.11.1996, Counter was filed, the matter was posted for enquiry on 10.1.1997 and on the same day a sum of Rs.5,400/- was paid towards arrears of rent which was received by the Landlord without prejudice his rights and the payment was recorded by the learned Rent Controller. 4. The Tenant resisted the Eviction Petition by filing a Counter stating that rent had been upto 14.5.1996; that the last payment was by cheque, that since the Landlord wanted to receive the rent in lumpsum and believing the representation of the Landlord, rent was not paid for the period from 14.6.1995 to 14.6.1996, when it was offered to be paid during first week of July 1996, it was refused to be received by the Landlord and the Eviction Petition was filed. Therefore, it was contended that there was no willful default and in order to establish the bonafides, the entire arrears being a sum of Rs.5,400/- was paid. 5. Before the learned Rent Controller, the Landlord examined himself as P.W.1 and one Nirmalchand, the brother of the deceased First Respondent/ Tenant and son of the Third Respondent was examined as R.W.1. The Landlord did not mark any documents and on the side of the Tenant, Exs. R1 to R7 were marked. 6. The Rent Controller by an order dated 13.4.2005 held that there was wilful default in payment of rent and ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the said order, the Tenants preferred an Appeal before the learned Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No.18 of 2005 and the learned Appellate Authority also confirmed the finding of the learned Rent Controller. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings, the Tenant has filed the present Revision. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that the Tenant had deposited the entire arrears on the first date of hearing and therefore there is no wilful default. In support of the said contention, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, 1985 (98) LW 49. It was further contend by the learned Counsel that N. Prasenchand was the Tenant and at the time of hearing of the Eviction Petition, he had passed away and therefore his legal heirs who were impleaded as Respondents to the Eviction Petition were precluded from examining any witness to support the contention that the Landlord was receiving the rents in lumpsum. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that the rent for the period upto 14.5.1995 was paid by cheque dated 15.5.1995 which was received by the Landlord on 16.5.1995 and as the Landlord requested that the rent should be paid in lumpsum, based on such representation, the rent for the period from 14.6.1995 to 14.6.1996 was tendered during July 1996, which was refused to be received and simultaneously the Eviction Petition was filed without issuing any notice and the Tenant was precluded from resorting to the procedure contemplated under Section 8 (5) of the Act. Therefore, the learned Counsel would submit that since it is not a case of supine indifference in payment of rent, it is not a case of wilful default and in the absence of the deceased Tenant, his legal heirs were precluded from putting forth the best evidence before the Court and in such circumstances, the Court erroneously held that there was wilful default. It is further contended that in view of the Proviso to Section 10 (2) (1) of the Act, the Rent Controller ought to have granted time to enable the Tenants to pay the rent. 8. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Landlord would contend that the Tenant did not pay the arrears of rents on the first hearing of the Eviction Petition as alleged, but only after the matter was posted for enquiry, the same was tendered and in any event, the law on the subject has taken a sea of change and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundaram Pillai, referred supra is of no assistance to the case of the Petitioner. Further, it is stated that the tenancy is in respect of non residential premises in which the deceased Tenant was carrying on Finance Business along with his brother, his brother examined himself as R.W.1., admitted that the rent was payable on a monthly basis and that he was also doing business along with his brother. Therefore, the premises being a business premises, the case putforth by the Tenants is utterly false, the Courts below rightly appreciated the evidence on record and ordered eviction. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that this Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act should not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion than what was arrived at by the Courts below concurrently. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that this Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act should not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion than what was arrived at by the Courts below concurrently. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that the proviso to Section 10(2)(1) of the Act which was relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is not applicable to the case on hand since the learned Rent Controller has recorded a finding that the default was wilful and in support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the Respondent placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in (i) C.K.R. Murugan v. T.S. Arunagiri & Another, 1999 (1) LW 100 ; (ii) K.S. Pandian v. G. Rukmani Bai and Three Others, 2001 (1) CTC 356 : and (iii) Nagamani v. Boomi & Another, 2002 (4) LW 150 . 9. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record. 10. The sheet anchor of the argument of the learned Counsel for the Tenants is based on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Pillai, referred supra. Reference was made to paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Judgment and contended that the two factors mentioned under Section 10(2)(1) of the Act giving clear notice to the Tenant as to the mode of payment and also the last date by which he is legally supposed to pay the rent. However, this does not put the matter beyond controversy because before passing an order of eviction under the Proviso, it must also be proved that the default was willful and if the Rent Controller is of the opinion that the default in the facts of the case was not willful, he may give the Tenant a reasonable time not exceeding fifteen days to pay the rents and if this is complied with the Eviction Petition should be dismissed. 11. Reference was also made to the explanation contained under Section 10(2)(1) of the Act. Thus, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision, there is a duty cast upon the Court to decide whether default was wilful. 11. Reference was also made to the explanation contained under Section 10(2)(1) of the Act. Thus, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision, there is a duty cast upon the Court to decide whether default was wilful. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundaram Pillai was considered in several decisions of this Court and reference has been made to the decisions of this Court in the case of C.K.R. Murugan v. T.S. Arunagiri & Another, 1999 (1) LW 100 referred supra and Nagamani v. Boomi & Another, 2002 (4) LW 150 , referred supra. In the case of C.K.R. Murugan, this Court has held as follows: “10. The question whether the non-payment of rent by the Tenant for a particular period, amounts to wilful default or not would depend upon the facts of each case. It cannot be laid down as an universal rule that whenever the Tenant deposits the arrears of rent into Court at the first hearing of the case, the Tenant should be absolved from the terms “wilful default”. The Appellate Authority relying upon the Judgment of this Court reported in A.M.A. Jabbar v. T.S. Abdul Bari and two others, 1997 (2) LW 616 held that the Tenant has deposited the entire arrears of rent before 12.6.1985 i.e., the first hearing of the case and that the landlady has also accepted the said fact and that therefore, it cannot be said that the Tenant has committed wilful default. Learned Counsel for the Tenant mainly relies upon the above decision to substantiate his plea that the Tenant has not committed wilful default. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the above decision. This Court on consideration of the facts of the case in the above decision and the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in V. Krishna Mudaliar v. Lakshmi Ammal, 1996 (2) LW 467 has held that since the Tenant has paid the entire arrears before the effective date of hearing, there is no wilful default committed by him. But on a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Supreme Court, on peculiar facts of the said case has given the ruling in that case that the Tenant has not committed wilful default. But on a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Supreme Court, on peculiar facts of the said case has given the ruling in that case that the Tenant has not committed wilful default. It is stated in the above decision that the Tenant had deposited the rent immediately after the Ejectment Application. The facts of the above case will show that though the Appellant was the Tenant of the property in dispute under the earlier owner, the Respondent/ Landlord has dragged the Appellant to the Civil Court on the allegation that he was a trespasser and that the Civil Court decided the controversy in favour of the Appellant and held that he was the Tenant in the property and that in the reply notice also the Tenant has stated that he could not pay the rent because the Respondent never accepted him as the Tenant and refused to accept the rent till the proceedings were finalized by the Civil Court and that in the reply notice it was also stated that the non-payment of rent was not due to any fault on the part of the Tenant. The Supreme Court has held that the above facts were not taken into consideration by the Courts below in deciding the question whether the default committed by the Tenant is wilful or not. It is, thus, clear that the Tenant has offered valid explanation for not paying the rent and depositing the rent only after the R.C.O.P. is filed. Therefore, it is clear that the fact that the Tenant deposited the rent into Court at the first hearing of R.C.O.P. alone is not a valid ground for coming to a conclusion that the default in the payment of rent is not wilful. There can be no dispute that the question whether the non-payment of rent would tantamount to supine indifference on the part of the Tenant can be inferred from certain admitted facts. The above reported decision i.e., A.M.A. Jabbar v. T.S. Abdul Bari and two others (supra) has not been approved by this Court in the later judgment. There can be no dispute that the question whether the non-payment of rent would tantamount to supine indifference on the part of the Tenant can be inferred from certain admitted facts. The above reported decision i.e., A.M.A. Jabbar v. T.S. Abdul Bari and two others (supra) has not been approved by this Court in the later judgment. In the decision reported in Pandian K.S. v. G. Rukmani Bai, 2001 (1) CTC 356 : 2001 (1) LW 801 , a learned Single Judge of this Court referring to the above decision has held thus: “With due respect I am unable to share the view of the learned Judge in view of the reasons stated above, especially in the context of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Pillai’s case, 1985 (98) LW 49”. Relying upon the judgment of this Court delivered by K. Govindarajan, J., the learned Single Judge has held thus: “ Being faced with the very same contentions as raised before me, K. Govindarajan, J. held that accepting the contention that there was no wilful default if the Tenant had deposited the entire rent on the first date of hearing, would amount to rewriting the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act vide Easwara Rao, T.V.N.W. Ansari, 1999 (1) CTC 221 , I am in respectful agreement with him”. 11. As already stated in Krishna Mudaliar’s case referred to above, the Tenant has offered valid explanation for the delay in payment of rent and therefore, the Supreme Court has held that as the Tenant deposited the rent into Court at the first hearing of the case, it cannot be said that the Tenant has committed wilful default. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Tenant that the judgment of this Court reported in M.A. Jabbar v. T.S. Abdul Bari and two others (supra) has to be followed in all cases. 12. Learned Counsel for the revision Petitioners relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 = 1985 98 LW 45. 12. Learned Counsel for the revision Petitioners relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 = 1985 98 LW 45. The expression “wilful default” has been described in the above decision thus: “A consensus of the meaning of the words “wilful default” appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a Tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Tamil Nadu Act or by other State Acts which are in pari materia”. Regarding the facts relating to issue of notice and non-payment of rent within time, the Apex Court has observed thus: “But if the Landlord chooses to give two months’ notice to the Tenant to clear up the dues and the Tenant does not pay the dues within the stipulated time of the notice then the Controller would have no discretion to decide the question of wilful default because such a conduct of the Tenant would itself be presumed to be wilful default unless he shows that he was prevented by sufficient cause or circumstances beyond his control in honouring the notice sent by the Landlord” Bearing the principles of law laid down in the above decision, the question whether or not the Tenant has committed wilful default in this case has to be decided and in the case of Nagammal, this Court held as follows: “12. Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 . The expression “wilful default” has been described in the above decision thus: “A consensus of the meaning of the words `wilful default’ appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. The expression “wilful default” has been described in the above decision thus: “A consensus of the meaning of the words `wilful default’ appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a Tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Tamil Nadu Act or other State Acts which are in pari materia”. Regarding the facts relating to issue of notice and non-payment of rent within time, the Apex Court has observed thus: “But if the Landlord chooses to give two months’ notice to the Tenant to clear up the dues and the Tenant does not pay the dues within the stipulated time of the notice then the Controller would have no discretion to decide the question of wilful default because such a conduct of the Tenant would itself be presumed to be wilful default unless she shows that he was prevented by sufficient cause or circumstances beyond his control in honouring the notice sent by the Landlord”. Bearing the principles of law laid down in the above decision, the question whether or not the Tenant has committed wilful default in this case has to be decided. 13. If the Tenant is able to give valid explanation for nonpayment of rent till the same is deposited into Court, then there would be no difficulty in holding that the Tenant has not committed wilful default. In this case, the Tenant has offered the following explanation in the counter: (i) The Petitioner/ Landlord demanded enhanced rent and she evaded to receive the rent; (ii) The First Respondent sent the rent by money orders; (iii) There was a dispute between the landlady and the landlady represented that the rent would be received after settlement of the dispute; (iv) The son of the Petitioner, who is handicapped, demanded the rent, for which the Tenant was not agreeable. Therefore, he did not pay the rent. On Tenant’s own showing, the explanation offered by the Tenant/ R.W.1. cannot be accepted at all. Therefore, he did not pay the rent. On Tenant’s own showing, the explanation offered by the Tenant/ R.W.1. cannot be accepted at all. There are no materials to show that the Petitioner/ Landlady demanded enhanced rent from the Tenant. There are also no materials to show that the First Respondent sent the amount by money order to the Landlady. R.W.1, the Tenant, has admitted in his evidence that the son of the Petitioner is dumb and he could not speak and that he demanded the rent from him. I fail to understand as to how a dumb person could have demanded amount from the Tenant, especially when the landlady is alive. The above admission of R.W.1 itself will show that the Tenant has come forward to offer false explanation for non-payment of rent”. 12. The aspect as to whether the deposit of the entire arrears of the rent made by the Petitioner after receiving notice in the Eviction Petition would absolve the Petitioner from the wilful default was considered by this Court in the case of K.S. Pandian v. Rukmani Bai, 2001 (1) CTC 356 . While considering the various decisions including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundaram Pillai, observed as hereunder: “17. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words “wilful default” appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a Tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above. 18. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is the scope of a Proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation either to a Proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall first take up the question of the nature, scope and extent of a Proviso. The well established rule of interpretation of a Proviso is that a Proviso may have three separate functions. We shall first take up the question of the nature, scope and extent of a Proviso. The well established rule of interpretation of a Proviso is that a Proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a Proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the Proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a Proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set a naught the real object of the main enactment. 19. Craies in his book Statute Law (7th Edn.) while explaining the purpose and import of a Proviso states at p. 218 thus: “The effect of an exception or qualifying Proviso, according to the ordinary rule of construction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the Proviso would be within it… The natural presumption is that, but for the Proviso, the enacting part of the Section would have included the subject-matter of the Proviso.” Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th Edn.) while referring to the scope of a Proviso mentioned the following ingredients. “p. 317 Provisos – These are clauses of exception or qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or qualifying something in, the enactment which, but for the Proviso, would be within it. p. 318. Though framed as a Proviso, such a clause may exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.” Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-295 has collected the following principles in regard to a Proviso: (a) When one finds a Proviso to a Section the natural presumption is that, but for the Proviso, the enacting part of the Section would have included the subject-matter of the Proviso. (b) A Proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. ( c) Where the Proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the Proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the Section as the Proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers. (b) A Proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. ( c) Where the Proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the Proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the Section as the Proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers. (d) Where the Section is doubtful, a Proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a Proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the Section. (e) The Proviso is subordinate to the main Section. (f) A Proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary Proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a Proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of Section should prevail. (i) When a Proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the Proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A Proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. 20. In the case of Local Government Board v. South Stoneham Union Lord Macnaghten made the following observation: “I think the Proviso is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate.” In Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai, it was held that the main object of a Proviso is merely to qualify the main enactment. In Madras and Southern Mahrata Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipalit, Lord Macmillan observed thus: “The proper function of a Proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case.” The above case was approved by this Court in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. Where Kapur, J. held that the proper function of a Proviso was merely to qualify the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out, as it were, from the main enactment a portion which, but for the Proviso, would fall within the main enactment. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha, Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, very aptly and succinctly indicated the parameters of a Proviso thus: “As a general rule, a Proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a Proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.” 34. In West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Societ, while guarding against the danger of interpretation of a Proviso, Lord Watson observed thus: “a very dangerous and certainly unusual course to import legislation from a Proviso wholesale into the body of the statute”. A very apt description and extent of a Proviso was given by Lord Oreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co, where it was pointed out that insertion of a Proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly adhered to its legitimate use and at times a Section worded as a Proviso may wholly or partly be in substance a fresh enactment adding to and not merely excepting something out of or qualifying what goes before. To the same effect is a later decision of the same Court in Jennings v. Kell, where it was observed thus: “We must now come to the Proviso, for there is, I think, no doubt that, in the construction of the section, the whole of it must be read, and a consistent meaning, if possible, given to every part of it. The words are…`provided that such licence shall be granted only for premises situate in the ward or district electoral division in which such increase in population has taken place…’ There seems to be no doubt that the words “such increase in population” refer to the increase of not less than 25 per cent of the population mentioned in the opening words of the section.” 21. While interpreting a Proviso care must be taken that it is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them separately. In short, generally speaking, a Proviso is intended to limit the enacted provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a Proviso may be embedded in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a substantive provision itself. In short, generally speaking, a Proviso is intended to limit the enacted provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a Proviso may be embedded in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a substantive provision itself. 22. Apart from the authorities referred to above, this Court has in a long course of decisions explained and adumbrated the various shades, aspects and elements of a Proviso. In State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jai, the following observations were made: “So far as a general principle of construction of a Proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a Proviso is to limit the main part of the section and carve out something which but for the Proviso would have been within the operative part.” In the case of STO, Circle-I, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad, Bhargava, J. observed thus: “It is well-recognised that a Proviso is added to a principal clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what the legislature desires should be excluded.” In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. R.S. Jhaver, this Court made the following observations: “Generally speaking, it is true that the Proviso is an exception to the main part of the section; but it is recognised that in exceptional cases a Proviso may be a substantive provision itself.” In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwaraka Das Saraf, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed thus: “There is some validity in this submission but if, on a fair construction, the principal provision is clean a Proviso cannot expand or limit it. Sometimes a Proviso is engrafted by an apprehensive draftsman to remove possible doubts, to make matters plain, to light up ambiguous edges. Here, such is the case…. If the rule of construction is that prima facie a Proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the Proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a Proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a Proviso. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the Proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a Proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a Proviso. A Proviso ordinarily is but a Proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the Proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.” In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P. & Anr etc., this Court made the following observations: “Ordinarily a Proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. But cases have arisen in which this Court has held that despite the fact that a provision is called Proviso, it is really a separate provision and the so-called Proviso has substantially altered the main section”. 23. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a Proviso may serve four different purposes (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment: (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. These seem to be by and large the main purport and parameters of a Proviso. 24. These seem to be by and large the main purport and parameters of a Proviso. 24. So far as the Act in question is concerned, the matter does not rest only on the question of wilful default, but by an amendment (Act 23 of 1973) an Explanation, in the following terms, was added to the Proviso to Section 10(2) of the Act: “Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, default to pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful, if the default by the Tenant in the payment or tender of rent continues after the issue of two months notice by the Landlord claiming the rent.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the legal principle which could be culled out from all the above referred decisions is that the burden is on the Tenant to show that the default is not intentional or deliberate. 13. In the instant case, R.W.1 is one Mr. N. Nirmalchand, who is the brother of the original Tenant N. Prasandchand and the son of N. Gumani Bai, the Petitioners herein. In the course of cross examination, R.W.1 candidly admitted that he and his deceased brother are the Tenants, that the tenancy agreement was drawn in the name of his brother, till his life time, the rents were paid by cheque and for the period from 1991-92 the rents were paid every month by cheque. The learned Rent Controller after considering the evidence of R.W. 1 and also the counter which was filed in R.C.O.P. stating that the monthly rent of Rs.300/- is payable on or before 14th day of every succeeding English Calender Month, disbelieved the contentions raised by the Tenant stating that the Landlord desired the rent to be paid in lumpsum and they are not in default. In the light of the admission by the Tenants stating that the rents have to be paid on or before 14 day of every succeeding English Calender month, the Rent Controller held that the Tenants were under an obligation to pay the contractual rent within the said period and disbelieved the stand taken by the Tenants that it is on the request of the Landlord, rent was paid in lumpsum. 14. Further, the learned Rent Controller also recorded a finding that the Tenants failed to prove their stand stating that the rent was payable in lumpsum. 14. Further, the learned Rent Controller also recorded a finding that the Tenants failed to prove their stand stating that the rent was payable in lumpsum. Thus, the Rent Controller came to a conclusion that the failure was wilful and ordered eviction. This order was confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority also took note of the fact that the arrears of rent was not paid at the time of first hearing as contended by the Petitioner. In any event, as per the discussion in the case of K.S. Pandian, referred supra, there is no declaration of law to the effect that if the arrears are paid within the short time after the filing of the Application, there would be no default. 15. Thus, in view of the concurrent finding arrived at by the Courts below, which according to this Court has been done on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, there are no grounds made out by the Petitioners to interfere with such concurrent findings. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scope and jurisdiction of this Court under Section 25 of the Act held that this Court is not an Appellate Court to re-appraise or reverse the concurrent findings of the Courts below by coming to a different conclusion contrary to the findings arrived at by the Courts below. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, 1980 (4) SCC 259, and followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the latest decision in Speedline Agencies v. T. Stanes & Co. Ltd., 2010 (4) CTC 573 (SC): 2010 (6) SCC 257 , that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 25 of the Act may not be as narrow as the power under Section 115, C.P.C. but it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of First Appeal. The findings rendered by the Courts below is based on proper appreciation of evidence and therefore this Court finds no justifiable reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 16. For all the above reason, I find no merits in the contentions raised by the Petitioners. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is dismissed. The findings rendered by the Courts below is based on proper appreciation of evidence and therefore this Court finds no justifiable reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 16. For all the above reason, I find no merits in the contentions raised by the Petitioners. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is dismissed. The Tenants shall vacate and handover vacant possession of the Petition premises within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.