Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 523 (GUJ)

Chandrakant Kantilal Mehta v. Surat Municipal Corporation

2010-10-26

BANKIM N.MEHTA

body2010
Judgment Bankim N. Mehta, J.—The Appellants have preferred this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the following substantial questions of law formulated by the Court: (1) Whether looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, R.D. Desai is an officer of the Corporation who is entitled to issue the impugned notice, Ex. 23? (2) In the absence of notice to plaintiff No. 2, whether the impugned notice and the impugned decision can be said to be legal, proper and enforceable? (3) Whether the impugned decision taken without hearing plaintiff No. 2 on the question whether a part of the land has been let to him and whether part of the superstructure is constructed by him is in violation of the principles of natural justice and the provisions of Sec. 260 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act? 2. The Appellants-plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Suit No. 62 of 1981 in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Surat, for declaration that the proposed action of the Municipal Corporation by which construction of 48 ft. x 13 ft. made in the corner of the said rented premises be declared illegal, arbitrary, unauthorized, against the principles of natural justice and also sought by way of consequential relief, permanent injunction. 3. The plaintiffs filed Suit contending that 500 sq. yards of land out of 800 sq. yards of land situated in T.P. Scheme No. 3 Final Plot No. 134B in Katargam area was given by plaintiff No. 1 to plaintiff No. 2 on rent under agreement dated 10.11.1976. The Respondent Corporation served a notice to plaintiff No. 1 only to remove the construction made on the suit property as it was against the provisions of law. The plaintiffs approached the Civil Court by filing the suit for the above mentioned reliefs. The Municipal Corporation contested the Suit. After trial, the trial Court by judgement dated 30.3.1984 dismissed the Suit. Therefore, the plaintiffs preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1984 in the Court of learned District Judge, Surat. 4. The first appellate Court after hearing Learned Advocates for the parties by judgement dated 26.8.1987 dismissed the appeal. 5. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the Appellants have preferred this Second Appeal. 6. I have heard learned Advocate Mr. Vyas for learned Advocate Mr. Bharat J. Shelat for the Appellants. Learned Advocate Mr. 4. The first appellate Court after hearing Learned Advocates for the parties by judgement dated 26.8.1987 dismissed the appeal. 5. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the Appellants have preferred this Second Appeal. 6. I have heard learned Advocate Mr. Vyas for learned Advocate Mr. Bharat J. Shelat for the Appellants. Learned Advocate Mr. Pranav G. Desai for the Respondent is absent. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Vyas has mainly submitted that the Courts below committed error in appreciation of evidence as there was no evidence produced on the record of the trial Court to establish that the Officer Mr. R.D. Desai who had issued notice Exh. 23 had authority to issue such notice. He has also submitted that the Courts below also committed error in not believing that plaintiff No. 2 was required to be served with the notice as he was a tenant of plaintiff No. 1 and was in occupation of the suit property. He has also submitted that as the decision was taken without hearing plaintiff No. 2, the decision was against principles of natural justice and therefore, the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the Suit. 8. It appears from the contentions taken by the Appellants that construction was made in the margin land of the property belonging to Appellant No. 1 and as the construction was against the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the authority served notice under Section 260 of the said Act. It also appears that the owner of the property entitled to the notice raised various contentions. The local authority after giving an opportunity to the owner of the property in question passed an order to remove the construction made in the margin land against the provisions of law. Therefore, legal action was taken by the owner of the property and the alleged tenant occupying the property in question. 9. It appears that according to the Appellant-original plaintiff No. 1, measurement of the entire property was 800 sq. yards and out of that 500 sq. yards of property was given on rent to Appellant-plaintiff No. 2. The Courts below on appreciation of evidence recorded the findings against the Appellants. The trial Court assigned reasons for the conclusion reached by it. It appears that the Appellants-plaintiffs did not produce any documentary evidence to indicate that the property in question was rented out and rent was being recovered. The Courts below on appreciation of evidence recorded the findings against the Appellants. The trial Court assigned reasons for the conclusion reached by it. It appears that the Appellants-plaintiffs did not produce any documentary evidence to indicate that the property in question was rented out and rent was being recovered. It also appears that the Appellant-plaintiff No. 1 had earlier submitted plans Exhs. 21 and 22 for construction before the Municipal Corporation and thereafter revised plans were approved by the Municipal Corporation in the year 1978. The first appellate Court observed that the plans were in respect of the construction on the entire plot of land of 800 sq. yards and if tenancy was created in the year 1976 the owner of the property would have no business to get the plan approved for the entire plot of 800 sq. yards. The first appellate Court has also observed that consequently the plans were revised as per Exh. 34 but it was subsequent to the issue of injunction order Exh. 46 dated 16.6.1980 served by the Municipal Corporation with regard to unauthorized construction on the property in question. The first appellate Court has after reappreciation of evidence recorded finding that Appellant-plaintiff No. 2 was never in occupation of the property in question and therefore was not required to be heard by issuing notice under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. In view of the observation made by the first appellate Court it clearly emerges that the Appellants-plaintiffs tried to raise a defence for the unauthorized construction made in the property in question. It also appears that no evidence with regard to the alleged tenancy rights of Appellant-plaintiff No. 2 was produced before the trial Court and therefore the Courts below were justified in not believing the case of the Appellants-plaintiffs. As regards the authority of the officer Mr. R.D. Desai who issued notice Exh. 23, it appears from the judgement of the first appellate Court that learned Advocate for the Appellants-plaintiffs did not press the point further. It also appears that the Municipal Corporation had produced sufficient evidence to establish the authority of the officer to issue the notice Exh. 23. The first appellate Court has also recorded the finding that the Standing Committee or General Body had authority, by passing Resolution, to delegate the powers to the concerned officer. It also appears that the Municipal Corporation had produced sufficient evidence to establish the authority of the officer to issue the notice Exh. 23. The first appellate Court has also recorded the finding that the Standing Committee or General Body had authority, by passing Resolution, to delegate the powers to the concerned officer. Therefore, the Courts below were justified in holding that Mr. Desai had authority to issue the notice Exh. 23. 10. Learned Advocate for the Appellants has not been able to point out any infirmity in the impugned judgements. 11. In the result, substantial question of law No. 1 is answered in affirmative and substantial questions of law Nos. 2 and 3 are answered in negative. The appeal fails and stands dismissed with no order as to costs. 12. In view of dismissal of the main matter, the Civil Application does not survive. Interim relief stands vacated. P P P P P