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2010 DIGILAW 5243 (MAD)

Dr. M. Kamatchi Sundaram v. State by the Inspector of Police, City Crime Branch, Coimbatore (Crime No. 3/2004)

2010-12-01

K.MOHAN RAM

body2010
Judgment :- The petitioner in the above Criminal Revision is the seventh accused in C.C. No.221 of 2007 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Coimbatore, wherein he is facing trial along with the other accused for the charges under Sections 420, 465, 468, 471, 472 r/w 120-B and 109, I.P.C. The petitioner filed Crl.M.P. No.2759 of 2007, seeking his discharge. But the same was contested by the respondent herein and the learned Magistrate dismissed the said Discharge Petition and being aggrieved by that, the above Criminal Revision has been filed. 2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the above Criminal Revision is set out below: (i) On 12.01.2004, the Assistant Vice President of ING Vysya Bank, Saibaba Colony, Near Sivasakthi Theatre, Coimbatore, lodged a Complaint against the petitioner herein and others alleging that A1 to A3 created a false partnership deed on 14.09.2001 as if A2 (R. Nageswari) and A3 (Sakthi Ganesh) were partners of the firm M/s. Golden Fibre and prepared a fabricated lease deed as if the mother of the first accused leased out the factory land and building to M/s. Golden Fibre firm to carry on coir fibre manufacturing work. It is alleged that the said fabricated documents were produced by accused 1 to 3 before the complainant Bank and secured a term loan as well as cash credit facility totaling to Rs.43,58,175/-in favour of M/s. Golden Fibre firm for installation of machineries and to avail cash credit facilities. It is further alleged in the complaint that the accused 4 to 7 being brothers stood as guarantors and offered joint family property as guarantee for the loan sanctioned to A1 to A3. In the property given as guarantee, a nursing homo is located. It is further alleged in the complaint that A1 to A6 were previously partners of three firms viz., (i) Subham Mattings (ii) Subham Industries, and (iii) Coir Twills and by giving the factory land and building as security, obtained loan for the aforesaid three firms from City Union Bank, Pollachi. The accounts of the aforesaid three firms became non-performing assets and the total outstanding due from the said firms in the year 1098 stood at Rs.23 lakhs. It is further alleged that being unable to settle the above said loan. The accounts of the aforesaid three firms became non-performing assets and the total outstanding due from the said firms in the year 1098 stood at Rs.23 lakhs. It is further alleged that being unable to settle the above said loan. A1 and A3 intentionally changed their names as S.R.P. Ramesh (previously S. Subramuniam) and S. Sakthi Ganesh (previously S. Marimuthu), created false partnership firm M/s. Golden Fibre as if A2 and A3 were partners and availed loan from the complainant bank to settle the liability towards City Union Bank, Pollachi with the help or the other accused. (ii) On receipt of the Complaint, the respondent registered a case in Crime No.3 of 2004 for the offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 465, 468 and 471, I.P.C. After completing the investigation, the respondent filed charge sheet against all the accused for the offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 109, I.P.C. The prosecution sought to prove the charges against the accused by examining L.Ws 1 to 10 and the documents numbering about 29. (iii) The petitioner herein filed a Discharge Petition before the learned Judicial Magistrate contending that while no prima facie case has been made out against him he is sought to be charged along with the other accused by alleging that he had conspired with other accused and abetted the other accused in the commission of the various offences. It was contended by the petitioner that he is a Doctor by profession and the only allegation against him as per the first information report and the statement of the witnesses examined in the course of investigation is that he along with other accused viz., A4 to A5 stood as guarantor by offering a joint family property wherein a nursing home is situated as guarantee to help A2 and A3 to secure the loan for their firm M/s. Golden Fibre from the complainant bank. It was further contended that even as per the prosecution caser the petitioner van neither a partner of the firm for which the loan was fraudulently availed nor involved in creating any fabrication of documents. By merely standing as a guarantor for the sanction of the loan to A1 to A3, it cannot be inferred that he conspired with the main accused and abetted them to commit the various offences alleged. By merely standing as a guarantor for the sanction of the loan to A1 to A3, it cannot be inferred that he conspired with the main accused and abetted them to commit the various offences alleged. (iv) The above said Petition was opposed by the prosecution by contending that there is evidence to prove that the petitioner took part in the Criminal conspiracy with the other accused to commit the main offence and that he abetted the other accused to commit the other offences. It was further contended that specific overt acts have been attributed to the petitioner in the charge-sheet. It was also contended that the petitioner had knowledge about the offence being committed by the other accused and as such it could be prima facie held that he had conspired with the other accused and abetted the other accused to commit the main offence. (v) The learned Magistrate has considered the rival contentions and the materials produced by the prosecution but erroneously holding that the petitioner herein had account with the City Union Bank, Pollachi and his complicity in the commission of the offences along with the other accused can be determined only after recording of the evidence, dismissed the Petition. 3. Being aggrieved by that, the above Revision is filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner, even as per the prosecution, is neither a partner of M/s. Golden Fibre for which the loan was obtained from the complainant-Bank nor he was involved in the creation of fabricated documents. The only overt act attributed against the petitioner is that he joined with A4 to A6 in offering the joint family property as security for the sanctioning of the loan to A1 to A3. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner is hot a beneficiary of the loan obtained from the complainant-Bank. The three firms in which A1 to A6 were partners had obtained loan from the City Union Bank, Pollachi and those loans were not repaid by them and hence those accounts became non-performing assets. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner is hot a beneficiary of the loan obtained from the complainant-Bank. The three firms in which A1 to A6 were partners had obtained loan from the City Union Bank, Pollachi and those loans were not repaid by them and hence those accounts became non-performing assets. The prosecution case is that on the advise and abetment of the eighth accused (A8), A1 to A3 floated M/s. Golden Fibre firm and since A8 knew about M/s. Kurichi Engineering located at Pattukottai since earlier he was employed there, he had opened an account in the name M/s. Kurichi Engineering and abetted A1 and A3 to get the demand drafts disbursed by the complainant-Bank and deposited the demand drafts in that account and thereafter utilized the amounts so collected to discharge the loan amounts payable by A1 to A6 to City Union Bank, Pollachi. According to the learned counsel, it has not been alleged either in the charge sheet or in the statement of L.W.1 that there was any agreement or meeting of mind between the petitioner and the other accused regarding the commission of the offences under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 471, I.P.C. Learned counsel submitted that merely because the petitioner stood as a guarantor, he could not be presumed that he had abetted the commission of the offences by the other accused. The learned counsel in support of the said contentions placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 66. In the aforesaid decision, in para 17, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “17. Conspiracy is defined in Section 120-A, I.P.C. to mean: “120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.- When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,- (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a Criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement, to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation: It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” An offence of conspiracy which is a separate and distinct offence, thus, would require the involvement of more than one person. Explanation: It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” An offence of conspiracy which is a separate and distinct offence, thus, would require the involvement of more than one person. Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It is punishable separately, its ingredients being- (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is now, however, well, settled that a conspiracy ordinarily is hatched in secrecy. The Court for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the said offence has been committed or not may take into consideration the circumstantial evidence. While however doing so, it must be borne in mind that meeting of the mind is essential; mere knowledge or discussion would not be sufficient.” (ii) Kishori Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (3) SCC (Cri) 701. In the said decision, in para 6, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “6. Section 107, I.P.C. defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in I.P.C. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any per is on to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional air, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment, provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.” (iii) S.W. Palanitkar and Others v. State of Bihar and another, 2002 SCC (Cri) 129. “Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.” (iii) S.W. Palanitkar and Others v. State of Bihar and another, 2002 SCC (Cri) 129. In the said decision, in para 21, the Apex Court has observed as under: “21…….. The allegations made against the appellants other then appellant 7 are very vague and bald. From the materiel that was placed before the Magistrate, even prima facie, it cannot be said that there was conspiracy or connivance between the other appellants and appellant 7. If the appellants have committed breach of agreement, it is open to respondent 2 to seek redressal in a Competent Court or forum to recover the damages, if permissible in law in case he had sustained any loss.” Further, in para 27, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “77. In the case on hand, we have already stated above that except against appellant 7, no offence was made out against the remaining appellants as the ingredients of offences alleged against them were not satisfied. Unfortunately, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to correct manifest error committed by the learned Magistrate in issuing process against appellants 1-6 and 8 when the alleged acts against them did not constitute offences for want of satisfying the ingredients of the offences. The approach and considerations while exercising power and jurisdiction by a Magistrate at the time of issuing process are to be in terms of Sections 200 to 203 under Chapter XV, Cr.P.C., having due regard to the position of law explained in various decisions of this Court, and whereas while exercising power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. the High Court has to look t the object and purpose for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. This being the position, exercise of power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of Court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object of which they are conferred.” 5. Countering the said submission, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that the order of the learned Magistrate do not suffer from any material irregularity or illegality and as such the same cannot be interfered with. The learned counsel submitted that the statement of L.W.1 contains specific allegations against this petitioner which prima facie establishes the charges leveled against the petitioner herein. According to the learned Government Advocate, the petitioner was a joint owner along with A4 to A6 of the property wherein a nursing home was situated and the same was offered as security/guarantee for the sanctioning of the huge amount of loan by the complainant-Bank to A1 to A6. Being the brother of A4 to A6, this petitioner has knowledge about the other three firms in which A4 to A6 are also partners along with A1 to A3 and which firms had obtained loan from the City Union Bank, Pollachi and those loans were unpaid and therefore those accounts became non-performing assets; and unable to pay the loan due to City Union Bank by A1 to A6 the firm M/s. Golden Fibre was floated by them and bogus documents were prepared and obtained loan from the complainant bank and the petitioner being the brother of A4 to A6 would have knowledge of the same and L.W.1 in his statement has stated that this petitioner has knowledge about the illegal acts; committed by the other accused and has stated prima facie ingredients of offence under Sections 120-B and 109, I.P.C. have been made out. Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) submitted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court cannot appreciate the evidence but it can only look into the evidence sought to be produced by the prosecution in support of the case and should accept such evidence as true and find out as to whether prima facie case has been made out or not. According to the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side), the statement of L.W.1 prima facie makes out the ingredients of the offence alleged against the petitioner herein and therefore, the learned Magistrate is right in dismissing the Discharge Petition. 6. In support of the said contention the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) State of Maharashtra and Others v. Som Nath Thapa and Others, 1996 SCC (Cri) 820. In the said decision, in para 24 and 30, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had th’i knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use. …. …. …. 30. In Antulay case, 1986 (2) SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 236, Bhagwati, C.J., opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of Sections, that despite the difference there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied. According to Shri Jethmalani, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the accused liable to conviction. In our view, a better an clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame a charge against him for committing that offence.” (ii) State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, 1977 SCC (Cri) 533. In the said decision, in para 5, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “5. In Nirmaljit Sing Hoon v. State of West Bengal, 1973 (2) SCR 66 : 1973 (3) SCC 753 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 521, Shelt, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the majority of the Court referred at page 79 of the report to the earlier decisions of this Court in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, 1964 (1) SCR 639 : AIR 1963 SC 1430 : 1963 (2) CRl.LJ 397) – where this Court was held to have laid down with reference to the similar provisions contained in Sections 202 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 “that the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, and observed that where there was prima facie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the Complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused”. Illustratively, Shelat, J., further added “unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory, or intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot be refused if that evidence makes out a prima facie case.” (ii) R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay and another, 1966 SCC (Cri) 256. In the said decision, in para 73, the Apex Court has observed as under: “73. We have no intention to make any thing final at this stage except that the prosecution for the offence under Section 384, I.P.C., must fail. Any observation made by us in any part of our judgment is confined to the question as to whether charges should be framed and/or the order of discharge should be upheld. We have no intention to make any thing final at this stage except that the prosecution for the offence under Section 384, I.P.C., must fail. Any observation made by us in any part of our judgment is confined to the question as to whether charges should be framed and/or the order of discharge should be upheld. Even where we have said that a charge is to be framed the position is that a prime facie case has been made out which is open to be rebutted by respondent 1. The learned Trial Judge is, therefore, free to come to his own conclusions on the basis of the evidence which is already on record and which may be led before him by the parties when the trial proceeds after the framing of the charges and he will decide whether the charges against respondent I are made out or not on the basis of the entire evidence.” (iv) Hem Chand v. State of Jharkhand, 2008 (2) MLJ 1641 (SC). In the said decision, in para 8 and 9, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “8. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court will not weigh the evidence. The stage for appreciating the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion as to whether the prosecution was able to bring home the charge against the accused or not would arise only after all the evidences are brought on records at the trial. The documents whereupon the appellant intended to rely upon were (i) an order of assessment passed by the Income Tax Authority, and (ii) his declaration of assets. 9. It is one thing to saythat on the basis of the admitted documents, the appellant was in a position to show that the charges could not have been framed against him, but it is another thing to say that for the said purpose, he could rely upon some documents whereupon the prosefution would not rely upon.” (v) J. Jayalalitha and others v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle, Madras, 2007 (1) MLJ (Crl) 58. In the said decision, the learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the Discharge Petition filed under Section 245, Cr.P.C. has held that at that stage, the Court is obliged to consider whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused but not to conduct a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the case by weighing the evidence or collecting materials as if the trial. 7. I have considered the aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record and the decisions relied upon by them. 8. To appreciate contentions, it is necessary to look into the statement of L.W.1, the complainant. The Assistant Vice President of ING Vyasa Bank viz., the complainant, in his statement has stated that at the end of December, 2001, A1 and his wife A2 and A3 approached the complainant bank for sanctioning of the loan for a sum of Rs.38 lakhs for setting up a coir industry. A project report was also submitted by them and the same was evaluated by the authorities of the complainant-Bank and the site where the industry was proposed to be set up was inspected by them and thereafter an Application was submitted by A1 to A3 in the name of M/s. Golden Fibre an 28.01.2002. After following the usual procedure, loan was sanctioned. When the bank wanted A1 to A3 to offer the immovable property where the unit is to be located as security, the accused re alleged to have stated that since a temple is located there, they are sentimentally against the offering the said property as security but on enquiry, it came to light that the said property has been given as security for the loans obtained by them from City Union Bank, Pollachi. L.W.1 has further stated that A8-Balasundaram was the Manager of the Pollachi branch from 2002 and that he was the Manager of City Union Bank, Pattukottai earlier and has stated that he knew the owner of the M/s. Kurichi Engineering Mr. K.A. Saminathan and his son Mr. K.S. Ramesh, who was the Manager of the said firm. The said Kurichi Engineering had Current Account No.1481 with City Union Bank, Pattukottai. K.A. Saminathan and his son Mr. K.S. Ramesh, who was the Manager of the said firm. The said Kurichi Engineering had Current Account No.1481 with City Union Bank, Pattukottai. Since A1 to A8 knew the details about Kurichi Engineering, Pattukottai, they conspired together and A1 opened the account in Account No.1268 with City Union Bank, Pollachi by impersonating as if A1 is the owner of Kurichi Engineering. The said account has been opened with the help and connivance of A8. By using this account, various demand drafts obtained from the complainant-Bank in the name of Kurichi Engineering were encashed and the encashed amount was utilized by AB to close the loan account of A1 to A6 with City Union Bank, Pollachi. To obtain the demand drafts from the complainant bank, various invoices, bills and receipts have been fabricated by A1 to A3 and produced before the complainant-Bank. Thus by fabricating the false documents, A1 to A3 and produced before the complainant-Bank. Thus by fabricating the false documents, A1 to A3 have cheated the complainant-Bank. Thus by fabricating the false documents, A1 to A3 have cheated the complainant-Bank and also committed offence under Sections 465, 468 and 471 I.P.C. It is further stated by L.W.1 that without purchasing new machineries, old machineries have been repainted as if those are new machineries purchased by them. 9. In his statement, L.W.1 has further stated that A4 to A7 executed the guarantee deed on 07.10.2002 and all or them are close relatives. Except the petitioner herein, all the other guarantors are debtors to City Union Bank, Pollachi. A4 to A6 are the partners of the three firms with A1 to A3 and firms’ accounts became non-performing assets. He has stated that they have played a major role in obtaining the loan from the complainant-Bank and repaying the loan due to City Union Bank, Pollachi. L.W.1 has also stated that they also knew about the conspiracy hatched by A1 to A3 to cheat the complainant-Bank. He has further stated that they also knew about the non-purchase of new machineries and fabrication of invoices, receipts and seals and also cheating committed by A1. He has stated that these accused only with an intention to close the non-performing assets account with City Union Bank, Pollachi, being stood as guarantors for the sanctioning of the loan and thereby, they have cheated the complainant-Bank. 10. He has stated that these accused only with an intention to close the non-performing assets account with City Union Bank, Pollachi, being stood as guarantors for the sanctioning of the loan and thereby, they have cheated the complainant-Bank. 10. The aforesaid statement of L.W.1 was strongly relied upon by the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) to show that there is prima facie allegation against the petitioner, which according to him, constitute the ingredients of the offences under Sections 120-B and 109, I.P.C., At this juncture, it has to be pointed out that the aforesaid passage, if read carefully, only points out this: L.W.1 has stated that the petitioner had not obtained any loan from the City Union Bank, Pollachi whereas A4 to A6 are partners of the firms whose accounts have become non-performing assets and as such, they had used the demand drafts obtained from the complainant-Bank in repaying the loan to City Union Bank, Pollachi. A cogent reading of the statement of L.W.1 would only show that he is referring only to A4 to A6 and not referring to A7, when he says about the conspiracy hatched by the accused was known to the other accused. 11. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner, is not a beneficiary of the loan obtained from the complainant-Bank by the other accused and he was not a debtor of City Union Bank, Pollachi and he was not the partner of the three forms in which A1 to A6 were partners, which had obtained loan from the City Union Bank, Pollachi and those accounts became non-performing assets. Only because A7 happened to be the joint owner along with A4 to A6 of the property wherein a nursing home is being run and which was given as a guarantee for the loan sanctioned to A1 to A3, it is sought to be contended that he had knowledge about the conspiracy hatched by the other accused. 12. In Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 66, it has been clearly laid down that the Court for the purpose of arriving at the finding as to whether the offence of Criminal conspiracy has been committed or not may take into consideration the circumstantial evidence. While, however doing so, it must be borne in mind that meeting of mind is essential. Mere knowledge or discussion could not be sufficient. While, however doing so, it must be borne in mind that meeting of mind is essential. Mere knowledge or discussion could not be sufficient. Placing reliance on this decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that there is absolutely nothing in the statement of L.W.1 or other witnesses to show that there was meeting of mind between the petitioner and the other accused and there was any agreement between them to commit offence. 13. By placing reliance on the decision Kishori Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (3) SCC (Cri) 701, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is absolutely nothing in the statement of L.W.1 to show that the petitioner either instigated the other accused to do anything or engaged with the other accused in any conspiracy for the doing of anything or evidently aided by act or illegal omission the doing of anything. In the absence of these essential ingredients, the offence of abetment is not made out. The main offence laid in the charge sheet is under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 471, I.P.C. and there is nothing in the statement of L.W.1 to show that the petitioner abetted the other accused to commit those offences. In the absence of any allegation or averment in the statement of L.W.1 or other witnesses examined in the course of investigation, it cannot be said that prima facie the ingredients of the offence under Section 109, I.P.C. are made out against the petitioner. 14. By placing reliance on the decision in S.W. Palanitkar and Others v. State of Bihar and another, 2002 SCC (Cri) 129, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when prima facie the ingredients of the offence alleged against the petitioner have not been made out, it is the bounden duty of this Court, while exercising Revisional power, to correct the illegality committed by the learned Magistrate. 15. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) strongly relied upon the aforesaid statement of L.W.1 to show that prima facie ingredients under Sections 109 and 120-B I.P.C. have been made out against the petitioner. By relying upon the aforesaid decisions, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. 15. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) strongly relied upon the aforesaid statement of L.W.1 to show that prima facie ingredients under Sections 109 and 120-B I.P.C. have been made out against the petitioner. By relying upon the aforesaid decisions, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) submitted that t this stage, this Court has to only look into the averments or allegations contained in the statement of the witnesses to find out as to whether prima facie the offences alleged against the petitioner have been made out or not. Learned counsel submitted that since the petitioner is a close relative of the other accused and the joint family property belonging to A4 to A7 has been given as guarantee for sanctioning of the loan for A1 to A3, it can be presumed that he had knowledge about the conspiracy hatched by the other accused to float a fictitious firm M/s. Golden Fibre and about the fabrication of invoices, bills and receipts to cheat the complainant-Bank. 16. It has to be pointed out that s rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the decision in Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 66, mere knowledge on the part of the petitioner is not sufficient to show that he has committed the offence under Section 120-B, I.P.C. Similarly, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner either instigated or evidently aided the other accused in the commission of the various offences. In the considered view of this Court, merely because the petitioner happened to be the brother of A4 to A6 and he was one of the joint owners of the property given as guarantee for the sanctioning of the loan to A1 to A3, it cannot be suspected that he had participated in the conspiracy with the other accused in the commission of various offences or abetted the commission of those offences. There is absolutely no material to prima facie hold that this petitioner has committed the offence under Sections 1120-B and 109, I.P.C. The aforesaid aspects have not been considered by the learned Magistrate. Without even considering the materials valuable on record, the learned Magistrate had simply dismissed the Petition by holding that the contentions raised by the petitioner can be considered only after recording evidence and at time of trial. Without even considering the materials valuable on record, the learned Magistrate had simply dismissed the Petition by holding that the contentions raised by the petitioner can be considered only after recording evidence and at time of trial. This approach of the learned Magistrate is not proper. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Magistrate sufferes from material irregularities and illegalities and as such it deserves to be interfered with. Therefore, the order dated 7.12.2007 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Coimbatore in Crl.M.P. No.2759 of 2007 is hereby set aside and the Criminal Revision is allowed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.