Judgment D.H. Waghela, J.—The petitioner, Union of India through General Manager, Western Railway, has invoked Articles 14, 226 and 227 of the Constitution for an order to set aside the application dated 18.9.1991 of Respondent No. 1, under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act’ for short) as also the draft award dated 17.7.2002 approved by the State Government. Admittedly, the land in question was acquired from Respondent No. 1 for the purpose of the petitioner for which notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 26.2.1981 and notification under Section 6 was issued on 01.12.1984. Thereafter, award of compensation was made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 19.4.1986 and some of the claimants had sought references under Section 18 of the Act. Those reference cases were decided by learned Joint District Judge, Nadiad on 18.3.1991 whereby additional compensation of Rs. 4.60 per sq. mtr. was awarded. First Appeals therefrom were filed in this Court wherein the petitioner was a party and those appeals were dismissed by this Court on 28.7.1999. 1.1 According to the petitioner, while the award in favour of Respondent No. 1 was declared on 19.4.1986, he had not made any application for reference and straightaway made the application dated 18.9.1991 under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of compensation. Since the reference cases of other claimants, whose lands were acquired under the same notifications were decided on 18.3.1991, the application under Section 28-A filed by Respondent No. 1 on 18.9.1991 is alleged by the petitioner to be barred by the period of limitation prescribed in Section 28-A of the Act. It was vehemently argued by Learned Counsel Mr. Shevade that, in absence of any provision for condonation of delay, the application under Section 28-A of Respondent No. 1 could not have been entertained by the Land Acquisition Officer and, therefore, that application as well as the award made pursuant thereto were liable to be quashed. 1.2 Replying to the above contention, it is stated on oath in the affidavit-in-reply of Special land Acquisition Officer, Kheda that the Land Acquisition Officer had, on 19.10.1996, written a letter by RPAD to the Executive Engineer, Western Railway, Ahmedabad, informing that Respondent No. 1 herein had filed the application under Section 28-A and to send their opinion as early as possible in order to decide the application. Again, a letter was sent by RPAD on 25.10.1996 to the petitioner requesting them to provide necessary information and their opinion and it was again informed that interested persons had filed applications under Section 28-A. However, the petitioner had not responded to those letters and hence again a letter dated 20.6.1998 was written to the petitioner which was also not responded. A reminder was again sent on 01.7.1998, but the petitioner had refrained from responding. As for the contention that the application of the claimant being barred by the period of limitation, it is stated, on instruction of Mr. Bhadresh Parmar, Clerk in the office of Respondent No. 2, who was personally present with original record in the Court, that Respondent No. 1 had made the application under Section 28-A on 18.9.1991 along with Vakalatnama of an Advocate and certified copy of the award in LAQ Case No. 436 of 1987. It is further stated that it was only after verification of the dates mentioned on the certified copy and finding that copy was applied for on 27.3.1991 and received on 17.9.1991 that the application was considered to be covered by proviso to Section 28-A(1) and entertained as a valid application. Even as the application of Respondent No. 1 was so entertained and letters as aforesaid were issued to the petitioner, they had not taken the proceeding before the Land Acquisition Officer seriously and avoided to appear or participate in the proceeding, according to the submission of learned A.G.P. 1.3 Since original record of the proceeding before the Land Acquisition Officer was brought before the Court and verified by Learned Counsel and the above facts were born out from the record, it was argued by Learned Counsel Mr. Shevade that certified copy of the award ought to have been applied for by the applicant himself and the copy submitted by Respondent No. 1 clearly appeared to have been obtained by Learned Advocate appearing for the parties in the reference case. He, on that basis, insisted that the application of Respondent No. 1 ought to have been rejected as time-barred. Considering the above submissions, it appears that while Respondent No. 1 was conscious that the period of limitation was crossed, he had made application under Section 28-A along with a certified copy of the judgment of the reference Court. He, on that basis, insisted that the application of Respondent No. 1 ought to have been rejected as time-barred. Considering the above submissions, it appears that while Respondent No. 1 was conscious that the period of limitation was crossed, he had made application under Section 28-A along with a certified copy of the judgment of the reference Court. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A does not provide that application for certified copy of the award of Court has to be made by the applicant of the application under Section 28-A. All it provides for is that the time requisite for obtaining copy of the award shall be excluded. Therefore, we cannot read the words which are not used by the legislature in order to restrict the operation of the proviso. Accordingly, it is held that the application under Section 28-A of Respondent No. 1 was made in time for further process by the Land Acquisition Officer. 2. The second contention of Learned Counsel Mr. Shevade was that the petitioner was not served with a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 28-A and that the petitioner was entitled to such notice as ‘the person interested’. As against that, it was pointed out by learned A.G.P. that not only the correspondence referred hereinabove was addressed to the petitioner, but the petitioner’s officers were themselves aware of the proceedings insofar as they were parties to the reference cases as well as the First Appeals which were filed in the High Court. Even as the draft award was prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer on 26.6.2002, the petitioner was again informed by an urgent letter dated 07.9.2002, but the petitioner had all throughout insisted upon supplying of copies to them by Respondent No. 2. Ultimately, final award was made on 03.02.2004 calculating the total amount due to Respondent No. 1 to be Rs. 1,10,600/-; and intimation thereof was sent to the petitioner by letter dated 05.02.2004. Thereafter, the petitioner appears to have submitted the present petition in November 2004 and moved it for the first time for admission in April 2005. Ultimately, final award was made on 03.02.2004 calculating the total amount due to Respondent No. 1 to be Rs. 1,10,600/-; and intimation thereof was sent to the petitioner by letter dated 05.02.2004. Thereafter, the petitioner appears to have submitted the present petition in November 2004 and moved it for the first time for admission in April 2005. Under such circumstances, Learned Counsel for the petitioner was requested to relate the objections which the petitioner could have raised in the proceeding before the Collector and it was submitted in reply that the petitioner could have raised and established the objection regarding maintainability of the application under Section 28-A in view of its late filing. 2.1 Learned Counsel Mr. Shevade has relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Babua Ram vs. State of U.P. [ (1995) 2 SCC 689 ] and emphasized the observations, as under, in Para 42: “42. . . . . . Section 28-A (2) speaks of interested persons and Section 28-A(1) of persons aggrieved. As interpreted by this Court of the said expressions, the beneficiary is also an interested person to see that proper compensation is determined by the Court, get right to hearing before award is made and to carry in appeal under Section 54 and has a right to appear before the Collector during award inquiry which right is only limited to participation in the inquiry and to adduce evidence or to file an appeal to determine just and proper compensation for the lands under acquisition”. 3. In the facts and circumstances briefly narrated hereinabove, it is clear that the petitioner did not have, all throughout, a valid objection to resist re-determination of the amount of compensation in accordance with Section 28-A of the Act and the petitioner had consciously and actively desisted from participating in any proceeding before the Land Acquisition Officer. Respondent No. 1 is admittedly an illiterate person and he even admitted on oath that he being an uneducated farmer and being ignorant about law, he had not filed application under Section 28-A within 90 days. However, the benefit of proviso to Section 28-A could not be denied to Respondent No. 1 on account of his ignorance about law and poor legal assistance that he could have availed. However, the benefit of proviso to Section 28-A could not be denied to Respondent No. 1 on account of his ignorance about law and poor legal assistance that he could have availed. On the other hand, the petitioner, for whose benefit the land was acquired as early as in the year 1984, cannot be heard to contend that they could have only awaited replies and copies from Respondent No. 2 and could not have come forward to take the opportunity of hearing. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court clearly appears to have been invoked not for doing justice but for undoing justice inasmuch as Respondent No. 1 was and would have been entitled to the amount awarded by the impugned award, without any elaborate enquiry and even after affording to the petitioner a fuller opportunity of being heard, as expected by them. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the award and in view of the delay and the period intervening between making of the application under Section 28-A and final hearing of the present petition, the following order is made, in the interest of justice. 4. The petition is dismissed, Rule is discharged and the petitioner is directed to pay to Respondent No. 1, by an account payee cheque in his name, the sum of Rs. 1,10,600/- with interest @ 15% per annum, in terms of Section 34 of the Act, from 05.4.2002 (the date upto which interest is included in the award) till the date of payment, along with cost quantified at Rs. 10,000/-. P P P P P