Judgment :- 1. The petitioner stands arrayed as 1st accused in C.C.No.1331 of 2003 on the file of the learned XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and as 3rd accused in C.C.No.17 of 2003 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate I, Kanchipuram. In both such cases, the petitioner is facing prosecution for offence under Section 499 IPC. While the respondent/complainant in the first case is one Shri.Durai Samy, the respondent/complainant in the second case is one Neelamegham. The complaints in both case relates to certain utterances allegedly made by the petitioner which were reported in paper publications and which the respondents/complainants termed defamatory. Though the complainants are different, both complaint in so far as the offences alleged are concerned are in sum and substance one and the same and in fact are verbatim reproductions. Hence, both petitions may be disposed of by a common order. 2. The petitioner is the head of the Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Mutt, Kanchipuram. The petitioner has in two interviews to the press expressed certain views inter alia touching upon the rights to enter temples which respectively were reported in the Tamil newspaper editions of "Dina Malar" and "Dinamani". The editors/publishers of such publication also stand arrayed as accused by the complainants. 3. The complainant in Crl.O.P.No.9657 of 2003 informs that he belongs to the oppressed community and as such has faced severe hardships and difficulties since he so belonged, informs that he is highly qualified and has held several important posts and that he was the State Level General Secretary of a party by name Pudiya Tamilagam. The complainant in C.C.No.17 of 2003, informs that he was the Secretary of the Kachipuram Town Unit of the party by name Pudiya Tamilagam. What has been found offending is as follows: "TAMIL" "TAMIL" "TAMIL" "TAMIL" "TAMIL" 4. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in both cases, the complainants were office bearers of a particular party and the contents of the complaints were identical. This reflects that the complaints were not bonafide. Informing that similar complaints had been filed at several places through the State, the learned Senior counsel submits that the complaints are identical and had been moved by persons belonging to a particular party with malafide intent. The complaints were malafide and an abuse of process of Court. 5. This reflects that the complaints were not bonafide. Informing that similar complaints had been filed at several places through the State, the learned Senior counsel submits that the complaints are identical and had been moved by persons belonging to a particular party with malafide intent. The complaints were malafide and an abuse of process of Court. 5. The petitioner had not meant to offend persons belonging to any particular community or group and a fair reading of the articles which were said to be defamatory would show that the petitioner had spoken in support of Dalits and in fact was espousing their cause. The complainants had not pointed out any personal grievance and none of the complainants had claimed to have heard what precisely was stated by the petitioner. The head lines carried in the newspapers of which the accused 2 and 3 were incharge might well carry a wrong impression but that, would be the result of editorial work at newspaper offices of which the petitioner had no control and for which he could not in any manner be blamed. A fair reading of the publications which are said to be offending would show that no offence whatsoever would be made out and that the complaints proceed on an interpretation placed on them by the complainants. 6. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that in order to attract offence under Section 499 IPC and in keeping with explanation two thereof, the persons allegedly defined should belong to a particular class which is not indefinite or indeterminate. 7. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in G.Narasimhan and others v. T.V.Chokkappa (1972) SC 2609 to contend that the allegation against the petitioner was that he had defamed Dalits. The term Dalit was too general and could not constitute a determinate or definite class. Unless the persons allegedly defamed constitute a definite or determinate class, no prosecution for offence under Section 499 IPC could be maintained. In the said decision, the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows: "the Chairman of the Reception Committee of a conference organised by the Dravida Kazhagam was the complainant. The complaint was in respect of a news item regarding a resolution passed in the meeting. The conference consisted of a large number of party sympathisers, leaders and outsiders. In the said decision, the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows: "the Chairman of the Reception Committee of a conference organised by the Dravida Kazhagam was the complainant. The complaint was in respect of a news item regarding a resolution passed in the meeting. The conference consisted of a large number of party sympathisers, leaders and outsiders. It was held, applying the test that collection of people must be identifiable, definite and determinate in relation to the imputations, that the conference was not an identifiable or definite body so that all those who attended it could be said to be its constituents who, if the conference was defamed, would in their turn be said to be defamed. The complainant who was the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the conference was therefore held to be not an aggrieved person." "A complaint was filed under Sections 500 and 501, I.P.C. by the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Conference organised by the party named Dravida Kazhagam. The complaint was in respect of a news-item published by the accused in their newspapers regarding certain resolution. The resolution was read out by the President of the conference and taken as passed because no one got up to oppose it. The conference consisted of a large number of members of the party sympathisers, leaders and outsiders including 5000 women. Held that it was impossible to have any definite idea as to the number of persons who attended the conference, the ideas and ideologies to which they subscribed and whether all of them positively agreed to the resolution in question. The conference clearly was not an identifiable or a definite body so that all those who attended it could be said to be its constituents who, if the Conference was defamed, would, in their turn be said to be defamed. The Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Conference could not therefore be said to be an aggrieved person entitling to maintain the complaint within the meaning of S.198, Criminal P.C. Whether the Dravida Kazhagam was an identifiable group or not was beside the point." 8. The other decisions relied upon by the learned Senior counsel in support of his contention flow from the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in the case above cited and hence, further discussion thereupon is not necessary. 9. The other decisions relied upon by the learned Senior counsel in support of his contention flow from the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in the case above cited and hence, further discussion thereupon is not necessary. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would refer to decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1451. Such was a case where the allegation was of the public prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, having been defamed through a newspaper article. The Honourable Apex Court found as follows: "(9)The next question to determine is whether it is essential for the purpose of an offence under S.500, I.P.C. that the person defamed must be an individual and that the prosecuting staff at Aligarh or of the State of Uttar Pradesh could not be said to be a person which could be defamed. Section 499, I.P.C. defines defamation and provides inter alia that whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in cases covered by the exceptions to the Section, to defame that person. Explanation 2 provides that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. It is clear, therefore, that there could be defamation of an individual person and also of a collection of persons as such. The contention for the appellant then reduces itself to the question whether the prosecuting staff at Aligarh can be considered to be such a collection of persons as is contemplated by Explanation 2. The language of Explanation 2 is general and any collection of persons would be covered by it. Of course, that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could, with certainty, say that this group of particular people has been defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community. The prosecuting staff of Aligarh or, as a matter of fact, the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons. There is nothing indefinite about it. This group consists of all members of the prosecuting staff in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The prosecuting staff of Aligarh or, as a matter of fact, the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons. There is nothing indefinite about it. This group consists of all members of the prosecuting staff in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Within this general group of Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is again an identifiable group of prosecuting staff, consisting of Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors, at Aligarh. This group of persons would be covered by Explanation 2 and could, therefore, be the subject of defamation." 10. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioners herein had not so much as appeared before the lower Court and had approached this Court prematurely. The allegations in the complaint make out prima facie offences, the lower Courts on consideration of the complaint and sworn statements have taken cognizance. The fact of the various complaints being stereotype is really of no significance and the appreciation of the facts therein would be an exercise for the trial Court to undertake. The defamatory imputations had been published in newspapers and the same reflected that it related to an identifiable class of persons and when so, the question of locus standi of the complainants would not arise. The complainants belonging to the class defamed would be entitled to prefer the complaints. Mere multiplicity of complaint cases could not be a deterrent for prosecution of the offence and it was well possible that various complaints may be clubbed together to be tried in one and the same Court. 11. In support of the contention that once the lower Court had thought it fit to take cognizance, this Court would not interfere, reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Balraj Khanna and others v. Moti Ram AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1389. 12. Placing reliance on decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K.Karanjiya and others AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1514, the learned counsel submitted that the question of good faith was one to be decided, upon due conduct of trial. 13. I have considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record. 14. The social depredations suffered and ignominies heaped upon the downtrodden, over the centuries, is now well recognised. 13. I have considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record. 14. The social depredations suffered and ignominies heaped upon the downtrodden, over the centuries, is now well recognised. That such remains the case, even upto the present day, though thankfully in much smaller measure, is reflected by the need for passing enactments such as the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The sensitivity to the use of the word Dalit well can be appreciated and the question of whether the same would refer to a class of persons as would be covered by explanation of Section 2 of 499 IPC may be left to be decided in a case where such decision necessarily is called for. This Court presently is not expressing any opinion on such question. 15. This Court having perused the alleged defamatory statements and the complaints as also the other materials available on record, would allow the present quash petitions on the ground that a wholesome reading of the said articles makes clear that the same do not reflect anything that is defamatory or convey any such intent. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior counsel, the articles reflect that the petitioner was in support of persons entering temples as Adhi Dravidars. The complaints note as offending the statement attributed to the petitioner regards not allowing entry into temples as Dalits. What the statement goes on to state is that Dalits would include also Dalit Christians who, according to the petitioner, cannot be allowed entry. The complaints are selective of what is considered defamatory without reading the article in total perspective. Again, it is well known that the word J}a;ik is used, particularly in matters religious, to spiritual cleanliness as distinguished from physical cleanliness. The words found in support of the underprivileged do not seem to be used as a cloak towards defaming them. It is by a contrived reading put by the complainants upon the alleged defamatory statements, that the cases have come to be filed. The prosecution of cases of this type ought not to be permitted and accordingly, these Criminal Original Petitions shall stand allowed. The proceedings in C.C.No.1331 of 2003 pending on the file of the learned XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet and C.C.No.17 of 2003 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate I, Kanchipuram shall stand quashed. The prosecution of cases of this type ought not to be permitted and accordingly, these Criminal Original Petitions shall stand allowed. The proceedings in C.C.No.1331 of 2003 pending on the file of the learned XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet and C.C.No.17 of 2003 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate I, Kanchipuram shall stand quashed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.