JUDGMENT 1. Present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and order dated 01.09.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has, by the said judgment and order, rejected the petition preferred by present appellant. 1.1 The appellant is the original petitioner. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant challenged the order dated 21.02.2009 passed by the respondent No.1, whereby the said authority confirmed the order dated 20.03.2006 passed by present respondent No.2 in Fragmentation Case No.72/2005. The said proceedings of Fragmentation Case No.72/2005 were initiated by the Competent Authority under the provision of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). In the aforesaid two concurrent orders, the authorities passed order against present appellant and declared the transaction entered into by the appellant as illegal being in violation of the provision under the Act. Aggrieved by the said two concurrent orders, the appellant filed the writ petition which came to be rejected by the impugned order. 2. The factual backdrop of present appeal can be summarized thus: 3. The appellant claims to be an agriculturist. He purchased on 5th February, 2002, a parcel of land bearing Survey No.22/paiki admeasuring two acres situate in Village Chautra, Taluka Rajula. After the execution and registration of the sale deed, the name of the appellant was mutated in the revenue record. 3.1 The aforesaid transaction and mutation of the Entry No.590 took place in 2002. The said entry was duly certified also. 3.2 After the mutation of the entry in present appellant's name (in respect of the aforesaid land bearing Survey No.22/paiki in Village Chautra) was made, as aforesaid, in 2002, the Mamlatdar initiated proceedings by issuing notice dated 16.01.2006 i.e. after almost 3? years under the Fragmentation Act and in March-2006, present respondent No.2-Deputy Collector, Rajula passed order holding that the said transaction was contrary to the provision of the Act and imposed penalty of Rs.100/- while cancelling the transaction. 3.3 Aggrieved by the said order dated 20.03.2006 passed by the Deputy Collector, Rajula (i.e. present respondent No.2), the appellant herein preferred revision application before present respondent No.1. 3.4 The said revision application, which was registered as Application No.5/2006, came to be rejected by the respondent No.1 by order dated 21.02.2009. 3.3 Aggrieved by the said order dated 20.03.2006 passed by the Deputy Collector, Rajula (i.e. present respondent No.2), the appellant herein preferred revision application before present respondent No.1. 3.4 The said revision application, which was registered as Application No.5/2006, came to be rejected by the respondent No.1 by order dated 21.02.2009. 3.5 The appellant-petitioner claimed that he came to know about the order dated 21.02.2009 when the Mamlatdar issued notice under Section 135-D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code i.e. on or around 17.05.2009. Thereafter, the appellant preferred writ petition challenging the order dated 20.03.2006 and the order dated 21.02.2009. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order dated 01.09.2009 rejected the petition. Therefore, the petitioner has preferred present appeal. 4. Mr.B.C. Dave, learned advocate has appeared for the appellant and Ms.Krina Calla, the learned AGP has appeared for the respondent Nos.1 and 2. Mr. V.K. Joshi, learned advocate has appeared for the respondent No.3. We have heard the learned Counsel for contesting parties and have also perused the record. The opponent No.3 has filed affidavit opposing the appeal and the appellant has filed a rejoinder affidavit. In view of the rival contentions, the appeal is admitted for final hearing and at the request of the appellant and with the consent of the parties, the appeal is taken up for final hearing and decision. The learned AGP and Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for private opponents have waived notice of Admission/Rule. 5. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the appellant assailed the orders by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 on the ground that the initiation of the proceedings under the Act after lapse or delay of almost three years is fatal and the said delay has vitiated the entire proceedings, including the impugned orders. He also submitted that the authorities and the learned Single Judge failed in not terminating the impugned orders and the proceedings on the ground of delay. So as to support his submission, the learned advocate relied upon the judgment in the case between Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and others ( 1984 (2) GLR 1225 ). Mr. He also submitted that the authorities and the learned Single Judge failed in not terminating the impugned orders and the proceedings on the ground of delay. So as to support his submission, the learned advocate relied upon the judgment in the case between Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and others ( 1984 (2) GLR 1225 ). Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the appellant also submitted that the transaction between the appellant and the respondent No.3 was not in breach of Section 8 of the Act, however, the authorities below, and also the learned Single Judge, failed to appreciate the said aspect, which was apparent on face of the record. He also submitted that the land is situate adjoining to or near the canal which is passing through Survey No.22 of Village Chautra and that therefore, the disputed parcel of land is, since many years, irrigated land and that since the transaction is in respect of more than one acre of irrigated land, the transaction cannot be treated as fragmentation and the restriction under the Act would not apply. He also supported the aforesaid submission by asserting that there is even a well on the land bearing Survey No.22/paiki, which fact also supports the submission that the land in question is irrigated land. He relied on the judgment in the case of Jiviben wd/o. Kalaji Bapuji vs. State of Gujarat and others ( 1998 (3) GLR 2567 ) 5.1 Per contra, Ms.Krina Calla, learned AGP relied upon the gazette/notification dated 08.10.1954 issued under the provision of the Act and submitted that considering the nature of the land the minimum area, required to avoid the restriction regarding fragmentation, is 20 gunthas and since the land which remained in the hands of the lander after the transaction was less than 20 gunthas, the transaction was hit by the provision under the Act and amounted to fragment not permissible under the Act. 5.2 The learned advocate for the opponent No.3 also has resisted the appeal and inter-alia submitted that the respondent No.3 has filed Regular Civil Suit No.89/2009 challenging the sale deed dated 01.03.2004 allegedly executed between the petitioner and him i.e. respondent No.3 and the said suit is pending. He claimed that the petitioner got executed the said sale deed by fraud and taking disadvantage of an illiterate person who never intended to sell the land in question. He claimed that the petitioner got executed the said sale deed by fraud and taking disadvantage of an illiterate person who never intended to sell the land in question. He submitted that even if the disputed sale - deed is taken into account, it would emerge that two acres out of the total holding of three acres is claimed to have been sold to the petitioner, which would leave behind, only one acre of land in the hands of respondent No.3 and that since the land in question is non-irrigated land, only one acre land in the hands of the respondent No.3 tantamount to fragment. The learned advocate of the respondent No.3 has also relied upon a certificate dated 05.06.2010 issued by the Talati-cum-Mantri certifying that there is no well on the land in the hands of the respondent No.3 and/or the land in question. 6. The learned Single Judge has noted that the petitioner's contention to the effect that the authorities below did not consider the evidence on record on which the petitioner relied, deserved to be rejected because except for the averments in para-5 of the revision application (claiming that the land was irrigated land) no documentary evidence in support of such averement was either referred to in the revision application or was annexed to the application. The learned Single Judge, on perusal of the record, reached the conclusion that the petitioner (i.e. present appellant) had not produced any evidence before the authorities in support of the assertion that the land is irrigated land. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rejected the contention that the authorities failed to take into consideration relevant evidence available on record. 6.1 The learned Single Judge has also rejected the contention raised by present appellant to the effect that the seller was left with one acre of land, and therefore, the provisions of the Act were not attracted. The learned Single Judge also did not entertain present appellant's contention that in absence of any statutory notice, the impugned proceedings and orders were not sustainable in law. The learned Single Judge has observed that the petitioner being the purchaser, the contention based on the provision under Section 6(2) was totally misconceived and did not merit any consideration. The learned Single Judge also did not entertain present appellant's contention that in absence of any statutory notice, the impugned proceedings and orders were not sustainable in law. The learned Single Judge has observed that the petitioner being the purchaser, the contention based on the provision under Section 6(2) was totally misconceived and did not merit any consideration. The learned Single Judge has also recorded that the transaction in question had resulted in creation of fragment in the hands of seller, and therefore, the provision under Section 8 was attracted. 7. The appeal can be disposed of on short ground viz. delay in initiating the proceedings under the Act. Before proceeding to address the said issue, we must note that so far as other contentions of the appellant and the conclusions by the learned Single Judge are concerned, we agree with and we do not see any error or infirmity in the the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and/or in the reasons in support of the conclusions. Since we agree with the reasons as well as the findings of the learned Single Judge in respect of the other contentions of the appellant, we have not discussed the said aspects at length and/or recorded our separate views and conclusions. 7.1 The appellant has, inter-alia, contended that the impugned proceedings and the impugned order are vitiated by delay in initiating the proceedings and in exercising the power inasmuch as the disputed transaction was entered into and executed in February-2002 whereas the proceedings came to be initiated, for the first time, by virtue of notice issued in 2005 i.e. after more than about three years and that therefore, the impugned order is vitiated due to delay. So as to support the said submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment in the case between Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat [ 1984(2) GLR 1225 ]. 8. The power conferred under the statute should be exercised within prescribed limitation and if the statute does not prescribe any time limit then within reasonable time except the cases involving fraud and/or suppression of material facts i.e. the cases in which the petitioner is alleged to have caused fraud and/or suppressed material facts. This plea is thus not available to him who himself is guilty of fraud or suppression of facts. This plea is thus not available to him who himself is guilty of fraud or suppression of facts. This is too well settled position of law to need reiteration. 9. In this context, reference may be made to the judgment in the case between Bhanabhai Morarbhai Solanki vs. State of Gujarat [ 1994(1) GLR 822 ], wherein while considering the proceedings under Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, the Hon'ble Court has observed: 5. Besides, sale of a parcel or agricultural land if made in contravention of any provision of the Act can be declared invalid in view of Sec. 83(a) of the Act and the necessary proceedings can be initiated under Sec. 84C thereof. In its ruling in the case of Bhaniben Makanbhai Tandel v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1991 Guj. 184 , this Court has held that the initiation of the proceedings under Sec.84C of the Act has to be made within reasonable time and if such proceedings are taken after five years or so they cannot be said to be taken within reasonable time. In that case, the proceedings under Sec. 84C of the Act were found to have been initiated after lapse of more than five years from the date the entry in the revenue records with respect thereto was certified. If initiation of the proceedings under Sec. 84C of the Act cannot be taken beyond any reasonable time, by analogy the proceedings for cancellation of any mutation entry cannot be taken beyond any reasonable time. (Emphasis supplied) 10. In the judgment, in the case between Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim [ 1997(6) SCC 71 ] where the sale of agricultural land was effected in favour of the non-agriculturists and the suo motu proceedings under Sec.84C of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 were commenced, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while referring to the judgment in the case between Ram Chand v. Union of India, 1994 (1) SCC 44 , set aside the orders passed in the proceedings initiated after delay of three years holding, inter-alia, that suo motu powers under Sec.84C was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within reasonable time. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in para-2 of the said judgment, observed as follows: 2. Although Mr. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in para-2 of the said judgment, observed as follows: 2. Although Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, t here should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84(C) of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreperable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat V/s. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Section 84(C) itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat V/s. Patil Raghav Natha and in the case of Ram Chand V/s. Union of India has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise at any time; such power has to be exercises within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo-motu power under Section 84(C) of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs. (Emphasis supplied). 11. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo-motu power under Section 84(C) of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs. (Emphasis supplied). 11. In the judgment in the case between Gujarat Khet K0amdar Union vs. State of Gujarat [ 1999(3) GLR 2044 ], the Division Bench of this Court has, while dealing with the issue of initiation of proceedings in exercise of suo motu powers under Section 84(C) observed, while holding that when the statue does not prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of the statutory power then such power must be exercised within reasonable period subject to the exception that such a plea would not be available to a person who is himself guilty of fraud or has suppressed material facts, observed in para-12 of the judgment that: 12. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we are of the view that there is considerable force in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner Union as well as the State Government. As per the settled legal position, when the statute does not provide for any period of limitation for exercising a particular power, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period, subject to the exception that such a plea is not available to a person who is himself guilty of fraud or who has suppressed material facts, but it is equally well settled that what is reasonable period during which a particular statutory power is to be exercised would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and also on the nature of the order to be passed.............. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention urged on behalf of the purchasers that the period of limitation stipulated in Section 76A of the Act should be taken into consideration for the purpose of explaining the scope and ambit of "reasonable period" within which the proceedings under Section 84C of the Act must be initiated to avoid the risk of being set aside on the ground of delay........... (Emphasis supplied). 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the judgment in the case between Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 3 GLR 2610] has observed in paras-27 & 28 of the judgment as follows: 27. (Emphasis supplied). 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the judgment in the case between Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 3 GLR 2610] has observed in paras-27 & 28 of the judgment as follows: 27. Now it is true that no period for revision is provided in the Act. It was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the land-owners that when the Legislature did not think it fit to prescribe period of limitation, such power can be exercised 'at any time' and no Court by a 'judicial fiat', usurp legislative power and prescribe period of limitation. It is no doubt true that the statute does not fix period of limitation within which revisional power should be exercised under Section 34 of the Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has not fixed period of limitation as it had empowered the State Government to exercise revisional power suo motu. In our judgment, however, only in such cases i.e. where the period of limitation is not prescribed that the concept of reasonable time' can be invoked and power must be exercised within such period. 28. In this connection, it would be profitable to refer to a leading decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 187 . In that case, an application was filed by the land-owner under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 for converting agricultural land to non-agricultural use. The permission was granted. The Municipal Committee, however, objected to such permission and the Commissioner, in purported exercise of revisional power under Section 211 of the Code, set aside the order passed earlier. When the matter reached this Court, it was contended by the owners, that though Section 211 did not prescribe period of limitation, revisional powers ought to be exercised within a reasonable time. (Emphasis supplied). 13. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has referred the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha [ (1969) 2 SCC 187 ] and others and has observed that the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said case of Patil Raghav Natha has been reiterated in several cases. (Emphasis supplied). 13. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has referred the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha [ (1969) 2 SCC 187 ] and others and has observed that the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said case of Patil Raghav Natha has been reiterated in several cases. Therefore, it would not be out of place to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, with regard to the issue of exercise of power where no period of limitation is prescribed by the statute. In paras-11 & 12 of the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court, has observed thus: 11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under s. 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under s. 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 12. It seems to us that s. 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under, s. 21 1. Under s. 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading ss. 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the 'Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late. (Emphasis supplied). 14. In present case, it is not in dispute that the proceedings have been initiated after delay of more than about three years, it is also not in dispute that in present case there is no allegation of fraud and/or suppression of facts by the petitioner. In present case, it is also not the case of the respondent authorities that the authorities were not aware about the transaction. Having regard to the fact that the proceedings came to be initiated after delay of more than about three years and that the petitioner is not guilty of fraud or suppression the impugned proceedings and order cannot be said to have been initiated within reasonable time inasmuch as undisputedly the notice under the Act was issued in 2005. The proceedings and the order are hit by the vice of delay. 15. In view of the facts of present case, the appeal, on this limited ground, deserves to be allowed. It appears that the appellant herein had raised the said contention before the learned Single Judge in the petition as well. Even in the reply affidavit filed by present opponents, the factual assertion by the petitioner-appellant viz. with regard to the period when the transaction was entered into and the period when the notice under the Act was issued, are not denied or disputed. Thus, the factual aspects regarding the period of transaction and impugned notice being not in dispute, are established, which in turn establish that the impugned proceedings and the orders by the authorities are hit by the vice of delay of more than about 3 years. Hence, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mahamad Amin (supra) the initiation of proceedings under the Act after delay of three years is, in the facts of present case, not found to be within reasonable period. 16. Hence, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mahamad Amin (supra) the initiation of proceedings under the Act after delay of three years is, in the facts of present case, not found to be within reasonable period. 16. Thus, on this limited ground, present appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned orders passed by the statutory authorities i.e. orders dated 21.02.2009 and 20.03.2006 deserve to be set aside since the orders have been passed without taking into account the vice of delay caused in initiating action. 17. In view of the legal position emerging from the above referred judgments, particularly the judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mahamad Amin (supra) the impugned proceedings and the orders are vitiated by vice of delay, hence they are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. 18. Thus, the impugned proceedings and the orders are hereby set aside. The order of the learned Single Judge is also set aside. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order for costs.