Judgment :- D. MURUGESAN, J. This review application is taken out by the appellant in W.A.No.1132 of 2008 and the petitioner in W.P.No.26484 of 2007. 2. The review application arises under the following circumstances. The applicant was employed as Assistant Librarian in the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and was allowed to retire on 30.6.2007 at the age of 60 years on attaining the age of superannuation. On the ground that the age of superannuation for the post of Assistant Librarian was 62 years, he filed the writ petition seeking for a direction to the second respondent-Institute to permit him to continue in service till he completed the age of 62 years. As the said request was rejected, he filed the writ petition questioning the said order and for consequential directions. 3. It was his contention that the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education in their letter dated 30.3.99 clarified that in respect of the employees of the Indian Institutes of Management at Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Kolkata, Lucknow, Indore, Calicut and the Indian Institutes of Technology at Mumbai, Kanpur, Kharagpur, Madras, Guwahati, Bangalore, the enhancement of age of superannuation from 60 to 62 years indicated in the Ministrys letter of even number dated 31.8.98 would be applicable to the Assistant Librarians as well. Later, by another letter dated 22.9.2006, the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India addressed the Secretary, University Grants Commission, New Delhi informing the decision of the Ministry to make uniform the age of superannuation for the Assistant Librarians/College Librarians etc., as 62 years. Referring to that letter, the University Grants Commission in its letter dated 9.10.2006 informed the Registrar, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras of the aforesaid decision and intimated that the University Grants Commission has decided that the age of superannuation of the Assistant Librarian/College LIbrarian etc., would henceforth be 62 years. Hence, the applicant contended that his date of superannuation would be on 30.6.2009 and therefore he would be entitled to continue in service till that date. That contention was rejected by the learned single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition. Questioning the same, the applicant preferred writ appeal and canvassed the same points. Hence, the applicant contended that his date of superannuation would be on 30.6.2009 and therefore he would be entitled to continue in service till that date. That contention was rejected by the learned single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition. Questioning the same, the applicant preferred writ appeal and canvassed the same points. The Division Bench, having considered the above submission, factually found that the terms and conditions of service of teachers or other staff as provided under Statute 26(g) of the Statutes of the second respondent-Institute, the Board of Governors would alone be competent to amend the terms and conditions of service by amending the Statutes under Section 27(2) of the Act. As per the Statutes, the age of superannuation of Assistant Librarian would be only 60 years. Till such time the Statutes are amended, the applicant cannot claim as a matter of right the date of superannuation at the age of 62 years on the basis of the communication of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education, Government of India as well as the University Grants Commission. However, the Division Bench, while disposing the writ appeal, further directed that the Indian Institutes of Technology, Madras should reconsider the question of enhancement of the age of superannuation of the existing Assistant Librarian, etc., in the light of the recommendations made by the Government of India and suggested by the University Grants Commission. 4. The said order was questioned by the applicant by filing a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and the same was dismissed on 20.7.2009. Thereafter, the present review application has been filed. 5. Mr.A.E.Chelliah, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, in support of the review application, would submit that while the Ministry of Human Resources Development had intimated its decision as to the enhancement of retirement age from 60 to 62 years for Assistant Librarian etc., which was also suggested by the University Grants Commission to the second respondent-Institute, the second respondent-Institute abdicated its power and not bothered to implement the enhancement in the retirement age. He would further submit that the decision of the Ministry of Human Resources Development as suggested by the University Grants Commission would be automatically applicable to the respondent-Institute as well and in that sense, the judgment should be reviewed. He would further submit that the decision of the Ministry of Human Resources Development as suggested by the University Grants Commission would be automatically applicable to the respondent-Institute as well and in that sense, the judgment should be reviewed. He would also submit that in any case, the Division Bench, while directing the reconsideration of the question of enhancement of the age of superannuation, should have directed the enhancement to all the Assistant Librarians and should not have restricted the applicability to the existing Assistant Librarians only. 6. We have heard Mr.K.Mohanamurali, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the first respondent and Mr.Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel for the second respondent. 7. The review application is opposed by the respondents as not maintainable, since the order under review was questioned by the applicant before the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition and that petition was dismissed. 8. We have considered the above submissions. In Kabari (P) Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff, (1996) 1 SCC 690 , the Apex Court has held that the Court cannot entertain an application for review if before making the review application, the superior Court had been moved for getting the selfsame relief, for the reason that for the selfsame relief two parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot be taken. Subsequently, in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1996) 3 SCC 463 , the Apex Court has held that when a special leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the Court and thereafter the power of review cannot be exercised by the Tribunal as it would be "deleterious to the judicial discipline". The same view has also been reiterated by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (1995) 2 Scale 23, Sree Narayana Dharmasangham Trust v. Swami Prakasananda, (1997) 6 SCC 78 , K.Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 and Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 . 9. The same view has also been reiterated by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (1995) 2 Scale 23, Sree Narayana Dharmasangham Trust v. Swami Prakasananda, (1997) 6 SCC 78 , K.Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 and Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 . 9. A three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K.Santhakumaran, (1998) 7 SCC 386 , has considered the said issue afresh and held that filing of the review petition after dismissal of the special leave petition by it against the selfsame order amounted to an abuse of process of the Court and the entertainment of such a review application was an affront to its order and it was subversive of judicial discipline. 10. Subsequently, another three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reconsidered the entire issue in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 and in paragraph-44, the Apex Court has laid down the following principles: (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before a superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties." After the judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case (supra) holding that no review application can be filed after the dismissal of the special leave petition against the selfsame order, as it would amount to an abuse of process of the Court, the Apex Court in Kunhayammed case (supra), has held that an order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge, as all that it means is the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. With that finding, the Court came to the conclusion that where the matter has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine, the party may approach the High Court by filing a review petition. This view was reiterated by the Apex Court in National Housing Cooperative Society Limited v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 149. 11. Having considered all the above judgments, the Apex Court has recently in Meghmala and others v. G.Narasimha Reddy and others, (2010) 8 SCC 383 , has held, in paragraph-25, as follows: "25. Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that in case a litigant files a review petition before filing the special leave petition before this Court and it remains pending till the special leave petition stands dismissed, the review petition deserves to be considered. In case it is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the process of filing review application amounts to abuse of process of the court." With that finding, the Apex Court ultimately directed in paragraph 51(xiv) that the review application was certainly not maintainable as the respondents had approached the higher forum and it merely amounted to abuse of process of the court. 12. 12. A careful reading of the above judgments would show that the Apex Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case (supra) was considering the question of maintainability of a review application where at the time when the special leave petitions were taken up for hearing, both the appellant and the respondents were represented by senior advocates and after hearing the respective learned counsel, the special leave petitions were dismissed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions, no review application could be filed as it would amount to an affront to its order. After considering the said judgment, the Apex Court subsequently held in Kunhayammed case (supra) that in case the special leave petition was dismissed by a non-speaking order, then the question of merger would not arise and in that sense, the application for review before the High Court would be maintainable even after the dismissal of the special leave petition. This judgment was referred to in Meghmalas case and the Apex Court did not render any finding contrary to the one rendered in Kunhayammed case, which was subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in National Housing Cooperative Society Ltd case. Hence, we are of the considered view that though a review application is not maintainable after the dismissal of the special leave petition, as such filing of review application would amount to abuse of process of the Court, in case the special leave petition is dismissed by a non-speaking order, review application would be maintainable in terms of the law declared by the Apex Court in Kunhayammed and National Housing Cooperative Society Ltd., cases. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the review application is maintainable in this case and accordingly, we overrule the objection as to the maintainability of the review application. 13. This takes us to the other contentions of the respective learned counsel on merits. The first contention of the learned senior counsel for the applicant is that the second respondent-Institute had abdicated its power in not taking action in terms of the decision of the Ministry of Human Resources Development and the subsequent suggestion of the University Grants Commission. 13. This takes us to the other contentions of the respective learned counsel on merits. The first contention of the learned senior counsel for the applicant is that the second respondent-Institute had abdicated its power in not taking action in terms of the decision of the Ministry of Human Resources Development and the subsequent suggestion of the University Grants Commission. As far as this contention is concerned, the Division Bench had elaborately considered the said point and had come to the conclusion that though the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources Development recommended for the enhancement of age from 60 to 62 years for Assistant Librarians in respect of the other Institutes and the said recommendation of the Government of India was also accepted and suggested by the University Grants Commission to the second respondent-Institute, the applicant cannot claim the benefit of the said decision so long as the Statutes of the Institute in question governing the service conditions of the applicant relating to the age of superannuation being 60 years are amended, thereby the age is extended to 62 years. As this is a finding based on the submissions made by the applicant, question of review of that order would not arise. The review is not an appeal in disguise. The power of review of this Court is restricted only where there is error apparent on the face of record or there is some clerical mistake in the order. The contention of the applicant as to the enhancement of the age of superannuation to 62 years was negatived after due discussion. Hence, we do not find any merit in the submission of Mr.A.E.Chelliah, learned senior counsel seeking for review of that finding. 14. So far as the second contention is concerned, the Division Bench after going into the question as to the age of superannuation, though found that no relief could be granted in favour of the applicant, ultimately, directed the second respondent-Institute to reconsider the question of enhancement of the age of superannuation only in respect of the existing Assistant Librarians in the light of the recommendations made by the Government of India and suggested by the University Grants Commission with a further expectation that the Board of Governors would deliberate on the issue and take a decision on an early date. With that finding, the Division Bench modified the order in the writ petition. With that finding, the Division Bench modified the order in the writ petition. While directing the Board of Governors of the second respondent-Institute to reconsider and deliberate on the issue in order to take a decision, the Division Bench was fully aware of the claim of the applicant for enhancement of the age of superannuation. Nevertheless, the Division Bench did not think it fit to direct the Board of Governors to reconsider the question of enhancement of the age of superannuation of the applicant. The decision of the Ministry of Human Resources Development to enhance the age from 60 to 62 years was taken on 30.3.99 and subsequently on 22.9.2006 and the further suggestion was also made for such enhancement by the University Grants Commission vide its letter dated 19.10.2006. By the time the order of the Division Bench came to be passed, the applicant had retired at the age of 60 years on 30.6.2007. For that reason only, the Division Bench had directed the second respondent to consider the amendment to the statutes by enhancing the age of retirement to 62 years for the existing Assistant Librarians alone, as the amendment would be only prospective and cannot be made retrospective to give benefit to the retired employees as well. This decision of the Division Bench, in our opinion, cannot be considered to be error apparent on the face of record requiring review. Hence, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the applicant in this regard also cannot be accepted. 15. For all the above reasons, we reject both the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the applicant seeking for review. Accordingly, the review application is dismissed. No costs.