JUDGMENT I.P. Mukerji, J. 1. THE writ petitioner company (hereafter described as "the writ petitioner") manufactures and sells the well known brand of ice cream 'Rollick'. It has its factory in Village and Post Office - Jaladhulagiri, Dhulagarh, within the jurisdiction of the Howrah Zilla Regulated Market Committee. THE Act which requires consideration in this writ application is the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972. Section 2(h) defines "market area" as follows: "2(h). "market area" means any area declared to be a market area under section 3;" Section 13 inter alia enacts that no person shall sell or purchase any agricultural produce or be engaged in processing of any agricultural produce in that market area without a licence issued by the market committee. 2. NOW according to the respondent Howarh Zilla Regulated Market Committee the writ petitioner carries on the business of purchasing goods or processing within the designated market area. It "deals" with "Skimmed Milk, Sugar, Vegetable Oil, Kaju, Pesta, Almond, Kismis purchasing or processing them", according to the committee. This will appear from the statement made by them in Complaint Case No. 1079 of 2009 against the Director of the writ petitioner in the Court of the Ninth Judicial Magistrate, Howrah. The market committee has the power to levy fee on agricultural produce sold or purchased or processed in the market area. Every holder of a licence is required to submit a return of his turnover under section 17A. Upon failure to furnish such turnover, the market committee has the power to initiate assessment proceedings. Such fee, it seems is on the basis of the turnover. Although, the writ petitioner had obtained the requisite licence under section 13 it had not filed its return under section 17A. By a letter dated 6th March 2008 the Howrah Zilla Regulated Market Committee told the writ petitioner that it was obligatory on its part to file such return and warned them of 'suo moto' assessment and prosecution under section 34 of the Act. After about five weeks the writ petitioner replied to this letter that the product manufactured by them, namely, ice cream was not a 'notified item'. I think that by 'notified item' the writ petitioner meant that the product was not an agricultural produce as defined in section 2(l)(a) of the Act read with its schedule. 3. After about five weeks the writ petitioner replied to this letter that the product manufactured by them, namely, ice cream was not a 'notified item'. I think that by 'notified item' the writ petitioner meant that the product was not an agricultural produce as defined in section 2(l)(a) of the Act read with its schedule. 3. BY another letter dated 11th November 2008, the said market committee told the writ petitioner that they had been repeatedly asked to submit return and pay the market fees under the Act. They stated in that letter that they were compelled to do 'suo moto' assessment of market fees under section 17A. They threatened that if those market fees were not paid within ten days from that date, prosecution would be instituted under section 34. A sheet was annexed to that letter purporting to be the 'suo moto' assessment. In that sheet or statement items like "Skimmed Milk, Sugar, Vegetable Oil, Kaju, Pesta, Almond, Kismis etc." were stated as "purchased agricultural commodities" by the writ petitioner. Various periods were mentioned in the statement from 09.07.2007 to 31.10.2008. Purchase value for each of the aforesaid periods was determined by the special officer of the committee and on that basis market fees were assessed at Rs. 10 lacs. 4. ALSO pursuant to the above threat a criminal prosecution was instituted against the Director of the writ petitioner under section 34 of the Act being Case No. 107C of 2009 in the Court of the Fourth Chief Judicial Magistrate Howrah. That prosecution was instituted by a complaint petition. Those criminal proceedings are pending. Rival Contention of the Parties: At the time of hearing of this writ application the learned counsel for the writ petitioner Mr. Samit Talukdar, Sr. Advocate has abandoned the prayer made in the writ petition for quashing of the criminal complaint case. Such stand has also been taken in the written notes of argument filed by them. The attack to the assessment is limited to violation of principles of natural justice. It has been stated that section 17A(6) enjoined the market committee to give an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. Such opportunity of hearing was not given. The assessment was made ex-parte without hearing the writ petitioner. The attack to the assessment is limited to violation of principles of natural justice. It has been stated that section 17A(6) enjoined the market committee to give an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. Such opportunity of hearing was not given. The assessment was made ex-parte without hearing the writ petitioner. In support of the above contention the decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, reported in (1998)8 SCC 1 was cited to contend that if principles of natural justice were violated the writ petitioner could straight way come to the writ Court without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal. For violation of these principles the assessment order should be set aside. Both Ms. Sutapa Sanyal, Advocate, representing the respondent committee and Mr. Ashok Sarkar, Advocate for the State have made elaborate arguments. Their contentions are as follows: (a) The writ petitioner has got no defence whatsoever to the assessment order as it admittedly purchases and processes agricultural products as stated in the assessment and is therefore liable to pay the fee. (b) Because it is so liable the writ petitioner obtained the licence under the Act. Having obtained such licence under the Act, it cannot now turn round and say that it is not liable to pay the market fee. (c) The writ petitioner was put to notice of this assessment by the letter of the committee dated 6th March 2008 and since there was no response to this notice the assessment was made 'suo moto'. (d) The writ petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of an appeal which the writ petitioner has not availed. (e) Any interference by the Court with the assessment order will have a repercussion in the criminal proceedings. The points which are urged in the writ petition can well be taken in the criminal proceedings as well as before the said alternative forum and hence this writ should not be entertained by this Court. Discussion and Findings: 5. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. The crucial enactment is sub-section 6 of section 17A of the said Act. That sub-section embodies the principles of natural justice. It says that the secretary will be empowered to make assessment of fees, "after giving the trader an opportunity of being heard". Discussion and Findings: 5. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. The crucial enactment is sub-section 6 of section 17A of the said Act. That sub-section embodies the principles of natural justice. It says that the secretary will be empowered to make assessment of fees, "after giving the trader an opportunity of being heard". By their letter dated 6th March 2008, the Howrah Zilla Regulated Market Committee asked the managing director of the writ petitioner to file a necessary return within seven days and threatened to make 'suo moto' assessment and institute criminal proceedings. By their letter dated 11th November 2008, the said committee said that they had already made such assessment as the returns were not submitted by the said director of the petitioner. On my understanding of the said sub-section, even if returns are not filed, the said committee did not. have the immediate power to make an ex-parte assessment. It could only make an ex-parte assessment after giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner of being heard. If despite notice return was not filed by the writ petitioner, the said committee had the power to assess such market fee on such evidence as was available. But before doing so, the writ petitioner had to be called for a hearing. There would not have been any infirmity in the proceeding had the writ petitioner been asked to be present at a particular date and time for being heard before the order of assessment was passed. No such hearing was offered to the writ petitioner. 6. FURTHER, a right of hearing is empty unless any party likely to be affected by a decision is allowed to file a written defence and allowed to produce evidence. Further, in my evaluation of the assessment there are no details or particulars or reasons as to how "purchase value" for each period has been arrived at. Further, how the items mentioned in that assessment are exigible to such fee is not mentioned. 7. FOR the above infirmity in the procedure and in the order which includes violation of principles of natural justice, the writ petitioner need not avail of the alternative remedy provided in the above Act but could approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction to correct the wrong, (see the Whirlpool Corporation. 7. FOR the above infirmity in the procedure and in the order which includes violation of principles of natural justice, the writ petitioner need not avail of the alternative remedy provided in the above Act but could approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction to correct the wrong, (see the Whirlpool Corporation. Registrar of Trademarks, reported in (1998)8 SCC 1 ) The Court has appropriate powers to set aside such order in its writ jurisdiction. 8. IT has been specifically clarified in the written notes of argument of the petitioner that no submissions are being made for quashing of the criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no necessity for me to deal with the very elaborate arguments made by Mr. Sarkar and Ms. Sanyal that the Court should not quash criminal proceedings. IT is true, as submitted by Ms. Sanyal that the writ petitioner had obtained a licence, thereby suggesting an acknowledgement that it was liable to pay fee under the Act and that it was engaged in sale or purchase or processing of agricultural produce as mentioned in the schedule. But, if an authority has been empowered by law to take a decision such decision should not be sought to be justified by an affidavit- in- opposition subsequently filed or by the arguments made in Court. The decision has to justify itself. If it was the case of the authority concerned that the writ petitioner was covered under the Act and had to pay the fee, it had to present that case to the writ petitioner to answer. It had the duty to consider the case of the writ petitioner as well as the case of the Zilla committee or the Government of West Bengal and come to a reasoned decision after giving them hearing or an opportunity of being heard. For not doing so this particular order is vitiated. As I have said earlier, there is not even a line in any letter or notice asking the writ petitioner to appear for hearing on a particular day and at a particular time as required by section 17A(6). Therefore, the assessment made on 3rd November 2008 by the Howrah Zilla Regulated Market Committee forwarded by its letter dated 11th November 2008 is quashed and set aside. Therefore, the assessment made on 3rd November 2008 by the Howrah Zilla Regulated Market Committee forwarded by its letter dated 11th November 2008 is quashed and set aside. The said committee is directed to pass a reasoned order within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order by giving the writ petitioner an opportunity of filing their written defence and producing evidence and hearing them. I am not interfering with the criminal proceedings at all. Both parties will have rights to take stands in those criminal proceedings which are available to them in law. The writ application is thus partly allowed. Petition allowed in part.