Judgment : 1 Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for passing this order would run thus: (a) The respondents herein fifed the suit in O.S. No. 425 of 2004 before the District Munsif, Vridhachalam, seeking the relief of declaration of title over the suit property and for recovery of possession of it. The trial Court; decreed the prayer for declaration, but dismissed the prayer for the relief of possession. (b) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with. the judgment of the trial Court, the plaintiffs and defendants preferred two separate appeals, paying separately the entire Court fee, which was paid by the plaintiffs before the lower Court, (c) The appellate Court, on merits dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants, but decreed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs by a common judgment. However, two separate decrees emerged. (d) Challenging and impugning the common judgment as well as the two decrees passed by the first appellate Court, only one second appeal has been filed by the defendants in the suit. 2 For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 3 When the matter came up before this Court, after issuance of notice of admission to the respondents/plaintiffs, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs raised a pertinent law point, which is having immense significance while entertaining the second appeals by the registry, to the effect that as against two appellate decrees one second appeal is untenable and the defendants should have filed two separate second appeals and correspondingly should have paid the appropriate Court fees. 4 Heard both sides. 4 Heard both sides. 5 The gist and kernel, the pith and marrow of the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the defendants would run thus: (a) Rule 93 of the Civil Rules of practice contemplates that when two first appeals are filed, from out of a judgment of a trial Court, the appellate Court, after disposing the appeals, by a common judgment could prepare one decree and not two decrees, (b) The reliefs sought for are interlinked with each other as the relief of declaration and the consequential relief of possession cannot be separated from each other, in such a case, there are decisions of this Court as well as the Apex Court enuring to the benefit of the defendants to file one second appeal instead of fifing two second appeals. (c) The Court, fee paid also is incommensurate with the Court fee paid by the plaintiffs before the trial Court. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for rejecting the contention raised by the respondents/plaintiffs and for proceeding further with the matter, 6 Whereas, by way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the counsel for the defendants, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs advanced his arguments, the warp and woof, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus: i. Undue importance cannot be given to Rule 93 of the Civil Rules of Practice, as it emerged only out of delegated Legislation and nowhere in C.P.C. it is contemplated that as against two appellate decrees one Second appeal could be filed. ii. The reliefs are not mentioned in the relief of declaration and the relief of possession are different and in such a case, the substantive questions of law which could be raised in this case would be two distinctive ones and not one and the same. iii. It is not the problem of paying Court fee that arises, but the law envisages that as against every appellate decree there should a second appeal. As such, the defendants should have filed two appeals as against the two appellate decrees. iii. It is not the problem of paying Court fee that arises, but the law envisages that as against every appellate decree there should a second appeal. As such, the defendants should have filed two appeals as against the two appellate decrees. Furthermore, factually also it is not a case where the decree was prepared and issued by the appellate Court incommensurate with Rule 93 of Civil Rules of Practice, but on the other hand, the appellate Court did choose to issue two separate decrees, as against which, two second appeals are contemplated, which cannot be clubbed in one second appeal itself. 7 In this connection, both sides cited precedents. Hence, I would like to refer to those precedents in seriatim. (a) The learned counsel for the defendants cited the following decisions; (i) Appa and Others. v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti and Others AIR 1932 Mad 689, an excerpt from it would run thus: “ There was one original suit, against the decree in which in favour of the plaintiffs, two appeals were preferred to the lower appellate Court by two sets of defendants. The result of the appeals was that the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate Court and a decree dismissing the suit was passed. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs need not fife two second appeals – it is enough if the plaintiffs file one second appeal; see Sanyasi Lingam v. Gavaramma. In the circumstances, the appellants will pay only one set of pleaders ‘ fee to the respondents in the two second appeals together, which would be shared – a moiety by the other defendants. The respondents will also get the costs of printing and transaction in each second appeal from the appellants. ” (ii) Gangulakurti Sanyasi Lingam v. Nidugonda Gavaramma (1906) 1 MLJ 411, certain excerpts from it would run thus: “ It is objected that in this case there were two appeals to the District Judge from the original decree of the District Munsif and that therefore there should be two second appeals to this Court. The District Judge, however, very property heard the two appeals together and passed one judgment: and one decree only upon both appeals. The rules of this Court (Rule 105) lay down the practice that when there are two appeals from the same decree they should, if possible, be heard together and only one decree passed. The District Judge, however, very property heard the two appeals together and passed one judgment: and one decree only upon both appeals. The rules of this Court (Rule 105) lay down the practice that when there are two appeals from the same decree they should, if possible, be heard together and only one decree passed. Here there is only one appeal entered, and we think that the course adopted is right and that there was no necessity to enter two appeals, and even if two appeals had been entered the proper course would have been to hear them together and to pass one decree. ” (iii) Subbiah Udayar v. Karuppiah Odayar alias Pichai Odayar ILR (1965) 1 Mad 57, certain excerpts from it would run thus: “ ..,. We may in this connection refer to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Narhari and Others v. Shankar and Others . In that case, there was a suit in which the plaintiff claimed 2/3rd share in an estate. The two defendants opposed his claim, contending that they were each entitled to one-third share, The plaintiff ‘ s claim was accepted by the trial Court. Each one of the defendants filed separate appeals which were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment The plaintiff who lost in the appeal, preferred an appeal from one of the decrees only claiming at the same time relief in respect of the entire subject matter in dispute. The Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the dispute arose out of the same suit and the appeal had been disposed of by the same judgment, it was not necessary to file two separate appeals. The learned Judges observed at page 758: “ The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata . When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata . We are of the opinion that in the present case, the subject-matter in dispute between the parties in substance can he regarded as forming one list only. ” (iv) Narhari and Others. v. Shanker and Others AIR 1953 SC 419 , certain excerpts from it would run thus: “ 4. ...,, The plaintiffs in their appeal to the High Court have impleaded all the defendants as respondents and their prayer covers both the appeals and they have paid consolidated Court-fee for the whole suit. It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not he two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up. As has been observed by TEK CHAND, J. in his learned judgment in AIR 1927 Lah 289(H), mentioned above, the determining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the Question of res judicata does not arise at ail and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one. Besides, the High Court was wrong in not giving to the appellants the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act because there was conflict of decisions regarding this question not only in the High Court in the State but also among the different High Courts in India. ” (b) Whereas the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would cite the decision rendered by theBench of the Honourable Apex Court in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh and Another AIR 1962 SC 338 . 8. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment of the Bench, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would try to distinguish the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Narhari and Others v. Shanker and Others (supra) and point out that blindly the lower Courts cannot jump to the conclusion that whenever there are two appellate decrees emerging out of two connected appeal proceedings, it would be sufficient if one second appeal is filed and that bereft and niggard of factual circumstances such filing of one second appeal is anathema to justice and fair play. 9. Whereas the learned counsel for the defendants would interpret the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Bench and highlight that the Honourable Bench ‘ s judgment emerged, in respect of an Election Petition, wherein reliefs were sought to the effect that the appellant ‘ s opponent ‘ s status as the declared successful candidate should be set aside and correspondingly, the appellant should be declared as the successful candidate; in those peculiar circumstances, such judgment emerged and the ratio decedendi of that case has to be looked into. 10. I am of the view that even the obiter-dictum of the Honourable Apex Court should be taken as binding precedent and the lower Court should not try to carve out an exception, so as to bypass the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court and there could be no second thought over it, 11. Certain excerpts from the said judgment of the Bench in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh and Another (supra) would run thus: “ 12. Certain excerpts from the said judgment of the Bench in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh and Another (supra) would run thus: “ 12. It was in these circumstances that this Court observed: “ It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up, ” This does not mean that whenever there be more than one appeal arising out of one suit, only one appeal is competent against the order in any of those appeals irrespective of the fact whether the issues for decision in those appeals were all common or some were common and others raised different points for determination. The existence of one finding and one decision mentioned in this observation simply contemplates the presence of common points in all the appeals and the absence of any different point m those appeals, and consequently of one derision on those common points in all the appeals. ” 12. The Honourable Apex Court, in my view did not lay down the law that whenever two appellate decrees are emerging out of two connected appeals there could only be one second appeal. Depending upon the facts and circumstances. the question of filing a single appeal or two appeals would arise. 13. Now the factual scenario in this case should necessarily be considered. The learned advocates would put forth and set forth the factual position thus: (i). There emerged an oral partition between two brothers in respect of a house site and subsequently, one of the brothers sold the property in favour of the defendants. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, the sale deed is fraught with misdescription and taking undue advantage of the same, the defendants encroached into the area belonging to the plaintiffs. (ii). Whereas, the learned counsel for the defendants would submit that the factual matrix in this case would expatiate and display, demonstrate and project that the prayers for declaration and consequential possession form integral part of one relief. If it is found that the sale deed contains misdescription, then the possession of the defendant would tantamount to trespass; wherefore it is clear that the relief of declaration cannot be viewed or visualized independent of the relief of possession. (iii). If it is found that the sale deed contains misdescription, then the possession of the defendant would tantamount to trespass; wherefore it is clear that the relief of declaration cannot be viewed or visualized independent of the relief of possession. (iii). The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the matter cannot be viewed in that manner, because the relief of declaration is based on various facts and circumstances; however, the prayer for possession could be dealt with independently also de hors the prayer for declaration. 14. At present, without finally deciding on those issues, I am of the view that, the very suit itself is only for declaration and for consequential possession of an immovable property and it was valued under Section 25 (a) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. At this juncture, I would also like to point out that while framing substantial questions of law in the second appeal naturally the factual as well as the legal points involved in this case should be taken note of and I am of the view that at that time suffice if one set of substantial questions of law is framed touching upon the prayers for declaration and possession. 15. It so happened in this case that the plaintiffs succeeded in getting declaratory relief of their title relating to the property, but, they could not get the relief of possession in the trial Court. Correspondingly, the defendants virtually succeeded in getting the suit dismissed in respect of the relief of possession, but they were made to suffer a decree for declaration of title. The appellate Court allowed the plaintiffs ‘appeal and thereby granted the plaintiffs ‘ prayer for possession and the defendants ‘ appeal was dismissed. Ultimately, the net result was that the plaintiffs got both the reliefs of declaration and possession, 16. In this factual circumstances, the defendants preferred only one second appeal challenging the common appellate judgment and the two decrees, which emerged. In my considered opinion, it has to be taken as a whole, because, the plaintiffs succeeded in toto and the defendants failed fully. 17. No doubt, sticking en to the letters of the provisions of law as found in Section 100 C.P.C., if the matter is viewed, then it may appear as though as against every decree passed in an appeal there should be a second appeal. 17. No doubt, sticking en to the letters of the provisions of law as found in Section 100 C.P.C., if the matter is viewed, then it may appear as though as against every decree passed in an appeal there should be a second appeal. But here, the factual position is different. The relief of declaration is the main relief and the relief of possession is the consequential one and it so happened that both the plaintiffs and the defendants were constrained to file separate appeals before the appellate Court and before the appellate Court the plaintiffs succeeded and the defendants failed. 18. In this connection, the decision of this Court in Gangulakurti Sanyasi Lingam v. Nidugonda Gavaramma (supra) could fruitfully be cited, as factually much of a muchness could he seen between the facts in that case and the facts in this case. 19. Before the first appellate Court, each side paid a sum of ` 750/-in their respective appeals, taking into account the total Court fee paid before the lower Court by plaintiffs. Now by entertaining one second appeal, the appellants in second appeal are enjoined to pay the Court fee as paid in the trial Court by the plaintiffs and nothing more. 20. It may appear as though if only one second appeal is allowed to be filed against the two appellate decrees, there would be loss of Revenue to the State. 21. I could take a cue from Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, which emerged out of the noble object that a litigant should not be constrained to pay excessive Court fee. 22. The object of Section 6 is that when there is only one cause of action and out of that several reliefs emerge, then on the aggregate value of the reliefs, Court fee should be paid and not independently on each and every relief, even though there might be separate provisions of law contemplating separate charging of Court fee on each one of those reliefs. As such, keeping the said object in mind I am of the view that allowing one appeal to be filed would not cause any less to the exchequer. 23. As such, keeping the said object in mind I am of the view that allowing one appeal to be filed would not cause any less to the exchequer. 23. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would point out that simply because Rule 93 of the Civil Ruses of Practice might contemplate preparation of one decree incorporating the cause titles of two appeals, in stricto sensu, it should be taken as one format containing several decrees. 24. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs also would place reliance on Order 4 Rule 16 o the Appellate Side Rules (Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Madras) and it is extracted hereunder for ready reference, along with Section 100 of C.P.C. “ Order 4 , Rule 16: Appeals Against Orders and Appeals Against Appellate decrees and Orders Every memorandum of appeal against an order, appellate decree by appellate order shall be accompanied by- (1) as many clear authenticated copies on plain paper of the memorandum of grounds of appeal as there are respondents to be served, together with another such copy for the Court record; (2) the particulars for service of such notices on the respondents set out in Form No, 2 of the schedule to these rules; (3) the fees prescribed for service of such notices on the respondents; and (4) such other papers as are referred to him Order 42 and 43 of the Code) ” Section 100 C.P.C-Second Appeal – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this Section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (2) An appeal may lie under this Section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) the appeal shall be heard on the question as formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, it is satisfied that the case involves such question, ” 25 Before trying to interpret further those provisions, I hark back to the following maxims: (i). ‘ Verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat quam pereat ‘ – The words (of an instrument) are to be so understood, that the subject matter may rather be of force than perish (rather be preserved than destroyed; or, in other words, that the instrument may have effect, if possible) (ii). ‘ Verba generalia generaliter sunt intelligenda ‘ – General words are to be generally understood. 26 I also recollect one other maxim as under: ‘ Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera ‘ The purport of the said maxim is that letter of the law should be adhered to 27 A balance has to be struck. The meaning attributed to the words used in a statute cannot be given a total go-by under the pretext of ushering in the object. There should be reasonable interpretation in concinnity and in commensurate with the object, when there is ambiguity in the statute. Accordingly, if viewed, allowing the defendant ‘ s to prefer appeal would further the cause of justice, as otherwise, the defendants would be put to inconvenience and considerable financial hardship, which would be anathema to the justice and fair play. 28 Technicalities are hand maids of justice and here I am of the considered view that the factual scenario are in support of filing of one second appeal rather than two second appeals. 28 Technicalities are hand maids of justice and here I am of the considered view that the factual scenario are in support of filing of one second appeal rather than two second appeals. If the Court ultimately decides that in this case the plaintiffs do have title over the suit property, then automatically they would be getting both the reliefs of declaration and possession. But on the other hand, if the plaintiffs could not get the declaratory relief, automatically and as a sequel they could not get the relief of possession also. When such is the legal and factual position, allowing the defendants to file one appeal as against the common judgment and the two decrees of the first appellate Court would be justified and accordingly, it is ordered. Post the second appeal on 13.12.2010.