ORDER 1. Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order dated 1-7-2009 passed by Fee Regulatory Committee, Bhopal, Annexure P-1, about fixation of fee structure for the Session 2009-10 and the order dated 22-8-2009, Annexure P-2, passed by the Appellate Authority in Appeal No. 38/2009. 2. The petitioner/institution is being controlled and managed by a Trust, named 'Samta Lok Sansthan', which is registered under the Indian Trusts Act. The present institution has been running B.E. Courses. It has been granted ISO : 9002 quality certificate. The petitioner-institution has a very good reputation amongst other institutions imparting education of B.E. Course. 3. As per the petitioner-institution, its ex-students have been placed to multinational corporations, and other prestigious Indian Companies including TCS, Imfosys, Wipro, Tech Mahindra, Honey Well Automation etc. The Institution has implemented recommendations of Sixth Pay Commission. It has good faculty. 4. Petitioner-institution submitted accounts-statement and other documents to the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, hereinafter referred to as 'AFRC, for fixation of fee. As per the accounts statement, the petitioner-institution required an amount of Rs. 3,77,38,779.00 for the purpose of maintenance, growth and up-gradation of the institution. The expenditure of the petitioner-institution for the year ending 31st March, 2009 was of Rs. 8,14,10,250.81 and income was Rs. 5,78,77,417.59. As per the balance-sheet, the petitioner- institution suffered a loss of Rs. 2,35,32,833.22 in the financial year 2008-09. The AFRC considered 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 as a three year block for finalizing the fee structure. For the sessions 2007-08 and 2008-09 fee was declared on 12-8-2008. The fee-structure was withheld for the session 2009-10 on the request of institutions due to implementation of the sixth pay commission recommendations. The hearing of the petitioner-institution for fixation of fee for B.E. Course for the academic session 2009-10 was held on 20-5-2009. Vide impugned order, Annexure P-1, dated 1-7-09 the AFRC fixed the fee of the petitioner-institution for B.E. Course for the session 2009-10 at Rs. 27,500/- per semester and caution money payable on one time at the time of admission of Rs. 1500.00. The AFRC also fixed the fee on other heads including transportation, hostel and training and placement as mentioned in the impugned order, Annexure P-1. 5. 27,500/- per semester and caution money payable on one time at the time of admission of Rs. 1500.00. The AFRC also fixed the fee on other heads including transportation, hostel and training and placement as mentioned in the impugned order, Annexure P-1. 5. Against the aforesaid order passed by the AFRC the petitioner-institution filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, constituted under section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh Niji Vyavsayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2007, hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 2007". The Appellate Authority vide order dated 22-8-2009 partially increased the fee of B.E. course from Rs. 27,500/- per semester to Rs. 30,500/- per semester, i.e., Rs. 61,000/- per annum, besides caution money and charges on other heads fixed by the AFRC. 6. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-institution, has submitted that the AFRC and the Appellate Authority have not considered the statutory provisions of the Act of 2007 and the principles laid down in Regulations for Fixation of Fee for a Private Unaided Professional Institution. The leaned Senior Counsel further submitted that it is mandatory for the respondent No. 2, Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, to consider all the documents submitted by the petitioner-institution for the purpose of fixation of fee. It has further been contended that even the respondent No. 2 has not taken into consideration the fee proposed by the auditor appointed by respondent No. 2 and no reasons have been assigned by respondent No. 2 in fixation of fee. The respondent No. 2 has issued cyclo-style order to all the institutions in fixing the fee, which is arbitrary and illegal and also against the directions issued by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in regard to fixation of fee in various judgments. In support of his contentions learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments: (1) S.N. Chandrshekar and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 208 ; (2) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; (3) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481 ; (4) Cellular Operators Association of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 186 ; (5) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maddula Ratanavalli and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; (3) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481 ; (4) Cellular Operators Association of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 186 ; (5) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maddula Ratanavalli and Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 81 ; (6) Shivaji Atmaji Swant v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR 986 SC 617; (7) A.P.S.R.T.C. and Ors. v. G. Srinivas Reddy and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1465 ; (8) Tandon Brothers v. State of W.B. and Ors. (2001) 5 SCC 664 . 7. Contrary to this, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, has submitted that as per the provisions of the Act of 2007 and Regulations of 2008 made thereunder, the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee considered in detail the documents submitted by the petitioner-institution. The Committee has also taken into consideration the relevant criteria for fixing the fee and fixed the fee accordingly. It has further been submitted by the learned Counsel that Appellate Authority also considered the submissions of the petitioner and partially enhanced the fee, hence, there is no merit in this petition. The orders passed by the Authorities are in accordance with law. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.A. Inamdarand Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2005) 6 SCC 537 . 8. Learned Counsel for the State has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 and further submitted that job of fixation of fee is of respondent No. 2. 9. State Legislature has enacted an Act named as the Madhya Pradesh Niji Vyavsayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2007, hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 2007", for the purpose of regulation of admission and fixation of fee in private professional education institutions in the State of Madhya Pradesh. section 9 of Chapter IV of the Act of 2007 prescribes factors which have to be taken into consideration in fixation of fee. The aforesaid section is as under: 9. section 9 of Chapter IV of the Act of 2007 prescribes factors which have to be taken into consideration in fixation of fee. The aforesaid section is as under: 9. Factors.- (1) Having regard to,- (i) the location of the private unaided professional educational institution; (ii) the nature of the professional course; (iii) the cost of land and building; (iv) the available infrastructure, teaching, non-teaching staff and equipments; (v) the expenditure on administration and maintenance; (vi) a reasonable surplus required for growth and development of the professional institution; (vii) any other relevant factor; the Committee shall determine, in the manner prescribed, the fee to be charged by a private professional educational institution. (2) The Committee shall give the institution an opportunity of being heard before fixing any fee: Provided that no such fee, as may be fixed by the Committee, shall amount to profiteering or commercialization of education. 10. The State Government has also framed Regulations in exercise of powers conferred by section 13 of the Act of 2007, named as "Regulations for Fixation of Fee in a Private Unaided Professional Institution Regulation, 2008", hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation, 2008". The Regulations have been published in the Gazette Notification dated 15th April, 2008 and came into force from the date of its publication in the Gazette. Regulation 4 thereof prescribes "criteria for fixation of fee", which is as under: 4. Criteria for fixation of fee.- The Committee shall prescribe the fee in the manner after considering the following factors: (a) the location of the private unaided professional education institutions; (b) the nature of the professional course; (c) the cost of land and building; (d) the available infrastructure, teaching, non-teaching staff and equipments; (e) the expenditure on administration and maintenance; (f) a reasonable surplus required for growth and development of the professional institutions; (g) any other relevant factor: Provided that the Committee may also decide for providing incentive to the accredited course or Quality Certification like ISO: 9002 etc. or weightage or backward/less area development for promoting professional educational institutions in these areas. 11. Regulation 5 of the Regulations of 2008 prescribes procedure for fixation of fee, which is as under: 5. or weightage or backward/less area development for promoting professional educational institutions in these areas. 11. Regulation 5 of the Regulations of 2008 prescribes procedure for fixation of fee, which is as under: 5. Procedure for fixation of fee.- (1) At the beginning of each calendar year, that is in the month of January of each year the Committee shall issue an advertisement inviting applications in regard to determination of fees for admission in professional education institution for forthcoming academic session. (2) The Committee may evolve its own procedures for giving inter se weightage to the different parameter for fixation of fee. (3) Each institution shall be heard by the Committee for finalisation of its fee structure. (4) The Committee shall require a private unaided professional educational institution, or a deemed University to make submissions by the date prescribed in the advertisement. Any new professional institution that gets permission from Appropriate Authority after aforesaid prescribed dates should approach the Committee for fixing their interim fee and thereafter for final fee structure as per calendar and procedure fixed by the Committee. (5) The submission shall be made in the form prescribed by the Committee and shall be accompanied with the following documents: (i) The authorization/permission letter issued by the All India body controlling and regulating the professional studies, e.g., the A.I.C., T.E., N.C.T.E., Bar Council of India, Medical Council of India and the like ones; (ii) Documents and information relating to society and its by-laws; (iii) A copy of Project Report for starting the professional educational institution; (iv) The physical infrastructure facilities available by the area earmarked for the institution, its title, ownership, the building stating the number of classroom and administrative , block rooms available for library, reading room, indoor games (if any) playgrounds, laboratories, general utilities etc. together with the site plan. together with the site plan. (v) Library facilities - number of books subjectwise, faculty-wise and for general reading; (vi) Reading room facilities - number of dailies, weeklies, monthly magazines, periodical professional magazines and literature subscribed in the institution; (vii) Laboratory facilities - Information regarding Equipments and instruments available and in the laboratory; (viii) Teaching Faculty - Number of Professors, Readers, Lecturers in junior, senior and selection scale (to be indicated separately), their names, educational qualifications and their bio-data, pay scale, pay and allowances and total emoluments; (ix) Tie up, if any, with a State enterprise public/corporate body engaged in production of items similar to the education proposed to be imparted by the institution; (x) Financial standing: (1) Proposed budget of the institution for a year; (2) Amount required for annual maintenance of infrastructure; (3) Amount required for growth, development and up gradation of laboratories; (4) Deposits- both fixed and current deposits in the name of the institution along with the names of institutions and names of Banks; (5) Sources of funding; and (6) Loans, if any, from the banks, other financial institutions; (xi) Balance sheet and Income and Expenditure Account of the institution from the date of inception duly authenticated by a Chartered Accountant; (xii) An affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the information furnished in the submission. (6) A processing fee, as laid down by the Committee from time to time, shall be deposited along with the submissions. Any submission without processing fee shall not be entertained. (7) After the receipt of the information, the Committee may, either at its own motion inspect the institution, or constitute an Inspection Team to make an on the spot assessment and verification of the facts mentioned in the submission. (8) The inspection team, as constituted by the Committee shall consist of: (a) an eminent educationist of the rank of Principal of a college or professor concerned with the relevant course for which fee fixation is sought shall be nominated by the Chairman, Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee from a panel approved by the Committee. (b) a Chartered Account of repute, who is versed with auditing of the accounts of educational institutions - Member. (c) an Officer from the Secretariat of Committee Secretariat to be nominated by the Chairman of the Committee as Member Secretary of Inspection team. (b) a Chartered Account of repute, who is versed with auditing of the accounts of educational institutions - Member. (c) an Officer from the Secretariat of Committee Secretariat to be nominated by the Chairman of the Committee as Member Secretary of Inspection team. (9) The Inspection Team may call for any record, which it considers necessary and a requisition calling for the record shall be made in writing and shall be treated as if it is called by the Committee. (10) The inspection team may seek oral evidence from any of the persons concerned with the affairs of the Institution and a written record of such oral evidence shall form part of the report by the Inspection Team. (11) Any association of teachers, students etc. may through a petition make counter submissions to the Inspection Team. The Inspection Team may hear them and forward the petition to the Committee along with their views. (12) After completion of the inspection the Inspection Team shall submit its report to the Secretary/OSD in the Committee Secretariat. The Secretary shall scrutinize the report and submit it to the Chairman of Committee. (13) If the Chairman feels that the submissions need further analysis he may order the Report and the documents to be scrutinized and verified by a Chartered Accountant hired by the Committee for this purpose. (14) The Committee shall consider documents accompanying the submissions, the Inspection Report submitted by the Inspection Team, the verification report of the Chartered Accountant and the assessment made by the Committee Secretariat. (15) Committee shall then decide whether the fees proposed by that institute are justified and are not profiteering or charging capitation fee. The Committee shall be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to decide some other fee which can be charged by the institute. (16) Committee shall be at liberty to fix the fee of those institutions which do not submit their proposals to the Committee. (17) For checking various data/information and documents furnished by the Institutions a Chartered Accountant firm may be asked to perform the work as mentioned. (18) Fee proposed by institution on prescribed proforma with desired information shall be checked for arithmetical accuracy, completeness and furnishing of required documents. (19) The information furnished shall also be checked with reference to the Audit Reports submitted therewith as well as final accounts of the trust/society. (18) Fee proposed by institution on prescribed proforma with desired information shall be checked for arithmetical accuracy, completeness and furnishing of required documents. (19) The information furnished shall also be checked with reference to the Audit Reports submitted therewith as well as final accounts of the trust/society. (20) Qualifications and adverse observations in the Audit Reports or Notes to Accounts shall also be considered and necessary adjustment be made in the proposals submitted by the institutions in accordance therewith. (21) Special emphasis be given on the apportionment of common cost incurred by the society/trust running more than one institutions. (22) The information data documents submitted by the Institutions shall further be checked with reference to the norms established hereunder and wherever necessary adjustments shall be make to the date furnished by the Institutions for arriving at the fee to be fixed. (23) Irregularities found on the basis of the above said scrutiny shall be verified for their gravity and wherever necessary the society/trust/institution may be asked to submit its representation in respect of the said irregularity. In case where the Committee finds that the irregularity is of such magnitude as well vitiate the process of fee fixation, it may reject the application and may also proceed to take penal action against such society/trust/institution including prosecution. (24) Committee shall give an opportunity of hearing to the Institutions and further wherever found necessary the Institutions may be visited for ascertaining the correctness of the information and data submitted by the Institutions. (25) The Committee shall fix the fee including all the fees payable to the institution for a year. (26) Where information received from institution is incomplete or insufficient, the Committee shall ask the institutions to rectify the same failing which Committee shall have the right to fix their fees after making suitable assumptions/provisions. (27) The Committee Secretariat shall evolve proper system of finalization of fees and shall maintain all record related with it for a period of 5 years. 12. From the aforesaid statutory provisions contained in the Act of 2007 and Regulations of 2008, it is clear that the Committee has to consider various aspects in fixation of fee in regard to each institution. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also passed judgments with regard to factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Authority or the Committee in fixing of the fee. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also passed judgments with regard to factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Authority or the Committee in fixing of the fee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (supra), has held, as under, with regard to fee structure, factors and object of fixation of fee: So while the State has the right to prescribe qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of their choice subject to an objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance with conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage of students belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships or scholarship, if not granted by the Government. Furthermore, in setting up a reasonable fee structure, the element of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian conditions. The fee structure must take into consideration the need to generate funds to be utilized for the betterment and growth of the educational institution, the betterment of education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. In any event, a private institution will have the right to constitute its own governing body, for which qualifications may be prescribed by the State or the university concerned. It will, however, be objectionable if the State retains the power to nominate specific individuals on governing bodies. Nomination by the State, which could be on a political basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise to embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering educational institutions. For the same reasons, nomination of teachers either directly by the department or through a service commission will be an unreasonable inroad and an unreasonable restriction on the autonomy of the private unaided educational institution. ** *** *** One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the Government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the Government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. There are a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by private parties who do not seek any Governmental aid. In a sense, a prospective student has various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the Government. ** *** *** Yet inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the Government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. In the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution. 14. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (supra), has also formulated questions and answers to questions with regard to scheme of fixation of fee and the right to establish and administer educational institutions and held as under: Q. 9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645 , (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/modification and if yes, what ? A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan case, and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering. ** *** *** Q. 1. What is the meaning of the expressions "education" and "educational institutions" in various provisions of the Constitution? However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering. ** *** *** Q. 1. What is the meaning of the expressions "education" and "educational institutions" in various provisions of the Constitution? Is the right to establish and administer educational institutions guaranteed under the Constitution ? A. The expression "education" in the articles of the Constitution means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level up to the post-graduate level. It includes professional education. The expression "educational institutions" means institutions that impart education, where "education" is as understood hereinabove. The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the: Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19(1)(g) and 26, and to minorities specifically under Article 30. All citizens have a right to establish and administer educational institutions under Articles 19(1) (g) and 26, but this right is subject to the provisions of Articles 19(6) and 26 (a). However, minority institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority group, in the manner as discussed in this judgment. 15. Further the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 697 , has held, as under, with regard to fixation of fee to approve fee structure by the Committee: Question No. 1: 7. So far as the first question is concerned, in our view the majority judgment is very clear. There can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by the Government. Each institute must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure taking into consideration the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. They must also be able to generate surplus which must be used for the betterment and growth of that educational institution. In Paragraph 56 of the judgment it has been categorically laid down that the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions that do riot seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee structure. In Paragraph 56 of the judgment it has been categorically laid down that the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions that do riot seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made, salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution etc. Of course there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot be charged. It thus needs to be emphasised that as per the majority judgment imparting of education is essentially charitable in nature. Thus, the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use of that educational institution. Profits/surplus cannot be diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise. As, at present, there are statutes/regulations which govern the fixation of fees and as this Court has not yet considered the validity of those statutes/regulations, we direct that in order to give effect to the judgment in TMA Pai's case the respective State Governments concerned authority shall set up, in each State, a Committee headed by a retired High Court Judge who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The other member, who shall be nominated by the Judge, should be a Chartered Accountant of repute. A representative of the Medical Council of India (in short 'MCI') or the All India Council for Technical Education (in short 'AICTE'), depending on the type of institution, shall also be a member. The Secretary of the State Government in charge of Medical Education or Technical Education, as the case may be, shall be a member and Secretary of the Committee. The Committee should be free to nominate/co-opt another independent person of repute, so that total number of members of the Committee shall not exceed 5. Each Educational Institute must place before this Committee, well in advance of the academic year, its proposed fee structure. Along with the proposed fee structure all relevant documents and books of accounts must also be produced before the Committee for their scrutiny. Each Educational Institute must place before this Committee, well in advance of the academic year, its proposed fee structure. Along with the proposed fee structure all relevant documents and books of accounts must also be produced before the Committee for their scrutiny. The Committee shall then decide whether the fees proposed by that institute are justified and are not profiteering or charging capitation fee. The Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to propose some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by the Committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of which period the institute would be a liberty to apply for revision. Once fees are fixed by the Committee, the institute cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed as fees. If any other amount is charged, under any other head or guise e.g., donations the same would amount to charging of capitation fee. The Governments/appropriate authorities should consider framing amount appropriate regulations, if not already framed, whereunder if it is found that an institution is charging capitation fees or profiteering that institution can be appropriately penalised and also face the prospect of losing its recognition/affiliation. 16. Another seven Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 , has again held, as under, with regard to fixation of fee: Every institution is free to devise its own fee structure but the same can be regulated in the interest of preventing profiteering. No capitation fee can be charged directly or indirectly, or in any form. Education used to be charity or philanthropy in the good old times. Gradually it became an "occupation". Some of the judicial dicta go on to hold it as an "industry". Whether to receive education is a fundamental right or not has been debated for quite some time. But, it is settled that establishing and administering of an educational institution for imparting knowledge to students is an occupation, protected by Article 19(1) (g) and additionally by Article 26 (a), if there is no element of profit generation. As of now, imparting education has come to be a means of livelihood for some professionals and a mission in life for some altruists. As of now, imparting education has come to be a means of livelihood for some professionals and a mission in life for some altruists. Education, accepted as a useful activity, whether for charity or for profit, is an occupation. Nevertheless, it does not cease to be a service to society. And even though an occupation, it cannot be equated to a trade or a business. *** *** *** Capitation fee cannot be permitted to be charged and no seat can be permitted to be appropriated by payment of capitation fee. "Profession" has to be distinguished from "business" or a mere "occupation". While in business, and to a certain extent in occupations, there is a profit motive, a profession is primarily a service to society wherein earning is secondary or incidental. A student who gets a professional degree by payment of capitation fee, once qualified as a professional, is likely to aim more at earning rather than serving and that becomes a bane to society. The charging of capitation fee by unaided minority and non-minority institutions for professional courses is just not permissible. Similarly, profiteering is also not permissible. Despite the legal position, the Supreme Court cannot shut its eyes to the hard realities of commercialisation of education and evil practices being adopted by many institutions to earn large amounts for their private or selfish ends. If capitation fee and profiteering are to be checked, the method of admission has to be regulated so that admissions are based on merits and is transparent and the students are not exploited. It is permissible to regulate admission and fee structure for achieving the same. 17. The Division Bench of this Court in Association of Private Dental & Medical Colleges v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2009(3) M.P.H.T. 418 (DB) : ILR (2009) MP 2269, has held, as under, with regard to fixation of fee by the Committee under the provisions of Act of 2007: 39. We are of the view that sections 4(1) and 4(8) of the Act, 2007 have to be read with section 9(1) of the Act, 2007, which deals with factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Committee while determining the fee to be charged by a private unaided professional educational institution. We are of the view that sections 4(1) and 4(8) of the Act, 2007 have to be read with section 9(1) of the Act, 2007, which deals with factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Committee while determining the fee to be charged by a private unaided professional educational institution. A reading of Sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act, 2007 would show that the location of private unaided professional educational institution, the nature of the professional course, the cost of land and building, the available infrastructure, teaching, non-teaching staff and equipment, the expenditure on administration and maintenance, a reasonable surplus required for growth and development of the professional institution and any other relevant factor, have to be taken into consideration by the Committee while determining the fees to be charged by a private unaided professional educational institution. Thus, all the cost components of the particular private unaided professional educational institution as well as the reasonable surplus required for growth and development of the institution and all other factors relevant for imparting professional education have to be considered by the Committee while determining the fee. section 4(8) of the Act, 2007 further provides that the Committee may require a private aided or unaided professional educational institution to furnish information that may be necessary for enabling the Committee to determine the fees that may be charged by the institution in respect of each professional course. Each professional educational institution, therefore, can furnish information with regard to the fees that it proposes to charge from the candidates seeking admission taking into account all the cost components, the reasonable surplus required for growth and development and other factors relevant to impart professional education as mentioned in section 9(1) of the Act, 2007 and the function of the Committee is only to find out, after giving due opportunity of being heard to the institution as provided in section 9(2) of the Act, 2007 whether the fees proposed by the institution to be charged to the student are based on the factors mentioned in section 9(1) of the Act, 2007 and did not amount to profiteering and commercialisation of the education. The word "determination" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, to mean a final decision by the Court or an administrative agency. The word "determination" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, to mean a final decision by the Court or an administrative agency. The Committee, therefore, while determining the fee only gives the final approval to the proposed fee to be charged after being satisfied that it was based on the factors mentioned in section 9 (1) of the Act, 2007 and there was no profiteering or commercialisation of education. The expression 'fixation of fees' in section 4 (1) of the Act, 2007 means that the fee to be charged from candidates seeking admission in the private professional educational institution did not vary from student to student and also remained fixed for a certain period as mentioned in section 4 (8) of the Act, 2007. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Peerless General Finance v. Reserve Bank of India (supra), the Court has to examine the substance of the provisions of the law to find out whether provisions of the law impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. The provisions in sections 4 (1), 4 (8) and 9 of the Act, 2007 in substance empower the Committee to be only satisfied that the fee proposed by a private professional educational institution did not amount to profiteering or commercialisation of education and was based on the factors mentioned in section 9 (1) of the Act, 2007. The provisions of the Act, 2007 do not therefore, violate the right of private professional educational institution to charge its own fee. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 751 : 2009(5) M.P.H.T. 1 (SC), has held as under with regard to provisions of Act of 2007: 13. In our view, it cannot be left to the unilateral decision of the State Government to say that the private institutions have failed to meet with the triple tests mentioned in Inamdar case (supra), because that will be giving unbridled, absolute and unchecked power to the State Government. In our view, it cannot be left to the unilateral decision of the State Government to say that the private institutions have failed to meet with the triple tests mentioned in Inamdar case (supra), because that will be giving unbridled, absolute and unchecked power to the State Government. In our prima facie opinion, the M.P. Niji Vyavsayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2007 (for short "the Act of 2007"), appears to hand over the entire selection process to the State Government or the agencies appointed by the State Government for Under Graduate, Graduate and Post Graduate medical/dental colleges and fee fixation. This, in our prima facie opinion, is contrary to, and inconsistent with the observations (quoted above) made by the eleven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in T.M.A. Pai case (supra), and hence the 2007 Act would become unconstitutional if it is read literally. We have therefore to read down the 2007 Act and the Rules to make them constitutional. Such reading down of a statute is permissible, since it is well settled that the Court should make all efforts to sustain the validity of a statute, even if that involves reading its language down vide G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, pp. 496-503. Thus, while considering the validity of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, the Federal Court construed the word "property" as meaning "property, other than agricultural land", vide Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, In re., AIR 1941 FC 72, otherwise the Act would have become unconstitutional. *** *** *** 15. In our view, a balance has hence to be struck because while on the one hand, the State Government does have an element of interest in the private unaided professional institutions, this does not mean that there will be no autonomy to the private unaided institutions. After all, the private unaided institutions have to generate their own resources and funds and consequently they must have a larger degree of autonomy as compared to the aided institutions or the State Government institutions. After all, the private unaided institutions have to generate their own resources and funds and consequently they must have a larger degree of autonomy as compared to the aided institutions or the State Government institutions. In this situation, we are of the opinion that this Court must use its creativity and find out a workable, balanced, via media to safeguard the interest of both parties, namely, the State Government on the one hand, and private unaided institutions on the other, and also to keep the interest of the students in mind. 19. From the statutory provisions contained in the Act of 2007 and Regulations of 2008, framed under by the State Government, it is clear that it is obligatory on the Fee Regulatory Committee to consider the factors mentioned in section 9 of the Act of 2007 in fixing the fee. The same factors have been mentioned in Regulation 4 of the Regulations of 2008. The Regulation 5 of the Regulation of 2008 further prescribes procedure for fixation of fee and it has been mentioned that the institution shall submit number of documents and details with regard to queries mentioned in the Regulations of 2008 and also financial standing. It has further been provided in the aforesaid Regulation that the Committee shall constitute an inspection team for the purpose of verification of the claims submitted by the institution and thereafter, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the institution, the Committee shall fix the fee. 20. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that it is statutory duty on the Committee to fix the fee for each institution after considering various factors. In section 9 of the Act of 2007, it has been mentioned that "the Committee shall determine" and in Regulation 4 of the Regulations of 2008 it is mentioned "that the Committee shall prescribed the fee in the manner after considering the following factors". 21. The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. In section 9 of the Act of 2007, it has been mentioned that "the Committee shall determine" and in Regulation 4 of the Regulations of 2008 it is mentioned "that the Committee shall prescribed the fee in the manner after considering the following factors". 21. The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 , has held as under, with regard to meaning of the word 'consider', because, in our opinion, the aforesaid word is important in considering the provisions of the Act of 2007 and Regulations of 2008: The meaning of the word 'consider' as so used is given in the Oxford English Dictionary as "To contemplate mentally, fix the mind upon; to think over, meditate or reflect on, bestow attentive thought upon, give heed to, take note of". The relevant definition of the word 'consider' given in Webster's third New International Dictionary is "to reflect on : think about with a degree of care or caution". Below this definition are given the synonyms of the word 'consider', these synonyms being "contemplate, study, weigh, revolve, excogitate". While explaining the exact different shades of meaning in this group of words, Webster's Dictionary proceeds to state as under with respect to the word 'consider': 'Consider' often indicates little more than think about. It may occasionally suggest somewhat more conscious direction of thought, somewhat greater depth and scope, and somewhat greater purposefulness. 22. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain and Anr. AIR 2008 SC 1339 , has held, as under, with regard to the word 'Consider': "Consider" means to look at closely and carefully; to think or deliberate on; to take into account. 23. Hon'ble the Supreme Court further in P. Manohar Reddy & Bros. v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 494 , has held, as under, with regard to word 'consider': The word "consider" is of some significance, it means "to think over; to regard as or deem to be". (See, Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., 2005). 24. Hon'ble the Supreme Court further in P. Manohar Reddy & Bros. v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 494 , has held, as under, with regard to word 'consider': The word "consider" is of some significance, it means "to think over; to regard as or deem to be". (See, Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., 2005). 24. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the meaning assigned to the word 'consider', it is clear that it is obligatory on the part of the Fee Regulatory Committee to reflect on, think about with a degree of care or caution about the claims submitted by the petitioner-institution with regard to fixation of fee. The word 'determination', which has been used in the Act of 2007, has wider meaning than the word 'consider'. This has specifically been used by the Legislature to safeguard the interest of the institution in fixing the fee. The Legislature has also mentioned in section 9 of the Act of 2007 that the Committee shall not fix the fee, which would amount to profiteering or commercialization of education. It is in consonance with the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the cases of T.M.A. Pai (supra) and P.A Inamdar (supra). Hon'ble the Supreme Court in PA. Inamdar (supra), has clearly observed that every institution is free to device its own fee structure, but, the same can be regulated in the interest of preventing profiteering and from section 9 of the Act of 2007, it is clear that the Fee Regulating Committee has given limited powers in fixing the fee in order to prevent the institution from profiteering or commercialization. However, it is the duty of the Committee to consider legitimate claim of the institution in determining the fee. 25. It has also to be seen that what is the type of the function of the Committee in order to determine the fee of the institution- whether it is administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial ? section 4(11) of the Act of 2007 gives power to the Committee in certain aspects at par with Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit. Then, an appeal has also been provided against the order of the Committee. The Committee has been given mandate to decide the Us in regard of fixation of fee. 26. Hon'ble the Supreme Court In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. Then, an appeal has also been provided against the order of the Committee. The Committee has been given mandate to decide the Us in regard of fixation of fee. 26. Hon'ble the Supreme Court In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. AIR 1959 SC 308 , has held, as under, with regard to functions of the Authority: 19. At the outset it would be convenient to consider the question whether the State Government acts quasi-judicially in discharging its functions under section 68-C of the Act. The criteria to ascertain whether a particular act is a judicial act or an administrative one, have been laid down with clarity by Lord Justice Atkin in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. 1924-1 KB 171 elaborated by Lord Justice Scrutton in Rex v. London County Council; Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. 1931-2 KB 215 and authoritatively re-stated by this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani 1950 SCR 621 : AIR 1950 SC 222 . They laid down the following conditions:- (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. They laid down the following conditions:- (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. In the last of the cases cited supra, Das, J., as He then was, analysed the scope of the third condition thus at page 725 (of SCR): (at p. 260 of AIR): (i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi- judicial act; and (ii) that if a Statutory Authority has power to do any act which will pre-judicially affect the subject then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In the case Inre, Banwarilal Roy 43 Cal WN 766, Das, J., as He then was, said much to the same effect at Page 800: A judicial or quasi-judicial act, on the other hand, implies more than mere application of the mind or the formation of the opinion. It has reference to the mode or manner in which that opinion is formed. It implies a proposal and an opposition and a decision on the issue. It vaguely connotes "hearing evidence and opposition" as Scrutton, LJ, expressed it. The degree of formality of the procedure as to receiving or hearing evidence may be more or less according to the requirements of the particular statute, but there is an indefinable yet an appreciable difference between the method of doing an administrative or executive act and a judicial or quasi-judicial act. 20. This statement is practically in accord with the first proposition extracted above. 20. This statement is practically in accord with the first proposition extracted above. This Court again, in Nagdra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division AIR 1958 SC 398 , in the context of the provisions of Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 (1 of 1910), considered the scope of the concept of "judicial act". Sinha, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, made the following observations at page 408: Whether or not an administrative body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi-judicial capacity must be determined in each case, on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder. "In Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 578 , this Court again reviewed the law on the subject to ascertain whether the Wage Board functioning under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) was only discharging administrative functions or quasi-judicial functions. Bhagwati, J., made the following observation at Page 613: If the functions performed by the Wage Board would thus consist of the determination of the issues as between a proposition and an opposition on data and material gathered by the Board in answers to the questionnaire issued to all parties interested and the evidence led before it, there is no doubt that there would be imported in the proceedings of the Wage Board a duty to act judicially and the functions performed by the Wage Board would be quasi-judicial in character. 21. The aforesaid three decisions lay down that whether an Administrative Tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a Us, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially. 27. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 685 , has held, as under, with regard to functions of the Authority: 18. The question then arises whether, in the absence of an express power in the Act, the Election Commission is empowered to de-register a registered political party. 27. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 685 , has held, as under, with regard to functions of the Authority: 18. The question then arises whether, in the absence of an express power in the Act, the Election Commission is empowered to de-register a registered political party. Learned Attorney General, appearing for the Union of India urged that the Election Commission while exercising its power under under section 29-A of the Act, acts quasi-judicially and in absence of any express power of review having been conferred on the Election Commission, the Election Commission has no power to de-register a political party. According to learned Attorney General, excepting in three circumstances when the Election Commission could not be deprived of the power to de-register a party are- (a) when the Election Commission finds that the party has secured registration by playing fraud on the Commission, (b) when a political party itself informs the Commission in pursuance of section 29-A (9) that it has changed its constitution so as to abrogate the provision therein conforming to the provisions of section 29-A(5) or does not believe in the provisions of the Constitution, rejecting the very basis on which it secured registration as a registered political party and (c) any like ground where no enquiry is called for on the part of Election Commission, the Commission has no power to de-register a political party. Learned Attorney General further argued that in a situation where a complaint is made to the Election Commission and it is required to make an inquiry that a particular registered political party has committed breach of the undertaking given before the Election Commission or has violated the provisions of the Constitution. The Election Commission has neither any power to make any inquiry into such a complaint nor de-register such a political party. 19. Whereas, Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 urged that the discharge of function by the Election Commission under section 29-A of the Act cannot be termed as quasi-judicial function, in the absence of a lis - a proposition and apposition between the two contending parties which the Statutory Authority is required to decide. 19. Whereas, Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 urged that the discharge of function by the Election Commission under section 29-A of the Act cannot be termed as quasi-judicial function, in the absence of a lis - a proposition and apposition between the two contending parties which the Statutory Authority is required to decide. According to him, unless there is a lis or two contending parties before the Election Commission, the function assigned to the Election Commission 29-A is an administrative in nature. His further argument is that where exercise of an administrative function manifests one of the attributes of quasi-judicial function, such a discharge of function is not quasi-judicial. Learned Counsel referred to a passage from Wade and Forsyth's Administrative Law and relied upon decisions in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and Ors. (1950) SCR 621, Shri Radeyshyam Khare and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1959) SCR 1440, T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner of India etc. v. Union of India and Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 611 and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal and Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 43 , in support of his argument. 20. On the argument of parties, the question that arises for our consideration is, whether the Election Commission, in exercise of its powers sunder section 29-A of the Act, acts administratively or quasi-judicially. We shall first advert to the argument raised by learned Counsel for the respondent to the effect that in the absence of any Us or contest between the two contending parties before the Election Commission under section 29-A of the Act, the function discharged by it is administrative in nature and not a quasi-judicial one. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi is 'not exactly' and it is just in between a judicial and administrative function. It is true, in many cases, the Statutory Authorities were held to be quasi-judicial authorities and decisions rendered by them were regarded as quasi-judicial, where there were contest between the two contending parties and the Statutory Authority was required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. In Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309, it is stated that "the definition of a quasi-judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside authority to decide those disputes". In Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309, it is stated that "the definition of a quasi-judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside authority to decide those disputes". In view of the aforesaid statement of law, where there are two or more parties contesting each other's claim and the Statutory Authority is required to adjudicate the rival claims between the parties, such a Statutory Authority was held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as a quasi-judicial order. Thus, where there is a lis or two contesting parties making rival claims and the Statutory Authority under the statutory provision is required to decide such a dispute, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority, such a Statutory Authority is quasi-judicial authority. AIR 1999 SC 1786 : 1999 AIR SCW 1376. 21. But there are cases where there is no lis or two contending parties before a Statutory Authority yet such a Statutory Authority has been held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as quasi-judicial decision when such a Statutory Authority is required to act judicially. In Queen v. Dublin Corporation (1878) 2 IrR 371, it was held thus: In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or Legal Tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for purpose of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by Competent Authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights. And if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, makes estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be judicial acts. 22. Atkin, L.J. as He then was, in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171, stated that when any body of persons having Legal Authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, such body of persons is a quasi-judicial body and decision given by them is a quasi-judicial decision. In the said decision, there was no contest or Us between the two contending parties before the Commissioner. The Commissioner, after making an enquiry and hearing the objections was required to pass order. In the said decision, there was no contest or Us between the two contending parties before the Commissioner. The Commissioner, after making an enquiry and hearing the objections was required to pass order. In nutshell, what was held in the aforesaid decision was, where a Statutory Authority is empowered to take a decision which affects the rights of persons and such an authority under the relevant law required to make an enquiry and hear the parties, such authority is quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it is a quasi-judicial act. 23. In Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and Ors. (supra), it was held thus: (i) that if a statute powers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the Deciding Authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially. 24. 24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a Statutory Authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these: Where (a) a Statutory Authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the Statutory Authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial. 28. From the aforesaid principle of law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it is clear that the act of the Fee Regulating Committee in determination of fee is quasi-judicial in nature. In such circumstances, it is obligatory on the part of the Fee Regulating Committee to pass reasoned order after considering all the documents and claims submitted by the institution in accordance with Regulations of 2008. In the present case, the petitioner-institution has submitted all the details, but, the Fee Regulatory Committee has not considered the claim of the petitioner-institution. It is clear from the order (Annexure P-1) that it has only been mentioned in the order that the Committee has considered the claim of the petitioner, however, there is no such factual data mentioned by the Committee in the order that why the claim of the petitioner-institution was not found sustainable even though the Chartered Accountant, appointed by the Committee, recommended a fee of Rs. 72,000/-per year. That has also not been approved by the Committee. No reasons have been assigned by the Committee in rejecting the recommendation of the C.A. appointed by the Committee itself. This Court has gathered an impression that the Committee has mechanically reproduced the order, which was sent to the Committee, in a cyclo-style manner in fixing the fee of the institution-petitioner. It has been done in order to escape the responsibility from considering all the facts submitted by the petitioner-institution for determination of the fee. The Appellate Authority has also not considered the aforesaid facts in detail and did not assign any reason that why it has enhanced the fee up to certain extent. 29. It has been done in order to escape the responsibility from considering all the facts submitted by the petitioner-institution for determination of the fee. The Appellate Authority has also not considered the aforesaid facts in detail and did not assign any reason that why it has enhanced the fee up to certain extent. 29. It has to be borne in mind that our country is at the verge of knowledge revolution and it is the duty of every Statutory Authority to impart its functions in accordance with the rules and regulations enacted for the purpose. The fee structure is an important factor, which will determine the quality of the institution and which will also prevent profiteering and commercialization of the education, it is an important goal fixed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that reasonable and actual demand of the institutions for the purpose of development of the infrastructure and good faculty has to be considered by the Committee, so the institutions and the students can achieve their goal. 30. The impugned orders passed by the Committee and the Appellate Authority are not in accordance with the Act of 2007 and the Regulations of 2008 as well as the judgments passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, quoted above in this order, however, because the academic session 2009-10 is already over, hence no purpose would be served by striking down the orders, because the institution has already realized the fee and the students have already paid the fee. Learned Counsel for respondent has submitted that the Committee will consider the fee-structure for the academic session 2010-11. Hence, the petition of the petitioner is disposed of with a direction that the Committee shall determine the fee structure for academic sessions 2010-11 in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Act of 2007 and Regulations of 2008 and the directions issued by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The Committee shall pass specific order after considering the claims submitted by the petitioner-institution. The Committee shall also mention relevant data in determining the fee. This Court observes that the Committee will act in the right spirit in the light of the observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in various judgments. It is hereby clarified that this Court has not fixed the amount of fee. It is the exclusive job of the AFRC. 31. This Court observes that the Committee will act in the right spirit in the light of the observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in various judgments. It is hereby clarified that this Court has not fixed the amount of fee. It is the exclusive job of the AFRC. 31. With the above directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. Looking to the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.