Judgment Akil Kureshi J.—Petitioner is school management running a primary school. Issue pertains to admissibility of grant payable by the government to the non-teaching staff of the school. Petitioner has made the following substantive prayers: “9(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the authorities to do as per the order dated 26.11.84 / 4.12.84 passed by this Hon’ble Court in Special Civil Application No.2269 / 1983 and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 26.07.2000 rejecting the proposal of the petitioner for grant for non-teaching staff and further be pleased to direct the authorities to release the grant of non-teaching staff for the petitioner Trust from the year 1993-94 with interest;” 2. Shortly stated the facts are as follow : 2.1 Petitioner trust had previously approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No.2269 of 1983 seeking grant for its non-teaching staff. Learned Single Judge by order dated 26.11.1984 / 04.12.1984 relying upon Rules 106(A), 106(2) and 115 (3) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1959 held that there was no reason for the respondents to deny to the petitioner the benefit of grant at the rate of three fourth of their approved expenditure on the head of pay and allowances of administrative, supervising, clerical and inferior staff. In the result, the following order was passed: The petitioner will, therefore, have to be allowed. Writ of mandamus is issued to the concerned respondents especially respondents Nos.1 and 2 herein to consider the case of the petitioner’s school for being released grant for meeting expenses actually incurred by the petitioner school from 1.6.1978 onwards on non-teaching staff - i.e. clarical staff as well as class IV staff being peons and other menial staff, actually employed by the school. The petitioner shall furnish all these relevant data to the concerned respondents and moment this data is submitted, the concerned respondents will consider the same and will release the legally permissible grant to cover the expenditure actually incurred by the petitioner school for giving pay and allowances to these non-teaching staff members from 1.5.1978 onwards upto date. The permissible grant on this head to the petition as per rules shall be computed by the concerned officers within a period of four weeks of the receipt of relevant “data at their end. The permissible grant on this head to the petition as per rules shall be computed by the concerned officers within a period of four weeks of the receipt of relevant “data at their end. The respondents are directed to pay all such permissible grant as computed within a further period of four weeks thereafter to the petitioner school. The concerned respondents school see to it that the entire exercise is completed within the outer limit of three months from the receipt of writ of this court at their end. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.” 2.2 It is not in dispute that the respondents in compliance with the said judgment paid grant for salary and allowance to the non-teaching staff at the prescribed rate and continued to do so till year 1993. However, after 1993 the same was discontinued. The petitioner, therefore, initially filed contempt petition but withdrew the same on 23.04.2001 and thereafter filed the present petition praying for above noted relief. 2.3 In reply, stand of the government is two fold. Firstly, it is contended that in another matter raising identical issues, learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the Special Civil Application No.1363 of 1987 by judgment dated 02.03.1990 relying on the above-mentioned judgment in the case of present petitioner. Decision dated 02.03.1990 was carried in appeal in Letters Patent Appeal No.246 of 1991 which was dismissed on 09.03.1994. Against which, Special Leave Petition was filed. Apex Court allowed the appeal and reversed the judgments of the High Court by decision dated 04.08.1995. It is, therefore, case of the government that by virtue of the said judgment, the petitioner cannot seek further grant. Second ground of opposition is that by notification dated 09.10.1996. Above-mentioned Rules 106(2) and 115(3) of the Rules have been amended thereby, disentitling the petitioner from seeking any grant for its non-teaching staff. 3. Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the previous judgment rendered in Special Civil Application No.2269 of 1983 has attained finality. Such judgment cannot be discarded or disregarded either due to some other view in another matter or on account of any subsequent amendments. She contended that amendment made by notification dated 09.10.1996 shall not apply to existing school and can not be made applicable only to the schools which receive recognition after said amendment. 4. Such judgment cannot be discarded or disregarded either due to some other view in another matter or on account of any subsequent amendments. She contended that amendment made by notification dated 09.10.1996 shall not apply to existing school and can not be made applicable only to the schools which receive recognition after said amendment. 4. On the other hand, learned AGP opposed the petition contending that the amendments were made applicable to all the existing schools. Reference was made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Safal Kelvani Mandal & Others vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in 1984(2) GLR 1488 . 5. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the documents on record, I am of the opinion that the issue can be divided into two parts. First is question of entitlement of the petitioner to receive grant for salary and other allowances and expenditure for its non-teaching staff till the date of notification by which Rules 106 and 115 were amended. Second aspect of the matter is whether after such amendment, petitioner can still claim such grant. 6. With respect to the first question, it clearly emerges that the petitioner’s earlier approach to the High Court resulted into judgment dated 26.11.1984/ 04.12.1984 in which the claim of the petitioner was allowed. Relevant portion of the judgment is already reproduced in the earlier part of this order. This judgment attained finality. Petitioner also started receiving grant as per the directions contained in the said judgment. Long thereafter on the basis that in similar case, the Government succeeded before Supreme Court in having the High Court order set aside, grant was abruptly stopped. To my mind approach of the Government was totally erroneous. Petitioner’s case had attained finality and the rights between the parties were crystallized. Issue of grant was concluded by the High Court. As held in the decision in the case of Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India and Others reported at AIR 1990 SC 334 as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner such approach was not permissible. In the said decision, the Court held and observed as under : “28. The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. In the said decision, the Court held and observed as under : “28. The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. So far as the parties are concerned, they will always be bound by the said decision. In other words, either of the parties will not be permitted to reopen the issue decided by such decision on the ground that such decision violates the equality clause under the Constitution. There is no question of overruling the provision of Article 14, as contended by the learned Attorney General. The judgment which is binding between the parties and which operates as res judicata between them cannot be said to overrule the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution even though it may be, to some extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. So far as the Supreme Court employees are concerned in these proceedings the only enquiry to be made is whether the judgments of the Delhi High Court relating to the L.D.Cs. and the Class IV employees have become final and conclusive between the employees of the Delhi High Court and the Union of India.” 7. In the result, the action of the respondent in discontinuing the grant to the petitioner till October 1996 was wholly impermissible. 8. Second question is with respect to the payability of the grant from 09.10.1996 i.e. after date of notification. In its unamended form prior to its amendments, Sub-section (1) and (2) of Rule 106-A read as under : “106 (A) Application for recognition:—(1) A person who desires to impart primary education by establishing a private primary school from the commencement of the new academic year, shall apply on or before the last date of October of the previous academic year to the “Authorised Officer” in Form ‘AA’ in Appendix ‘C’ appended to these rules as provided in Sub-rule (2) of this rule. (2) Every application under Sub-rule (1) of this rule shall be sent to the authorised officer by registered post with acknowledgment due together with an undertaking in writing that the conditions of employment of the staff in the private primary school shall be those as specified in Schedule “F” appended to these rules together with a fee of Rs. 500.” 8.1 By virtue of the said notification, word “staff” has been replaced by the word “teachers”. 8.2 Similarly, Rule 115(3) of the said Rules, prior to its amendment read as follows: 115(3) Subject to the instructions that may be issued by the Director from time to time educational bodies or associations conducting a number of approved schools shall be entitled to grant on overhead expenditure at three-fourths of their approved expenditure under that head. 8.3 By virtue of the said notification, entire Sub-section (3) has been deleted. 9. It is, thus, not in dispute that by virtue of the said amendment, after notification, liability of the government to pay expenditure for the grant for the non teaching staff of the primary schools ceased. Only question is whether such change could be applied to all existing schools and also the new schools which receive recognition after such amendment or whether such amendment could be made applicable only to schools which came into existence after notification was issued. 10. As pointed out by the learned AGP, previous to the change and amendment in Rule 106 pertaining to the responsibility of the persons desirous to impart primary education to undertake to fulfill conditions of the employment of the staff came up for consideration before the Division Bench. Relevant observations made therein are as follows : “In view of these settled legal principles, we are afraid that the present contention as advanced on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be sustained. Relevant observations made therein are as follows : “In view of these settled legal principles, we are afraid that the present contention as advanced on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be sustained. If Rule 106(2) is amended as indicated above, so as to oblige the school management to file a written undertaking that the condition of the employment of teachers in the school shall be those as specified in Schedule ‘F’ in place of the original obligation to furnish a written undertaking that the condition of the employment of teachers in the school shall be as near as possible to those specified in Schedule ‘F’ on the recognized principle of interpretation as set out above, the original provision of Section 106(2) before the amendment in 1970 ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there. It, therefore, cannot be urged successfully that since the obligation which is now prescribed after amendment in 1970 is materially different, the schools which are once recognized as approved schools would continue to be so recognized unless their recognition can be withdrawn for the breach, if any, of the original undertaking only. The contention that the rights of the schools which were recognized prior to the amendment in 1978 when the old Schedule ‘F’ was substituted by the present one, cannot be disturbed is also not well-conceived. It is in the ultimate analysis the question of legislative intent as evinced in the amended rule to indicate that the legislature intended to destroy those rights. The amendment in Rule 106(2) in 1970 clearly manifests the clear legislative intent that the Legislature wanted to impose an obligation on the school managements to undertake that the conditions of teaching and non-teaching staff in the employment of such recognized schools to be as those specified in Schedule ‘F’. The presumption that the Legislature which generally does not impose new liabilities in respect of some thing that had already happened is rebutted by the express words used in the amending rule as well as the substitution of new Schedule ‘F’ in place of the old one. In that view of the matter, therefore the 5th contention deserves to be rejected.” 11. In that view of the matter, therefore the 5th contention deserves to be rejected.” 11. It can, thus, be seen that previous amendment made in the said rule were also held to be applicable to all the existing institutions imparting the primary education. 12. There is nothing in the said notification to suggest that the same would not be applicable to existing institutions. It is true that amendments brought about by virtue of the said notification are not made applicable retrospectively. Ordinarily, when the statute is silent, it should be held to be having prospective applicability. However, by applying such changes to existing institutions, I do not find that statute is being made applicable with retrospective effect. Statute applies to all the educational institutions equally from the date of notification and not for any period interior thereto. In that view of the matter, after the date of the said notification by virtue of the amendments in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 106(A) and 115(3), the petitioner is no longer entitled to receive any grant for its non teaching staff. 13. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of the Apex Court dated 4th December 1988 wherein the judgment of this Court providing for grant to the educational institutions running primary schools was upheld. She submitted that the decision of the Apex Court was rendered after the government notification dated 09.10.1996. However, I find that in the said order itself, the Apex Court observed that “period relevant in the High Court judgment was prior to the date of notification. We express no view of the validity of the notification.” It, thus, becomes clear that the Apex Court was not examining the effect of continuity of payability of grant to educational institutions after the date of notification. Such issue is, therefore, at large before me in the present petition. 14. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that this petition must succeed in part. All actions of the respondents in not releasing the grant in favour of the petitioner institution for the authorised expenditure for non-teaching staff at the prescribed rate till the date of notification dated 09.10.1996 is held to be illegal. Respondents are directed to release such grant with simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum upon petitioner’s producing necessary accounts for such expenditure. Respondents are directed to release such grant with simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum upon petitioner’s producing necessary accounts for such expenditure. If such accounts of expenditure are produced within four weeks from today, necessary payment as found admissible shall be made within eight weeks thereafter. With respect to the claim for the grant after the date of notification i.e. 09.10.1996,the petition fails. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. P P P P P