Judgment :- The petitioner was working as a Blacksmith in the Government Automobile Workshop at Hasthampatti, Salem. He filed Original Application No.5504 of 2000 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal challenging the order dated 1.6.2000 passed by the 1st respondent, namely Director, Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department, Chennai, by which the 1st respondent imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. Even though the order had stated that the petitioner had right to appeal to the State Government within 60 days, the petitioner did not avail the alternate remedy provided under the Rules. On the contrary, in the Original Application filed before the Tribunal in paragraph 7, he had declared that he had not filed any alternate remedy under the relevant Rules and he also filed an application in M.A.No.5389 of 2000 to waive the alternate remedy. 2. The Tribunal admitted the Original Application and also granted an interim stay on 29.11.2000. A Vacate Stay Application was filed. In the vacate stay application, the Tribunal curiously recorded that the petitioner was charged on the ground that he has got married for the second time without prior permission of the Government and the Rule 19 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules provides for an appropriate permission of the Government to be obtained for contracting second marriage. The Tribunal did not vacate the interim order and made the Stay absolute. This finding of the Tribunal is startling. 3. Rule 19 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules has two different applications. In case a person, who is governed by personal law, contracts more than one marriage, then the question of prior permission of the Government will arise. In case the personal law do not provide polygamous marriage, the question of prior permission of the Government will not arise. The Government cannot legalize what is impermissible in law. Therefore, the Tribunal had misdirected itself in confirming the stay order. However, it is rather unfortunate that the State Government did not file any appeal against the order of the Tribunal dated 29.11.2000, which on the face of it is per se illegal and not supported by Rules. 4. Before the Tribunal on behalf of the respondents, counter affidavit dated 31.8.2000 was filed. In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this Court and renumbered as W.P.No.44180 of 2006. 5. 4. Before the Tribunal on behalf of the respondents, counter affidavit dated 31.8.2000 was filed. In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this Court and renumbered as W.P.No.44180 of 2006. 5. The facts leading to the termination of the petitioner are as follows: (i) The petitioner while he was working in the 2nd respondent workshop filed a nomination in the name of one J.Amuda claiming to be his wife on 11.8.1986 so as to avail the Family Benefit Scheme. Subsequently, he filed another nomination to include the name of J.Lakshmi on 24.4.1990 for the Provident Fund Scheme. In view of the filing of two nominations in the name of two different wives, the petitioner was asked to give his explanation. The petitioner on 28.9.1992 gave a reply requesting further time for giving explanation. Since he failed to submit his explanation, once again he was reminded to submit explanation. In the letter dated 18.1.1993, the petitioner informed that after consulting the elders in the family, he can arrive a conclusion only through the court and he should be given time to obtain the orders of the Court and submit the same along with explanation. Even after three years, as the petitioner did not submit explanation, the further time was given. (ii) In the meanwhile, the alleged second wife of the petitioner J.Lakshmi sent a legal notice through an advocate that after six months of joining Government service, the first wife Amudha (who is none other than her elder sister) was eloped with one Thoongappan and also married him in the year 1987. Therefore, Lakshmi is the only legally wedded wife and the whereabouts of Amuda are not known. Since there was no marriage existing between Amudha and the petitioner Jothimani, the Department was directed to remove the name of the first wife from the Service Register of the petitioner. The petitioner also submitted a similar representation on 25.3.1996. (iii) Therefore, a charge under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was framed against the petitioner for having violated Rule 19(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. The petitioner also submitted a similar representation on 25.3.1996. (iii) Therefore, a charge under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was framed against the petitioner for having violated Rule 19(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. In the explanation to the charge memo dated 14.2.1996, he accepted the fact of marriage with one Amudha, who was the first wife and came up with an explanation as she became sick after the first delivery, he was unable to perform marital relationship with that lady and on the basis of repeated requests of his family members and with the consent of his first wife, he married Lakshmi. He also accepted that he was unable to have legal divorce from the first wife and he was very affectionate to her and the second marriage itself was contracted under the pressure from the 1st wife. The Department did not accept the story put up by the petitioner. Therefore, an enquiry officer was appointed, namely the Regional Deputy Director, Salem. (iv) The enquiry officer after conducting enquiry on 28.10.1998 submitted a report and he found that the charges against the petitioner was proved. On the basis of the said report, the petitioners explanation was called for and the petitioner at that stage took up the plea that the Government has passed orders granting permission to marry the second time and enclosed a Government Order to that effect. But, this explanation of the petitioner was not accepted by the Department and the Department had rightly held that the question of prior permission of the Government for contracting second marriage will arise only if there is a personal obligation and not otherwise and having found that the petitioner has contravened Rule 19(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, it was found that the petitioner has committed the offence of bigamy and therefore in view of the proved misconduct, he was dismissed from service. 6. The petitioner in his Original Application once again reiterated the theory of Government granting permission, deserving the Government servant to contract a second marriage for valid reasons. Perhaps when this was argued, it was accepted by the Tribunal without any legal justification in confirming the said order. 7. It is needless to state that the law relating to the marriage is governed purely by personal law. Perhaps when this was argued, it was accepted by the Tribunal without any legal justification in confirming the said order. 7. It is needless to state that the law relating to the marriage is governed purely by personal law. After the enactment of Hindu Marriages Act, 1956, there is no scope for contracting the second marriage whether the Government permits or whether the elders consent or due to first wife pressure. Therefore, the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved even on the basis of the admission by the petitioner. Though on earlier point of time, he concocted a different story to justify to disown the first wife, suddenly he found that his first wife is very affectionate and he could not divorce her as per law. 8. Thereafter an argument was addressed on the basis of proportionality of the punishment. Since the petitioner having married second wife, he has two families to support. Therefore, the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate. In the counter filed by the respondents dated 31.8.2000, the Department had clearly referred that the violation of Rule 19 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rule clearly attract major penalty and therefore there is no scope for reconsidering the penalty. 9. Mr.P.Mohanraj, learned counsel for the petitioner once again stated that on the strength of the interim order, the petitioner has been continuously in service for the last ten years and since he has got few more years, the penalty other than the penalty of dismissal can be given to him. 10. In view of the above submissions, the following questions arise for consideration by this Court i) Whether the petitioner has committed a misconduct in contravening Rule 19(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules ii) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether the penalty of dismissal given by the respondents is justified. Iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether this Court can modify the penalty by exercising the extra judicial power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. In respect of the 1st question, it is necessary to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in respect of similar misconduct committed by another Government servant. Iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether this Court can modify the penalty by exercising the extra judicial power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. In respect of the 1st question, it is necessary to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in respect of similar misconduct committed by another Government servant. The Supreme Court in State of W.B. v. Prasenjit Dutta reported in (1994) 2 SCC 37 in paragraph 5 it held as follows: 5....It cannot at the same time be said that the departmental authorities cannot go into such question for the limited purposes of sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the aforesaid Rules. When contracting another marriage, in the presence of the previous one, has been termed to be misconduct visiting departmental punishment it is difficult to keep suspended action under the Rule till after a proper adjudication is made by the civil or matrimonial court. It would, thus, have to be viewed that the departmental proceeding could not be shut in the manner in which the High Court has done and it would have to go on to some finality at a departmental end, on the culmination of which, it may then give rise to the delinquent approaching the civil court for determining his matrimonial status. Thus, we are of the view that the High Court, both at the trial and the appellate stages, committed an error in preventing the dismissal order to take effect on the premises as noted above. However, besides that point, if any other point had arisen in the matter which justified stay of operation of the dismissal order that could be left to the High Court to be determined in accordance with law. 12. The Supreme Court further upheld the right of the Government to conduct an enquiry in case of such misconduct by the Government servant vide its judgment in State of Karnataka v. T. Venkataramanappa reported in (1996) 6 SCC 455 . In paragraph 3 of the said judgment it was observed as follows: 3. The prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen short of those standards but that does not mean that the State was in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which forbids a government servant to marry a second time without the permission of the Government. The prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen short of those standards but that does not mean that the State was in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which forbids a government servant to marry a second time without the permission of the Government. But, here, the respondent being a Hindu, could never have been granted permission by the Government to marry a second time because of his personal law forbidding such marriage. It was thus beyond the ken of the Tribunal to have scuttled the departmental proceedings against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy should normally not be taken up for decision in departmental enquiries, as the decisions of competent courts tending to be decisions in rem would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a clear fallacy in such view because for purposes of Rule 28, such strict standards, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under Section 494 IPC, may not, to begin with, be necessary. We therefore explain away the orders of the Tribunal to the afore extent that Rule 28 can be invoked, but would certainly maintain the orders of revocation of suspension since in the presence of the orders of discharge in favour of the respondent, his continued suspension during the enquiry was totally unwarranted. Let the enquiry be held." 13. Therefore, the defence taken by the petitioner, and the earlier explanation given is clearly unwarranted. A person governed by the Hindu Marriage Act cannot have the benefit of contracting a second marriage and it cannot be held to be legally permissible. Even in case the petitioners theory of getting married for the second time under elders pressure or with the consent of the wife, such a consent is not legally available and it clearly contravenes Rule 19(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. 14. With reference to the second submission, namely the penalty, there were days when the Department was dealing with such misconduct of a Government servant with leniency, as if it is a trivial and natural phenomenon occurring in the society. But, after the advent of the International Womens Year in 1975, the Government came up with a stern guideline directing such misconduct cannot be treated with kid gloves and the major penalty should be imposed on such Government servant. But, after the advent of the International Womens Year in 1975, the Government came up with a stern guideline directing such misconduct cannot be treated with kid gloves and the major penalty should be imposed on such Government servant. Even otherwise, so long as the misconduct is serious and the Department had imposed a major penalty,(which was done in this case), it is not for this court to consider whether such a penalty was disproportionate. In the present case the respondents have applied their discretion in imposing the major penalty. Unless and until any flaw is found in such proceedings, the Court cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner on the basis of the sympathy or sentiment, ordering, modification of the penalty. 15. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Chairman and Managing Director, VST and others vs. Goparaju Sri Prabahara Hari Babu reported in 2008 5 SCC 569 has held that a well reasoned order of the Department cannot be interfered with on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. When the procedural formalities are applied by the authorities, the Court cannot ordinarily disturb the penalty. In such case, the Court has only limited jurisdiction to have a judicial power over such a penalty. 16. The last submission is made in desperation by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner having worked under the strength of the interim order should not ask to go away at the tail end of his service and therefore leniency should be shown. Alternately that the petitioner must be allowed to continue in service by modifying the penalty. It must be noted that an interim order does not survive after the final disposal of the Writ Petition and only on the strength of the interim order, the Court cannot grant any order.Further the interim order only survives till a final verdict in the main case and that by itself cannot become the final order. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the following decisions of this Court and the Bombay High Court, which are as follows. 17. Division bench judgment of this court in C.Kamatchi Ammal Vs. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the following decisions of this Court and the Bombay High Court, which are as follows. 17. Division bench judgment of this court in C.Kamatchi Ammal Vs. Kattabomman Transport Corporation Ltd. and others reported in AIR 1987 MADRAS 173 has held that interlocutory orders made in the course of proceedings will necessarily lapse with the decision of the suit unless the suit is one for permanent injunction and the interim injunction is made permanent as a part of the decretal order made by the court. 18. The Bombay High Court vide its decision reported in Ramesh Akre and others Vs. Smt.Mangalabai Pralhad Akre and others reported in AIR 2002 Bombay 487 has held as follows: "21.Similarly, it is also not necessary that suit should be disposed of only on merits in order to bring an end to interim order. What is contemplated in law is that such interim order would continue to operate till suit is disposed of one way or the other and would come to an end on the day suit is disposed of. Whether suit is disposed of for want of prosecution or on merits is not the criteria to decide existence of interim orders. These orders by their very nature are temporary and remain in force only during the pendency of the suit and come to an end when the suit is disposed of one way or the other." 19. It is rather unfortunate that the petitioner could make another submission that too after going to the Tribunal and also getting the case transferred to this Court and after continuing in service for the last ten years, by seeking permission to move to the Government again. That facility was available to the petitioner in the year 2000 to move the appellate authority. It was the petitioner, who thought that they were not adequate remedies, filed a miscellaneous application to waive the alternate remedy and the same was also permitted by the Tribunal. Therefore, such a request cannot be made after a decade just to get the case removed from the Courts file. Such a request was made after arguing the matter in detail. 20. Hence, no case is made out and the Writ Petition fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances, no cost is ordered.