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2010 DIGILAW 544 (DEL)

IN THE MATTER OF : UNION OF INDIA v. MAHENDER SINGH

2010-04-15

HIMA KOHLI

body2010
Judgment HIMA KOHLI, J. (ORAL) CM 2757/2008 (condonation of delay) 1. The present application is filed by the appellant praying inter alia for condonation of delay of 336 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 2. Reply to this application has been filed by the respondents No.1 & 2. 3. The present application is opposed by the counsel for the respondents No.1 & 2 who states that except for giving administrative reasons explaining the movement of the file within the Department of the appellant, no other justification has been given for seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, and hence, the application ought not to be allowed. 4. In the present case, the judgment impugned by the appellant is dated 20.10.2006. It is stated in the application that the certified copy of the said judgment was received by the counsel for the appellant on 2.12.2006 and the present appeal came to be filed on 20.12.2007. In para 3 of the application, the Land Acquisition Collector, who is the deponent of the affidavit, has explained that after receiving the certified copy of the impugned judgment, the same was sent to the Legal Department for obtaining an opinion; thereafter, the same was received back and put up before the Principal Secretary(Land and Building) on 8.3.2007 for approval, which was granted on the very same day, for preferring an appeal. The said file was received back by the Legal Department and forwarded to the Land Acquisition Collector on 3.4.2007. He however took further time to file the appeal as the appealable amount was to be calculated and verified and records prepared for preferring the appeal. The file was finally received by the Government counsel on 13.12.2007, who prepared the draft appeal and forwarded it to the Department for verification and approval. 5. It has been consistently held in a number of judicial pronouncements that the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and where there are no allegations of gross negligence, absence of bonafides, or intentional delay/inaction attributable to a party, generally, delays in preferring appeals, particularly when they are filed by the Government, are required to be condoned in the interest of justice, as also in public interest.(Refer: G.Ramegowda Major Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 ). 6. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 ). 6. The yardstick for examining “just and sufficient cause” for the purposes of considering an application for condonation of delay, where it relates to a Government department as against private citizen, is therefore a little different for the reason that the considerations which weigh with the Court include the fact the decision making process in a Government department takes much longer as it is taken collectively and at an institutional level. Hence the extent of latitude granted to the Government is wider. It is not unheard of that in revenue matters, like the present one, where the issue for consideration is compensation payable by the UOI for land acquired by it for public purpose, the delay in preferring the appeals is some times substantial. Even in the case of private landowners seeking enhancement of compensation assessed by the Reference Court and payable by UOI for their land so acquired, generally, there is delay in filing the appeals, as in many cases it is claimed that the villagers took time to arrive at a collective decision in the panchayat, for filing the appeal. However instead of adopting a pedantic approach of ousting parties at the threshold on technicalities, it is invariably considered appropriate to overcome the technicalities and deal with the matter on merits, as the effort is to do substantial justice between the parties. 7. In the present case, no doubt, the appellant ought to have taken a prompt decision to file the appeal and the matter ought to have been pursued by the concerned responsible officers diligently and dealt with reasonable despatch. However, as noted in the case of State(NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan reported as 2008(11) Scale 455 , “the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. However, as noted in the case of State(NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan reported as 2008(11) Scale 455 , “the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision as to whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” Even on earlier occasions, a similar view has been taken in such like matters where it was noted by the Supreme Court that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. [Refer: State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 132 ; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Vs. K.V.Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634 ; and State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 ] 8. A similar trend of thought was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Y.Moideen Kunhi(dead) by LRs. and Ors. reported as 2009(6) SCALE 677 where it was observed that many matters concerning the State Government and Central Government are delayed either by the nature of bureaucratic process or by the deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of the litigation. 9. In the present case, there is no reason why the explanation offered by the appellant for the movement of the file in department ought not to be considered “just and sufficient” reason for condoning the delay in filing the accompanying appeal. No malafides have been attributed to the officers of the appellant. Nor are there any allegations of deliberate inaction on their part. 10. The application is therefore allowed and the delay of 336 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 11. The application is disposed of.