Judgment :- 1. These two Second Appeals are focused by the original Plaintiff, animadverting upon the common judgment and decree dated 14.9.2009 passed in A.S. Nos.8 & 9 of 2008 by the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, confirming the common judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, namely, Subordinate Judge, Vellore in O.S. Nos.130 of 2004 & 151 respectively. 2. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the Trial Court. 3. Heard both sides. 4. A summation and summarization of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of these Second Appeals would run thus: (a) The Plaintiff filed the Suit O.S. No.151 of 2005 for injunction so as to prevent the Defendants from evicting the Plaintiff otherwise than in accordance with law. She also filed one other Suit viz., O.S. No.130 of 2004 for the purpose of getting an Agreement to Sell enforced specifically. In both the Suits, Written Statements were filed and the Defendants contested the matter, whereupon issues were framed. (b) During joint trial, the Plaintiff on her side, examined herself as PW1 along with P.Ws.2 & 3 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-35. On the side of the Defendants, the First Defendant Selvaraj examined himself as DW1 along with D.Ws.2 & 3 and marked Exs.B1 to B12. (c) Ultimately, the Trial Court dismissed both the Suits by a common judgment, as against which, two separate Appeals were filed for nothing but to be dismissed confirming the common judgment of the Trail Court. 5. Challenging and impugning the common judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, these two Second Appeals have been preferred by the Plaintiff on various grounds, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: (i) Both the Courts below were not justified in simply relying upon their own ability in comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature, without the assistance of a handwriting expert and arriving at a conclusion. (ii) The preponderance of probabilities are in favour of the Plaintiff, who was already in possession of the property concerned as a tenant and without any valid reason Ex.A13, the Agreement to Sell was rejected by the Courts below. (iii) The initiation of the Rent Control proceedings by the Defendants as against the Plaintiff is having no bearing on both the Suits filed by the Tenant. 6. (iii) The initiation of the Rent Control proceedings by the Defendants as against the Plaintiff is having no bearing on both the Suits filed by the Tenant. 6. The Second Appeals suggested the following substantial questions of law: S.A.No.83 of 2010: 1. Whether the Courts below are right in dismissing the Suit as well as the Appeal for grant of injunction holding that the provision under the Rent Control Act have to be resorted to? 2. Whether the Courts below are right in dismissing the Suit for injunction when the possession of the property is still with the Appellant? S.A.No.135 of 2010: 1. Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting the claim of the Appellant for issue of a decree for specific performance when Ex.A13 satisfies the norms of an agreements? 2. Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting a decision for comparison of the signature by the Courts itself without resorting to an Expert, contrary to various decisions? 3. Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting the plea of the Appellant who was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract? 7. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff advanced this argument, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: 1. Simply because in the reply notice there was no reference to Ex.A13 that it does not mean that such an agreement did not come into existence at all. 2. The absence of any reference to advance amount in the agreement to sell would not be fatal to the agreement to sell itself. Even oral agreement to sell could be enforced. 3. Without analyzing the evidence property, both the Courts below simply accepted the case of the defendants and dismissed the case of the Plaintiff. 8. 2. The absence of any reference to advance amount in the agreement to sell would not be fatal to the agreement to sell itself. Even oral agreement to sell could be enforced. 3. Without analyzing the evidence property, both the Courts below simply accepted the case of the defendants and dismissed the case of the Plaintiff. 8. Whereas by way of torpedoing and pulverizing the argument as put forth on the side of the Plaintiff, the learned Counsel for the First Defendant would advance his argument, the pith and marrow of them would run thus: (a) If really Ex.A13 dated 19.2.2004, which is in the receipt form emerged genuinely, then certainly in the Reply Notice dated 10.4.2004 given by the Plaintiff, to the Defendant’s notice, would have contained a reference to such alleged agreement to Sell and that itself is indicative of the fact that only as an after thought for the purpose of illegally and unjustifiably buttressing the untenable claim of the Plaintiff in the Suit for specific performance, such Ex.A13 was brought about. (b) Both the Courts below, correctly adverted to the evidence adduced before the Trial Court and arrived at a just conclusion, warranting no interference in these Second Appeals. 9. At this juncture, it has to be seen as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in both the Appeals. 10. Indubitably and indisputably, Ex.B7 dated 10.4.2004 emerged, so to say, the said Reply Notice, was sent by the Plaintiff’s Advocate in response to the Defendant’s Lawyer’s notice and in that there is no reference to Ex.A13 at all. 11. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the First Defendant that if at all there was any agreement to sell or even any oral agreement to sell, certainly that would have got reflected in Ex.B7. Over and above that the learned Counsel for the First Defendant also would appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly point out that it is not the case of the Plaintiff in the Plaint that there had been some oral agreement to sell and that was sought to be enforced by filing the Suit. 12. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the following maxim: “Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probate”-It is the duty of a judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved. 12. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the following maxim: “Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probate”-It is the duty of a judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved. When the plea of oral agreement was not the case of the Plaintiff, in the Plaint itself the following decisions cited on the side of the Plaintiff would have no bearing: (i) Sanga Thevar v. Thanukodi Ammal and others, AIR 1954 Mad. 116 (Vol.41 C.N.4S); and (ii) Ram Kissan Agar walla and others v. Muktinath Sarma and others, 1956 Assam 154 (AIR V 43 C 44 Oct.). Absolutely, there is no quarrel over the proposition of law as found enunciated in the aforesaid two decisions but in this factual matrix they cannot be pressed into service in favour of the Plaintiff. 13. Here, it has to be seen as to whether after analyzing the factual evidence, the Trial Court arrived at the conclusion. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff himself meticulously read the relevant portion of the judgment of both the Courts below and from that what I could understand is that the Trial Court in the discussion portion scrupulously analysed the evidence both oral and documentary and pointed out that preponderance of probabilities are not in favour of the Plaintiff. Over and above that the concept; onus of proof was correctly applied by the Trial Court. It is the Plaintiff, who placed reliance of Ex.A13. 14. I harp back on the following maxims: (i) Affirmantis est probare-He who affirms must prove. (ii) Affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio: The burden of proof lies upon him who asserts and not upon him who denies. 15. Here, in this case, it is not the Defendant who putforth Ex.A13, but it is the Plaintiff and it was for her to prove the disputed signature of the Defendant-Selvaraj. But in this case, no steps have been taken to prove the signature and not even an Application was filed by the Plaintiff to get compared the disputed signature with admitted signature by any handwriting exert. 16. In such a case, it is too late in the day on the part of the Plaintiff to raise her accusative finger as against the Defendants that the Defendants did not pray for taking the assistance of an expert to disprove the signature found in Ex.A13. 17. 16. In such a case, it is too late in the day on the part of the Plaintiff to raise her accusative finger as against the Defendants that the Defendants did not pray for taking the assistance of an expert to disprove the signature found in Ex.A13. 17. No doubt, I would like to agree with the arguments as putforth by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that normally Courts, suo motu should not resort to the act of comparing the signatures as per Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is now a trite proposition of law itself that Courts should be reluctant to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature as though they are experts by themselves. However, in certain circumstances, once the Court resorts to compare the signatures as per Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, by themselves then certainly they should play the role of any handwriting expert in stricto sensu. A Judge cannot as per Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act express his subjective satisfaction concerning the disputed signature. If the Judge desires to act as an expert in handwriting science, then he should assume the role of a handwriting expert in stricto sensu and analyse it by referring to various characteristics and arrive at a conclusion, so that objectively, the Appellate Court as well as the higher Courts would be in a position to verify and analyse as to whether the Trial Court was justified in arriving at such a conclusion. 18. Simply observing that the disputed signature and the admitted signature are one and the same, would have no probative force at all. But, in this case, I would like to point out that the Trial Court in extensor dealt with the evidence and circumstances and arrived at the conclusion. Incidentally, the Trial Court also stated that the disputed signature is not in commensurate with the admitted signature and that cannot be given undue importance when, in fact the Plaintiff herself had not taken any steps to get the disputed signature verified by a handwriting expert. 19. As such, both the Courts below were right in not decreeing the Suit for specific performance as well as the Suit for injunction and such dismissal was confirmed by the Appellate Court. 19. As such, both the Courts below were right in not decreeing the Suit for specific performance as well as the Suit for injunction and such dismissal was confirmed by the Appellate Court. In view of the fact that already the defendants initiated the Rent Control proceedings and based on the overall factual circumstances, the Court below thought that no injunction could be granted, warrants no interference of this Court is Second Appeal. 20. The aforesaid suggested substantial questions of law in my opinion ex facie and prima facie would show that there is no question of law much less substantial question of law and they are only relating to certain factual issues. 21. At this juncture my mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court: (i) Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, 2006 (4) CTC 79 (SC) : 2006 (5) SCC 545 , certain excerpts from its would run thus: “17. After the amendment, a Second Appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The Memorandum of Appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case… 18…. It has to be kept in mind that the right of Appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a Second Appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The Second Appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of fact will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this Section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. 21…. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by sufficing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 21…. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by sufficing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a Second Appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, the phrase “Substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju (Sir Chunilal case, SCR p.557). “when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case, it would not be a substantial question of law.” This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial: (Sir Chunilal case, SCR pp.557-58). “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or call for discussion of alternative view. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case”, there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari). 24. … … (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are: where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” (ii) Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and another, 2003 (4) Scale 300, an excerpt from it would run thus: “9. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the Memorandum of Appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Court have been issuing notices and generally deciding the Second Appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the Code. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this Section in several cases, the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of Appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a Second Appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The Second Appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this Section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , held that: “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty of calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court of the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law.” As such, unless there is possibility of formulating any substantial question of law in a Second Appeal, the question of entertaining the Second Appeal would not arise. 22. Accordingly, I am of the view that both these Second Appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.