JUDGMENT D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J : The Plaintiff in O.S.No. 12/1992 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Belgaum is the appellant in this regular first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being not fully satisfied with the judgment and decree dated 14.11.2006, wherein the plaintiff has met with partial success. 2. The appeal is for achieving the decree in terms of the prayer in the plaint. As things would have it, fortunes of the plaintiff have only brightened with the intervening law, particularly the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act in terms of the amendment Act No. 39/2005, which has been brought into effect from 09.09.2005 which governs the field and is applicable to the facts of the present case also and which has ensured the status of a coparcenar in a coparcenary property in favour of the plaintiff, a member of a Hindu joint family, a daughter who had been married for considerable number of properties comprised in as many as seven schedules and Schedule-A comprising 12 items, Schedule-B comprising 6 items, Schedule-C comprising 4 items, Schedule- D comprising 6 items, Schedule-E comprising 4 items, Schedule-F comprising 3 items and Schedule-G comprising gold ornaments, silver utensils etc. 4. The schedules are arranged having regard to the common factor existing in the properties figuring in each, of the schedule, with Schedule-A comprising of house properties, Schedule-B comprising agricultural lands, Schedule-C comprising of vacant sites, Schedule-D comprising of movables such as shares and bank deposits, Schedule-E comprising of industrial concerns of the family, Schedule-F comprising of the trading concerns of the family and Schedule-G comprising of gold jewels, silver articles and other movables belonging to the family. 5. Learned Judge of the Trial Court opined that the properties were not liable to be shared equally by the plaintiffs and defendants, mainly comprising of brothers, sisters and the wife and children of the deceased elder brother in the family. . 6. 5. Learned Judge of the Trial Court opined that the properties were not liable to be shared equally by the plaintiffs and defendants, mainly comprising of brothers, sisters and the wife and children of the deceased elder brother in the family. . 6. For a good measure a few more defendants who were not immediate members of the family, such as defendant No. 16 Sri Surendra B. Upadhye who was not a member of the family of the father of the plaintiff, but is a cousin and was a partner in a family run industry known as M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries and defendants-19 and 20 who were also outsiders to the family but who figure as partners in a trading concern of the family viz., M/s. Yeshwanth Traders, had also been arrayed as defendants. This would completes the array of parties. 7. The suit was on the premise that the plaintiff and defendants-1, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are the surviving children of one Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye and so also his eldest son Annasaheb Yeshwanth Upadhye who had died by the time the suit was filed, but was survived by his widow Smt. Vasanthi impleaded as 4th defendant and their children impleaded as defendants- 5, 6 and 7 and the two sons of the 1st defendant Mahaveer and Prithviraj also having been added as defendants-2 and 3, for-the reason that some of the joint family properties stood in their names but are the properties of the family. 8. It is the case of the plaintiff that the entire suit schedule properties were acquired by her father Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhyre on the demise of his adopted mother Smt. Sunanda Bai. That Smt. Sunanda Bai was a member of the Hindu joint family which owned a good number of properties, that the family was hit by a catastrophe and in the plague epidemic that attacked the village not only her husband Chandrakant Upadhye but even many of his siblings had also perished and to continue the family traditions and the lineage, Smt. Sunanda Bai had adopted the father of the plaintiff as a son and therefore the father of the plaintiff having become a member of the family, his children have become entitled to the joint family properties in equal measure. The mother of plaintiff and the husband defendants-1 to 4 and defendants 9 to 12 viz., Champabai (8th defendant) expired during the pendency of the suit and with all her legal heirs being already on record no further steps were necessary and her death has resulted in the augmentation of the shares of her children. 9. The suit which was initially for partition and separate possession of plaintiffs 1/8th share in the suit schedule properties had thus become a suit for l/7th share of the plaintiff in the joint family properties. 10. Defendants-1 to 8 constituting one group while filed the main written statement contesting the suit only for the purpose of contending that not all properties are joint family properties and are not liable to be shared, but some of them can be shared and some cannot be shared as they were the self-acquired properties of some of the defendants and on such plea sought for decreeing the suit only in respect of house bearing No. 365, Angol, Belgaum and land bearing RS Nos. 196, 182/2/1, 193/3/3, 311/1 and 556/3 totally measuring 2 acres and 22 guntas and also house bearing No. 4903/6, 369 and 266 and land bearing RS No. 176/B to an extent of3 acres and 12 guntas which were actually joint family properties but not in respect of other properties described in plaint A to F Schedules. The plaint was amended from time to time either for inclusion of the properties or for impleading other parties. 11. Therefore, a good number of written statements had been filed from time to time to controvert the averments of the plaint which were as stated above. 12. The defendants-5 to 7, the two brothers and a sister, children of Annasaheb for a good measure also came up with a counter-claim and filed a frivolous untenable counter-claim claiming a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/as damages against all their losses. 13. This counter-claim which was without any rhyme or reason obviously did not see the light of the day with he defendants themselves abandoning the counter-claim without a murmur only because they realised that even to put forth such an unrighteous claim, they have to pay a price in the form of Court fee and the Court free being not an insignificant amount, obviously became quiet and abandoned their counter-claim. 14. Defendants-1 to 8 had also filed an additional written statement. 14. Defendants-1 to 8 had also filed an additional written statement. It appears the plaintiff gradually became more and more aware of the joint family properties, with the suit taking its own time to come to an end and step by step improved upon the details of the properties, by amending the plaint, and as and when the plaint was amended, the defendants also came up with additional statements. The line of defence was the same, but to counter the claims in respect of the additional properties. 15. Very strangely, the learned trial Judge framed a good number of issues some relevant and arising and many irrelevant and as many as ten issues were framed in the main pleadings and seven additional issues due to the amendment of pleadings. 16. We find that framing of so many issues was wholly unnecessary, for the simple reason that the defendants though were in good number and though had filed many written statements had not seriously contested the essential facts pleaded by the plaintiff viz., the relationship, the existence of joint family nucleus and the non-availability of any independent source of income to the other members of the joint family, though some of them might have been a little enterprising and would have improved the business and industry of the family and others inactive, particularly the female members of the family having not contribute~, much for the augmentation of the family assets. 17. In the written statement filed on 21.07.1992 contents of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 has virtually made the suit a no contest and reads as under: “1. The contents of para No.1 of the plaint are not correct. One Smt. Sunandabai w/o Chandranath Upadhye was the original propositus of the family. Smt. Sunandabai's husband and other members died long back in the year 1930 in a "Plague" epidemic, leaving behind her, moveable Gold, Silver, various ornaments and immoveable properties H.No.365, of Patil Galli, Anagol. Belgaum and Anagol Village lands bearing R.S.No.197, 198/1/1, 193/3/3, 311/1 and 556/3, totally measuring- 2 A. 22 Gunthas (All these lands were then even in possession of different tenants, lateron, some are gone in a Teanncy Act. For the welfare of her self late Sunandabai Chandranath Upadhye adopted Shri Yashawanth Chandranath Upadhye who was originally belongs to Kidarapur District Shiroda, Maharashtra State. 2. For the welfare of her self late Sunandabai Chandranath Upadhye adopted Shri Yashawanth Chandranath Upadhye who was originally belongs to Kidarapur District Shiroda, Maharashtra State. 2. Apart from this, Shri Yashwanth C.Upadhye had purchased a house No.4903/6 of Tanaji Galli. Belgaum, around 1932 out of Smt. Sunadabai's money. Thereafter, immediate adjacent neighbouring houses bearing Nos.366 and 369 were purchased in the name of Smt. Sunandabai by shri Annasaheb and Yashawanth Upadhye. Besides this, Smt. Sunandabai had purchased R.S.N o. 176/B measuring 3 A-5Gs. These five properties were declared and assessed as H.U.F. property since beginning. 3. In the year 1958, Shri Annasaheb became major, and till then there were nothing prospectus in the family ot Shri Y.C.Upadhye. Only in the year of 1963, M/s. Yashawanth Metal Industries, were started by Shri Annasaheb Y.Upadhye and his father Shri Yashawanth C.Upadhye. Lateron, CTS No.1440/A, 1440/B and 1440/C were purchased by M/s. Yashawanth Metal Industries, in the name of Shri Yashawanth C.Upadhye in the year of 1973, by sale purchase." 18. In the wake of such written statements and the evidence let in by defendants also being in consonance, particularly the evidence of DW-1, the 1st defendant, virtually conceding the salient aspects of the suit claim and also conceding that the father of the plaintiff, and the husband of defendant-1 and defendants 9 to 12 who was from outside the family' but taken in adoption, while did not have any independent source of income, became possessed of the properties only because of the adoption by Smt. Sunanda Bai. The properties of Smt. Sunanda Bai’s family constituted the nucleus for all further developments and the so-called defence that the eldest son of Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye viz., Annasaheb Yeshwant Upadhye had improved the fortunes of the family by his independent earnings but such a defence being virtually floored by the deposition of defendant No.1 indicating that this brother who graduated only in the year 1954-55 did not have any experience either in trade or business nor having any special skill, who even as per the pleading became a major only in the year 1958 and immediately he was taken as a partner in the business along with his father and both continued the business with 50% share each in a partnership firm which is- nothing but a joint family business and the further income and other acquisitions being attributed to generation of income from the profits of the said firm. The very evidence indicates that all subsequent income which has gone into acquisition of further assets have all got merged with the joint family assets and constituted joint family properties and cannot be characterised nor constitute any self- acquired property of any member of the joint family. 19. With such set of pleadings and the evidence, the suit should have been straight away decreed as sought for. But there were some minor hiccups and that the plaintiff herself having given up a claim in respect of suit G-Schedule i.e., gold jewellery, silver ornaments and moveables and in fact the finding being the plaintiff could not prove her right in respect of item No.1 in suit Schedule-F properties and the existence suit G-Schedule properties viz., gold jewellery and silver items being not made good by the plaintiff and inter alia they went out of the purview of partition. 20. 20. Even amongst the other properties, particularly the Schedule-F properties in respect of the two trading concerns the Trial Court having found that the other partners of these two trading concerns were outsiders to the family the partnership cannot necessarily be characterised as a family partnership firm except to the extent the father of the plaintiff had a share in such firms and that alone was included in the property required to be shared amongst the joint family members or legal heirs of the said Yeshwant Chandrakant Upadhye and it is only with such minor adjustments, the suit was decreed holding that the plaintiff was entitled to l/7th share in suit Schedule-A items 5, 7, 8, 9, 10. 11 and 12, 1/28th share in suit item No.6 whereas in items 1 to 4 no share was allotted holding that they were properties acquired by Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye by utilising the funds of M/s. Yeshwanth Metals which was a partnership firm consisting of Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye, Annasaheb and the 1" defendant. 21. In so far as Schedule-B properties are concerned, the Trial Court denied any share in suit item No.1 and in suit Items Nos.2 to 6, plaintiff was given 1/28th share, again on the premise that the ownership of the members of the family in respect of these items i.e., 2 to 6 was only 1/4th, and to such an extent the property being a coparcenary. 22. The learned trial Judge has not assigned any reason to deny a share in item 1. In items Nos.2 to 6, plaintiff was allotted 1/28th share for the reason of the plaintiff being a daughter, can claim a share only from out of a share which her father would have got a notional partition of the family Properties immediately prior to his death. 23. In Schedule-C on the same premise while 1/28th share was given in items 1 to 3, in item 4 no share was given for the reason that it was the self-acquired property of the elder brother of the plaintiff. 24. In Schedule-D the suit claim was accepted in full by giving 1/7th share in all the movables such as shares and bank deposits. 25. 24. In Schedule-D the suit claim was accepted in full by giving 1/7th share in all the movables such as shares and bank deposits. 25. In so far as Schedule-E items are concerned, no share was allotted in suit items 1 to 3 on the premise that they were self-acquired properties of the brothers of the plaintiff viz., deceased Annasaheb and the 1st defendant -Prakash and only in item No.4, l/7th share was given. 26. In Schedule-F no share was given and with the plaintiff herself having given up her claim in respect of item No.1, what survives for further contest in this appeal is, the plaintiffs entitlement to a share in items 2 and 3 of this schedule. 27. In so far as item 2 is concerned, which is a partnership firm in the name of M/s. Yeshwant Sales, share was denied on the premise that it was a self-acquired by the property of the elder brother of plaintiff. i.e., deceased Annasaheb, and no share was given in item 3, another trading company M/s. Yeshwant Traders, for the reason that while two outsiders to the family held 30% share each the remaining 40% was held by the wife of 1st defendant Prakash and who figured as the 17th defendant in the suit. 28. It is because of the denial of share to the plaintiff in some of the suit schedule properties by the Trial Court in the afore stated manner, the plaintiff is before us in this appeal. 29. Appeal had been admitted and has been set down for final disposal with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 30. We have heard Sri V.P.Kulkarni, learned Counsel for plaintiff! appellant and Sri S.N.Patil, learned Counsel for defendants-1 to 3/respondents-1 to 3 and Smt. Hemalekha, learned Counsel for defendants4 to 6/respondents-4 to 6 and Sri Andanimath, learned Counsel for defendant No. 16/respondent No. 15. 31. Sri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that all the suit schedule properties were joint family properties and they were held so and left behind by the deceased Sri Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye and therefore, the plaintiffs suit should have been decreed as sought for. 31. Sri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that all the suit schedule properties were joint family properties and they were held so and left behind by the deceased Sri Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye and therefore, the plaintiffs suit should have been decreed as sought for. It is also pointed out that the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act in terms of the amending Act No.39/2005 has only confirmed the claim of plaintiff and in fact has reduced the arithmatical work for the Court in strictly allotting an equal share to the plaintiff instead of giving a share only in the share allotted to her father and allotment of 1/28th share in some of the suit properties on the premise of notional partition should have been avoided and the plaintiff being on par with a male coparcenar i.e., on par with her brothers and all brothers and sisters are entitled to equal shares in the joint family properties and therefore, in respect of the entire suit items law mandates this Court should decree the suit for the legal entitlement of plaintiffs l/7th share. 32. With reference to individual items in the different schedules. Sri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for plaintiff would point out to Ex.P1 a sale deed dated 21.03.1974 executed in favour of the father of plaintiff and the recitals in the sale deed clearly indicating that it was acquired by the father of the plaintiff, the property forming part of the joint family properties and, there is no question of property being construed in any other manner to refuse or deny a share to the plaintiff in this property in accordance with law, particularly with reference to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005, ensuring the status of the plaintiff as a coparcenar. 33. Ex. P1 which indicates that the properties comprising the suit items 1 to 4 were all acquisitions by the father of the plaintiff and therefore there was no way of denying a share in favour of the plaintiff. 34. 33. Ex. P1 which indicates that the properties comprising the suit items 1 to 4 were all acquisitions by the father of the plaintiff and therefore there was no way of denying a share in favour of the plaintiff. 34. In so far as suit item No.1 in Schedule-B is concerned, it is pointed out by Sri Kulkarni that Ex.P5 the sale deed dated 02.05.1938 and the record of rights in respect of the property would indicate that this property belonged to the father of plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff should be given 1/7th share in this item also. So far as items 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are concerned, our attention is drawn to Ex:P27, 28, 29. 30 and 31 respectively, the record of rights in respect of these properties, which indicates these properties also stood in the name of the father of plaintiff. Sri Kulkarni submits that the learned trial Judge has committed an illegality in ignoring the evidence on record and drew our attention to the manner in which evidence has been appreciated to record a finding at variance with the evidence on record and submits that it is a perverse finding and requires correction. 35. So far as the suit Schedule-C items are concerned, while in suit items 1I to 3 what is given is 1/28th share, submission is that in these items also plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share. 36. The learned Counsel for plaintiff has drawn our attention to Ex.P13 a sale deed dated 25.04.1977 which is in Marathi language and Kannada version being Ex.P14, executed by one Krishnaji Mahadev Gadgil in favour of the father of plaintiff, the plaintiffs entitlement on the same logic is 1/7th in this property. 37. Suit item 2 in this Schedule viz., an urban immovable property CTS No.681/2/B was acquired under a registered sale deed dated 20.05.1974 executed in favour of Annasaheb and Prakash by one Bharma Devappa Gundappa for a consideration of Rs.35,000/-. In this regard the learned Counsel would submit that neither Annasaheb nor Prakash had any independent source of income and the sale consideration was paid from the income of the Joint family business concerns, and therefore it would automatically become a Joint family property. In this regard the learned Counsel would submit that neither Annasaheb nor Prakash had any independent source of income and the sale consideration was paid from the income of the Joint family business concerns, and therefore it would automatically become a Joint family property. The sale deed also recites that out of the entire sale consideration of Rs.35,000/- a sum of Rs.29,000/ - had been paid earlier and the remaining sum of Rs.6,000/-•was paid at the time of execution of sale deed. 38. Again in respect of item No.3 which is a property purchased in terms of Ex.P3 and in the name of the father of the plaintiff, the claim for 1/7th share is justified. In respect of suit Item No.4 bearing No.32/2/2/4/1 our attention is drawn to Ex.P34 record of rights in respect of this property that the record indicates that it is in the name of late Annasaheb. It is submitted on the lines of the argument as above that all properties were• purchased only from out of the joint family nucleus and there being no independent income either to deceased Annasaheb or 1st defendant, the property obviously is a joint family property being liable for partition amongst the members of the family. 39. In so far as D-Schedule properties are concerned, the parties have not joined issue before us. So far as Schedule-E is concerned, while share is given only in item No.4 on the premise that it is a joint family property the share is denied in items 1 to 3 for the reason that the industry or the business concerned described therein stand in the name of the members of family in their individual capacity and they are not Joint family properties. The learned Counsel for plaintiff points out that deceased Annasaheb or 1’ Defendant did not have any independent source of income and therefore, plaintiff is entitled for l/7th share in the other three items also. 40. In so far as suit Schedule-F Items are concerned, while the plaintiff herself did not press her claim in respect of item No.1. however in respect of Item No.2 learned Counsel for plaintiff would submit that the reasoning given by the Trial Court that this was a self-acquired property of the children of Annasaheb is contrary to evidence on record therefore, plaintiff is entitled for 1/7th share in suit item No.2 of Schedule-F. 41. however in respect of Item No.2 learned Counsel for plaintiff would submit that the reasoning given by the Trial Court that this was a self-acquired property of the children of Annasaheb is contrary to evidence on record therefore, plaintiff is entitled for 1/7th share in suit item No.2 of Schedule-F. 41. In so far as third item of this Schedule is concerned, submission is that while the 60% of the ownership of this firm which is held in equal ratio by two outsiders is not admittedly liable for partition, the 40% ownership in this firm held in the name of the wife of Prakash-1st defendant, is again an investment from out of the joint family nucleus and therefore, this 40% is liable to be shared amongst the members of the family i.e., the plaintiff, her brothers and sisters in equal shares and the plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share. 42. The learned Counsel for plaintiff would place reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pushpalatha N. V. Vs. V. Padma rendered on 19.03.2010 in R.F.A.No.326 of 2004 to contend that amendment to Section 6 has retrospective application and therefore, the amended Act is applicable to the present situation though the suit was filed in the year 1992. 43. It is also submitted that the learned trial Judge has committed an error in not directing enquiry to award future mesne profits in favour of plaintiff. 44. On the other hand, Sri S.V.Patil, learned Counsel for respondents1 to 3 and Smt. Hemalekha, learned Counsel for respondents-4 to 6 and as also Sri Andanimath, learned Counsel for respondent No.15 have very vehemently urged that, the law with regard to the joint family property and self-acquired property is very well settled that self-acquired properties of joint, family members are not liable for partition amongst all members of the family merely because of the existence of a joint family nucleus is proved: that the amended law in terms of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the present set of facts and if at all the case has to be decided applying the provisions of Section 6 as they stood prior to the amendment by Act No.39 of 2005. The learned Counsel would submit that the learned Judge of the Trial Court has rightly evaluated the evidence on record and has granted the correct share and there is no need for altering the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 45. Mr. Patil, learned Counsel for respondents-1 to 3 would also urge that a partnership firm is not automatically presumed or inferred to be a joint family firm. The learned Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P.S.Sairam & Another Vs. P.S. Rama Rao Pisey & Others reported in ILR 2004 Kar 1353 wherein it is held that if no contribution has flown from out of the joint family fund to any partnership firm, it cannot be presumed in law that the family has any interest in such a firm and even if an individual member of a family has used a part of joint property to conduct business to invest his own earning, the same is not liable for partition amongst other joint family members. Mr. Patil would also place very strong reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of M. Prithviraj & Others Vs. Neelamma N. & Others reported in ILR 2009 Kar 3612 to contend that the provisions of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act as amended by At No.39 of 2005 arc not applicable to the instant case. In the above cited judgment, with reference to facts obtained therein, this Court held that as the father of the plaintiff died in the year 1988, much before the amendment to Section 6 was brought into effect and therefore the amended law had no bearing on the case in the wake of succession having opened long prior to the amendment. The learned Counsel would submit that such is the factual position in the case on hand also and therefore, it is only the law which existed on the date of opening of succession that has to be applied and not the law as amended by Act No.39 of 2005. The learned Counsel for the defendants/respondent submits that therefore the plaintiff cannot improve her fortunes in the wake of the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act by Act No.39 of 2005. 46. The learned Counsel for the defendants/respondent submits that therefore the plaintiff cannot improve her fortunes in the wake of the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act by Act No.39 of 2005. 46. We have considered the submissions made at the Bar and gone through the findings of the Trial Court with reference to the evidence on record and have examined them in the light of the law on the point. 47. In our considered opinion the following points would arise for determination: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share in all the suit schedule properties described in plaint Schedules-A to F? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in terms of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005? (iii) Whether the contesting defendants prove that the partnership concerns viz.. (i) M/s. Yeshwant Metal Industries (ii) Yeshwant Agencies (iii) Yeshwanth and Co. are their self-acquisitions and the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in these properties? (iv) Whether defendants have proved that suit item Nos. 1 to 4 of A schedule, suit item No.1 in B Schedule and suit items-2 to 4 in suit C Schedule, item Nos. 1 to 3 in D Schedule and item Nos.2 and 3 of F Schedule are the self- acquired properties of 1st defendant, wife and children of the 1st defendant and the wife and children of deceased Annasaheb? (v) Whether the impugned judgment and decree call for interference? (vi) What order? 48. Our findings on the above points and reasons thereof are as follows: Before adverting to evidence on record it has become necessary for us to advert to the conduct of 1st defendant who has not disputed that both deceased Annasaheb and 1st defendant were B.A. graduates. Yet 1st defendant has not produced any document to show their date of birth to establish that they were possessed of independent income to acquire the aforesaid properties. The I defendant has also not produced the books of accounts relating to M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries. Therefore, we are left with oral evidence of the parties. 49. The 1st defendant in his evidence has admitted that M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries was established in the year 1957-58. The I defendant has also not produced the books of accounts relating to M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries. Therefore, we are left with oral evidence of the parties. 49. The 1st defendant in his evidence has admitted that M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries was established in the year 1957-58. He has also admitted that his elder brother deceased Annasaheb was born during the year 1940 arid he was elder to the 1st defendant by twelve years. The 1st defendant has sought to establish that his father Yeshwanth Chandrakanth Upadhye was working as a priest and he did have sufficient means. This is contrary to the averments in the written statement extracted in para 14 of this judgment and the evidence on record to the effect that his father Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye besides working as a priest was also working as an accountant in two firms and that he had at his disposal the properties left by deceased Sunanda Bai which included house properties, lands, gold arid silver ornaments in good measure. Incidentally it is necessary to state that defendants-1 to 3 have raised all the pleas both tenable and untenable to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. In the first place they have contended that during the lifetime of their father Yeshwanth Chandrakanth Upadhye and also Sunanda Bai there was a family arrangement under which the gold and silver ornaments possessed by Sunanda Bai were distributed amongst the plaintiff and other daughters of Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye and plaintiff and her sisters had accepted the same in full and final satisfaction of their claims in the joint family properties. 50. Defendants-1 to 3 have also pleaded that the deceased Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye (their father) had left behind a Will dated 01.06.1983 bequeathing the suit schedule properties in favour of all the sons. 51. The plea of family arrangement remained a mere plea without there being any proof. In the pleadings it is stated that the Will dated 01.06.1983 is said to be executed by their father Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye was lost when deceased Annasaheb had shifted his residence. However, during the course of evidence, 1st defendant has come out with a version that they are prepared to produce the Will at a later stage of the trial which never happened. However, during the course of evidence, 1st defendant has come out with a version that they are prepared to produce the Will at a later stage of the trial which never happened. Even in the written arguments filed on behalf of defendants- 1 to 3 before the Trial Court, the defendants have reserved their right to produce the Will even during the final decree proceedings. Thus we find the defendants were unsuccessful in establishing the family arrangement, much less the Will propounded by him. 52. The 1st defendant has sought to establish that his brother Annasaheb was an enterprising person and he started his business on his own, so also the 1st defendant. This contention is belied by the averments of the written statement, extracted supra, as also from the evidence of 1st defendant wherein he has admitted that his elder brother Annasaheb was a B.A. graduate. He completed his degree in the year 1954-55. He had no previous experience of business in hardware. His father and his brother were doing business but he does not know as to who started the business. He has admitted that business in hardware in the name and style of Yeshwant Metal Industries was started in the year 1956.-57 in CTS No. 1440/B situated at Ravivarpeth, Belgaum. During the year 1963 his brother Annasaheb started a branch of the hardware business at Sankeshwar. He also admitted that he started assisting in the hardware business from the year 1963 onwards. He joined the partnership firm during the year 1968 at which point of time he had nothing to invest on his own. It is also admitted that Yeshwanth Metal Industries was a prospering business concern. The 1” defendant has sought to establish that the properties in CTS Nos. 1440/A, 1440/B, 1440/C .and 1440/D were purchased by his fattier out of the income from M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries and reliance is placed on the ledger extract marked as Ex.D1. It is also contended that deceased Annasaheb and 1st defendant thereafter started several business partnerships. Thus we find that Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye started hardware business under the name and style Yeshwanth Metal industries in the year 1957-58 which was a proprietory concern at the inception. As the family belonged to a trading community, deceased Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye inducted his sons as partners only to provide them suitable avocation in life. 53. Thus we find that Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye started hardware business under the name and style Yeshwanth Metal industries in the year 1957-58 which was a proprietory concern at the inception. As the family belonged to a trading community, deceased Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye inducted his sons as partners only to provide them suitable avocation in life. 53. The learned Counsel for defendants-1 to 3 have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.S.Sairam & Another Vs. P.S. Rama Rao Pisey & Others reported in ILR 2004 Kar 1353 wherein it is held that if no contribution has flown from out of the family fund to any partnership firm, it cannot be presumed in law that the family has any interest in such a firm and even if an individual member of such family has used a part of joint property to conduct business by investing his own earning, the same is not liable for partition amongst other family members. 54. The instant case is not a case where there were no investments at all from out of the joint family funds. It is not a case where deceased Annasaheb and 1st defendant had established business without any aid from the income of the joint family business. As already noticed, deceased Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye, the father was the founder of M/s Yeshwant Metal Industries and he had established partnerships in the name of M/s. Yeshwanth Raj & Company and Yeshwanth Sales out of the Income of the joint family. Therefore, defendants cannot be heard to say that properties CTS Nos. 1440/A, 1440/B, 1440/C and 1440/D are the properties of M/s. Yeshwanth Metal Industries. The subsequent firms were also started from time to time and Yeshwanth Chandrakanth Upadhye was a partner all along in all joint family firms. As the family belonged to a trading community with all the junior members of the joint family viz.. Annasaheb and 1st defendant assisting their father in the business, there was prosperity in the business. Thereafter, from time to time the other members of the joint family started different firms. It is significant to note that all the firms started by the joint family members had the trade name ‘Yeshwanth’ which shows that Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye had earned a good reputation in business. 55. The defendants have also sought to rely upon the income tax returns filed by them. It is significant to note that all the firms started by the joint family members had the trade name ‘Yeshwanth’ which shows that Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye had earned a good reputation in business. 55. The defendants have also sought to rely upon the income tax returns filed by them. The 1st defendant was all along harbouring an impression that whatever independent partnership firms and the properties acquired therefrom became the properties of the firm and other members of the joint family had no share. In other words, the interest of the partnership was sought to be determined on the basis of the terms and conditions of the partnership deed and not on the personal law governing the parties. This contention is wholly untenable as all the firms were established by Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye from the joint family business. However, in the subsequent firms established after the death of Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye there were partners who did not belong to the joint family. Even regarding the claim that properties acquired in the names of Annasaheb and 1st defendant, the consideration being not paid at one time but part of the consideration having been paid earlier and the remaining consideration being paid at the time of execution of registered sale deeds, it cannot be accepted that the property had been acquired with the help of the individual earnings of the said Annasaheb. 56. The learned trial Judge has relied upon a number of decisions to answer the issues in favour of the defendants. But the settled position of law remains only that if a member of a joint family has independent income and by investing such income if he starts business and develops his business by his individual skills and expertise, the other members of the joint family cannot lay their hands on such business firm or properties acquired out of the income of the business firms. In the case on hand, neither Annasaheb nor 1st defendant had any independent source of income to invest in the business. They did not possess special skills to develop the business without the aid of the joint family members and without the guidance and contribution of their father Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye. Therefore, what has been held in the decision of the Supreme in the case of P.S. Sairam (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 57. They did not possess special skills to develop the business without the aid of the joint family members and without the guidance and contribution of their father Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye. Therefore, what has been held in the decision of the Supreme in the case of P.S. Sairam (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 57. The record, particularly, the written statement itself concedes that all the properties were acquired only from out of the joint family nucleus and nothing else. 58. There is no worthwhile independent earning traceable to any member of the joint family. That even the eldest member after the demise of Yeshwant Chandrakant Upadhye, being only dependent on his father not only for educating him but also for starting the initial business as a partner with his father. Even for this partnership all funds have flown only from the joint family assets, though it is sought to be urged on behalf of the defendants by their learned Counsel that funds from out of the joint family properties have not gone into the investment, for purchasing other properties in the names of individual members. Even assuming that to be so, in the absence of any independent source of income either pleaded or proved by the individual member of the family that such property had been acquired by his own independent earning and not from out of the activities of business and industry carried on initially started by the joint family nucleus, all such subsequent acquisitions, assuming for argument's sake that it was due to the entrepreneural skills and committed hard work on the part of a few individual members of the family, nevertheless, all such properties only acquire the characteristic of joint family properties and not a self earned/acquired property of an individual member. This legal position is too very well settled for us to get confused or to think of disturbing the same, at this point of time!. 59. The evidence on record fully supports the submission made by Sri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the appellant indicating that a majority of the properties were acquired in the name of Sri Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye and later either in the name of the deceased elder brother Annasaheb or some of the present members or even in the name of children of either Annasaheb or the wife of Prakash. In the wake of such established facts and settled position of law applicable to fact situation, we find all properties and partnerships held in the name of any individual member of the family inevitably gets branded with the character of a joint family property and is liable to be shared amongst all members of the family in a partition of the joint family properties. 60. That only leaves us with the question as to whether the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act by Act No.39 of 2005 has any bearing to the instant, case or otherwise. 61. The law in this regard is too well settled in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar Vs. Geetha & Others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 99 . Any development of law inevitably applies to a pending proceeding and in fact it is not even to be taken as a retrospective applicability of the law but only the law as it stands on the day being made applicable. 62. The suit, no doubt, might have been instituted in the year 1992 and even assuming that it was four years after the demise of Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye, the position so far as the parties are concerned, who are all members of the joint family, in terms of Section 6 as amended by Act No.39 of2005 is that a female member is, by a fiction of law created in terms of the amended provision also becomes a coparcenar and has a right in joint family property by birth. They are also sharer members of the coparcenary property at par with all male members. When a partition takes place, coparceners succeed to the property in equal measure. Such is the legal position in terms of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005 and as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of G.S.Sekar (supra). The only exception carved out to the applicability and operation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005 being a situation or a factual position where there was a partition which had been effected by a registered partition deed or by a decree of the Court which has attained finality prior to 20.12.2004 in terms of sub-section (5) to Section 6. 63. 63. In the present case such being not the factual position, the exception available under sub-section (5) to Section 6 cannot be called in aid by the defendants and therefore, the liability in terms of the amended provisions operates. It is not necessary for us to multiply the judgments by going into details or discussing other judgments referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties at the Bar as one judgment of the Supreme Court if clinches the issue on the point, it is good enough for us, as a binding authority to apply that law and dispose of the case as declared in that judgment. 64. So applying the law, we find that in so far as all joint family properties are concerned, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share and in respect of partnership firms in which the family had limited share, to the extent of such percentage alone the plaintiff gets 1/7th share and so also her brothers and sisters. 65. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is modified by allotting 1/7th share to the plaintiff in all joint family properties and assets, except in suit item No.1 of Schedule-E which has been voluntarily given up by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants before the Trial Court and therefore, we exclude this from the operation of this modified judgment and decree. In respect of other suit items, to the extent we have indicated in this judgment, the decree stands modified declaring the entitlement of plaintiff to 1/7th share in respect of all items of A Schedule, l/7th share in respect of all items in B Schedule, 1/7th share in respect of all items in C Schedule, 1/7th share in respect of all items in D Schedule, 1/7th share in respect of all items in E Schedule, in respect of F Schedule with the first item having been given up, in other two items, while 1/7th share is given in respect of suit item No.2, it is 1/7th share in the 40% ownership in item No.3 held in the name of the wife of the 1 defendant Prakash for the reason that this partnership business was established out of the joint family contributions. 66. 66. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer point No.(i) in favour of the plaintiff except in respect of item No.1 of F Schedule property which the plaintiff had given up. 67. We answer point No.2 holding that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share in terms of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005. 68. We answer No.3 against the defendants and hold that the judgment calls for interference and modification of the decree in the aforesaid terms and conditions. 69. We find from the impugned judgment it is very necessary for us to elaborate about the judgment, which has not adhered to the record and has gone off at a tangent to the evidence on record. The learned trial Judge has ignored the oral and documentary evidence to determine the nature of properties as to whether they were joint family properties or self acquired properties. The learned trial Judge except reproducing the head notes of decisions cited at the Bar has not shown any awareness to the legal position and in keeping abreast with the development of law. The learned trial Judge has ignored the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act No.39 of 2005 which in fact came into effect during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, we hold that the impugned judgment calls for interference. 70. The appeal is allowed with costs. 71. The office is directed draw up decree in terms of this judgment. The Trial Court shall hold an enquiry into the mesne profits arising out of the properties in which the plaintiff has 1/7th share in terms of the decree modified by this Court from the date of the modified decree till the date such properties are divided by metes and bounds and the plaintiffs 1/7th share is allotted to her. In respect of business concerns/partnerships from the date of decree till the date of rendition of accounts and allotment of l/7th share to the plaintiff in terms of the decree modified by this Court. Appeal allowed with costs.