JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. There is no dispute at the bar that this writ petition is squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered on 14.8.2007 in Union of India and Ors. v. Shri Man Bahadur Chhetri and Ors. WA Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of 2006. The sole question which falls for consideration now is whether the Petitioner is automatically entitled to similar relief granted in those writ appeals. 2. Before proceeding, it may be necessary to briefly refer to the facts of this case. In this case, the Petitioner was enrolled as Rifleman Operator in the signal category of the Assam Rifles on 8.4.1967, was promoted to the rank of Havildar and was further promoted to Naik Subedar on 1.2.1989. He was further promoted to the rank of Subedar in May, 1986 whereafter he was again promoted to the rank of Subedar Major in June 1996. In the year 2001, the Respondent No. 2 issued the notice dated 16.4.2001, purportedly in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules read with Rule 48(1) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and also on the basis of the undertaking made by the Petitioner, compulsorily retiring him from service on 31.5.2002 on his completion of 53 years, 3 months and 16 days of service and on completion of a tenure of 6 years as Subedar Major. According to the Petitioner, following the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission Report, which enhanced the retirement age of JCOs of Assam Rifles including Subedar Major to 60 years, the impugned notice of his retirement at the age of 53 years, three months and 16 days is illegal. He, therefore, prays that he be paid salary and allowances admissible to him as per rule with effect from 1.6.2002 to 2009 when he would have attained the age of 60 years. This Court has held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment dated 14.8.2007 as follows: 8. As noticed earlier, the Office Memorandum dated 13.5.1998 read with the Office memorandum dated 14.5.1998 did enhance the retirement age of Government employee including Assam Rifles personnel from 58 years to 60 years by making consequential amendment in the Fundamental Rules. This Court has held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment dated 14.8.2007 as follows: 8. As noticed earlier, the Office Memorandum dated 13.5.1998 read with the Office memorandum dated 14.5.1998 did enhance the retirement age of Government employee including Assam Rifles personnel from 58 years to 60 years by making consequential amendment in the Fundamental Rules. This Rule is made by the President of India in exercise of his legislative powers under Article 309 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the policy decision taken by the Director General of Assam Rifles to require the Respondent and other similarly situated persons to retire on completing a tenure of 4 years as Subedar Major or on attaining 55 years of age has no legislative sanction, but is, at the most, in the nature of administrative instructions or directions. Administrative instructions are subsidiary to the statute or rules, and cannot be permitted to interfere with, or prevail over, statutory provisions. Provisions of law cannot be circumvented or overridden by administrative instructions/directions. In other words, administrative instructions cannot amend, supplant or supersede the rules. A rule can be amended only by a rule and not by administrative instructions. Such instructions inconsistent with a rule cannot stand. It is true that where rules are silent, administrative instructions can certainly be issued to carry out the functions under the Act, but this principle is always subject to the conditions that such instructions should not conflict with or defeat any provisions in the rules or parent Act. This is a settled law without reference to cases. Applying this settled law, we are of the view that the substantive right of the Respondent to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years conferred by the amended Fundamental Rules cannot be curtailed or defeated by the policy decision taken by the Director General of Assam Rifles. The policy decision taken by the Director General, Assam Rifles is contrary to, or is inconsistent with the amended Fundamental Rules enhancing the retirement age of Assam Rifles personnel. 9. The policy decision taken by the Director General, Assam Rifles is contrary to, or is inconsistent with the amended Fundamental Rules enhancing the retirement age of Assam Rifles personnel. 9. Similarly, by the Undertaking dated 31.1.1995 (Annexure 1) signed by the Respondent to the effect that on his promotion to the rank of Subedar Major, he had agreed to retire from service on completion of 4 years as Subedar Major, or on his attaining the age of 55 years of age, whichever was earlier, cannot come in the way of making his rightful claim or of enforcing his legal right to continue in service up to the age of 60 years for the simple reason that there can be no estoppel against statute. The statutory right conferred upon the Respondent to retire from service at the age of 60 years in terms of the amended FR cannot be bartered away by him by signing an undertaking of the nature purportedly enforced by the Appellant authorities. In K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, (1974) 2 SCC 506 (at 514), the Apex Court held that an excess of statutory power cannot be validated by acquiescence in or by operation of an estoppel. An agreement or undertaking contrary to law cannot, therefore, be enforceable. In the view that we have taken, we hold that the said undertaking is non est and cannot be acted upon by the Appellant authorities for the compulsory retirement of the Respondent. Therefore, the contention of Mr. S.C. Shyam, the learned CGC, on both counts fail. Therefore, the impugned notice is illegal and ultra vires and is accordingly quashed. We may also point out that the inevitable consequence of our finding that the said undertaking is illegal is that the promotion of the Respondent to the rank of Subedar Major in terms thereof is equally illegal. In the result, we hold that the Respondent was deemed to have been in service in the post of Subedar and was entitled to continue in that post up to 19.1.2002 when he attained the age of 60 years. This is in terms of the submission of the learned CGC, which has sufficient force. 3. In the case at hand, the Petitioner was compulsorily retired from service with effect from 31.5.2002. The writ petition was, however, filed by him only on 1.2.2008, i.e., about six years later. This is in terms of the submission of the learned CGC, which has sufficient force. 3. In the case at hand, the Petitioner was compulsorily retired from service with effect from 31.5.2002. The writ petition was, however, filed by him only on 1.2.2008, i.e., about six years later. He is obviously enlightened and encouraged by our decision in Man Bahadur Chhetri case (supra). Mr. B.N. Dutta, the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, contends that as the Petitioner is similarly situated with the writ Petitioners in Man Bahadur Chhetri case and having approached this Court within six months of the pronouncement of the judgment thereof, there is no reason why the benefit of that judgment cannot be extended to this Petitioner. He strongly relies on the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in to buttress his contention. On the other hand, Mr. S.C. Shyam, the CGC, appearing for the Respondents, argues that as the Petitioner approached this Court six years after his compulsory retirement, he is not entitled to similar relief. In support of his contention, he places reliance on the decisions of two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2007) 2 SCC 725 and U.P. Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and Anr., (2006) 11 SCC 464 . For better appreciation of the controversy, I will first refer to the decision in Nand Kishore Naik case. Suffice it to reproduce paragraph 3 of the judgment: (SCC p.699, para 3) 3. The Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Rama Chandra Das v. State of Orissa on an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 read with the relevant rules made thereunder came to the conclusion that the fixing of the date of superannuation of some teachers at 58 years and others at 60 years was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It, therefore, concluded as under: (p. 292) Hence, the teachers whose age of superannuation according to the instructions read with the 1982 rules was 58 years are entitled to have a declaration that they would continue till they attained the age of 60 years unless the tenure was cut short by the coming into force of the 1986 rules which fixed the age of superannuation at 58 years and I so declare. Therefore, it follows that the teachers who completed 60 years of age prior to 15th March, 1986 were to retire on attaining 60 years of age and those who did not complete 60 years of age but had completed 58 years of age when the rules came into force, would retire on 15th March, 1986. Some of the Petitioner-teachers even though they had completed 58 years of age and should have retired on 15th March, 1986 have, however, continued in service pursuant to the orders of stay passed by this Court. They shall retire on 31st December, 1987. If they have rendered service, they shall be entitled to their salary. After this declaration was made by the High Court, certain employees who had retired at the age of 58 but were entitled to continue till attainment of 60 years, filed petitions in the High Court. The Appellant was one such employee. The grievance of the Appellant is that although the benefit was granted to other similarly situated by the High Court it was refused to him on the ground that he approached the High Court after a lapse of 41/2 years since his retirement. His submission is that he could approach the High Court only after this pronouncement was made on 22nd December, 1987. In fact, he approached the High Court on 19th January, 1988, i.e., within less than a month after this pronouncement. We think that the High Court was not right in refusing to grant benefit of the judgment to the Appellant. The aforesaid decision may be compared with the subsequent decisions of the two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court rendered in Jaswant Singh case (supra) and A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. case (supra). In Jaswant Singh, the question that arose before the Apex Court was whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same, and had collected their post-retirement benefits, could be given relief in the light of the subsequent decision delivered by the Apex Court in Harwinder Kumar case. The relevant portions of the judgment are found at paragraphs 6 and 12, which read, thus: (SCC pp. 468 and 470, paras 6 and 12) 6. The relevant portions of the judgment are found at paragraphs 6 and 12, which read, thus: (SCC pp. 468 and 470, paras 6 and 12) 6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim orders. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 12. The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the Defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. 4. The Apex Court on the facts and circumstances of that case held that the Respondents were guilty of delay and laches since they had acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. In A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court followed the principles laid down in Jaswant Singh and held that the benefit of a judgment is not extended to a case automatically, that while granting relief in a writ petition, the High Court is entitled to consider the fact situation obtaining in each case including the conduct of the Petitioner. In doing so, the court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the writ Petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and then wake up after the decision of the court. If it is found that the Appellant approached the court after a long delay, the same would disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. There is, thus, apparent conflict between the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Jaswant Singh and the judgments of two-Judge Bench in Jaswant Singh and A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. The doctrine of stare decisis or precedents envisages that judicial decisions have a binding force for the future. It is not, however, the whole judgment that is deemed to be so binding. A judgment is authoritative only as to that part of it, called ratio decidendi, which is considered to have been necessary for the decision of the actual issues between the litigants. The doctrine of stare decisis envisages that the lower courts are by bound by the decisions of the higher courts, and, thus, every court in India is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. This is what has been provided for in Article 141 of the Constitution, which says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. 5. To promote consistency and certainty in the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the ideal situation would be that the entire court should sit in all cases to decide questions law. 5. To promote consistency and certainty in the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the ideal situation would be that the entire court should sit in all cases to decide questions law. It is for this reason that the U.S. Supreme Court consisting of nine Judges sit as a whole to decide cases. But it is not feasible to do so in India owing to the volume of works coming before the Supreme Court. Thus, it became necessary for the Supreme Court to sit in benches of two, three or five Judges. A Constitution Bench consists of five or more Judges. It is, therefore, possible for different Division Benches to render inconsistent decisions on points of law from time-to-time. Therefore, to promote consistency and certainty in the development of law, a rule is followed that the statement of law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of equal or smaller number of Judges. Accordingly, a two-Judge Bench ought to follow the earlier decision of a three-Judge Bench. The law declared by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court is binding on another Division Bench of the same or smaller number of Judges, The decision of the Constitution Bench is, thus, binding on all smaller Benches. A three-Judge Bench decision cannot prevail over an earlier constitutional bench decision of a five-Judge on the ground of being a later decision. At this stage, it may also be noted that even the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is regarded as binding on all courts below it. While the term ratio decidendi of a decision is the principle of law formulated by the Judge for the purpose of deciding the problem before him, the term obiter dicta are "observations made by the Judge, but which are not essential for the decision reached. Obiter dicta may be observations upon the broader aspect of the law relating to the problem arising for decision; they may be answers to the hypothetical questions raised by the Judge or the counsel in the course of hearing or they may be observations upon social or other questions, prompted by the facts under consideration." (See M.P. Jain's Indian Constitutional Law, 5th edn., pp. 323-24) 6. 323-24) 6. Considering the fact that the two-Judge Bench in U.P. Jal Nigam has elaborately discussed the principles for extending (or denying) the benefit of a judgment to a similarly situated person in a later case, the question which then falls for consideration is whether the instant case is to be decided on the basis of the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Nand Kishore Nayak or not. In my judgment, the answer to this question will depend on when the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Nand Kishore Nayak case will amount to a law declared by the Apex Court. As noticed earlier, what is of essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations in the judgment. In S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 8 SCC 361 , it was clarified by the Apex Court that "a decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons, nor which proceeds on consideration of the issues" cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect under Article 141 of the constitution. The following observations are instructive: (SCC pp. 368-69, para 12) 12. Thirdly, as we have already indicated, in the present round of litigation, the decision in M. Varadaraja Pillai case was cited only as a precedent and not as res judicata. The issue ought to have been examined by the Full Bench in the light of Article 141 of the Constitution and not by applying the doctrine of merger. Article 141 speaks of declaration of law by the Supreme Court. For a declaration of law, there should be a speech, i.e., a speaking order. In Krishena Kumar v. Union of India this Court has held that the doctrine of precedents, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. R.M. Sahai, J (vide para 41) dealt with the issue in the light of the rule of sub-silentio. The question posed was can a decision of an appellate court be treated as a binding decision of the appellate court on a conclusion of law which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration or in other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? The question posed was can a decision of an appellate court be treated as a binding decision of the appellate court on a conclusion of law which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration or in other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? His Lordship held that the rule of sub-silentio is an exception to the rule of precedents. "A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind." A court is not bound by an earlier decision if it was rendered "without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority". A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons, nor which proceeds on consideration of the issues, cannot be deemed to be a law declared, to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. His Lordship quoted the observation from B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry "it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein". His Lordship tendered an advice of wisdom - "Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law.(SCC p. 163, para 41) 8. I have read and re-read the decision of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Nayak case to understand as to whether this decision can be deemed to be a law declared so as to have a binding effect upon this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In my opinion, with due respect, the decision therein cannot be said to be a conclusion on law as the particular point of law involved therein was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration: that particular point of law was apparently not perceived by the Apex Court or present to its mind. Moreover, the question whether the writ petitions therein were barred by the principles of acquiescence and/or waiver was also never at issue between the parties. Moreover, the question whether the writ petitions therein were barred by the principles of acquiescence and/or waiver was also never at issue between the parties. In other words, the question as to whether the benefit of a judgment can be automatically extended to similarly situated persons against the backdrop of the principles of acquiescence and/or waiver was not apparently raised or discussed in Nand Kishore Nayak. Any declaration or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded by any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Thus, in my considered view, the Petitioner in the instant case cannot derive any benefit from the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Nand Kishore Nayak. On the other hand, the two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Jaswant Singh followed in A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. clearly laid down the law governing the instant case. The Petitioner in this case chose to sleep over his rights for over six long years and had acquiesced in accepting his compulsory retirement and then preferred to file this file writ petition belatedly taking cue from the successful litigants who lost no time in filing those writ petition. In such circumstances, this Court of equity should be slow in entertaining stale claims. This Court cannot also be oblivious of the administrative inconvenience and the financial implications being caused by allowing the writ petition. Had the Petitioner like others challenged his compulsory retirement immediately, perhaps the Respondent authorities could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet their liability. By not asserting his rights, he has allowed time to pass and after a lapse of six years, he filed this writ petition claiming the benefit of the judgments passed in favor of those Petitioners who are demonstrably alert and vigilant: the Petitioner cannot claim parity. 9. In the view that I have taken, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed