JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed against the order of Registrar Co-operative, Societies, Bhopal passed in Case No. 19-17/99 passed on 14-05-2008. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant is a Primary Housing Co-operative Society whose respondent is a member. The Board of Director of the appellant society issued a show cause notice to the respondent on 19-8-1999 after the resolution of the Board on 02-08-1999 why the respondent be not expelled from its membership. Earlier an annual general meeting of the appellant society in its meeting held on 24-02-1997 had directed the Board to expel the respondent from the membership as there were number of irregularities committed and reported against him. Respondent sought some papers from the appellant society in his interim reply which according to the appellant were provided to him on 11-08-1999. However, the respondent on 16-08-1999 pointed out that he has not been supplied the relevant documents. The members of the Board of the appellant society was convened on 25-081999 in which the respondent was also informed to remain present if he left it necessary and since the respondent was not present, the Board of the appellant society in its meeting took the decision to expel the respondent from its membership. This decision was communicated to him on 27-08-1999 along with the refund of share money and other amounts deposited in the society. The appeal against this order was preferred by the respondent before the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal. The Registrar initially transferred the case to the Joint Registrar. However, when the matter came to Tribuanl, the Tribunal in its order in Revision No.687 /1999 dated 30-10-2000 directed the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal to hear the matter and pass an order himself. The Registrar has accordingly through the impugned order set aside the order of the appellant society expelling the respondent from its membership. Therefore this appeal. 3. Following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration of this appeal. 1. Whether the findings of Registrar Co-operative Societies are perverse? 2. Whether the Registrar has jurisdiction to hear the case? 3. Whether the delivery of judgment by the lower Court is belated and consequently bad in law. 4. Considered the rival contentions of both counsels. QUESTION NO.1 5. Following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration of this appeal. 1. Whether the findings of Registrar Co-operative Societies are perverse? 2. Whether the Registrar has jurisdiction to hear the case? 3. Whether the delivery of judgment by the lower Court is belated and consequently bad in law. 4. Considered the rival contentions of both counsels. QUESTION NO.1 5. Learned counsel for the appellant society Shri Sanjay Bajpai submitted that the Registrar has passed the order without deciding the application under Order 41 Rule 5. This contention as a matter of fact does not have any bearing on the finding of the Registrar for making it perverse as such. Since, the Registrar has passed the final order on the basis of the argument of the two sides submitted before him there was no case for him to pass any interim order whatsoever. It is also important to note that the case has been pending before the Registrar right from 30-09-1999 to 14-05-2008, which is more than nine years. There was no justification left for the Registrar to pass an interim order at such a belated stage. The paradigm 'justice delayed is just denied' well applicable in the case. Therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Registrar. It can further be noted that the interim order normally affects the appellant and in this case since the present appellant was the respondent, the virtual case for any interim order must have been sought and passed for him only. Therefore, this argument of the appellant is at all not tenable. QUESTION NO.2 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that decidedly when the Tribunal in its order dated 30-10-2000 directed the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal to hear the matter, only the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal enjoyed the powers at that juncture. However, subsequently, the powers have been delegated to the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gwalior. Therefore later on either the case should have been decided by the Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gwalior or Dy. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gwalior and the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal should not have passed any order and desisting himself from doing so he should have transferred the case to the Joint Registrar or the Deputy Registrar, Gwalior. 7. Therefore later on either the case should have been decided by the Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gwalior or Dy. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gwalior and the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal should not have passed any order and desisting himself from doing so he should have transferred the case to the Joint Registrar or the Deputy Registrar, Gwalior. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant himself admits that the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal came to hear the matter at the instance of the order of the Tribunal passed in Revision No.687/1999 dated 30-10-2000. There are as many as seven Registrars successively hearing this case one after another. While honouring this verdict of the Tribunal, no matter if the powers came to be delegated to the Deputy Registrar or Joint Registrar, Gwalior it did not debar the Registrar. The senior most officer of the hierarchy in the department, who was rightly under obligation of hearing the matter as directed by the Tribunal. The Registrar therefore in his wisdom and right earnest has passed the proper order which can at all no be challenged on the ground of either jurisdiction or authority. The Registrar is the Registrar of the Co-operatives in the State and his jurisdiction extend through out the State without any limitation. This question is also therefore goes in the favour of the respondent. QUESTION NO.3 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Joint Registrar after hearing two sides on 02-06-2007 has passed the final order in the case on 14-05-2008 which is after an expiry of eleven months from the date of the closure of the case. This according to him is highly objectionable and is in contravention of the judicial precedence as well as laid down principles and procedures by Hon'ble High Court as well as the Tribunal. Once the case is heard finally a proper order should be passed within 15 days of it. Learned counsel placed his reliance on following in this respected. (i). Revision No. 7511999 (Zila Shakari Kendriya Bank Mydt., Dhatia v. Chotelal passed on 10.08.2009. ii). Govind Madhav Tiwari v. Zilla Shakari Kendriya Bank Ltd. Guna, 2006 RN 191 iii). Ramjati Sharma v. M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal and others, 2008 RN 88 iv). W.A. No. 290/09, District Co-operative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd., v. Mukesh Kumar Shrivastava and others passed by Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior (DB). ii). Govind Madhav Tiwari v. Zilla Shakari Kendriya Bank Ltd. Guna, 2006 RN 191 iii). Ramjati Sharma v. M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal and others, 2008 RN 88 iv). W.A. No. 290/09, District Co-operative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd., v. Mukesh Kumar Shrivastava and others passed by Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior (DB). 9. It is obvious that the order has been passed after an inexplicable delay of 11 months which on the face of it appears to be disgusting and unsatisfactorily. Officers passing this judgment obviously did not take proper care and we express our displeasure at this attitude. However, this delay cannot affect the merits of the case and the finding recorded in the order. The reliance which the learned counsel for the appellant places on above cited judgment also do not provide us any scope for setting aside the order which has been passed after above said delay in it. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent from his side further argued that the learned counsel for the appellant has only taken up the matter before the Tribunal on technical grounds and he has at all not harboured on the merits of the case which go into the favour of the respondent only. Learned counsel submitted that as well as the notice and the order have been issued by the Secretary who was not authorized under the Byelaws as it is only the Chairman of the Society who issues such notice and can communicate. According to him the charges levelled against the respondent were at all not serious and they do not attract the provision of 19-C for expelling him from the membership of the society. His further submission was this that the respondent was not provided proper opportunity as he was neither given all the documents he was seeking nor he was given a personal hearing. 11. We first deal with the technical objection of the learned counsel for the respondent. Regarding the notice and the order issued by the Secretary of the Society and not by the Chairman we do not find any infirmity in the process as it is at the instance of the resolution of the Board of Directors that someone as Secretary has signed the notice and the order. Regarding the notice and the order issued by the Secretary of the Society and not by the Chairman we do not find any infirmity in the process as it is at the instance of the resolution of the Board of Directors that someone as Secretary has signed the notice and the order. Obviously, the notice and the reply of it received by the society was well placed before the Board of Directors and if the Board of Directors of the society did not find it proper it would not have relied on it. Regarding the opportunity to be provided to the respondent, the same objection is also not tenable. Respondent has been seeking one or the other documents time and again. He was communicated that he could appear before the Board on 25.8.1999, but he himself did not utilize this opportunity. 12. As regards the nature of the allegation, it seems to be necessary that all the relevant documents were provided to the respondent so that he could answer to the specific allegations about the cheques which were dishonored and about the non-members who were converted into members and share capital of the members, transferred to the non-members. One of the allegations was about the default in making payment to the society as development costs. It is important to examine this from the point of view of the provision which speaks about persistently making default in payment of his dues. It is difficult to apply this sub-clause in a case which is regarding the payment of development costs by a member of housing society. A member makes default by not paying a loan on a due date it can be categorized as persistent defaulter at least when there are three such occasions when the payment has not been made on the due date. Firstly, it is not a case of any loan advance to the respondent which went into the default, It was a case of development costs levied to a member to pay to the society. It is difficult for us therefore to conclude that this clause can justifiable be applied in the case of the respondent. 13. The respondent has further been expelled by the appellant society for making some statement in the Annual General Meeting and writing a letter to the Deputy Registrar. It is difficult for us therefore to conclude that this clause can justifiable be applied in the case of the respondent. 13. The respondent has further been expelled by the appellant society for making some statement in the Annual General Meeting and writing a letter to the Deputy Registrar. This according to the appellant society was a case 0 causing injury to the credit of the society'. The Annual General Meeting is the only and a right Forum available for a member after a lapse of 12 months to make his representation by raising his voice. If a member therefore takes some objection and even opposes some move it cannot be concluded to be an act causing injury to the credit of the society. Likewise when a member after having been not responded by the society makes a complaint to the Deputy Registrar, who is the registering and supervisory authority of the appellant society can also not be a case of any injury to be caused to the society. 14. The other allegation levelled against the respondent are in respect of his discharge of duties in the capacity of the earnest while Secretary of the appellant Society. It is quite strange to conclude that if the respondent failed to fulfill his obligation in the capacity of office bearer, how can be made liable for being expelled from the membership itself The respondent was afterwards not elected as Secretary and even if this eventual punishment not being sufficient he could further be proceeded against other provision, but that certainly does not require the appellant society to expel him from the membership of society. 15. We have in following judgment (Nandial Arora v. Deputy Registrar and others passed in SA No. 57/2009 dated 30-07-2009) have held that:- "It is to be noticed from the conditions laid down in the statue for expulsion that the same are quite stringent and an order to be passed in above respect has to be a cautious and considered one. Particularly expelling a member from a housing society requires the authority passing this order to be extra careful. A member who has built a house in a particular campus of a society if expelled cannot be expected to take away his immovable property alongwith him outside the campus. Particularly expelling a member from a housing society requires the authority passing this order to be extra careful. A member who has built a house in a particular campus of a society if expelled cannot be expected to take away his immovable property alongwith him outside the campus. Such expulsion would also mean that necessary services like clearing road, street, playground, education, insanitation, electricity and water supply can also get disrupted. The whole exercise will amount to be expelling a person from a community or caste as it used to be in ancient times in an undeveloped society. There are definitely many other courses if it is a case of misuse of an office by an individual as it appears to be in the present case. The DR has in his power therefore superseded the board of the society. Therefore expelling a member from the membership of society is acting quite harshly which is not the intention of the law. Therefore, this question also remains answered that the order has not been passed in the spirit and letter of law. " 16. The expulsion of a member from a society should invariably be an exceptional decision in exceptional circumstances. It could not be made a routine practice. In the present case as the Registrar in his impugned order has recorded that there are obvious coloring of prejudices of the successive office bearers of the appellant for expelling the respondent. This cannot be taken in good taste and proper appreciation of fair performance of a responsible body of a society. 17. As a conclusion of above, the appeal deserves to be disallowed and impugned order of the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal in Case No. 19-17/99 passed on 14-05-2008 being proper and appropriate is hereby confirmed. Parties to bear their own costs.