Judgment :- 1. This criminal appeal arises against the judgment dated 17.09.2003 made in S.C.No.75 of 2001 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dindigul. 2. The appellant was tried in Sessions Case No.75 of 2001 for offence under Section 307 I.P.C. At about 8.00 p.m. on 08.03.1999, the appellant scolded P.W.1 saying that he would do away with him and so saying, he caused cut injuries with a butcher's knife to the head of P.W.1, the right fore arm, right shoulder and right knee. 3. According to the prosecution, the occurrence had taken place in Moonranthal at about 7.30. p.m. on 08.03.1999, when P.Ws.1 to 3 were going about their business. P.W.2, the father of the injured, P.W.1, was the uncle of the accused. He questioned the accused about his poor conduct and behaviour. This angered the accused, who reacted in a derogatory manner leading to P.W.1 slapping him on his right cheek. The accused went away promising to do away with the lives of P.Ws 1 and 2. The accused, who was a butcher, returned with his butcher's knife at about 8.00 p.m., attacked P.W.1 and caused injuries as aforesaid. 4. Before the trial Court, the prosecution examined nine witnesses and marked exhibits 1 to 8 and two materials objects. On the side of the accused two witnesses were examined and three exhibits marked. On appreciation of the material before it, the Trial Court found the accused guilty. However, in the circumstances of the case, he was convicted not under Section 307 IPC, but under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default one year R.I. It is against such finding of conviction, the present appeal has been filed. The fine amount ordered by the Lower Court has been paid. 5. Heard Mr. M.Suri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.L.Murugan, learned Government Advocate(Crl. side) appearing for the respondent. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would state that there was a delay in registration of the FIR Ex.P1. According to the prosecution, the occurrence had taken place at 8.00 p.m. The police station was at a distance of 120 feet from the place of occurrence. According to the prosecution Ex.P1-FIR had been recorded by P.W.8 at 9.00 a.m. at hospital, which was, half a furlong away from the scene of occurrence. According to the prosecution, the occurrence had taken place at 8.00 p.m. The police station was at a distance of 120 feet from the place of occurrence. According to the prosecution Ex.P1-FIR had been recorded by P.W.8 at 9.00 a.m. at hospital, which was, half a furlong away from the scene of occurrence. Ex.P1 had reached the Court only the next day at about 1.20 p.m. Though P.Ws.2 and 3 were allegedly eyewitness to the occurrence and had not suffered any injury, they had not chosen to prefer a complaint before the police. In the circumstances, the learned counsel would submit that Ex.P1 was delayed, the out-come of deliberation and an after thought and as such the prosecution case ought not to be believed. 7. The next line of contention is that the accused has also sustained injuries. The prosecution has suppressed the accident register relating to the accused and the same had been marked as Ex.D3, the same having been produced along with the written statement submitted at the Section 313 Cr.P.C. stage. Original of Ex.D3 was called for by the Trial Court and the Lower Court has specified that Ex.D3 is a true copy thereof. There has been absolutely no explanation of the injuries suffered by the accused. The accused has been sent with a police memo to hospital as reflected in Ex.D3, the accident register. Neither had the police memo, been marked as exhibit nor had the police constable, who accompanied the accused to the hospital, been examined. The doctor, who admitted the accused in hospital neither had not been examined in Court nor had his statement been recorded by the Investigating Officer. In the above circumstances, the learned counsel would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh and others Vs. State of Bihar, 1976 SCC (Cri) 671. 8. Learned counsel next would submit that according to Ex.P1 FIR, the injured P.W.1 had been brought to hospital by P.Ws.2 and 3. This is falsified by Ex.P4, accident register of P.W.1 informing that he was brought to the hospital by his father-in-law. Even in evidence, P.W.1 had admitted that P.Ws. 2 and 3, came upon hearing him. Therefore, in the light of Ex.P4 reflecting the position that the injured P.W.1 had been brought to the hospital by his father-in-law, there was every possibility that P.Ws. Even in evidence, P.W.1 had admitted that P.Ws. 2 and 3, came upon hearing him. Therefore, in the light of Ex.P4 reflecting the position that the injured P.W.1 had been brought to the hospital by his father-in-law, there was every possibility that P.Ws. 2 and 3 were not witnesses to the occurrence. He would submit that P.W.2 in the course of cross examination had admitted to not seeing the occurrence, while P.W.3 in the course of cross examination has stated that he had seen the same after the first blow was inflicted. Other eye witnesses put up by the prosecution are P.Ws.4 and 5, who were servants of P.W.1. P.W.4 had admitted that his father earlier had worked at the banana stall of P.W.1 and P.W.5 had admitted having worked at the garden of P.W.1 for a period of a year. The learned counsel drew attention to the evidence of P.W.1 that the place of occurrence was a busy one. Learned counsel would state that the failure to examine any independent witness would seriously prejudice the prosecution case. Learned counsel would state that both the shirt of P.W.1 and the knife allegedly recovered from the accused had not been sent for chemical examination. In the circumstances, the learned counsel would submit that the accused necessary would be entitled to the benefit of doubt and ought to be acquitted. 9. Learned Government Advocate(Crl. side) would contend that the FIR in the case had been registered as early as 9.30 p.m. and that Ex.P1 FIR reached the court at 1.20 p.m. the next day. The accused who had been arrested at 6.00 a.m. on 09.03.1999 had been produced before the Court at 10.30 a.m. on such date as informed in Ex.D1. In Ex.D1, the Magistrate had noted that the accused informed of having suffered injuries at the hands of P.W.1 and that such injuries had been caused by use of a knife. The injuries suffered by the accused as reflected by Ex.D3, were merely abrasions and lacerations and non explanation there of would not in any manner affect the prosecution case. The learned Government Advocate would submit that the finding of the lower Court ought not be interfered with. 10. In the case of Lakshmi Singh and others Vs. The injuries suffered by the accused as reflected by Ex.D3, were merely abrasions and lacerations and non explanation there of would not in any manner affect the prosecution case. The learned Government Advocate would submit that the finding of the lower Court ought not be interfered with. 10. In the case of Lakshmi Singh and others Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1976 SCC (Cri) 671, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "In Puran Singh V. State of Punjab, which was also a murder case, this Court, while following an earlier case, observed as follows: [SCC p.53: SCC (Cri) P.621, para 20] In State of Gujarat Vs. Bai Fatima one of us (Untwalia, J.) speaking for the Court, observed as follows: [SCC p.13: SCC (Cri) p. 390, para 17] In a situation like this when the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the person of an accused, depending on the facts of each case, any of the three results may follow: 1. That the accused had inflicted the injuries on the members of the prosecution party in exercise of the right of self-defence. 2. It makes the prosecution version of the occurrence doubtful and the charge against the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 3. It does not affect the prosecution case at all. The facts of the present case clearly fall within the four corners of either of the first two principles laid down by this judgment. In the instant case, either the accused were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased and were protected by the right of private defence or that if the prosecution does not explain the injuries on the person of the deceased the entire prosecution case is doubtful and the genesis of the occurrence is shrouded in deep mystery, which is sufficient to demolish the entire prosecution case. It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstances from which the Court can draw the the following inferences: 1. that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; 2. that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; 2. that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; 3. that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one. In the instant case, when it is held, as it must be, that the appellant Dasrath Singh received serious injuries which have not been explained by the prosecution, then it will be difficult for the Court to rely on the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and 6, more particularly, when some of these witnesses have lied by stating that they did not see any injuries on the person of the accused. Thus neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court appears to have given due consideration to this important lacuna or infirmity appearing in the prosecution case. We must hasten to add that as held by this Court in State of Gujarat V. Bai Fatima (supra) there may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case. This principle would obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. The present, however, is certainly not such a case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution case on unconvincing premises." 11. The present, however, is certainly not such a case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution case on unconvincing premises." 11. In the instant case we find that the nature of the injuries suffered by the accused as reflected in D3, are merely abrasions and lacerations on the left knee joint, right leg and right hand and right elbow apart from a lacerated injury on the right cheek. 12. As regards the contention of delay in registering the FIR, it may be stated that the prosecution party would be more intent on securing treatment to the injured P.W.1, who had suffered serious injuries. The fact that they had not gone to the police station even though the same was close by cannot be made much of. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Advocate(Crl. side) the very accident register of the accused inform the crime No. of the case. The accident register shows that the Doctor had treated the accused at 10.30 a.m on 09.03.1999 and the prosecution case was that the accused was arrested at 6.00 a.m. on the same day. In the circumstances, the delay of few hours in Ex.P1 FIR reaching the Court cannot be complained of. Even the evidence of DW1 was that he had given the accused first aid and asked him to go over to the Government Hospital. Apparently, to avoid arrest, the appellant has not done so. 13. It might be that the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 makes doubtful their claim of being eyewitnesses to the occurrence. It is also show that P.Ws.4 and 5 are interested witnesses. Even so, we have the evidence of P.W.1, who speaks clearly and categorically of the injuries suffered by him at the hands of the accused. This finds corroboration in the stand of the accused that he suffered injuries at the hands of P.W.1. The nature of injuries suffered by the accused and the seat thereof viz., abrasions and lacerations to the hands, elbow, and knee joint, would reflect a scuffle between the accused and P.W.1. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the injuries suffered by P.W.1 were caused by the accused and by use of butchers knife, which has been recovered from him. The non forwarding of P.W.1's shirt and the knife for chemical examination, really, is not material. 14. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the injuries suffered by P.W.1 were caused by the accused and by use of butchers knife, which has been recovered from him. The non forwarding of P.W.1's shirt and the knife for chemical examination, really, is not material. 14. The nature of injuries suffered and the evidence of doctor P.W.7, who testified to injuries to shoulder, right hand, right knee being cut injuries and that to the right forearm having resulted in a fracture, would make out a case for conviction under Section 326 IPC. We however, find that the entire episode has taken place as the direct result of a slap rendered to the accused by P.W.1. While upholding the conviction, considering the passage of time, the occurrence having taken place on 18.03.1999, that we are now 11 years away from the date of occurrence, that the appellant had already been in custody for a period of 65 days and that it is not in dispute that the accused has no other case against his name, this Court would consider inappropriate any further incarceration of the accused. Further it would be just and proper that while reducing the period of sentence to that already under gone by the accused, this Court require the appellant to pay an additional fine of Rs.17,500/-which shall be paid over to P.W.1 in keeping with Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. within a period of two months from today. 15. This criminal appeal is disposed of accordingly.