ORDER The 1st petitioner-Trust was created under a deed, dated 16.05.1974, by four trustees, by name, Juloori Veereshalingam, his son-Juloori Nagaraja Rao, Chama Kasinath-2nd petitioner herein, and Batchu Srinivas Rao-4th respondent herein. One of the objects of the Trust was to construct a community hall for the benefit of the economically weaker sections. It acquired properties, over a period of time. Juloori Veereshalingam and Nagaraja Rao died in the year 1979 and 1987, respectively. Juloori Vajramma, wife of Veereshalingam, was made as trustee. However, she is said to have resigned later. A big community hall has been constructed by the Trust at Kharkana, Secunderabad. 2. In the recent past, the Trust was reconstructed and petitioners 3 and 4, who are sons of the 2nd respondent, were inducted as trustees. Respondents 1 and 2, who are the sons of late Juloori Nagaraja Rao, one of the deceased trustees, and the 3rd respondent, who is said to be a Social Worker, presented a plaint in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, under Section 92 of C.P.C., for the relief of declaration, to the effect that the existing trustees are disqualified from being continued as trustees; a decree for rendition of accounts and to frame a scheme for administration of the Trust, as per its objects. It was also urged that the development agreement entered into in relation to the property held by the Trust, be declared as not binding on the trustees and the general public, and that a perpetual injunction restraining the respondents therein from interfering with the affairs of the Trust, be granted. Respondents 1 to 3 filed I.A.No.1623 of 2008, seeking permission to file the suit. The trial Court issued notices to the petitioners herein and respondents 4 to 10. The matter was mainly contested by the petitioners herein. On a consideration of the arguments advanced by both the parties, the trial Court allowed the LA., through order, dated 30.09.2008. The same is challenged in this revision. 3. Sri T. Surya Satish, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the trial Court did not take into account, the parameters of Section 92 CP.C, in the context of granting leave. He contends that the Trust is functioning strictly in accordance with the terms of the trust deed and the suit was filed, only with a view to settle the personal scores. He contends that the Trust is functioning strictly in accordance with the terms of the trust deed and the suit was filed, only with a view to settle the personal scores. He submits that the petitioners were responsible in mobilizing the funds and the development agreement was brought into existence, only with a view to advance the objectives of the Trust. Learned counsel contends that the leave granted in favour of respondents 1 to 3 is defective, contrary to law and untenable. 4. Sri R.A. Achuthanand, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, on the other hand, submits that the trial Court considered the pleadings in detail and arrived at a conclusion that his clients deserve to be granted leave to file the suit. He contends that the various submissions made by the petitioners herein on merits, need to be gone into, in detail, in the suit, on the basis of the evidence that may be adduced by the parties. 5. Section 92 CP.C provides for a typical category of suits, which are not adversarial in nature. The emphasis objective is to protect the public properties and Trusts. With a view to ensure that no frivolous litigation is instituted in respect of public trusts, the Section mandates that the leave of the Court is necessary, before the suit is registered. It is in this context that respondents 1 to 3 filed the I.A. 6. The parameters that need to be taken into account, while granting leave, are laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time. The latest of them is Vidyodayn Trust v. Mohan Prasad and others (1) 2008 (4) SCJ 529 = 25 (2008) 4 SCC 115 = 2009 (1) ALT 29.2 (ON SC). The gist of the judgment is that, while the leave to file a suit under Section 92 C.P.C., cannot be granted for the asking of it, the enquiry that is to be undertaken in such matters should not have any shadow on the future adjudication that may take place in the suit. Another aspect is that, it is only a person, who is genuiniely interested in the trust and who is able to point out a semblance of cause of action, that can institute the suit and not everybody, or for anything, whatever. 7. Another aspect is that, it is only a person, who is genuiniely interested in the trust and who is able to point out a semblance of cause of action, that can institute the suit and not everybody, or for anything, whatever. 7. In the instant case, respondents 1 and 2 are none other than the sons of one deceased trustee and grand children of another. Even if the claim or interest of the 3rd respondent is to be ignored, the effort made by respondents 1 and 2 cannot be said to be without basis. The emphasis and endeavour of respondents 1 to 3 is only to ensure that the objects of the trust are honoured and implemented in their letter and spirit. It is not in dispute that in the recent past, substantial change, as to the nature of the properties held by the Trust, has taken place. Whether or not that such a change was in consonance with the terms and objects of the Trust, is a matter, that needs to be considered in the suit itself. However, it cannot be said that respondents 1 to 3 did not have any basis to move the Court. It is ultimately for the parties to adduce evidence, in support of their respective contentions, and for the Court to arrive at the conclusions, on the basis of the evidence on record. 8. The trial Court has maintained a decent balance between the examination of the case of respondents 1 to 3 for grant of leave, on the one hand, and desisting from expressing final or firm view on the merits of the matter, on the other hand. It could not have gone into more deep, than what it has done. This Court is of the view that the order under revision does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 9. Hence, the CR.P. is dismissed. It is, however, made clear that any view expressed or observation made by the trial Court shall not be treated as a finding on the merits, in the suit. 10. No progress has taken place in the suit for the past two years, on account of the pendency of the C.R.P. before this Court. The same needs to be compensated by hastening the disposal of the suit. 10. No progress has taken place in the suit for the past two years, on account of the pendency of the C.R.P. before this Court. The same needs to be compensated by hastening the disposal of the suit. Learned Chief Judge shall endeavour to dispose of the suit as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 11. There shall be no order as to costs.