ORDER This criminal revision is directed against the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.17 of 2004 dated 15.10.2004 passed by the VII Additional Sessions Judge (Fast track Court), Nizamabad at Bodhan, whereby and whereunder the learned Assistant Sessions Judge confirmed the judgment dated 10.3.2004 passed in CC No.457 of 2002 by the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Bodhan, convicting the petitioner herein for the offence punishable under Sections 304-A, 337 IPC but sentencing him only for the first offence to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.3,000/- and in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for three months. The petitioner herein will be referred to as accused for the sake of convenience. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows: The accused was driving APSRTC bus bearing registration No. Appellant 10 Z 3008 from Banswada side to Nizamabad on 13.8.2002 at about 08:25 a.m. At that time, one Bhukya Rajesh @ Katroth Rajesh (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) and one Kunsoth Rajesh (PW7) were going to Bharath Vidyaniketan School at Mosra Village on a cycle. Kunsoth Rajesh was the pillion rider and the deceased was pedaling the cycle. It is alleged that the accused had driven the bus in rash and negligent manner and dashed against the cycle as a result of which, both the boys on the cycle sustained injuries and while they were on the midway to hospital, Bhukya Rajesh succumbed to the injuries. The father of the deceased - Bhukya Mohan, after coming to know about the death of his son in the accident, lodged complaint in EX.P1 basing upon which, PW8 - Sub The Sub-Inspector had also visited the scene of offence, examined the material witnesses, conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of mediators, drawn a rough sketch of the scene of offence in Ex.P5 and after obtaining reports from the Motor Vehicle Inspector and Post-mortem Certificate, filed charge-sheet. 3. Since the accused denied the charges levelled against him, the prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined PWs.1 to 5 and marked Exs.P 1 to P 11. None were examined on behalf of the accused and no documents were marked. 4. Since the father of the deceased who lodged the complaint died, his wife Bukya Santha examined herself as PW1. None were examined on behalf of the accused and no documents were marked. 4. Since the father of the deceased who lodged the complaint died, his wife Bukya Santha examined herself as PW1. PW2 - Bukya Muni is the elder brother of the father of the deceased. He was examined for the purpose of identifying the signatures of his brother in EX.P1. PW 3 Banoth Barath is aged about 12 years when he was examined by the Court on 6.11.2003. He deposed that the deceased is his cousin and that on the date of accident, at about 08:30 a.m., he and another boy were going to school on his cycle while the deceased and another - Kunsoth Rajesh were ahead of them on another cycle. According to him, when they reached near the school at Mosra Village, an APSRTC bus came at high speed from Banswada side and dashed against the cycle on which the deceased was travelling and that the accused is the driver of the said bus. PW4 - Banoth Daramsingh is the classmate of the deceased. He was aged about 15 years at the date of his examination. According to him, the accused had driven the bus in a high speed and dashed against the cycle on which the deceased was travelling and that after the incident, the accused stopped the bus at a distance and came to the place where the injured was lying, observed the injured and proclaimed that the injured would not die and then went on a scooter. PW5 - Bojja Sayagoud and PW6 - Dr. Basa Rajkumar whom the prosecution cited as an eye-witnesses to the accident, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. PW7 - Kunsoth Rajesh deposed- that he was a pillion rider of the cycle of the deceased. According to him, at about 08:30 a.m., when they reached the school at Mosra Village, an APSRTC bus, being driven by the accused, came at a high speed and dashed against their cycle as a result of which, the deceased and himself sustained injuries. It is also his case that immediately after the incident, he fell unconscious at about 10:30 a.m. and gained conscious only in the hospital. PW8 - B. Balaji is the Sub Inspector of police who investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. 5. It is also his case that immediately after the incident, he fell unconscious at about 10:30 a.m. and gained conscious only in the hospital. PW8 - B. Balaji is the Sub Inspector of police who investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. 5. The trial Court, believing the prosecution evidence, convicted the accused and the same has been confirmed by the lower appellate Court challenging which, the present revision has been filed. 6. Smt. Vasundhara Reddy, learned Counsel representing Sri C. Praveen Kumar Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Investigating Officer neither seized any documents nor examined the Depot Manager or Traffic Controller, APSRTC, to establish that the accused was driving the bus which involved in the accident at the relevant time. Her specific submission is that it was obligatory on the part of the Investigating Officer to seize the Trip Sheet, Statistical Record, or to examine any other witness who had acquaintance with the accused to prove that the accused had driven the bus at the relevant point of time Her main submission is that though PWs.3 and 4 claims to have identified the accused as the driver of the bus involved in the accident, admittedly, they had no prior acquaintance with the accused and that no Test Identification Parade has been conducted. It is also her submission that mere driving of the bus at a high speed will not constitute offence punishable under Sections 304-A, 337, 338 IPC, but the prosecution must prove that the accused had driven the bus in a rash and negligent manner. It is also her submission that the road was under up gradation at the place of accident and there was no possibility for the accused to drive the bus at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner. It is also her submission that the mediators who were present at the time of preparation of scene of offence - Panchanama and drawing of rough sketch, have not been examined. It is also her submission that though there is evidence of Investigating Officer with regard to the scene of offence, the evidence of panch witnesses is necessary. 7. It is also her submission that the mediators who were present at the time of preparation of scene of offence - Panchanama and drawing of rough sketch, have not been examined. It is also her submission that though there is evidence of Investigating Officer with regard to the scene of offence, the evidence of panch witnesses is necessary. 7. It is also submitted by her that the evidence of PW7 cannot be believed because, admittedly, PW7 became unconscious immediately after the occurrence of accident and that he did not state before the police that he could identify the driver of the bus. It is also her submission that when PW7 categorically admitted that he had not seen the accused at the time of accident, his evidence is not helpful to the prosecution. It is also her submission that PW4 has given different versions and his version before the Court that the accused after stopping the bus came to the place of accident and observed the injured and proclaimed that the injured would not die and then went on a scooter, was not stated -by him before the police. Admittedly, PW4 also did not see the accused prior to the accident. Therefore, the improved version of PW4 cannot be accepted. With regard to the evidence of PW3, learned Counsel submitted that PW3 is a child witness and that the accident occurred on 13.8.2002 whereas PW3 was examined on 6.11.2003 and that he was aged between 10 to 11 years at the date of accident and as such, he is a child witness. It is also her submission that norn1ally, child witness can be easily influenced and tutored and, therefore, no conviction can be placed basing on the evidence of child witness unless and until such evidence is corroborated by any other evidence of an independent witness. It is also her submission that according to PW3, he has seen the accused from a distance of 10 to 20 yards while running away after getting down from the bus towards Nizamabad side and that he has not given the descriptive features of the accused to the police when he was examined and if these two circumstances were considered, it is clear that PW3 also did not see the accused at the time of accident and his evidence cannot be relied upon. Learned Counsel, in support of her contentions, relied upon a case between Surnvu Parshaiah v.State of A.P., 2005 (2) ALD (Crl.) 806 (AP) = 2006 Cri. LJ 824. 8. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the state vehemently argued that there cannot be re-appreciation of evidence and that admitted facts need not be proved. According to him, the Counsel for the accused in the trial Court reported no objection for marking the inquest report, Postmortem Certificate, scene of offence - Panchanama, Wound Certificate and Motor Vehicle Inspector's report and since the documents have been marked under Section 294 Cr.P.C., the accused now cannot dispute the contents of those documents. His main submission is that once the document has been admitted, it need not be proved. It is also his submission that PW s.3 and 4 are the eye-witnesses to the accident and that PW3 was on the same cycle which was being pedaled by the deceased and that PW3 was injured and that PW4 was also following on another cycle behind the cycle on which the deceased was travelling and that they are truthful witness and their evidence is reliable and merely because PW3 is a child witness, his evidence cannot be brushed aside and thrown away. It is also his submission that if once the eyewitness had ample opportunity to see the accused at the scene of offence and when they have identified the accused before the Court, there is no need to hold Test Identification Parade. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the judgments in cases between Simon v. State of Kamataka, 2004 (1) ALD (Crl.) 467 (SC) = AIR 2004 SC 2775 , Visweswaran v. State rep. by SDM, 2003 Cri. LJ 2548 and Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1958 SC 350 . 9. Having considered the above rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration in this revision is (1) whether there is any need to hold Test Identification Parade in the circumstances of the case; (2) whether the prosecution had proved the documents which have been marked by the concerned; and (3) whether the evidence of PWs.3, 4 and 7 can be relied upon for convicting the accused. Point No.1 10. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, in support of his contentions, relied on Visweswaran's case (supra). Point No.1 10. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, in support of his contentions, relied on Visweswaran's case (supra). In that case, the Apex Court observed as follows: "The identification of the accused either in test identification parade or in Court is not a sine qua non in every case if from the circumstances the guilt is otherwise established. Many a times, crimes are committed under cover of darkness when none is able to identify the accused. The commission of crime can be proved also by circumstantial evidence. In the present case, there are clinching circumstances unerringly pointing out the accusing finger towards the appellant beyond any reasonably doubt. However, the Apex Court observed that it is unfortunate that despite the aforesaid facts, the test identification parade was not held." 11. Basing on the other circumstantial evidence, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court upheld the conviction in that case. Para 12 of the judgment is relevant and may be useful for who deal with the criminal cases in appreciating the evidence. It reads as follows: "12. Before we notice the circumstances proving the case against the appellant and establishing his identity beyond reasonable doubt, it has to be borne in mind that approach required to be adopted by Courts in such cases has to be different. The cases are required to be dealt with utmost sensitivity, Courts have to show greater responsibility when trying an accused on charge of rape. In such cases, the broader probabilities are required to be examined and the Courts are not to get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies which are not of substantial character. The evidence is required to be appreciated having regard to the background of the entire case and not in isolation. The ground realities are to be kept in view. It is also required to be kept in view that every defective investigation need not necessarily result in the acquittal. In defective investigation, the only requirement is of extra caution by Courts while evaluating evidence. It would not be just to acquit the accused solely as a result of defective investigation. Any deficiency or irregularity in investigation need not necessarily lead to rejection of the case of prosecution when it is otherwise proved." 12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on Kantha Prashad's case (supra). It would not be just to acquit the accused solely as a result of defective investigation. Any deficiency or irregularity in investigation need not necessarily lead to rejection of the case of prosecution when it is otherwise proved." 12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on Kantha Prashad's case (supra). In that case, holding that' the appellants were known to the police officials who had deposed against the appellants, the Apex Court upheld the conviction. However, the Apex Court observed as follows: "It would no doubt have been prudent to hold a test identification parade with respect to witnesses who did not know the accused before the occurrence, but failure to hold such a parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. The weight to be attached to such identification would be a matter for the Courts of fact and it is not for this Court to reassess the evidence unless exceptional grounds were established necessitating such a course." 13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor had also relied on Simon's case (supra). In that case, the Apex Court observed as follows: "Whether the identification of an accused for the first time in Court in absence of any test identification parade can be made the basis of the conviction depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down." 14. It was further observed as follows: "We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that evidence of mere identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of prior test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in Court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the Courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration." 15. The Apex Court also observed as follows: "With reference to PWs.63, 65 and 66 and other similar witnesses who have deposed to have seen the appellants at the place of occurrence, it was contended that basically the principles that the accused were unknown to these witnesses shall apply and not that they had known and seen the accused at the place of occurrence." 16. It was further held as follows: "We have no hesitation in accepting the contention that if the conviction was based on the testimony of PWs.63, 65 and 66 and other such witnesses who saw the accused for the first time on date of occurrence, it would have required corroboration" 17. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court, in the above referred case, had relied upon the evidence of PW97 who had seen the accused persons on earlier occasions as well whereas in the present case, conviction of the appellant is not based on the testimony of any witnesses but is based only on the testimony of PW7, who had categorically deposed that he had seen the accused on earlier occasion as well. 18. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court, while discussing the judgments in case between State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha, (1992) 3 SCC 700 , observed as follows: "it would be extremely risky to place implicit reliance on identification made for the first time in Court after a long lapse of time. But it has to be kept in mind that this principle . But it has to be kept in mind that this principle . will apply to case of total strangers" Thus, in the above referred cases, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that by the very nature, the Test Identification Parade of the accused for the first time in Court is a weak piece of evidence and cannot be made as basis for conviction wherein the case the witnesses are total strangers to the accused. 19. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances: For example, in case where the accused has committed rape on a victim and where the victim had ample opportunity to observe the accused closely, there are circumstances that even without holding Test Identification Parade, the evidence of such witness, if inspiring confidence, can be relied upon. For example, in a case of dacoity, robbery or in case of a murder, where the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the physical features of the accused and where there was sufficient light, the evidence of such witnesses can be relied upon. What is to be seen is whether the witnesses had an ample opportunity to get the impressions of the accused imprinted in their mind. Wherein a case there was no opportunity for the witnesses to see the accused and he had only the opportunity of getting a fleeting glimpse of the accused from a distance and that too when the accused was running away, then it may be difficult to accept the evidence of such a witness. What is to be seen is whether the witnesses had given descriptive particulars of the accused in their earlier statements before the police. Whether they had stated in their earlier statements under all the circumstances they were able to identify the accused and from the record if it appears that the witnesses had categorically stated on the earlier occasion before the police that they can identify the accused and as a mark of guarantee if they had narrated the physical features of accused to the police in their statements, then if the witness identify the accused, may be for the first time in Court, the Court may be justified in accepting the evidence of such witness. Therefore, what is required is that the Court has to consider the facts and circumstances of each case separately and should come to definite conclusion whether the witness had an ample opportunity to see the physical features of the accused or not. 20. It is settled legal position that if the accused is already known to the identified witnesses, there is no need to hold Test Identification Parade. The evidence of witnesses also looses importance if the accused have already been shown to the witnesses before their examination in the Court. It is also settled legal position that the Test Identification Parade should be held at the earliest possible opportunity. Point No.2 21. Now, let us see whether the contents of the documents, i.e., scene of observation - Panchanama, Rough Sketch of scene of offence, Motor Vehicle Inspector's report etc., are dependable or not. 22. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the judgment of this Court in Suruvu Parshaiah's case (supra), in which, it was held that "the inference drawn by the trial Court basing on the damage to the jeep is not sound and correct." In that case, EX.P20 is the observation panchanama. Relevant observations 'of this Court in that case are as follows: "Obviously the trial Court appears to have perused the contents of the scene of offence panchnama Ex.P20 to come to the conclusion that the bus went to the right side of the road and hit the jeep. The contents of panchanama Ex.P20 are not proved. The trial Court failed to realize that the scene of offence panchanama is not substantive evidence and without there being evidence in Court the contents of panchanama cannot be relied upon and that the contents can be used only to corroborate the oral testimony given in the Court." 23. In that case, the only panch witnesses examined did not state anything about the scene of offence panchanama. Even the Investigating Officer did not speak about the contents of scene of offence panchanama in Ex. P19. He did not state anything except saying that he prepared the panchanama. In the above circumstances, it was observed that "it is not at all open for the trial Court to peruse the contents of observation panchanama and to take the contents of panchanama as corroboration to the oral testimony". 24. P19. He did not state anything except saying that he prepared the panchanama. In the above circumstances, it was observed that "it is not at all open for the trial Court to peruse the contents of observation panchanama and to take the contents of panchanama as corroboration to the oral testimony". 24. Learned Counsel representing the petitioner submitted that mere marking of panchanama is not sufficient and the contents of panchanama are to be brought on record through the mediators or through the Investigating Officer and in the absence of any oral evidence with regard to the contents of panchanama and scene of observation Mahazar etc., no reliance can be placed on the contents of the said documents. 25. It is true that in the above referred decision, this Court held that mere marking of panchanama is not sufficient and the contents of panchanama shall be spoken to by the witnesses in the presence of accused to enable him to be cross-examined and then only the Court can place reliance on the contents of panchanama. 26. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the documents have been admitted by the accused as the Counsel for the accused in the trial Court reported no objection for marking those documents as a result of which, the documents were marked by the concerned. In the above circumstances, no formal' proof of such documents is required under Section 294 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 27. Section 294 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, reads as follows: 294. No formal proof of certain documents-(1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved. 28. In case between Erlapalli Prakasham v. State of A.P., 2002 (1) ALD (Crl.) 621 (AP) = 2002 (2) ALT (Crl.) 4 (AP), it was held as follows: "It is clear on Section 294 Cr.P.C. that the documents have to be filed with a list before the Court either by the prosecution or by the accused and the Pleader for prosecution or the accused has to be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. When the genuineness is not disputed, such a document maybe read in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed. But the Court is given power to insist upon proof of signature in certain contingencies. The contingencies for insisting on proof has been left to the discretion of the Court. Unfortunately, though this section has been introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Form under which the list of documents have to be mentioned is not prescribed by the State Government till now. This is the only provision which empowers the Court to dispense with the formal proof of al certain documents before admitting them. The Court has to adhere to the provisions of Section 294 Cr.P.C. and mark the documents. The question of marking the documents by consent does not at all arise under the Criminal Procedure Code, since the valuable right of the accused will be taken away." "Both the Courts below have failed to look at the matter in right perspective and proper angle. The marking of the Postmortem Report by consent is against law. If that is discarded, the death of the person and the cause of death is not proved as per law. That shows that the offence under Section 304-A IPC is not proved in this case as contemplated under law." 29. The marking of the Postmortem Report by consent is against law. If that is discarded, the death of the person and the cause of death is not proved as per law. That shows that the offence under Section 304-A IPC is not proved in this case as contemplated under law." 29. In case between Chinthala Veerabhadra Rao v. State of A.P., 2008 (2) ALD (Crl.) 207 = 2008 (3) ALT (Crl.) 1 (DB) (AP), the Division Bench of High Court of A.P. observed that when a document is admitted as evidence under Section 294(1) Cr.P.C. and no objection is taken as to the admission of the document, examination of the Doctor is not required and since the Postmortem report was marked by the concerned in that case, it was observed that it is not necessary to examine the Doctor to prove the contents of Ex.P10. 30. Sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. Sub-section (2) of Section 294 Cr.P.C. is important. It shows that the list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. However, if the correctness or genuineness of documents is not disputed and if they are marked as per the procedure prescribed under Section 294(1) Cr.P.C., it can be read as evidence. 31. The learned trial Judge observed that the inquest report, the Post-mortem Report, Scene of offence - Panchanama, Medical Certificate and the Motor Vehicle Inspector's Report are marked with the consent of the defense Counsel under Section 294 Cr.P.C. as the Counsel for the accused reported no objection for marking the said documents. However, it is settled law that the statements of witnesses and remarks in maps of place of occurrence are not on the basis of the statements during investigation are hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. For example, an occurrence occurred at a particular place and marking a place on the basis of statement given by the witness {Refer Tori Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 399 }. 32. 32. The word 'fact' has been defined under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as follows: "Fact" means and include- (1) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. (a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place, is a fact. (b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact. (c) That a man said certain words, is a fact (d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith, or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a pal1icular sensation, is a fact. (e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact. 33. When the Investigating Officer visited the scene of offence and found certain material objects at the scene of offence as if seen them personally, it can be said that he prepared a map having saw something. For example, any weapon found at the scene of offence, blood found at the scene of offence, a vehicle stopped at a particular place in a particular position etc., can be said to be the facts which were actually seen by the Investigating Officer. If the Investigating Officer put a mark in the rough sketch of the scene of offence on the basis of the statements made to him by the witnesses, the same is inadmissible in view of the provisions of Section 162 Cr.P.C. {(Refer Gabbu and others v. State of M.P., 2004 Crl. LJ 2001}. Therefore, when the presence of an expert or doctor cannot be secured, the prosecution may file the list of documents and call upon the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the same under Section 294 Cr.P.C However, when the witness himself it examined by the Court, it is obligatory or the part of the witness to speak about the contents of those documents. 34. In this case, though the Investigating Officer has been examined as PW8, his evidence shows that he visited the scene of offence and exan1ined the witnesses recorded their statements, held inquest Panchanama and observed the scene of offence and prepared EX.P4 - Panchanam and Ex.P5 - rough sketch. 34. In this case, though the Investigating Officer has been examined as PW8, his evidence shows that he visited the scene of offence and exan1ined the witnesses recorded their statements, held inquest Panchanama and observed the scene of offence and prepared EX.P4 - Panchanam and Ex.P5 - rough sketch. When the Investigating Officer himself has beer examined, he could have spoken about the contents of scene of offence panchanam since he had prepared the same and specifically ought to have deposed the distance of the bus from the place of accident etc. 35. It is most unfortunate that most of the Investigating Officers make investigation in a casual manner. In most of the cases, particularly in accident cases, the drivers will be strangers to the witnesses and the injured witnesses. Therefore, Investigating Officers must be careful. Normally, the vehicle involved in the accident will be present at the scene of offence. Thus, Investigating Officers must try to seize all the necessary documents which connect the accused with the crime like Trip Sheet, driving license or any other documents which reveal the identity of the accused. In case of APSRTC bus or even a private bus, the police must seize the Statistical Report and other documents, if any, available with the conductor or in the cabin to connect the driver of the bus with the crime. Similarly, wherein a case the witnesses claim that they can identify the driver of the bus, then the Investigating Officer must have some patience and record the physical features of the accused as narrated by the witnesses. If at all the accused had left any of his personal belongings at the scene of offence or in the bus, then those material objects should be collected so that they establish the identity of the accused. Wherein a case a bus is involved in accident, nom1ally besides injured persons or the other witnesses who are available at the scene• of offence, passengers and the crew of the bus will be available. The examination of the conductor of the bus or the cleaner of the bus or the passengers of the bus will certainly establish the identity of the driver of the bus. It is unfortunate that in most of the cases, the Investigating Officers do not follow such procedure. The examination of the conductor of the bus or the cleaner of the bus or the passengers of the bus will certainly establish the identity of the driver of the bus. It is unfortunate that in most of the cases, the Investigating Officers do not follow such procedure. In some cases wherein driver of the vehicle had in fact rendered some help to the injured persons or even if he is available at the scene of offence, for the best reasons best known to the police officers, do not show the arrest of the accused and thereby, presence of the accused immediately at the scene of offence cannot be established. Be that as it may, in the instant case, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court referred supra, since the documents were marked by the concerned, they can be received as evidence and can be looked into. Point No.3 36. Now, let us examine whether the evidence of PWs.3, 4 and 7 can be relied upon for convicting the accused. As regards the evidence of PW7, he claims to be the injured witness. According to him, he was a pillion rider of the cycle being pedaled by the deceased. According to him it was about 08:30 a.m. when they reached near their school at Mosra Village when the bus came at a high speed from Banswada side and on seeing the same, they got down from the road but the bus driver dashed against their cycle as a result of which, both of them fell down and sustained injuries. He had specifically deposed that immediately after the accident, he fell unconscious and regained conscious at 10:30 a.m. at hospital in Mosra Village. He had also deposed that he had not seen the bus driver when it was coming before hitting their cycle of course, he claims that he had seen the accused after the accident. But in the cross-examination, he had specifically deposed that he has not seen the accused as driver of the bus at the time of accident. Moreover, it was suggested to him that he did not state before the police that he had seen the driver of the bus and that he can identify him. But in the cross-examination, he had specifically deposed that he has not seen the accused as driver of the bus at the time of accident. Moreover, it was suggested to him that he did not state before the police that he had seen the driver of the bus and that he can identify him. Since PW7 had categorically stated that he has not seen the accused as the driver of bus at the time of accident and he became unconscious immediately after the accident, the probability of his seeing the accused after the accident becomes remote. Therefore, it appears that the evidence of PW7 cannot be taken as basis to convict the accused. 37. Coming to the evidence of PW4, it has to be seen that his case is that after the accident, the accused came to the place of accident, observed the injured and stated that the injured would not die and went away on a scooter after lifting the injured. In the cross-examination, he had admitted that he has not stated before the police that the accused came to the place of the accident by getting down from the bus and proclaimed that the injured would not die. According to him, he did not see the accused prior to the accident. It has to be seen that it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused came to the place where the injured was lying after the accident. The evidence of PWs3 and 7 shows that the accused ran away immediately after the accident by getting down from the bus. Therefore, the evidence of PW4 is not consistent with the evidence of PWs3 and 7. As per his own admission, he has given an improved version. Therefore, it cannot be said that PW 4 is the only reliable witness. 38. Coming to the evidence of PW3, it is clear that he is a child witness. His case is that he had seen the accused from a distance of 10 to 20 yards while the accused was running away after getting down from the bus towards Nizamabad side. He had admitted that he has not described the physical features of the accused to the police when he was examined by the police. His case is that he had seen the accused from a distance of 10 to 20 yards while the accused was running away after getting down from the bus towards Nizamabad side. He had admitted that he has not described the physical features of the accused to the police when he was examined by the police. He claims that he had seen the accused on earlier occasion, i.e., ten to twenty days prior to the accident while they were travelling in the bus. It has to be seen that it is not the case of PW4 or PW7 that they had seen the accused driving the bus on earlier occasion. PW3, at the first instance, deposed that there are three speed breakers in front of Bharatiya Vidya Niketan School. Subsequently, he deposed that there are no speed-breakers. Thus, it is clear that his version is also not consistent with the versions of other witnesses. 39. Now it has to be seen that the witnesses had only a fleeting glimpse since the accused, immediately after getting down from the bus, ran away. As seen from the rough sketch, the bus was stopped more than 100 feet away from the scene of offence. If that is the case, it may be difficult to identify a person, particularly for a stranger, who is getting down from the 'bus and running away. After the accident, not only the accused, but the conductor of the bus and some other passengers might have got down from the bus. It is not the case of PWs.3, 4 or 7 that• either the passengers of the bus or the conductor of the bus or some others came near the scene of offence. The evidence of witness should be inspiring confidence. It must be natural, spontaneous and free from tutory. 40. The impact and admissibility of child witness had been dealt with in detail by the Apex Court in case between Sri Prithwish Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 1 Cal. L T 192 (He), wherein, it was held as follows: "We feel appropriate to advert to at first the submissions made at the Bar on the impact of the evidence of the child witness. L T 192 (He), wherein, it was held as follows: "We feel appropriate to advert to at first the submissions made at the Bar on the impact of the evidence of the child witness. In order to better appreciate the same we feel it would be expedient to reproduce the provisions of Section 118 of the Evidence Act which governs the field over the question of evidence of a child witness: 118. Who may testify. -All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or cry other cause of the same kind. Explanation.-A lunatic is not incompetent to testify, unless he is prevented by his lunacy from understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers to them." "At the out set we remind ourselves of Mohamed Sugal v. The Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 3, where the Privy Council has field: But in the Indian Acts there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration, unless required by statute, goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law." "Way back in the early fifties the Supreme Court in Rameswar Kadyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan held that the child as a witness always gives the true version of a fact owing to its innocence but at the same time it is fraught with the danger of being tutored and influenced. As such, even though there is no legal bar in accepting the uncorroborated testimony of the said witness yet as a rule of prudence it would be safe to have corroboration unless the circumstances are so safe to dispense with the same. In other words, the caution of corroboration of a child witness is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. In other words, the caution of corroboration of a child witness is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. When there is unimpeachable evidence which lend unfailing assurance to the version of the child the same can safely be accepted." "Even though there is no axiomatic provision of law to put preliminary question to a child witness to ascertain its mental capacity, it is, however, a wholesome course left for adoption. This wholesome practice followed by the Courts of law is not for sanctifying the evidence of the child but for the purpose of saving Judicial hours, so as to dissuade it from further examination of the witness who may be found to be incompetent. However, as practice of testing the capacity of a child is only a rule of prudence failure to do so cannot be a ground for rejecting such testimony if it otherwise appears to be reliable. While a child on account of his tender years and innocence of mind may be prone to tutoring and grasp in his green intellect whatever is told to him but simply because the witness was a child of tender years it will not be proper to assume he is open to tutoring." "Recently the Supreme Court in Ratansinh Daisukhbl1ai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, 2004 SCC (Cri) 7, while dealing with a case involving evidence of child witness held: A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and given rational answers thereto." "The Supreme Court referring to a decision of the United States in Wheeler v. United State, 159 US 523, further held: The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction based thereon." 41. In the instant case, since the evidence of PW4 and 7 is not inspiring confidence, their evidence cannot be taken as corroborative evidence to the evidence of PW3. Even otherwise, evidence of PW3 is not inspiring confidence. Moreover, there is another aspect in this case. In the instant case, since the evidence of PW4 and 7 is not inspiring confidence, their evidence cannot be taken as corroborative evidence to the evidence of PW3. Even otherwise, evidence of PW3 is not inspiring confidence. Moreover, there is another aspect in this case. Though the prosecution witness of the case deposed that the accused drove the bus at a high speed, none of the witnesses had deposed that the driver of the bus had driven the bus in rash and negligent manner. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed cannot be considered as rash and negligent driving. Of course, the drivers must be careful and they must keep the vehicles in their control whenever they are passing through a village or nearing a school. Unfortunately in this case, there is no evidence to show that any signboard was kept showing the location of school. Normally speed-breakers are to be laid to control the speed of the vehicles near the schools. It is unfortunate that even the scene of offence panchanama shows that there are no speed-breakers near the school. The school authorities and concerned officials must take proper steps and see that speed-breakers are laid near the schools to avoid accidents. In the absence of any speed-breaker and in the absence of any signboard near the location of a school, it the driver drives a bus at a high speed, it cannot be treated as rash and negligent driving. In spite of speed-breakers, signboards and observing the school or the children, if the driver drives the bus at a high speed, the same may amount to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the bus. But nothing can be inferred without any legal evidence. No conviction can be based on assumptions and presumptions or any inference can be drawn not basing on legal evidence. Merely because a ghastly accident has occurred resulting in death of some persons, the accused cannot be convicted. 42. In the light of above discussion, since there is misreading of evidence resulting in miscarriage of justice and that the evidences of witnesses are not based on any legally acceptable evidence, the judgments of both the Courts below are set aside. The criminal revision case is allowed. Consequently, the revision petitioner; accused stands acquitted. Fine amount already paid by him, if any, shall be refunded to him.