Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 553 (KER)

K. Mohanan v. Pottendavida Usman

2010-07-21

C.K.ABDUL REHIM, PIUS C.KURIAKOSE

body2010
Judgment : Pius C. Kuriakose, J. 1. The tenant challenges in this revision under Section 20 the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(4)(iii). In fact the respondent/landlord invoked the ground of arrears of rent Section 11(2)(b) and the ground of bona fide need for own occupation under Section 11(3) also for evicting the tenant. Eviction on the ground of arrears of rent was declined by the Rent Control Court and the said order has become final. The Rent Control Court ordered eviction under Section 11(3). But, during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant the person, for whom possession of the building was sought under Section 11(3), passed away. It was noticed by the Appellate Authority that, the need under Section 11(3) was not the need for personal occupation of the person who passed away alone, but occupation by the family members of him also. Hence permitting the landlord to amend the pleadings, the issue of ordering eviction under section 11(3) was relegated to the Rent Control Court. 2. It was on the basis of a building, which is referred to in the judgment of the Appellate Authority as 'Janaki's building', that the Rent Control Court passed order of eviction under sect ion 11 (4)(iii). The pleading of the landlord in the RCP was that the tenant has acquired possession of another building and is actually doing his business of conducting taxi house (hiring of furniture, etc.) from that building. The revision petitioner's defence was one of total denial. It became evident through Ext.A3 and the tenant's own oral evidence that he had come into possession of the building referred to as 'Janaki's building'. The tenant's case was that the above building is a residential building in which he is presently residing. Significantly, the tenant did not specifically contend even alternatively that the above building is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements. The statutory authorities have taken the view that when it becomes evident that the tenant is in possession of another building, it is the tenant's burden to adduce evidence and show that the said building is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements within the same city, town or village. It is in that view of the matter that the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction passed under Section 11(4)(iii). 3. It is in that view of the matter that the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction passed under Section 11(4)(iii). 3. In this revision under section 20, various grounds have been raised assailing the judgment of the Appellate Authority to the extent it relates to section 11 (4)(iii). Mr.R.Surendran, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, addressed arguments before us on the basis of all the grounds. Inter alia, Mr.Surendran submitted that the building, which the tenant has admitted to be in his possession, is a residential building only. A ration card, which was sought to be adduced as an item of evidence before the Appellate Authority, was not allowed to be brought on record. At any rate, according to the learned counsel, a residential building will not be suitable for conduct of business. As regards Ext.A3, Mr.Surendran submitted that Ext.A3 was not put to his client, while he was examined as RW1, during cross examination. Hence, reliance placed on Ext.A3 to hold that the tenant has acquired possession of another building reasonably sufficient for his requirement is not justified. The learned counsel submitted that the petition schedule building is a double storied building and it is too much to assume that there will be enough facility in Ext.A3 building for accommodating the entire business which is being carried on in the petition schedule building. Mr.Surendran further submitted that the rent control petition lacks in proper pleadings regarding section 11(4)(iii) as there is no plea that the building acquired by the tenant is reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirement. The learned counsel would argue that Section 11(4)(iii) of Act 2 of 1965 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down as it is likely that the above eviction ground be invoked by the landlords of buildings simultaneously possessed by a tenant resulting in the situation of the tenant becoming liable to be evicted from both the buildings. Mr.Surendran further requested that as the matter is already before the Rent Control Court in the context of Section 11(3), let the issue of section 11(4)(iii) also be reconsidered by the Rent Control Court. 4. We have anxiously considered the submissions of Sri.Surendran. Mr.Surendran further requested that as the matter is already before the Rent Control Court in the context of Section 11(3), let the issue of section 11(4)(iii) also be reconsidered by the Rent Control Court. 4. We have anxiously considered the submissions of Sri.Surendran. According to us, the legislative intendment underlying section 11(4)(iii) is that at a time, where there is acute accommodation shortage, the tenant should not be allowed the luxury of having more buildings in his possession than that what is actually necessary for his purpose, so that additional buildings in the possession of the tenant can be made available either for a needy landlord or for other needy tenants. Here there was a specific plea by the landlord that the tenant has acquired possession of another building and that it is in that building that the tenant is presently conducting the business which he was conducting in the petition schedule building. True, the statutory requirement that the building, possession of which is acquired by the tenant over and above the petition schedule building, is reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirements in the same city, town or village, is not specifically pleaded. But, we notice that it has been pleaded by the landlord that it is in the newly acquired building that the tenant is conducting business. The authorities under the Rent Control Act are not expected to analyse the pleadings meticulously. According to us, pleadings raised by the landlord are sufficient enough to constitute eviction ground since any building, in which the tenant is allegedly conducting the business which he used to conduct in the petition schedule building will have to be reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirement. At any rate we are convinced that no prejudice has been occasioned to the tenant on account of insufficiency of pleadings. 5. The statutory requirement under Section 11 (4)(iii) is not ownership of a building other than the petition schedule premises, instead, the requirement is possession. Ext.A3 coupled with the tenant's own admission in the witness box will show that though the building in question stands in the name of his mother Janaki, it is the tenant, who is in actual occupation of the building. We are not impressed by the submission of Sri. Surendran that Ext.A3 was not put to the tenant in cross examination. Ext.A3 coupled with the tenant's own admission in the witness box will show that though the building in question stands in the name of his mother Janaki, it is the tenant, who is in actual occupation of the building. We are not impressed by the submission of Sri. Surendran that Ext.A3 was not put to the tenant in cross examination. It is true that it was not Ext.A3 that was put to the tenant in cross examination, but another agreement in respect of the building covered by Ext.A3. It was thereafter that Ext.A3 was got marked in evidence. Ext.A3 is a certified copy of the Property Tax Assessment Register maintained by the local authority in respect of the building mentioned therein. Ext.A3 is a document having considerable probative value in view of section 26 of Act 2 of 1965 and the Rent Control Court was bound to accept admission of Ext.A3 in evidence. In all probability, Ext.A3 was admitted in evidence on consent. Even without consent, Ext.A3 was liable to be admitted in evidence. 6. As already indicated, the tenant did not have a specific case that the building covered by Ext.A3 was not reasonably sufficient for his requirement. On the contrary, his case was that he has nothing to do with that building. Once it became evident that the tenant is in possession of the building, it was his burden to have adduced cogent evidence and convinced the Rent Control Court that the said building is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements. Having not done so, he cannot blame the statutory authorities for having concluded that the landlord has established eviction ground against the tenant under Section 11 (4)(iii). 7. We are not impressed by the argument of the revision petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Section 11(4) (iii). We are not expected to enquire into the constitutionality of a statutory provision in these proceedings under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965 where our essential concern is about the legality, regularity and propriety of the judgment of the appellate authority. The constitutionality of the provision was never challenged hitherto by the revision petitioner. We do not find much merit in the challenge on the constitutionality of the provision. One of the legislative objectives underlying the rent control legislation is to regulate letting, rent rates, and eviction in view of the acute accommodation shortage prevalent. The constitutionality of the provision was never challenged hitherto by the revision petitioner. We do not find much merit in the challenge on the constitutionality of the provision. One of the legislative objectives underlying the rent control legislation is to regulate letting, rent rates, and eviction in view of the acute accommodation shortage prevalent. It is trite by decisions of the Supreme Court that rent control legislations are for the welfare of the landlords also. Even if it is accepted that the essential objective of the statute is to prevent eviction other than on specified grounds and in that way to promote the welfare of tenants, we are of the view that a tenant who is liable to be evicted under Section 11 (4) (iii) is landlord like, as he enjoys, possession of more buildings than necessary for his requirements. In short, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or impropriety as envisaged by Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965, tainting the judgment of the Appellate Authority to the extent it pertains to ground under Section 11 (4)(iii). The decision of the Appellate Authority ordering eviction under Section 11 (4)(iii) stands confirmed. The revision petition stands dismissed.