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2010 DIGILAW 553 (PNJ)

Narinder Kaur v. Surjan

2010-01-22

L.N.MITTAL

body2010
Judgment L.N.MITTAL, J. 1. Defendant Narinder Kaur, having remained unsuccessful in both the courts below, has come up by way of this second appeal. Plaintiff respondent surjan filed suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 11.01.1996 alleging that defendants husband Hardial Singh alias Gurbachan Singh agreed to sell the suit land measuring 14 kanals to the plaintiff, vide agreement dated 11.01.1996 @ Rs.1,30,000/- per acre and received Rs.25,000/- as earnest money and delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff at the time of agreement. Sale deed was to be executed up to 31.12.1998. However, hardial Singh alias Gurbachan Singh died on 28.05.1996 and on the basis of his will, the defendant inherited the suit land. The plaintiff went to the office of sub- Registrar on 31.12.1998 with requisite amount, for getting the sale deed R. S. A. No.186 of 2010 2 executed and registered as per agreement, but the defendant did not turn up. The defendant refused to execute the sale deed as per agreement. Hence the suit. 2. The defendant resisted the suit and denied the plaint allegations. It was pleaded that defendants husband never agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff, nor received any earnest money. It was also denied that possession of the suit land was delivered to the plaintiff at the time of alleged agreement. It was also pleaded that suit land was ancestral property of the defendants husband, who was, therefore, not competent to sell the same beyond his share. Market value of the suit land in the year 1996 was also rs.2,50,000/- per acre. 3. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagadhri, vide judgment and decree dated 06.05.2008, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. First appeal preferred by the defendant has been dismissed by learned District Judge, Yamuna nagar at Jagadhri, vide judgment and decree dated 13.11.2009. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. 5. In order to prove the agreement, the plaintiff not only himself stepped into the witness-box, but also examined both marginal witnesses of the agreement. All of them have stated broadly according to the plaintiffs version. The agreement was drafted and got typed by Mr. Darshan Lal, Advocate, who has also stepped into the witness-box and has proved execution of the agreement by defendants husband. All of them have stated broadly according to the plaintiffs version. The agreement was drafted and got typed by Mr. Darshan Lal, Advocate, who has also stepped into the witness-box and has proved execution of the agreement by defendants husband. On the other hand, defendant herself appeared as DW-1 and did not lead any other evidence. The defendant in cross-examination identified the signatures of her husband on the impugned agreement and receipt of earnest money. On the basis of this evidence, the courts below have come to the conclusion that due execution of the agreement by defendants husband has been proved. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that mere admission by defendant, of signatures of her husband on the agreement and receipt, is not sufficient to prove due execution of the agreement. The contention cannot be accepted because the plaintiff himself has led sufficient evidence to prove due execution of the agreement. The plaintiff himself has stated about the same and has examined both marginal witnesses of the agreement and has also examined Mr. Darshan Lal, advocate as witness, who had drafted and got typed the agreement. There is, therefore, no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the courts below. Learned counsel for the appellant emphatically contended that as per agreement, the sale deed was to be executed up to 31.12.1998, but the suit was filed on 22.12.2001 i. e. a few days before the expiry of three years and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to relief of specific performance. In this context, it was also pointed out that defendants husband had earlier sold 8 kanals land to plaintiffs sons vide sale deed dated 09.11.1994. The said sale was challenged by defendants son by filing suit on 13.02.1999. It was accordingly contended that since said suit filed by defendants son against plaintiffs sons was pending since 13.02.1999, the plaintiff could not have waited till 22.12.2001 for filing the instant suit. I have carefully considered the aforesaid contentions, but I find no merit therein. Merely because the suit was filed just a few days before the expiry of limitation period of three years, the plaintiff could not have been denied the relief of specific performance. Moreover, both the courts below have exercised the discretion of granting relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. Merely because the suit was filed just a few days before the expiry of limitation period of three years, the plaintiff could not have been denied the relief of specific performance. Moreover, both the courts below have exercised the discretion of granting relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. The judgments of the courts below cannot be reversed in second appeal mere on account of delay in filing the suit, although the suit was filed within limitation period. Pendency of suit filed by defendants son against the plaintiffs sons would also not disentitle the plaintiff to relief of specific performance on the ground of delay in filing the suit, when execution of the impugned agreement is fully proved. For the reasons recorded herein above, I find that no question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for determination in the instant second appeal. The appeal is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.