JUDGMENT Jayant Patel, J. 1. The present appeal arise against the judgment and order dated 7/2/2000 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in First Appeal No. 12 of 2000, whereby the judgment and decree of the Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No. 30 of 1997 for directing Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as LIC for convenience) to pay amount of insurance of Rs. 1,00,000/- with interest was confirmed. 2. The relevant facts appear to be that the policy of Kalpesh Chandrakant Sheth (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased/insured') was got insured by his father Chandrakant Dalichand Sheth for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The declaration was filed at the relevant point of time and the insured was also examined by the panel doctor of LIC, who recommended for the proposal. The policy appears to have been taken on 25/1/1993, and it continued for a period exceeding two years. It appears that, insured expired on 15/10/1995, and thereafter the claim was submitted on account of death of the insured. The claim came to be repudiated by LIC by contending that the disease of kidney was not disclosed at the time when policy was taken, and therefore, the claim was not honoured. Parents of deceased-insured filed civil suit being Special Civil Suit No. 30 of 1997 in the Civil Court for recovery of amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the Defendant -LIC. Ultimately at the end of the trial, learned Civil Judge passed the judgment and decree on 21/9/1999 directing the LIC to pay amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the due date, till realisation of the amount. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the Civil Court, the appeal came to be preferred before this Court being First Appeal No. 12 of 2000. Learned Single Judge having found no infirmity in the findings arrived at by the trial court did not interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial court, and consequently dismissed the appeal. It is under these circumstances present appeal before us. 3. We have considered the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Judge, and also the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge in First Appeal, as well as the record and proceedings which was called for from the trial court. We have heard Mr. It is under these circumstances present appeal before us. 3. We have considered the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Judge, and also the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge in First Appeal, as well as the record and proceedings which was called for from the trial court. We have heard Mr. Amit P. Patel, learned Counsel for Mr. H.M. Bhagat for the Appellant /original Appellant - Defendant and Mr. Nirav Thakkar, learned Counsel for the Respondents/original Respondents-Plaintiffs. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant first contended that there was clear suppression of material fact, inasmuch as, prior to the death the insured had got his treatment before the Kidney Hospital at Nadiad and at that time in the history column it was declared that he had kidney problem 5 years back, i.e. prior to the issuance of policy and he submitted that said aspect was required to be disclosed before the panel doctor, which was not disclosed and, therefore, it can be said to be suppression of material fact, and on the basis of which LIC was justified in repudiating the contract. He submitted that said aspect has neither been properly appreciated by the Civil Court nor thereafter by learned Single Judge of this Court, hence the appeal be allowed only on that ground. 5. The examination of the aforesaid contention and upon close scrutiny, it appears that the question wherein disclosure was required to be made was as to whether the insured had any kidney disease and the answer given was 'No'. Another relevant question was as to whether the patient had undergone the treatment for a period exceeding one week in last 5 years and the answer given was 'No'. In this light of the fact-situation the matter is to be examined as to whether such could be said to be suppression of material fact or not. 6. On behalf of LIC, Branch Manager Shri Dilipbhai Iswarji Bhayani (PW-1) Exhibit-48 was examined, and in his deposition he had referred to hospital papers of Nadiad Kidney Hospital. Further, the Appellant -original Defendant also examined Dr. Bhavik Hiralal Shelat (PW-2) Exhibit-50, who had prepared the case papers of the insured and he was admitted for treatment in the said hospital on 6/9/1995. The History of the deceased does refer to sickness 5 years back, but in the deposition of Dr. Further, the Appellant -original Defendant also examined Dr. Bhavik Hiralal Shelat (PW-2) Exhibit-50, who had prepared the case papers of the insured and he was admitted for treatment in the said hospital on 6/9/1995. The History of the deceased does refer to sickness 5 years back, but in the deposition of Dr. Shelat he had stated that, upon inquiry from the patient it was found that some particles of blood was found in the urine and some particles of protein was also found in the urine about 5 years back prior to 1995 and he had taken treatment of steroid. 7. In the decision of the Apex Court in case of P.J. Chacko and Anr. v. Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors., reported in (2008) 1 SCC 321 : ( AIR 2008 SC 424 ), the Apex Court while considering the aspect of truthfulness of the question-answer has extracted some observations of Madras High Court at para-19, and the relevant of which can be extracted here for the present matter as under. The principles underlying the doctrine of disclosure and the rule of good faith oblige the proposer to answer every question put to him with complete honesty. Honesty implies truthfulness. But it happens that no man can do more than say what he believes to be the truth. 8. Therefore, it will have to be considered as to whether the answers were honestly given or not with truthfulness. If, at one point of time some blood particles were found in the urine or the protein particles were found in the urine and thereafter treatment is taken and is cured, one would not in normal circumstance carry an impression of having kidney disease at an age of about 15 years. Further, it has not been stated by Dr. Shelat even in the medical history papers that the patient had undergone treatment for a period exceeding one week or at least for one week as was required to be disclosed at the time of proposal. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to believe that the answers given were not with any truthfulness or there was any suppression by the insured or on behalf of the insured at the time when the proposal was submitted. 9. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to believe that the answers given were not with any truthfulness or there was any suppression by the insured or on behalf of the insured at the time when the proposal was submitted. 9. Apart from the above, it also deserves to be recorded that the burden in case of repudiation of contract of insurance would be heavily upon the Insurance Company and the reason being that the presumption would be that the proposal was genuine, more particularly when through the panel doctor of the Insurance Company the insured was examined and nothing adverse was found. Even at the time when a person was examined by panel doctor of the Insurance Company, nothing prevented him to get medically examined either by test of blood or otherwise if prima facie he found that such examination was required. It required to be hardly stated that, with the development of medical science blood test report for renal function may disclose the major ailment in the kidney, if any. But in the present case same has neither been advised by the doctor nor such examination was undergone. Further, if the repudiation was to be asserted by maintaining suppression of material fact, it was also required for the Insurance Company to prove that such blood particle or the protein particle found in the urine at any point of time resulted into kidney disease to the deceased. No such opinion has come on record of the expert on the said aspects. Under these circumstances, it is not possible for us to agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the Appellant that the burden of proof required for repudiation of contract for alleging suppression of material fact was satisfactorily discharged by the Appellant -Insurance Company. 10. If, in view of the aforesaid, the suppression of material fact was not proved, the ground of repudiation of contract would not be available to the Insurance Company by way of defence, nor could be accepted. 11. The aforesaid is also coupled with the statutory provision of Section 45 of the LIC Act, which provides that the policy would not be put in question after expiry of a period of 2 years. 11. The aforesaid is also coupled with the statutory provision of Section 45 of the LIC Act, which provides that the policy would not be put in question after expiry of a period of 2 years. It is an admitted position that the period of 2 years had expired and death of the insured was on 15/10/1995 i.e. after the expiry of period of 2 years on 24/1/1995. 12. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, we find that even if the contention of learned Counsel for the Appellant/original Appellant- Defendant is examined, it would not carry the case of the Appellant to maintain repudiation of the contrast. 13. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the judgment and decree of the Civil Court, and its confirmation thereof by learned Single Judge of this Court in the appellate jurisdiction does not deserve to be interfered with. Hence the appeal is meritless, therefore, same is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to cost. Record and proceedings may be returned to the trial Court. Appeal dismissed.