Judgment :- VINOD K.SHARMA, J. 1. The petitioner by invoking the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court has prayed for issuance of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Chief Manager/Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Circle Office, the first respondent herein from invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in respect of the petitioners staff housing loan in pursuance of the notice dated 20.8.2010 of the first respondent under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. 2 The pleaded case in the affidavit read as under: The petitioner joined the services of the Indian Bank in the year 1974 and was posted as Branch Manager of the Kotturpuram branch from 8.7.1993 to 31.3.1996. The petitioner thereafter joined as Senior Manager, Marketing Department at the head office of the respondent bank. 3 The petitioner availed staff housing loan of sum of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) in Sanction Ticket No.2347 dated 27.11.1981, sum of Rs.65,000/- (Rupees sixty five thousand only) in Sanction Ticket No.428 dated 14.6.1988 and Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) in Sanction Ticket No.1496 dated 3.7.1992. The petitioner claims that out of this amount, a sum of Rs.67,531/-(Rupees sixty seven thousand five hundred and thirty one only) is outstanding due as on 21.01.1999 on the principal amount with accrued interest of Rs.88,047/- (Rupees eighty eight thousand and forty seven only). The petitioner in addition, availed staff housing loan of Rs.3,05,000/- (Rupees three lakhs and five thousand only) vide SHL No.2347/99. 4 The petitioner was issued show cause notice for initiating departmental enquiry on 15.4.1996 for alleged irregularities in respect of appraisal, disbursal and follow up of credit limits sanctioned to the international Womens Football Tournament to be held at Chennai. The explanation submitted by the petitioner was not accepted and departmental enquiry was ordered on 17.5.1997. 5 The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to scrutinize the files and documents in the Zonal office and head office. The protest of the petitioner against continuing departmental enquiry was not accepted and enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry and submitted his report holding that the petitioner guilty of some of the charges. The petitioner submitted objection to the findings of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority concurred with the enquiry officer and by order dated 21.12.1999 imposed a punishment of compulsory retirement. The appeal filed against the order of punishment was also dismissed on 29.02.2000. The petitioner submitted objection to the findings of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority concurred with the enquiry officer and by order dated 21.12.1999 imposed a punishment of compulsory retirement. The appeal filed against the order of punishment was also dismissed on 29.02.2000. 6 The petitioner challenged the order of compulsory retirement by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court in W.P.No.54 of 2001 which was allowed by this Court and while setting aside the order of compulsory retirement, the case was remitted back to the departmental authorities for further consideration by providing documents and files on which reliance was placed by the petitioner. 7 The respondent Bank being aggrieved by the order passed in the writ petition, preferred a Writ Appeal No.425 of 2008 in which order passed by the Honble Single Judge was ordered to be stayed. The writ appeal is pending on the file of this Court. 8 The case of the petitioner is that the Branch Manager, the second respondent herein had approached the petitioner to sign acknowledgment of debt on 30.01.2009 which showed the balance outstanding payable by the petitioner as Rs.4,36,807/- (Rupees four lakhs thirty six thousand eight hundred and seven only) inclusive of all accrued interest. The balance debt reflected in the statement of accounts as on 5.8.2009 is Rs.4,38,100/-(Rupees four lakhs thirty eight thousand and one hundred only). The petitioner sent a cheque for Rs.2,50,000/- with an instruction to keep the said amount in the no lien account by stating as follows: "I have been a regular employee from 1974. This staff Housing loan, as per the original sanctioned terms and conditions, was to be recovered from my salary every month. Due to the compulsory retirement imposed on me in 1999, which this Court had held to be invalid. I would like to reiterate that I am eligible for full backwages and other service benefits. Notwithstanding my above contention, I state that for a period I am deprived of the salary, consequent to which the staff housing loan instalment could not be recovered, it would be fair and just that our bank does not recover/charge interest on my staff housing loan atleast to the extent of predetermined EMI from the time of when I was compulsorily retired". 9 The case of the petitioner pleaded in the affidavit is that the respondent bank vide letter dated 23.3.2010 informed the petitioner that they would be charging commercial rate of interest on the overdue housing loan from the date of compulsory retirement on 21.12.1999. The balance on the date of his retirement was claimed to be Rs.31,56,815/-(Rupees thirty one thousand fifty six lakhs eight hundred and fifteen only). 10 The further case of the petitioner pleaded in the affidavit is that it was represented to the respondent bank that in view of the order passed in the writ petition, the petitioner should be deemed as employee of the bank and the rate of interest on the staff housing loan as per the sanction letter/ admissible to the employees should only be charged. It was further requested that a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs only) lying with the bank in the no lien account be adjusted to write-off the loan due from the petitioner. 11 The petitioner was thereafter issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 stating that a sum of Rs.17,73,408/- (Rupees seventeen lakhs seventy three thousand four hundred and eight only) was outstanding due and payable as on 31.07.2010. The petitioner claims that he sent a reply to the notice received from the first respondent herein by asserting that the loan advanced to the petitioner cannot be treated to be a regular commercial loan merely because the employer is a banking company. The stand further taken in the reply was that invoking Sec.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by the respondent was contrary to law and the outcome is misinterpretation of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The petitioner disputed the outstanding amount and further brought to the notice of the respondent the order passed in the writ petition and Writ appeal. 12 The further case of the petitioner is that inspite of reply, the respondents are proceeding with action under SARFAESI Act, 2002, therefore the question for determination in this writ petition as pleaded in the affidavit is: "Whether a staff housing loan comes within the purview of the SARAFAESI Act ?. 12 The further case of the petitioner is that inspite of reply, the respondents are proceeding with action under SARFAESI Act, 2002, therefore the question for determination in this writ petition as pleaded in the affidavit is: "Whether a staff housing loan comes within the purview of the SARAFAESI Act ?. 13 By challenging the jurisdiction of the Chief Manager/ Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Circle Office, the first respondent herein to invoke the SARFAESI Act, the petitioner prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of prohibition to prevent the respondent Bank from invoking the provisions of SARFAESI Act, in respect of the staff housing loan advanced to the petitioner in pursuance of the notice dated 28.8.2010 issued under Sec.13(2) SARFAESI Act, 2002. 14 The relief claimed in the writ petition is based on following grounds: (a) The staff housing loan offered to the employees by the employers cannot be treated as a regular commercial loan merely because the employer happens to be a Banking company/Financial Institution. The proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, therefore cannot be invoked for recovery of staff housing loan. (b) The definition of debt given in SARFAESI Act would exclude housing loan as it cannot be said to be a loan advanced in course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank or financial institution. (c) The order of compulsorily retirement having been set aside by this Court, the petitioner is to be considered to be continuing in the service, thereby commercial rate of interest cannot be charged on the loan to bring it under the SARFAESI Act. 15 In the counter, stand taken by the respondent is that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is abuse of process of law as the petitioner while availing loan had admitted that he would be liable to pay commercial rate of interest in the event of leaving the service of the bank on any condition and also in view of the housing loan scheme which stipulates the recovery under the SARFAESI Act. 16 The stand taken in the counter is that the acknowledgment of liability as on 30.01.2009 and 5.8.2009 was by treating the petitioner as continuing employee of the bank. 16 The stand taken in the counter is that the acknowledgment of liability as on 30.01.2009 and 5.8.2009 was by treating the petitioner as continuing employee of the bank. The stand taken by the respondents is that the petitioner while availing the loan had given an undertaking that in case he failed to continue as employee of the bank, he would be liable to pay interest at commercial rate with quarterly rest. The condition accepted by the petitioner reads as under: "If the borrower ceased to be in the services of the bank on account of any reason whatsoever (including the demise of the borrower) the entire loan, including future instalments, interests, etc. shall become due and payable as and when the borrower so ceased to be in the services of the Bank and the borrower shall thereafter be liable to pay interest at commercial rate with quarterly rests" 17 The stand of the respondent is that once the petitioner accepted the condition, he cannot now deny it. As the petitioner is no longer employee of the bank, therefore cannot claim the benefit as staff member. The petitioner is to be treated as borrower of the bank and liable to pay commercial rate of interest. 18 On the question of law raised in the writ petition, the stand taken by the respondent is that the staff housing loan would fall within the definition of "debt" under Sec.2(g) of the Act as the definition of "debt" would include all kinds of loan including staff housing loan. The loan advanced to the petitioner is duly secured by a mortgage, therefore is "Secured Debt" as defined under Sec.2(2e), as well as "Security interest" under Sec.2(2f). It is therefore, not open to the petitioner to contend that SARFAESI Act would not be applicable to the loan advanced to him. 19 The stand further taken by the respondent is that the order passed by the Honble Single Judge in the writ petition is subject matter of Writ Appeal because of the stay the order of compulsory retirement is still in force. The petitioner therefore cannot be treated to be an employee of the bank. 20 The relief sought for by the writ petitioner is premature as the petitioner should have waited for action under Sec.13(4) of the Act before rushing to this Court. The petitioner therefore cannot be treated to be an employee of the bank. 20 The relief sought for by the writ petitioner is premature as the petitioner should have waited for action under Sec.13(4) of the Act before rushing to this Court. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed, in view of the stand taken in the counter. 21 Mr.Sakthivel, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner referred to Sec.2(g) of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which reads as under: "2(g) "debt" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application" to contend that in order to invoke the jurisdiction under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it is necessary that the liability inclusive of interest should be arising out at transaction in a course of business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution under any law for time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application. 22 Whereas, in the case in hand, the petitioner availed loan as an employee of the respondent bank, therefore the liability did not arise out of any business activity undertaken by the respondent Bank. The stand of the learned counsel is that the proceedings initiated being without jurisdiction are liable to be quashed, and has Tribunal prohibited from proceeding with the matter. 23 In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Gujarat High Court in the case of Bank of India Vs. The stand of the learned counsel is that the proceedings initiated being without jurisdiction are liable to be quashed, and has Tribunal prohibited from proceeding with the matter. 23 In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Gujarat High Court in the case of Bank of India Vs. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia and others reported in A.I.R. 1997 GUJARAT 75 wherein the Honble Gujarat High Court has held that misappropriation of amount of bank, by its employee cannot be construed as "debt" as defined under the Act as it cannot be termed to be liability arising during the course of any business activities undertaken by the bank. 24 It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in order to determine whether the liability would fall under the provisions of SARFAESI Act 2002, the facts of the case and entire averments made in the petition are required to be looked into. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Union Bank of India Vs Debt Recovery Tribunal reported in A.I.R. 1999 SUPREME COURT 1381. 25 It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the acceptance of the condition of payment of commercial rate of interest as stipulated in housing loan scheme for recovery of loan under SARFAESI Act cannot give jurisdiction to the party to proceed under the Act as the jurisdiction under SARFAESI Act and the proceedings under The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 can only be taken with regard to the debt/liability which falls within the definition of "debt" as referred to above. The contention raised is that the parties by consent or scheme cannot give jurisdiction to the Tribunal which does not vest in it otherwise. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law, but the question to be determined is whether housing loan advanced to employee would be a "debt" under the Act. 26 Mr.K.Sakthivel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also contended that in the present case, the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner has been set aside. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law, but the question to be determined is whether housing loan advanced to employee would be a "debt" under the Act. 26 Mr.K.Sakthivel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also contended that in the present case, the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner has been set aside. Though the order is stayed in the writ appeal, it does not lead to a conclusion that the petitioner can be treated to be an ex-employee for the purpose of recovering the loan due from the petitioner, advanced to him under the housing scheme, applicable to the employees. 27 In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to note the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and others Vs U.P. State Electricity Board and others ( (1997)5 S.C.C. 772 wherein it is held that stay of operation of order or notification only means the order or notification which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order, but does not mean that the order or notification has been wiped from existence. An order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceedings, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceedings, and it is the duty of the Court in such a case to put the parties in the same position as they would have been, but for the interim orders of the court. 28 However, this question is to be considered by the authorities under the SARFAESI Act or the Tribunal, as this cannot be a ground to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as the effect of stay order and relief to be granted to the petitioner is to be seen by Debt Recovery Tribunal at appropriate stage. 29 On the contention referred to above, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the respondents from proceeding further under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 29 On the contention referred to above, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the respondents from proceeding further under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 30 Mr.Jayesh Dolia, the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that the petitioner was estopped to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the reason that he had accepted the condition to pay interest at commercial rate with quarterly rests, in case he ceased to be in the service of the bank on account of any reason whatsoever. 31 Mr.Dolia, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to Sec.13(2)(f) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to contend that petitioner is a borrower within the meaning of the Act, therefore provisions of SARFAESI Act would be applicable to him. 32 The learned counsel for the respondents also referred to the definition of "Security interest" as given under Sec.2(zf) of SARAFAESI Act to contend that the mortgage executed by the petitioner to secure loan would be a "Security interest". The case of the petitioner would therefore squarely falls under Sec.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act as the petitioner is be a borrower and he is under the liability to the respondent being a "secured creditor". It is therefore not open to the petitioner to challenge the proceedings initiated by the respondent. 33 Mr.Jayesh Doli, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Eureka Forbes Limited Vs Allahabad Bank and others (2010)6 S.C.C. 193 to contend that Sec.2(g) of the Recovery Act suggests that the legislature has used a general expression in contradistinction to specific, restricted or limited expression which obviously means that the legislature intended to cover the larger area of jurisdiction so as to ensure attainment of the legislative object i.e. expeditious recovery and providing provisions for taking such measures which would prevent the wastage of securities available with the banks and financial institutions. 34 The learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Palat Achuthan Vs. Management, Citibank N.A. and another reported in 2003 117 CompCas 716 Mad, wherein the recovery from the "employee" by the bank and loan advanced was held to be covered under the definition of "debt" as given under the Act. Management, Citibank N.A. and another reported in 2003 117 CompCas 716 Mad, wherein the recovery from the "employee" by the bank and loan advanced was held to be covered under the definition of "debt" as given under the Act. This Court in said case held as under: "Therefore, I am unable to view the transaction as a simple grant by the employer to the employee which could be termed as due under the service condition of the employee. The banks action to recover the amount from the petitioner is not a claim towards any excess payment of salary or allowances or such other amounts like provident fund, gratuity, bonus, incentive payment etc., which are referable to the service conditions of an employee. The amounts which are sought to be recovered is due towards the loans obtained from the bank by the petitioner. The expression "debt" is defined in section 2(g) of the Act is as follows: "2.(g) debt means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is alleged as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether the secured or unsecured, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or otherwise and subsisting on and legally recoverable on the date of application." 12. The above expression has to be given a very wide meaning and amplitude as applicable to any transaction with a bank, financial institution, bearing in mind the objects of the Act, viz., the need to recover due to these institutions which deal with money and assets of the depositors and the customers of the bank. The money belonging to a bank or a financial institution is not to be compared with an asset of a company being the property and asset of the company and can dispose of the assets at its pleasure to its employees as loans and advances. Money at the disposal of these institutions belongs to the various depositors and it is only to protect their interest, the Act was enacted. Money at the disposal of these institutions belongs to the various depositors and it is only to protect their interest, the Act was enacted. The fact that the loan or advances are given by the bank to the employees cannot convert the nature of the loan transaction and place it beyond the scope of the Act. Such an interpretation would violate the objects of the Act. In fact, such undue concession shown by the banks and finance companies to their employees are highly questionable as they affect the interest of the depositors and also the corresponding heavier burden which is placed on the borrowing customers of the bank. Therefore, the attempt on the part of the employee/petitioner to treat the loans and amounts received by him as not a "debt" due to the bank, cannot at all be permitted. 13 In United Bank of India Vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that the expression "debt" has to be given a widest amplitude and objects of the act have to be taken into consideration to interpret the provisions of the Act. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court the claim by the bank was towards damages arising out of a breach of contract with the bank. 14 In state Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur V. Ballabh Das and Co., the respondents under the export credit facility, had obtained advances from the bank against pre-shipment and post-shipment export of certain categories of goods. The foreign buyers defaulted in payment due to the bank. The bank filed two suits against the respondents and during the pendency of the suit, the Act came into force and suits were transferred to the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the expression "alleged as due" has to be taken note of and what was necessary to be considered was whether the bank had alleged in the suits that the amounts are due to the bank from the respondents and that the liability of the respondents had arisen in the course of their business activity. The Supreme Court held that pre-requistite for the liability to be called a "debt" as contemplated under the Act was satisfied. 15. The Supreme Court held that pre-requistite for the liability to be called a "debt" as contemplated under the Act was satisfied. 15. In G.V.Films Ltd. V. Unit Trust of India (1999)1 L.W. 117 ; [2000] 100 Comp Cas 257 (Mad), the question arose as to whether the payment made by the Unit Trust of India, being a financial institution, to the defendants, of the dividend amounts payable to the second defendant could be recovered under the provisions of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court held that the expression "debt" would mean any liability which is due from a person to a financial institution in the course of any business activity undertaken by the financial institution and held that the claim of the Unit Trust of India will be entertainable under the Act. 16. Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid reasons, the contention of the petitioner that the amount due to the bank cannot be termed as a "debt" is not sustainable." 35 The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents was that once the liability of the petitioner falls under the definition of "debt", the writ petition deserve to be dismissed. 36 The learned counsel for the respondents also referred to Government circular under which right was given to the Authorised Officer to recover the loan as under the SARFAESI Act or by filing civil suit, to contend, that the right of the respondents to invoke SARFAESI Act cannot be challenged by the petitioner, as the circulars of the Reserve Bank of India are binding on the Bank and its employees. 37 On consideration, we find that the question as to whether staff housing loan comes within the purview of SARFAESI Act deserves to be answered against the petitioner. 38 In view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (supra), the word "debt" cannot be given restricted meaning as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It also cannot be said that the housing loan advanced to the employee would not fall under business activity undertaken by the bank as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The grant of loan is one of the business transaction undertaken by the bank. It also cannot be said that the housing loan advanced to the employee would not fall under business activity undertaken by the bank as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The grant of loan is one of the business transaction undertaken by the bank. Merely because the employee is given housing loan at concessional rate would not mean that the transaction will not fall within the business activity to take housing loan to employees out of definition of "debt". 39 The Honble Single Judge of this Court in the case of Palat Achuthan Vs. Management, Citibank N.A. and another (supra) rightly interpreted the definition of "debt" to include the housing loan to be covered under the Act. The judgment of the Honble Gujarat High Court in the case of Bank of India Vs. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia and others (supra), on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner would have no application, because in the said case the amount sought to be recovered was on the plea of misappropriation of the amount and not by way of loan. The judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Union Bank of India Vs. Debt Recovery Tribunal (supra) also does not advance the case of the petitioner, as the facts pleaded do not lead to the conclusion that the loan advanced to petitioner would not be a debt. The merit of the claim of petitioner can be looked into by the authorities or learned Tribunal, as it cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. 40 The question of law raised in this writ petition is therefore answered against the petitioner, it is held that staff housing loan granted to the employee by the bank against security would come within the definition of Debt as defined which can be recovered under SARFAESI Act. 41 For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. But no order as to cost. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2010 is also dismissed.