JUDGMENT This appeal is by the 8th• defendant against the judgment and decree passed in RA. No. 11 of 1999, dated 27-5-2004 on the file of Additional District Judge, Mandya and confirming the judgment and decree dated 16-10-1999 in O.S. No.5 of 1991 on the file of Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Srirangapatna. 2. Respondent 1, deceased-respondent 2 and respondent 3 were the plaintiffs in the Trial Court. Suit is one for declaration declaring that the plaintiffs are the owners and have got the right of redemption of mortgage dated 10-6-1957, for delivery of possession of the suit schedule property and consequently for mesne profits. 3. Case of the plaintiff is that, they are the brothers living in a joint family. The first plaintiff is the elder brother and was the manager of the joint family. They were natives of Vadesamudra Village, Kasaba Hobli, Pandavapura Taluk, now residing at Bangalore. For the family necessity towards discharge of old debts, they borrowed Rs. 300/- from defendants 1 to 3 by mortgaging the suit schedule property under a registered usufructuary mortgage deed dated 10-6-1957. Defendants 1 to 3 were put in possession of property for a period of 12 years. After harvesting the crop in January 1969, defendants 1 to 3 were required to redeem the mortgage. However, despite of the plaintiffs' demand, defendants 1 to 3 did not redeem the mortgage. It is thereafter, the plaintiffs made preparation to file a suit for redemption, at that time they came to know (in January 1991) that defendants unlawfully and illegally have created concocted documents and as such, immediately, the plaintiffs went to the Sub-Registrar's office and found that defendants 1 to 3 have created a transaction with 4 to 8. Accordingly, defendants 4 to 8 were impleaded in the suit. 4. Plaintiffs case is that cause of action accrued to them in January 1969, when the period of mortgage came to an end in January 1991, when plaintiffs came to know of the illegal transaction and the suit was filed. 5. Defendants 1 to 7 did not chose to file any written statement and contest the suit. 4. Plaintiffs case is that cause of action accrued to them in January 1969, when the period of mortgage came to an end in January 1991, when plaintiffs came to know of the illegal transaction and the suit was filed. 5. Defendants 1 to 7 did not chose to file any written statement and contest the suit. Defendant 8 alone filed a written statement, inter alia stating that he has purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 1-12-1983 and that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and has also made improvements in the suit schedule property. He specifically alleged that suit is barred by time as the suit is not filed within 12 years from the date of first registered sale deed dated 25-1-1979 which is hostile to the interest of the plaintiffs and also alleged that he has perfected the title by adverse possession. Before the Trial Court, plaintiff 2 was examined as P.W. 1 and in his evidence, he produced Exs. P. 1 to P. 14. On the behalf of defendants, defendant 8 got himself examined as D.W. 1 and also examined D.Ws. 2 to 5 in support of his case and got marked Exs. D. 1 to D. 27 in his evidence. 6. The Trial Court based on the oral and documentary evidence held that plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property and have proved that they are entitled for redemption of usufructuary mortgage created in favour of defendants 1 to 3 and further held that, the suit is in time. As against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, defendant 8 preferred an appeal in R.A. No. 11 of 1999. The lower Appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 27-5-2004, on re-appreciation of the documentary and oral evidence, has confirmed the judgment and decree by holding that there is no error in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. As against both the judgments, defendant 8 has preferred this appeal. 7. This Court, by an order dated 25-1-2010 admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse and capricious as a result of the wrong application of Article 61 of the Limitation Act?" 8. As against both the judgments, defendant 8 has preferred this appeal. 7. This Court, by an order dated 25-1-2010 admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse and capricious as a result of the wrong application of Article 61 of the Limitation Act?" 8. Sri P.S. Manjunath, learned Counsel representing the appellants submitted that registered mortgage deed was executed by the plaintiffs on 5-10-1957. The mortgage period was for 12 years after harvesting i.e., January 1969. However, plaintiffs did not seek for redemption of mortgage or possession or took any action after right accrued to them to seek redemption. In turn, 3rd defendant executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant 4 on 25-1-1979 to the extent of 3 acres 25 guntas on the eastern side. He also executed one more sale deed in favour of defendant 5 to the extent of 3 acres 25 guntas. Defendant 4 in turn, executed registered sale deed in favour of 6th defendant and 6th defendant executed the sale deed in favour of 7th defendant. 5th and 7th defendants together executed a registered sale deed dated 1~12-1983 in favour of 8th defendant. 8th defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property from 1-12-1983 and he has made improvement in the said land. 9. He submitted that Article 61, clause (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, 'the Act') requires the suits to be filed for recovery of possession within 12 years afterwards transfer by the mortgagee for valuable consideration. Admittedly, the first sale deed is dated 25-1-1979, whereas, the suit is filed on 25-1-1991 and 12 years period for seeking possession expired on 24-1-1991. Plaintiff had the deemed knowledge of the transaction of 25-1-1979. As in case of registered deed, the knowledge of the transaction is deemed from the date of registration. If that date is taken into consideration the suit is barred by time under Article 61, clause (b) of the Act. He further submitted that the Trial Court as well as lower Appellate Court both held, the date of knowledge as 25-1-1979, despite it is held that the suit is well-within time. If that date is taken into consideration the suit is barred by time under Article 61, clause (b) of the Act. He further submitted that the Trial Court as well as lower Appellate Court both held, the date of knowledge as 25-1-1979, despite it is held that the suit is well-within time. He submitted that if the date of knowledge is taken as 25-1-1979, the suit should have been filed either on 24-1-1979 or prior to that and as such, both the Courts have erred in holding that the suit within limitation. 10. Alternatively, he also submitted that, the plaintiffs are liable to pay for the improvement made by defendant 8. If the transfer is based on imperfect title and if the 8th defendant is a bona fide purchaser, he is, entitled for the value of the improvement from the true owner, that is plaintiffs. 11. In support of the point of limitation under Article 61(b) of the Act, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Dilboo (dead) by LRs and Others v Smt. Dhanraji (dead) and Others and submitted that the Apex Court at para 20 of the judgment in identical circumstances in a case of transfer of property by the mortgage, has held that in the absence of any documents to prove that the suit was within time and when the document is registered, the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge and as such, the date of registration is the material date for the purposes of determining the limitation under Article 61(b) of the Act. 12. To support his contention, he relied on the plaint averments and submitted that plaintiffs except saying that they came to know the transaction in January 1991, have not produced any material to substantiate the same and submitted that though there is a registered document, the Trial Court and the lower Appellate Court wrongly concluded the limitation period and have decreed the suit. 13. Notice of this appeal was issued by way of substitute service on the respondents and it is held sufficient. However, none of the respondents are represented before this Court. 14. Two contentions were raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. One is limitation and another is improvement. 15. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs executed mortgage deed on 5-10-1957 for a period of 12 years. However, none of the respondents are represented before this Court. 14. Two contentions were raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. One is limitation and another is improvement. 15. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs executed mortgage deed on 5-10-1957 for a period of 12 years. The period of 12 years gets over in January 1969 and the plaintiffs have got 30 years period of limitation under Article 61(a) for redemption of mortgage. It is also not in dispute that the period of limitation of mortgage under Article 61(a) has not expired. However, defendant 3, one of the mortgagee executed first registered sale deed dated 25-1-1979 and from there onwards, defendants 4, 5, 6 and 7 have executed subsequent sale deed and ultimately, defendant 8 is the last purchaser. Mortgagee is admittedly executed in favour of three mortgagees i.e., defendants 1 to 3. It is not in dispute that defendants 1 and 2 have not joined the first sale deed or subsequent sale deed and this entire extent of the land under the mortgage deed is sold by the defendant 3 alone. Assuming that defendant 3 has transferred the property and created interest more than the interest vested in him Article 61(b) of the Act is attracted. It is useful to refer to the said clause which reads as under: "(b) to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the mortgagee for a valuable consideration" - 12 years - when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff. 16. It cannot be said that there can be any transfer of immovable property of value of more than Rs. 100/- without the registered document. Article 61(b) of the Act does not distinguish the knowledge of the transfer on the basis of registered and un-registered document. Under Article 61(b) of the Act, the limitation starts running from the date of knowledge of transfer. 17. 100/- without the registered document. Article 61(b) of the Act does not distinguish the knowledge of the transfer on the basis of registered and un-registered document. Under Article 61(b) of the Act, the limitation starts running from the date of knowledge of transfer. 17. The judgment sited by the learned Counsel in the matter of Smt. Dilbo, the Apex Court considered this aspect of the Limitation Act and found that the plaintiffs in that case have not even averred or lead any evidence to show that they had no knowledge and in the circumstances the Apex Court observed as under: "Advisably there is no averment that the predecessors were not aware of this transaction or its nature and advisably nobody stepped into the witness-box to state that they were not so aware. There was no burden or duty on the defendants to prove knowledge on the part of the plaintiff It is only after and if the plaintiff first averred and then provided that the suit was within 12 years of the date they gained knowledge of the transaction that the burden will have shifted on the defendant to show that the plaintiff claims is false, in the absence of any such averment and proof, the plaintiff must fail. No question arose of the defendants having to show that the plaintiff or her predecessor had knowledge". 18. The Apex Court in to said case, on the basis of the pleadings has found that the plaintiff has neither averred nor lead any evidence to prove that he had no knowledge. But in this case at para 5 of the plaint, plaintiffs state that they demanded the defendants 1 to 3 to deliver back the suit schedule property after redeeming the mortgage but defendants gave evasive reply. There was a panchayat convened which was also of no avail. Plaintiffs had no other alternative except to file suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage. At that time, they came to know the unlawful acts i.e., in the second week of January 1991 and immediately, they went to the register's office and secured concocted documents and filed the suit by impleading defendants 4 to 8 being the subsequent alleged transferees. Plaintiffs had no other alternative except to file suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage. At that time, they came to know the unlawful acts i.e., in the second week of January 1991 and immediately, they went to the register's office and secured concocted documents and filed the suit by impleading defendants 4 to 8 being the subsequent alleged transferees. As against this averment, defendant 8 who alone filed the written statement, except saying that he has been in possession of the suit schedule property and the suit is beyond the period of limitation from the date of registered sale deed dated 25-1-1979 and claiming that he had perfected adverse possession, nothing is averred. 19. In Ex. P. 7, it is stated that the plaintiffs learnt the transaction 20 days prior to the filing of the suit and it is stated that they are not the residents of the village and they are living at Bangalore. This averment in the pleading in the plaint and Ex. P. 1, mortgage deed wherein, the mortgager-plaintiffs have stated that they are residing in Bangalore, they are not able to cultivate the land effectively and to discharge the loan, they have mortgaged the suit schedule property. This will show that the plaintiffs are not the residents of the said village and there is nothing to doubt the evidence of the plaintiffs as regards to the lack of knowledge on the date of registration of the document. The date of registration of the document would be the deemed knowledge, only if the plaintiffs fail to aver the lack of knowledge. 20. In this case, plaintiff has specifically averred of the knowledge in the year 1991 or little prior to the filing of the suit and it is also stated in his evidence that none of the vendors of defendant 8 have stepped into the witness-box. Defendant 8, except stating that he has perfected title by adverse possession and knowledge of the plaintiff by virtue of the registered deed has not seriously disputed the statement of the plaintiffs of the knowledge in the year 1991. 21. Both the Courts on this aspect have concurrently held against defendant 8. Under Article 61(b), limitation starts running from the date of knowledge of the transfer and the date of knowledge has been stated in this case. If that is taken into consideration, then the suit is well-within time. 21. Both the Courts on this aspect have concurrently held against defendant 8. Under Article 61(b), limitation starts running from the date of knowledge of the transfer and the date of knowledge has been stated in this case. If that is taken into consideration, then the suit is well-within time. The judgment of the Apex Court is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, as in the said case, there was no pleading or evidence. It is in these circumstances, Supreme Court observes that the date of registration is the date of deemed knowledge of the transfer. 22. Insofar as the provisions of Section 51 is concerned, first circumstance is that there is no sale deed executed by all the mortgagees. Only defendant 3 i.e., one of the mortgagees has executed the registered sale deed in favour of defendant 4, defendant 8 being the subsequent purchaser, it is his duty to make reasonable enquiry. Reasonable enquiry would trace back to the first sale deed and the first sale deed, if it was enquired. Admittedly, there was a registered mortgage and if the registered mortgage was in existence, defendant 8 should have made reasonable enquiry whether the vendor-defendant 3 could have executed the first sale deed on 25-1-1979. If there is no enquiry made by the defendant 8 as regards to the valid transfer of title, he cannot be held to be a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration on the basis of defective title to attract the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the plaintiff is not entitled for relief under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. 23. Hence for the reasons stated above, the substantial question of law is answered in negative. Appeal fails and the same is dismissed.