JUDGMENT 5. 4.5.10. This writ application has been filed for quashing of the charge sheet submitted by the C.B.I againstthe petitioner under Sections 120B, 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in R.C case no.06(A) of 2008AHDR and also for quashing of the order dated 17.12.2009 under which cognizance of the offences under Sections 120B, 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner. The facts leading to filing of this case are that the petitioner initially joined in the year 1976 as Upper Division Clerk at National Institute of Foundry and Forge Technology, Ranchi (in short NIFFT). In course of time, the petitioner in the year 2004 was promoted to the post of Assistant Registrar (Group A category). While the petitioner was holding such post, one firm, namely, M/s. Singh Security and Detective Services was engaged in the year 200506 for providing security to the properties of the NIFFT. It is the case of the petitioner that when terms of the said security agency got expired, the petitioner forwarded a note before the Director, NIFFT, requesting therein to pass order either for continuation of the said security agency or for engagement of other agency, upon which Director, NIFFT, took a decision to go for another security agency and for selecting the security agency, a committee was constituted to which the petitioner was a Convener. The committee on taking resolution made request to the Director General of Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to provide list of sponsors and also sought necessary information with respect to terms and conditions for the engagement of a security agency. By responding to the said request, Director General of Resettlement sent the name of three security agencies. On being noticed, only two of them submitted their quotations. The committee after scrutinizing the quotations submitted by them and after having negotiation, made recommendation on 11.10.2006 for engagement of one M/s. Lions' Security Agency for providing security to the properties of NIFFT which was approved by the Director, NIFFT and only then, work order was issued to M/s. Lions' Security Agency on 11.10.2006 for three months. The committee after scrutinizing the quotations submitted by them and after having negotiation, made recommendation on 11.10.2006 for engagement of one M/s. Lions' Security Agency for providing security to the properties of NIFFT which was approved by the Director, NIFFT and only then, work order was issued to M/s. Lions' Security Agency on 11.10.2006 for three months. After expiry of that period, terms of the said security agency was extended for one year under an agreement arrived at in between the parties on 14.8.2007. However, C.B.I upon receiving a complaint registered a case as R.C. No.06 (A) of 2008AHDRreg. against the petitioner and others alleging therein that NIFFT for the year 200506 had employed M/s. Singh Security Agency, Ranchi for providing security services and the said security agency during his engagement was provided with service charge @ 3.5% of the total wages but when the period of the said security agency got expired, the petitioner, being head of the Screening Committee selected M/s. Lions' Security Agency, Ranchi for providing security services whereby service charge to be paid was fixed as 12% of the total wages, though earlier service charge was paid to the security agency @ 3.5%. It has been further alleged that though the firm sponsored by DGR is entitled for service charge ranging from 12% to 18% but that is qualified with the condition that the agency has to employ minimum of 90% of exservice men, but in case of M/s. Lions' Security Agency only 57% of the exservice men were employed and still the service charge was paid @ 12% and, therefore, excess payment of Rs.9,96,944/ was paid to the security agency, as a result of which, NIFFT suffered a great loss. The said matter was taken up for investigation and on completion of the investigation, C.B.I wrote to the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution but the Chairman of the Board of Governor, vide its order as contained in letter dated 13.10.2009 refused to grant sanction for prosecution against the petitioner which decision was later on ratified by the Board of Governor but subsequently, the In charge, Director, NIFFT, respondent no.3, vide its order dated 11.12.2009 granted sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. Thereafter the C.B.I submitted charge sheet before the Special Judge on 15.12.2009, upon which cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned Special Judge, vide its order dated 17.12.2009 under Sections 120B, 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner and others. Being aggrieved with the submission of the charge sheet and also with the order taking cognizance, this writ application has been filed for quashing of the same. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner mainly assailed the order taking cognizance on the ground that Board of Governor being the appointing authority is competent to grant sanction but it is the Director, In charge, who has granted sanction and as such, it is nullity as Director, In charge being not an appointing authority of the petitioner has absolutely no authority to grant sanction. Learned counsel in order to substantiate his plea that it is the Board of Governor, who is the appointing authority referred to Annexure 15 which is an information furnished by the Deputy Secretary (PAE) pursuant to information sought under the R.T.I wherein it has been informed that the appointing authority in a case of Assistant Registrar is Board of Governor. By referring to that information, it was again reiterated that it is only the Board of Governor who is competent to grant sanction for prosecution. Learned counsel also put much emphasis on the point that earlier the Chairman, Board of Governor on the same fact had refused to grant sanction which decision had subsequently been ratified by the Board of Director and once the person competent to grant sanction has refused to grant sanction, it was never open by the Director, In charge to grant sanction on the same facts and, therefore, sanction granted by the Director, NIFFT who is not competent to grant sanction is nothing but a nullity and, therefore, any order taking cognizance on the basis of a sanction order which is a nullity is also bad and illegal and hence, it is fit to be quashed. Mr. Singh, pointed out that it was the final decision of the Director of NIFFT for engagement of M/s. Lions' Security Agency and not of the petitioner and as such, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed offence as has been alleged. Mr. Singh, pointed out that it was the final decision of the Director of NIFFT for engagement of M/s. Lions' Security Agency and not of the petitioner and as such, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed offence as has been alleged. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the NIFFT wherein by referring to the provision of the NIFFT Employees' (Conduct) Rules, it has been stated that 'disciplinary authority' in a case of Director is the Chairman of the Board of Governor whereas in case of all other employees, it is the Director and as such, sanction granted by the Director can never be said to be bad. Mr. Rajeev Ranjan, learned counsel appearing for the NIFFT submits that in view of the statutory rules defining 'disciplinary authority' information as furnished under Annexure 15 about the Board of Director being the appointing authority cannot hold any field and as such, the petitioner cannot take advantage of it. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the C.B.I submits that order granting sanction even if suffers from any irregularity, error or omission, it will have no adverse effect on its validity in view of the provision as contained in subsections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and, therefore, the order taking cognizance never warrants to be interfered with by this Court Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, controversy which has emerged out is that whether it is the Board of Governor or it is the Director, who is competent to grant sanction for prosecution. On one hand information furnished by Deputy Secretary (PAE) on an application filed under the R.T.I goes to show that it is the Board of Governor who is the appointing authority of the Assistant Registrar but on the other hand, the disciplinary authority, who as per NIFFT Employees' (Conduct) Rules and Discipline and Appeal Rules has power to impose penalty or termination is the Chairman of the Board of Governor in a case of Director whereas it is the Director, in case of all other employees. Therefore, any information given under the R.T.I Act will have no bearing at all over the statutory rules. Thus, prima facie, I do find that it is the Director of the Institute (NIFFT), who is competent to grant sanction for the prosecution. Therefore, any information given under the R.T.I Act will have no bearing at all over the statutory rules. Thus, prima facie, I do find that it is the Director of the Institute (NIFFT), who is competent to grant sanction for the prosecution. Otherwise also, even if the order granting sanction (Annexure 2) suffers from any defect, illegality or irregularity, it does not warrant to be interfered with by this Court, in view of the provision as contained in subsection (3) read with subsection (4) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act which reads as follows: 19(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under subsection (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. 4. In determining under subsection (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. 4. In determining under subsection (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation For the purposes of this section, (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature." A combined reading of subsections (3) and (4) makes the position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under subsection (1), unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. It be noted that explanation (a) to subsection (4) does stipulate that error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction meaning thereby, in my opinion, that even if the order granting sanction is assailable on the ground that the authority is incompetent to grant sanction, it cannot be interfered with by the court unless it is shown that the said defect/irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. The aforesaid proposition has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of State of Police Inspector vs. T. Venkatesh Murthy (supra) which view has been reiterated subsequently in a case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Virndra Kumar Tripathy (supra). In the instant case, nowhere it has been pleaded or even submitted that the order granting sanction has occasioned any failure of justice. Thus, the impugned order under which cognizance of the offence has been taken never warrants to be interfered with. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this application and hence, this application is dismissed. Before parting with this order it be observed that any observation or finding given on any point shall not be prejudicial to the case of the parties.