JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The aforementioned miscellaneous cases have been registered on separate applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ('the Act') for condonation of delay of 59 days in filing the accompanying writ appeals against the common Judgment and order dated 29.4.2009 passed in the corresponding writ petitions being WP(C) No. 118/2006 and WP(C) No. 99/2006. 2. We have heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, senior advocate assisted by Mr. R. Dubey, Advocate for the applicants and Ms. Subrata Borah Chowlek and Ms. Anima Das Gogoi, opposite party in person. 3. An abridged version of the facts leading to the present applications is indispensable for appropriate comprehension of the rival pleas. The opposite party instituted the abovementioned writ proceedings seeking an appropriate writ and/or direction from this Court to the appellant-Corporation (applicant herein) for regularization of their services under it from the dates of their initial appointment, as well as for disbursement of their service dues consequent thereto. They pleaded to have responded to an employment notice issued by the Corporation and published in the daily Assam Tribune for filling up of two posts of Teachers in Primary School (English medium) against permanent vacancies. Though, on their successful participation in the various segments of the selection process, they were appointed, their recruitment as teachers was for less than 45 days with the basic pay of Rs. 2,263 per month. This, the writ petitioners contended was in gross departure from the stipulations in the advertisement. The initial term of their appointment was thereafter extended intermittently and their pay was enhanced to Rs. 5,400 per month. As their engagements from time to time was effected with artificial breaks in between and inspite of repeated representations, their services were not regularized with consequential benefits, they approached this Court for redressal of their grievances as indicated hereinabove. 4. The applicants (respondents in the writ petitions) while admitting the initiation of a selection process by the employment notice as above, asserted that the appointments of the opposite party-writ petitioners as teachers were on temporary basis in a School run by the Assam Oil Division of the Corporation. They contended that the School did not form an integral part of the Corporation and in fact was closed in the year 2004 owing to an irreversible fall in enrollment. They contended that the School did not form an integral part of the Corporation and in fact was closed in the year 2004 owing to an irreversible fall in enrollment. According to them, the opposite party-writ petitioners were thereafter re-deployed as temporary Junior Clerk Typists in May 2006. The applicants-respondents, however, admitted that the opposite party-writ petitioners were not in receipt of the full service benefits such as, annual increments, loan and advances etc. availed of by the regular employees of the Corporation. The Opposite party-writ petitioners in their reply, however, reiterated their assertions in the writ petitions. 5. The learned Single Judge by the judgment and order dated 29.4.2009 after hearing the parties and on a consideration of the materials on record, allowed the writ petitions with a direction to the respondent-Corporation to treat the petitioners to have been regularly appointed with effect from the dates of their initial appointment with all consequential service benefits including notional fixation of pay from the date(s) of such appointment and to release their arrear salary on and from the date of filing of the writ petitions. All consequential service benefits were also directed to be made available to the opposite party-writ petitioner. 6. In course of the adjudicative process preceding such directions, the learned Single Judge on a scrutiny of the official records pertaining to the selection, observed that the same did not disclose any reason or justification for the appointment of the opposite party-writ petitioners, though selected, on fixed pay basis and for a limited duration with recurrent extensions involving artificial breaks in deviances from the covenants embodied in the advertisement. The admission on the part of the Corporation that its stand that the School, in which the opposite party-writ petitioners had been initially recruited was not an integral part of it, was untenable was noted as well. Observing that in the contextual facts the opposite party-writ petitioners not only fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed by the advertisement, but also had been duly selected on the basis thereof, the learned Single Judge on an exhaustive survey of the judicial precedents on the issues seeking adjudication, sustained the challenge. 7. Observing that in the contextual facts the opposite party-writ petitioners not only fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed by the advertisement, but also had been duly selected on the basis thereof, the learned Single Judge on an exhaustive survey of the judicial precedents on the issues seeking adjudication, sustained the challenge. 7. The applicants-respondents in their endeavor to explain the delay, have asserted that on receipt of the copy of the Judgment and order on 4.5.2009, the Assam Oil Division of the Corporation on 7.5.2009 sought the legal opinion of its conducting counsel Sri S.N. Sarma, senior advocate at Guwahati. The latter having rendered the same on 21.5.2009 it was forwarded by the Assam Oil Division by it letter dated 28.5.2009 to the General Manager(H.R.), Refinery Head Quarters, New Delhi seeking his further instructions in the matter. This authority, in turn requisitioned the documents from the Assam Oil Division, Digboi through its letter dated 6.6.2009 along with a copy of the Judgment. These documents were forwarded on 18.6.2009 by the General Manager (H.R.) to the Corporation's corporate legal advisers M/s. Koura & Co., Advocates and Barristers in New Delhi. The applicants-respondents have further asserted that due to the summer vacation of the hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court, the learned lawyers of M/s. Koura & Co., were on leave and the matter was attended to by them thereafter culminating in a legal opinion on 7.7.2009 advising the Corporation to file an appeal against the judgment and order dated 29.4.2009. On the receipt of the said legal advice, a note was put up by the Refinery Head Quarters, New Delhi before the competent authority seeking approval to file an appeal. The said approval having been granted on 8.7.2009, the Corporation's corporate legal advisers aforenamed were requested to prepare the memorandum of appeal for which the complete file of papers was sought for by them. It was after detailed discussions held with the officials of the Assam Oil Division as well as the Refinery Head Quarters, New Delhi that the complete file of papers were delivered to M/s. Koura & Co., on 15.7.2009 and on the preparation of the memoranda of appeal, the same were filed before this Court. A delay of 59 days was caused in the process. A delay of 59 days was caused in the process. According to the applicants, the delay had neither been intentional, nor for any deliberate inaction on their part and that in the interest of justice the same deserves to be condoned. 8. The opposite party writ-petitioners in identical affidavits filed individually, have in substance pleaded that the cause shown is insufficient and that as amongst others delay in the successive stages of the process referred to by the applicants had not been satisfactorily explained, the prayer made for condonation thereof ought not to be acceded to. 9. Mr. Choudhury, while abiding by the pleaded averments in the applications has persuasively urged that as the same demonstrably establish a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act, the marginal delay of 59 days ought to be condoned in the interest of justice. According to the learned senior counsel the steps in series as involved in the process leading to the filing of the appeal being indispensable and there being nothing on record to indicate intentional lapse or negligence on the part of the applicant/Corporation, it ought not to be shut out from pursuing its cause on merits. 10. The opposite party-respondents in person while reiterating that no sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay, have urged that on merits as well the applicant-Corporation's case is indefensible and merit less and, therefore, the prayer for condonation of delay ought to be rejected. 11. We have extended our thoughtful consideration to the competing pleadings and the arguments advanced. Without dilating on the merits of the decision rendered in the writ proceedings, suffice it would be to mention at the threshold that the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause proffered by the applicants would have to be essentially judged on the touch stone of the period of limitation prescribed for preferring the appeal against the same. The Judgment and order under appeal had been rendered on 29.4.2009, a copy whereof admittedly had been received by the applicant-Corporation on 4.5.2009. The legal opinion offered by its conducting counsel was received by it on 21.5.2009. It is not the case of the Corporation that it had been unaware of the period of limitation for these appeals as prescribed by the relevant rules. The legal opinion offered by its conducting counsel was received by it on 21.5.2009. It is not the case of the Corporation that it had been unaware of the period of limitation for these appeals as prescribed by the relevant rules. This is significant in the context of the omission on its part to disclose in their applications the reason for seeking a second opinion from its corporate legal Advisers M/s. Koura & Co., New Delhi as by that time, the period of limitation prescribed was on the verge of being over. From the averments in the applications, even if taken on their face value, it is obvious that the opinion rendered by the Corporations conducting counsel was forwarded to the General Manager (H.R.), Refinery Headquarters, New Delhi after a week, i.e., on 28.5.2009 of the receipt thereof whereafter certain documents were sought for by the latter on 6.6.2009, i.e., again a week thereafter. The documents were finally dispatched to the Corporation's corporate legal advisers at Delhi on 18.6.2009 which, however, could not be examined in view of the ongoing summer vacation of the hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court, for which the learned lawyers of the said corporate firm were on vacation/leave. It was only on 7.7.2009, i.e., almost three weeks after the documents were forwarded that the Corporation's learned lawyers in Delhi advised in favour of filing of the appeal and on completion of the necessary legal formalities, those were in fact lodged with this Court on 29.7.2009. 12. Having regard to the sequence of events as enumerated hereinabove, we are constrained to hold that the plea for consideration of delay taken by the applicants/respondents in absence of satisfactory explanations against the time consumed at various stages of the exercise represented cannot be sustained. 13. At all relevant times, the applicant-Corporation and its advocates were aware of the period of limitation involved and were, thus, required in law to be adequately active and vigilant either to meet the deadline or to minimize the delay as far as possible. However, the series of events as shown to have progressed, in our estimate do not reveal either any such concern or endeavor on their part to that effect. However, the series of events as shown to have progressed, in our estimate do not reveal either any such concern or endeavor on their part to that effect. The applicant-Corporation seems to have only casually fleeted from one stage to the other and did even afford to wait for the summer vacation of the hon'ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court to end though fully aware that thereby the enjoinment of limitation of time would be breached by a fair margin. Further no explanation either cogent or persuasive is available for the periods between 6.6.2009 and 18.6.2009, and 7.7.2009 and 29.7.2009 when viewed in the above perspective. 14. Condonation of delay, it is no longer res Integra, is not a matter of right, the essential pre-condition whereof is a sufficient cause satisfactorily explaining the same. There is no straitjacket formula to adjudge a sufficient cause, an appraisal whereof has to be logically individualistic contingent on the attendant facts and circumstances. By no means, if sufficient cause in wanting, delay can be condoned merely on equitable or sympathetic considerations. Though, a liberal approach in analyzing the cause is generally adopted, it cannot displace the imperative essentiality of a convincing and rational explanation to avail the discretionary relief. 15. As such, the averments made in the application do not disclose any weighty or convincing cause to construe the same as sufficient within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. The applicant-Corporation had since the delivery of the judgment and order involved been cavalier and nonchalant in its approach. No urge or concern to act with expedition or dispatch in view of the period of limitation prescribed is discernible in its enterprise to decide the next course of action following the decision of the Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the applicants are not entitled to the equitable relief of condonation of delay, they having utterly failed to offer a sufficient cause there for in filing the accompanying writ appeals. 16. These miscellaneous applications having been heard analogously, the pleadings being identical and the arguments common, are, thus, hereby rejected by this order on the aforementioned determinations. The parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.