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2010 DIGILAW 56 (KER)

Valothil Jose v. State Of Kerala

2010-01-20

M.C.HARI RANI, R.BASANT

body2010
Judgment : Is absolute perfection in proof to be insisted to record/uphold a verdict of guilty and conviction? Is there any distinction between the "belief" in the existence of a fact by a court and its satisfaction "that a prudent person ought to proceed on the supposition that such fact exists"? Is such "belief" invariably to be insisted in all criminal cases? In the wake of the same definition for the expression`proved' in Civil and Criminal trials under Section 3 of the Evidence Act how can the traditional insistence on a superior probative satisfaction in a criminal trial - that of proof beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt, be justified? 2. These thoughts are aroused in our mind incidentally in this case, where the appellant challenges the verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence in an indictment for uxoricide under Section 302 IPC. 3. The prosecution alleged that the appellant herein has caused the death of his wife Jessy @ Jessamma, who was nine months' pregnant, on 30.4.2002 at about 1.30 a.m. by inflicting multiple injuries on her by stabbing her with a sharp knife - MO11. The prosecution alleged that such injuries were inflicted by the accused on his wife on account of suspicion regarding her chastity. 4. A crime was registered on the basis of Exhibit P1 First Information Statement lodged by PW1, a neighbour at 11 a.m. on 30.4.2002, the offence having been committed earlier at 1.30 a.m. on that day. Exhibit P1(a) FIR was registered and PW17 after completion of investigation filed the charge sheet (final report) against the accused. 5. In all, the prosecution had relied on the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 17, Exts.P1 to P20 and M.Os 1 to 11. The accused had adduced the evidence of DW1 as a defence witness. The prosecution relied on 8 circumstances, which we shall narrate later, to drive home its case against the accused. 6. Though the prosecution expected to place before court evidence in support of the said eight circumstances and examined PWs 1 to 17, in support of its case, the major chunk of the so called independent witnesses turned hostile to the prosecution leaving the prosecution in a helpless situation. 6. Though the prosecution expected to place before court evidence in support of the said eight circumstances and examined PWs 1 to 17, in support of its case, the major chunk of the so called independent witnesses turned hostile to the prosecution leaving the prosecution in a helpless situation. The prosecution was constrained to contend that though the evidence that they had expected to adduce could not be adduced, sufficient evidence has been adduced of circumstances which clearly show that the offence alleged against the accused has been proved. 7. PW1, the neighbour who lodged Exhibit P1 First Information Statement turned hostile to the prosecution with impunity. He tendered evidence against his own version in Exhibit P1 as also the crucial portions of the case diary statement which he had allegedly given before the Investigating Officer. PW1 was not an eye witness. He was a neighbour, who was allegedly informed about the incident by PW14, the son of the accused. He then had allegedly rushed to the house of the accused and there the accused allegedly stated that the deceased had inflicted the injuries on herself. This version was completely disowned by PW1 and he was declared hostile and cross-examined. 8. PWs 2, 3 and 5 supported the prosecution case. They are the witnesses examined by the prosecution to show that the accused had a motive to do away with his wife. In short, the motive is that the accused had suspected the chastity of his pregnant wife-the deceased. His suspicion was that PW5 was having an illicit relationship with her. 9. PW4, a neighbour, was examined by the prosecution with a view to prove its case that he had come to the scene immediately after the occurrence and the accused had advanced a version that the deceased had inflicted injuries on herself. This witness also did not support the prosecution case and he was declared hostile. 10. PW6 is an attestor to the inquest report Ext.P2. M.Os 1 to 3, the articles found on the dead body, were seized under Ext.P2. 11. PWs 14 and 15 are children of the deceased and the accused. This witness also did not support the prosecution case and he was declared hostile. 10. PW6 is an attestor to the inquest report Ext.P2. M.Os 1 to 3, the articles found on the dead body, were seized under Ext.P2. 11. PWs 14 and 15 are children of the deceased and the accused. As stated earlier, the prosecution wanted to examine them in support of its case that when they, who were sleeping in the adjacent room, woke up hearing the cries of the deceased, they had seen the accused and the deceased in the bed room grappling with each other. They (accused and the deceased) had injuries on them. Both PWs 14 and 15 turned hostile to the prosecution completely and did not support the case of the prosecution. In Court they advanced a totally different version. They were declared hostile and cross examined by the Prosecutor. 12. PW10 had conducted postmortem examination on the body of the deceased and had issued Ext.P5. The prosecution examined PW10 to prove that the deceased had the injuries described in Ext.P5 on her, that the injuries except injury No.21 could all be inflicted with M.O 11 and that injury No.21 can be the result of contact with a hard and rough surface. PW10 further asserted that the fatal injuries, ie. injury Nos.2 and 9 described in Ext.P5 are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 13. PW16 conducted substantial portion of the investigation and PW17 filed the charge sheet after completing the investigation. The accused was initially kept under surveillance. He was arrested on 30.04.2002 at 10 p.m. He allegedly made a confession statement and on the basis of the confession statement Ext.P3(a), M.O 11 was recovered from its place of concealment in the latrine at the back of the house of the accused. PWs.7 and 8 are witnesses who had allegedly witnessed the seizure of M.O 11 under Ext.P3 and had signed as attestors to Ext.P3 seizure mahazar. Both PWs 7 and 8 did not support the case of the prosecution. They turned hostile to the prosecution. They were declared hostile and were cross examined. They admitted their signatures in Ext.P3, but did not subscribe to the contents of Ext.P3. 14. Both PWs 7 and 8 did not support the case of the prosecution. They turned hostile to the prosecution. They were declared hostile and were cross examined. They admitted their signatures in Ext.P3, but did not subscribe to the contents of Ext.P3. 14. PW13 is the Sub Inspector of Police, who had recorded Exts.P1 F.I statement and registered Ext.P1(a) F.I.R. He found that the accused had injuries on his person and had sent the accused to PW9 for medical examination. PW9 found that the accused had 2 injuries on his person - one incised wound on the left palm and an abrasion on the right shoulder. Ext.P4 is the wound certificate issued by PW9 after examining the accused. 15. PW12 had prepared Ext.P9 sketch of the scene of occurrence on the basis of the scene mahazar and PW11, a head constable, had seized articles under Exts.P6, P7 and P8. It is not necessary to refer in detail to the Material Objects so recovered. 16. The accused, in the course of cross examination of the prosecution witnesses, when examined later under 313 Cr.P.C and by examination of DW1 and also with the help of the hostile witnesses, attempted to advance a version that the incident had not taken place in the manner alleged by the prosecution at all. We may note that PWs 1 and 4 neighbours, PWs 14 and 15 – the children of the accused as also DW1 - another neighbour, extended complete support to the accused in advancing this version. The version of the accused can be summarised as follows: 17. He is a quarry worker. After the day's work, he was returning to his house. In the course of his day's work, he had suffered the injury on the left palm described in Ext.P4. He had asked his son PW14 to come to the local bazar. He met his son PW14 there and together, after purchase of articles, they were returning to their house. PW15, the younger child and the deceased alone were available in the house. As they approached the house, they heard the cries of the deceased from the house. They allegedly saw one person lighting his torch and running away from the house. The accused could not trace or stop that person. They went into the house. Some neighbours also came to the house. As they approached the house, they heard the cries of the deceased from the house. They allegedly saw one person lighting his torch and running away from the house. The accused could not trace or stop that person. They went into the house. Some neighbours also came to the house. They all found that the deceased had suffered the injuries described in Ext.P5. The accused had told every one truthfully that he saw a person running away from the house with a torch light. M.O11 knife was available at the scene. In short, the contention is that the deceased suffered injuries not at the hands of the accused as alleged by the prosecution, but at the hands of that other person, who allegedly was seen running away from the house when the accused and his son PW14 reached near the house. He admitted that the 2nd injury - abrasion on the shoulder was suffered by him in the house. According to him that injury was suffered accidentally when his shoulder came into contact with the wall in his house. 18. The court below on an anxious consideration of all the relevant inputs, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the injuries found on the deceased described in Ext.P5 were all inflicted on the deceased by the accused. Accordingly the court below proceeded to pass the impugned verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence. 19. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State have advanced their arguments. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the prosecution evidence has been shaken. The prosecution has not succeeded in proving the facts on which the prosecution initially proposed to rely on. Circumstances which have been adduced in evidence are not sufficient or satisfactory to come to a safe conclusion of guilt against the accused. At any rate, the version advanced by the accused competes in probabilities with the version advanced by Crl.Appeal No.732 of 2006 9 the prosecution and the benefit of doubt must, in these circumstances, be unhesitatingly conceded to the accused. In these circumstances, the appeal may be allowed and the accused may be acquitted, contends the learned counsel for the appellant. 20. In these circumstances, the appeal may be allowed and the accused may be acquitted, contends the learned counsel for the appellant. 20. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contends that it is true that the prosecution has not been able to adduce evidence about all circumstances which they initially wanted to rely on. But all the same, the surviving evidence that is available is more than sufficient for a prudent person to come to a conclusion that the injuries described in Ext.P5 must have been inflicted by the accused on the deceased. The learned Public Prosecutor argues that sufficient materials have been placed to satisfy the expression "proved" as defined under Section 3 of the Evidence Act to persuade the Court to "believe" that the fact - that the fatal injuries were inflicted on the deceased by the accused, exists. At any rate, the totality of evidence must satisfy the Court that a prudent person, in the circumstances of the case, must proceed on the supposition that such fact exists - ie. the injuries were inflicted on the deceased by the accused. 21. The expression "proved" is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. What we have to consider is whether the circumstances established before the Court by the prosecution is sufficient to justify the conclusion of the court below that the injuries described in Ext.P5 were inflicted on the deceased by the accused. 22. We shall now consider whether the 8 circumstances, relied on by the prosecution enumerated below have been proved or not. We shall then consider whether the facts that have been proved is sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty and conviction. 23. The eight circumstances relied on by the prosecution are enunciated below: (i) Motive which the prosecution expected to prove through Pws 2 and 3 - sister and brother of the deceased and PW5, a former neighbour with whom the accused allegedly suspected that his wife was having illicit relationship. As a corollary the prosecution wants to rely on the circumstance that no other person has any motive or animosity against the deceased. (ii) That the deceased suffered death by intentional infliction of injuries with a weapon like MO11 in the bed room of her house on the night of 29.4.2002. As a corollary the prosecution wants to rely on the circumstance that no other person has any motive or animosity against the deceased. (ii) That the deceased suffered death by intentional infliction of injuries with a weapon like MO11 in the bed room of her house on the night of 29.4.2002. (iii) That the injuries (21 in all) suffered by the deceased were homicidal injuries which could not have been self-inflicted injuries. (iv) In her house on that night when she sustained the fatal injuries, there was no one other than the accused and their minor children, Pws 14 and 15. (v) That the children, who were sleeping in the adjacent room, woke up from their sleep on hearing the cries of their mother and found the accused and the deceased grappling on the floor of the bed room. (vi) That the accused offered an improbable and patently false explanation to those who came to the scene, that the deceased had inflicted the injuries on herself. (vii) When persons rushed to the scene on coming to know of the incident, the accused had two injuries - a bleeding injury on the left palm and an abrasion, on his person. (viii) That MO11 knife was recovered from the place of its concealment by the police on the basis of the information furnished to the police by the accused in the confession statement which he allegedly made after his arrest. 24. The first circumstance relied on is the circumstance of existence of motive for the accused against the deceased. PWs , 3 and 5 have tendered evidence. We are left with not a semblance of doubt in our mind that evidence of motive spoken to by PWs 2, 3 and 5 which is relied on by the court below can safely be accepted. It has come out in evidence clearly from the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 5 that the accused entertained suspicion about the chastity of his pregnant wife. Though it is urged that any one of the persons with whom the deceased was having illicit relationship (like PW5) may have entertained motive against her, this remains only a weird theoretical possibility and not a practical probability. The first circumstance relied on by the prosecution is thus established convincingly by the evidence on record. 25. Though it is urged that any one of the persons with whom the deceased was having illicit relationship (like PW5) may have entertained motive against her, this remains only a weird theoretical possibility and not a practical probability. The first circumstance relied on by the prosecution is thus established convincingly by the evidence on record. 25. That the deceased suffered injuries on the night of 29.04.2002 at the bed room in her house is established beyond the shadow of a doubt. There is no serious challenge against this finding entered by the court below. That is the case of the accused also. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for us to delve deeper into that question. We agree that the second circumstance has been established satisfactorily. 26. The third circumstance relied on is that all these injuries are homicidal injuries and are not suicidal injuries. On this aspect also it is unnecessary to be detained any further. Both sides agree now and there is convincing evidence beyond doubt that the injuries described in Ext.P5 could not have been suffered otherwise than by the infliction of those injuries on the deceased by another. The court below has extracted the details of the injuries. We conclude that the third circumstance that these injuries are homicidal and are not suicidal injuries has also been established beyond doubt. 27. The fourth circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the deceased was available in the house along with her husband-the accused. and 2 minor children at the time when the injuries were suffered by her. The learned Public Prosecutor would argue that if this circumstance is proved, in the wake of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it will be up to the accused to explain how the incident took place. In support of this proposition if precedents be necessary, the learned Public Prosecutor relies on Trimukh M.Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006 (4) KLT 638 (SC)]. No precedent is necessary in support of that proposition. But the accused sets up a contention that the accused was not available in the house and that he along with PW14 was returning to the house. He also accepts that PW15 was available in the house. 28. No precedent is necessary in support of that proposition. But the accused sets up a contention that the accused was not available in the house and that he along with PW14 was returning to the house. He also accepts that PW15 was available in the house. 28. We must agree that consequent to consistent and concerted hostility of PWs 1, 4, 14 and 15, there is no satisfactory evidence available before Court to conclude that the accused was present inside the house when the injuries were suffered by the deceased. We shall later proceed to consider whether the defence version can be accepted or not. At the moment, we need only note that though it is proved convincingly that the homicidal injuries were suffered by the deceased in the bed room of her house on the night of 29.04.2002, there is no direct evidence to conclude that the accused was available inside the house at that time. We do alertly note immediately that, going by his own version, the accused was available near the house along with PW14. 29. The fifth circumstance which the prosecution wanted to rely on was the statement of PW14 and 15 that when they woke up hearing the cries of the deceased, they had found the accused and the deceased grappling in the bed room both having suffered injuries. Consequent to the complete hostility of PWs 14 and 15, the prosecution has not been able to establish this fifth circumstance relied upon by them though it is established convincingly that PW15 was available in the house when the deceased suffered injuries and that PW14 was available at least near the house when the deceased suffered injuries. 30. The sixth circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the accused offered a false explanation to those who came to the scene including PW1 that the deceased had inflicted injuries on herself. This is borne out clearly by Ext.P1 F.I statement, the signature in which is admitted by PW1 though PW1 now chooses to eat his own words and has not subscribed to the contents of Ext.P1. The evidence of PW1 and PW13 read along with Ext.P1 clearly and convincingly show that Ext.P1 statement was given by PW1 to PW13 and on the basis of that the F.I.R was recorded on the same day later. The evidence of PW1 and PW13 read along with Ext.P1 clearly and convincingly show that Ext.P1 statement was given by PW1 to PW13 and on the basis of that the F.I.R was recorded on the same day later. We find no semblance of doubt on this fact and on the genuineness of Ext.P1 notwithstanding the deliberate attempt of PW1 to deviate from that version on oath. 31. The seventh circumstance relied on by the prosecution was that the accused had injuries on his person described in Ext.P4. Two injuries are described in Ext.P4. These injuries, if proved to have been suffered by the accused at the scene when the deceased suffered injuries, would have gone a long way to help the prosecution to prove its case. But consequent to the hostility of PWs 1, 4, 14 and 15, we have no evidence to show that the accused had suffered the injuries in the course of the same incident. Though all the witnesses in unison had stated before the police that there was a bleeding injury on the left palm of the accused when they first saw the accused and the deceased with injuries, the accused now has set up a contention that the injury on the palm was suffered not at the scene, but earlier at the quarry where he worked. We shall for a moment ignore injury No.1. It will be crucial to note that injury No.2 has not been explained satisfactorily by the accused. That injury is consistent with the case of the prosecution, supported by the plurality of injuries described in Ext.P5, that before the deceased suffered the last of those injuries found on her person, there must have been a grappling and push and pull between the deceased and the assailant. The incised injury is on the left palm of the accused. It is not proved that he is a left hander. The possibility of that injury being caused when he wielded the weapon to inflict injuries on the deceased is not convincingly indicated. Going by the prosecution case that injury must have been suffered by an accidental contact with M.O11 when the accused was engaged in infliction of the multiple injuries on the deceased. Ext.P4 does not give details of the second injury - ie. the dimensions. The first injury is a 6 c.m long skin deep incised injury. Going by the prosecution case that injury must have been suffered by an accidental contact with M.O11 when the accused was engaged in infliction of the multiple injuries on the deceased. Ext.P4 does not give details of the second injury - ie. the dimensions. The first injury is a 6 c.m long skin deep incised injury. The evidence of PW9 does not help us to fix the time of the injury satisfactorily. Though the incised injury on the left palm is not proved convincingly to have been suffered in the course of the incident, the fact remains that the accused had on his person that injury which is congruent to the version of the prosecution as also an unexplained injury - injury No.2 described in Ext.P4 immediately after the occurrence. 32. The eighth and the last circumstance relied on by the prosecution is the statement admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act allegedly given by the accused in the course of his confession statement that he had concealed M.O 11 knife above the wall in the latrine behind the house where the incident took place. We have substantive evidence of this statement from PW16, the Investigating Officer. The evidence of PW16 shows that Ext.P3(a) information was furnished by the accused in the confession statement and that had led to the recovery of M.O 11 knife from its place of concealment in the latrine of the accused, which weapon, going by the evidence of PW10 doctor, could be used for the infliction of the injuries described in Ext.P5. The prosecution wanted to examine PWs 7 and 8 to prove this recovery. But both PWs 7 and 8 turned hostile to the prosecution. The evidence of PW16 about recovery is convincingly corroborated by the contents of Ext.P3 seizure mahazar. It is further corroborated by the admission of hostile PWs 7 and 8 that they had signed as attestors in Ext.P3 mahazar, the contents of which convincingly support the version of PW16. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the hostility of PWs 7 and 8 cannot in any measure persuade us to reject the evidence of PW16 supported by Ext.P3 that the recovery of M.O 11 was made on the basis of Ext.P3(a) information furnished by the accused. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the hostility of PWs 7 and 8 cannot in any measure persuade us to reject the evidence of PW16 supported by Ext.P3 that the recovery of M.O 11 was made on the basis of Ext.P3(a) information furnished by the accused. A reading of the evidence of PWs 7 and 8 shows unmistakably that they are not worthy of credence and their hostility cannot deliver any advantage to the accused. Though it is not specifically urged, we have considered the purported incongruity in the version of the prosecution regarding the concealment of M.O11 by the accused. The case of the prosecution is that the accused initially offered an explanation that the deceased had inflicted the injuries on herself. If that be the version, the weapon used for the commission must have been at the scene of the crime and could not have been elsewhere. From this emerges the improbability of the accused taking the weapon away and concealing it elsewhere. It is true that there is an element of contradiction between the two. But the state of mind of the accused at that point of time has to be borne in mind. He did not have the time or ingenuity to conceive a fool proof defence to explain all circumstances. He must have been in a dilemma. His children had seen the latter part of the incident. The convenient instant explanation offered - of self infliction, must have aroused dissatisfaction immediately in his mind itself. Before the neighbours reached the scene, he had to take a decision on the explanation. In this context, if he resorts to the course of concealing the weapon before the neighbours reached the scene, there is nothing improbable or artificial in the same to persuade the Court to commit the indiscretion of throwing over-board the version of the Investigating Officer about recovery in an omnibus manner. It is significant that Ext.P1 F.I.R or Ext.P2 Inquest Report does not refer to the presence of M.O11 weapon at the scene of the crime. There is no reasonable ground to apprehend that PW16, the Investigating Officer, had removed M.O11 or concealed the same to create false evidence against the appellant. 33. We now come to the version which the accused attempted to advance in Court. There is no reasonable ground to apprehend that PW16, the Investigating Officer, had removed M.O11 or concealed the same to create false evidence against the appellant. 33. We now come to the version which the accused attempted to advance in Court. We have narrated all the circumstances relied on by the prosecution and the extent to which the prosecution has succeeded in establishing those incriminating circumstances. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that in addition to these 8 circumstances, the prosecution now wants to rely on a ninth circumstance that is the totally false and unacceptable version advanced by the accused with the support of hostile PWs 1, 4, 14 and 15. The learned Public Prosecutor argues that this Court may consider whether this version is acceptable and if the Court finds this version not acceptable, the false version advanced must also be taken along with other circumstances while trying to decide the guilt of the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor in thiscontext relies on the decision in Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [A.I.R 2007 S.C 2531] to argue that a false version advanced can itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstance. 34. In this context it becomes necessary and important for this Court to consider whether the version advanced by the accused, of course with the help of PWs 1, 4, 14 and 15, can be accepted and whether that is a true or false version. One cannot lose sight of the fact that PW1 has tendered evidence against his own admitted Ext.P1 F.I statement. Ext.P1 F.I statement can certainly be made use of by the court while assessing and evaluating the evidence of PW1. It is now evident that the version of PW1 advanced as a hostile witness in court is totally unreliable and he is advancing a totally false and different version to oblige the accused. So is the version of PW4 also. The case diary contradictions reveal that the version of PW4 in court is not worth the paper on which it is written and he has deliberately and with malicious intent deviated from his earlier version before the police to oblige the accused. 35. So is the version of Pws 14 and 15. A careful reading of the evidence of Pws 1,4,14 and 15 can convincingly reveal that all those witnesses are speaking falsehood against their own earlier versions. 35. So is the version of Pws 14 and 15. A careful reading of the evidence of Pws 1,4,14 and 15 can convincingly reveal that all those witnesses are speaking falsehood against their own earlier versions. It does not require the wisdom of Solomon to scan the oral evidence of Pws 1, 4, 14 and 15 and sail to the absolutely safe conclusion that Pws 1, 4, 14 and 15 have no regard for truth at all on oath and are advancing a version convenient to the accused with the deliberate purpose of helping and assisting him. The earliest version of PW1 in Ext.P1 F.I.S is perhaps a very good foundation on which the oral evidence of PW1 and the version which the accused has attempted to advance now with the help and co-operation of PW1 can be judged. Pws 14 and 15 are minor children at the relevant time and the indications available suggest eloquently that they are under the patronage and protection of the accused and his relatives. A prudent mind cannot, in these circumstances, attach any significance or importance to the version of Pws 1,4,14 and 15 which stands discredited by their own intrinsic worth as also when assessed in the light of the previous statements made. 36. While considering this last circumstance, it will not be inappropriate to note that the accused has no case whatsoever that the police were in any way interested in falsely implicating him for any reason. Nor is there anything to suggest that the police were interested in helping that other person who is alleged to have run away from the scene of the occurrence with the torch light in his hands when the deceased started crying and attracted the attention of others. In this context, we again visit the circumstance that Ext.P1 F.I.S has been recorded at the earliest immediately after the occurrence. If it were true that a person had run away from the scene of the crime, we find it improbable, nay impossible, that such an F.I.S like Ext.P1 would have been recorded by PW13 from PW1. 37. It would be relevant in this context to note that the accused has not succeeded at all in trying to show that any other person was interested in doing away with the deceased. 37. It would be relevant in this context to note that the accused has not succeeded at all in trying to show that any other person was interested in doing away with the deceased. The accused attempts to point the accusing finger at PW5; but a careful evaluation of the evidence of PW5 in the light of the other circumstances exposes the hollowness, emptiness and falsity of the theory that PW5 could have been the person who allegedly ran away from the scene of the crime. 38. To crown all other circumstances when we consider circumstance No.9, we must note that prior to the commencement of the trial, at no point of time, had the accused advanced a version anywhere that the deceased might have suffered the injuries at the hands of a stranger who allegedly ran away from the scene of the crime. Criminal trial cannot be reduced to a mere fanciful flight of imagination. The explanations offered must be reasonable, cogent and appealing to a prudent mind if not necessarily to a trained legal mind. If, as a matter of fact, there was even the remote possibility of such an event - another assailant inflicting the injuries and running away from the scene of the crime, we find absolutely no reason as to why PW1 does not state so in Ext.P1 to the police. We do not find any reason why the accused did not advance such a version before the police. We do not find any reason why an F.I.R on such allegation was not and could not be registered by the police. The cross-examination of Pws 13 and 16 is in this context vitally relevant. No specific version is advanced that the accused had attempted to advance a version that injuries were suffered by the deceased at the hands of such person who ran away and that the police had, with mala fide intentions refused to accept and record such a version. 39. The 9th circumstance must also, in these circumstances, be held to have been established satisfactorily- that the accused had attempted, in the course of the trial, for the first time with the assistance of interested and unworthy witnesses - Pws 1, 4, 14 and 15 to advance a totally false and untenable version to explain the death of the deceased. 40. We have already adverted to the circumstances that have been proved. 40. We have already adverted to the circumstances that have been proved. The short question is whether the circumstances are sufficient for a court to conclude that the crucial fact alleged against the accused -that he inflicted the injuries on the deceased, has been proved or not. That is the crucial fact to be ascertained. 41. We think it apposite and proper to delve deeper into the definition of the expression "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and discuss certain fundamental concepts before we answer that crucial question. We feel that the question deserves to be decided conscious of the legal principles and nuances. 42. How a fact is to be proved or when a fact can be held to be proved, is stipulated in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. We extract the definitions of the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act below: "Proved".- A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. "Disproved".- A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. "Not proved".- A fact is said not to be proved when it is neither proved nor disproved." 43. The first point to be noted is that the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' have identical definition, meaning and content both in a civil trial and a criminal trial. The Evidence Act which applies with equal force to criminal trials and civil trials has defined the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' identically. Whether it be a criminal case or a civil case, going by the definition, the level of satisfaction required to be entertained by a court is the same. We mean only to say that the court must be satisfied that the disputed fact is 'proved', 'disproved' or 'not proved' as defined in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. 44. Whether it be a criminal case or a civil case, going by the definition, the level of satisfaction required to be entertained by a court is the same. We mean only to say that the court must be satisfied that the disputed fact is 'proved', 'disproved' or 'not proved' as defined in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. 44. After considering the matters before it and under the circumstances of the particular case, the court has to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the fact is 'proved', 'disproved' or 'not proved'. It will be relevant straightaway to note that what is required is not merely consideration of the "evidence" before it; the court has to consider "the matters before it". A decision as to whether a fact is proved, disproved or not proved has to be taken by a Court after considering the matters before it and appropriate conclusion under the circumstances of the particular case must be drawn by the court. 45. The matters before it under the circumstances of each particular case will induce a certain level of satisfaction in the mind of the court. The level of satisfaction may range from absolute certainty about the existence of a fact to absolve certainty about the nonexistence of that fact. Satisfaction entertained by the court must in each case fall at some point between these two extremities of absolute certainty of existence to absolute certainty of non-existence of such fact. 46. If we may usefully borrow from geometry, the level of satisfaction can be represented by a line as shown below the extremities of which can be marked as absolute satisfaction of the existence and absolute satisfaction about non-existence of that fact. A---------------------------------------------------------------------------D 'A' in the line 'AD' represents absolute certainty of the existence of the fact; whereas 'D' represents absolute certainty about the non-existence of that fact. 47. Sec.3 of the Evidence Act further culls out two segments in the level of satisfaction. The first is the level of satisfaction required to hold that a fact is proved. The other is the level of satisfaction required to hold that a fact is disproved. Between these two segments lies the level of satisfaction which is not sufficient to bring it within either of these two. That hiatus between the two is the satisfaction to hold that the fact is not proved. The other is the level of satisfaction required to hold that a fact is disproved. Between these two segments lies the level of satisfaction which is not sufficient to bring it within either of these two. That hiatus between the two is the satisfaction to hold that the fact is not proved. If we may continue with our attempts to geometrically represent the satisfaction, we can cull out two segments from line 'AD' supra. They are identified by the spots 'B' and 'C' marked on the line 'AD'. The level of satisfaction may fall within the segment 'AB' which can be described to answer the definition of 'proved'. At the other extreme of the line 'AD' lies the segment 'CD' which can be described to answer the definition 'disproved'. In between these two segments of 'AB' (proved) and 'CD' (disproved) lies the segment 'BC' which answers the definition of 'not proved' under Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. The dividing line between proved and not proved is the point 'B' and the dividing line between 'disproved' and 'not proved' is the point 'C'. The points can be marked as shown below on the line 'AD' A B C D ('AB' proved, 'CD' disproved and 'BC' not proved.) 1. 48. When we refer to a fact as proved, the level of satisfaction must fall within the segment 'AB' and cannot fall within 'BC' or 'CD'. Similarly, when we refer to a fact as disproved, it has to fall within the segment 'CD' and cannot fall within 'AB' or 'BC'. Continuing the same logic when we refer to a fact as not proved, it must fall within the segment 'BC' and cannot fall within 'AB' or "CD'. 49. We may straightaway note that the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' or 'not proved' do not refer to any single point event. They represent a range of satisfaction. The satisfaction required is not with reference to any one particular point; but it refers to a range of satisfaction between A and B (proved), B and C (not proved) and C and D (disproved). 50. We shall now take up specifically the identical definition of the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved'. In fact Sec.3 of the Evidence Act defines these two expressions and declares that whatever does not fall within these two, will fall within the sweep of the expression 'not proved'. 50. We shall now take up specifically the identical definition of the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved'. In fact Sec.3 of the Evidence Act defines these two expressions and declares that whatever does not fall within these two, will fall within the sweep of the expression 'not proved'. Whatever does not fall within 'AB' (proved) and 'CD' (disproved) would fall within 'BC'. That is, such fact will have to be reckoned as 'not proved'. We mean that the expression "not proved" is only what falls between proved and disproved. 51. Even within the segments 'AB' and 'CD' there is a distinction in the nature and level of the satisfaction to be entertained. The expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' take into account two situations. A fact can be said to be proved or disproved when it falls within either of the two categories specified in Sec.3 i.e.: (1) The court believes in the existence/ non-existence of a fact. (2) The court considers that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that such fact exists/does not exist. 52. It appears to be easy to assume that this two fold dimension of the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' stems from historical reasons and perspectives. When the Indian Evidence Act was enacted in 1872 the Act had to cater to two types of situations. The first was when the court comprised of only the judge. Such a judge had to decide questions of fact as well as questions of law. There was another situation where the court included the judge and the jury. The jury conceptually is a group of prudent persons in the community who are chosen/ selected to be part of the court to discharge its duty of resolving questions of fact. The principle of democratisation of the sovereign judicial power is attempted by reckoning and accepting the jury comprising of a specific number of prudent persons as part of the court. They were the examples or representatives of prudent persons. Feed the relevant inputs in accordance with law to the jury and the jury could give the answer - whether a fact is proved or not. 53. Today, we have no jury trial any where in India. Consequently, it is not essential that the definition of the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' should contemplate a verdict by the jury. Feed the relevant inputs in accordance with law to the jury and the jury could give the answer - whether a fact is proved or not. 53. Today, we have no jury trial any where in India. Consequently, it is not essential that the definition of the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' should contemplate a verdict by the jury. But the courts cannot ignore the fact that when the definition was enacted it had to cater to a court with jury as well as a court without jury. 54. The court in the past could consist of the judge alone or the judge with the specific number of jurors. The judge must definitely be, and must be assumed to be, a prudent person. But the judge in addition to being a prudent person is a trained legal person also. It has often been accepted by the courts including the apex court that a trained and experienced judge who occupies the chair in the court can press into service his "trained intuitions". In short, the court now consists of a prudent person/persons (the Judge) who has training and experience and consequently trained intuitions. The jury of yester years under the Indian law may be a specimen of a lay prudent person who may not necessarily have experience and training in resolution of controversies of facts. Such a lay prudent mind cannot normally be depended upon to exhibit the quality of `trained intuitions'. We do hence note that even when jury with lay commonsense and prudence does not reckon the existence of a fact to be so probable as to persuade it to act on the supposition that such fact exists, the trained and experienced judge with trained intuitions may hold the said fact to be proved. The levels of satisfaction are different though there may be substantial overlapping. 55. The definition of the expressions 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' in the Evidence Act when it was enacted in 1872 therefore referred to the levels of satisfaction to be entertained by both courts with judge alone and courts with the jury. That explains why the definition in two parts spoke of the belief of a court as also its satisfaction that a prudent person ought to act on the supposition of existence or non-existence of a fact. 56. That explains why the definition in two parts spoke of the belief of a court as also its satisfaction that a prudent person ought to act on the supposition of existence or non-existence of a fact. 56. The modern Indian judge who is not assisted by jury must also be conscious of the two levels of satisfaction which is specified in the definition of the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved'. Belief of a trained judicial mind in the existence of a fact can definitely be held to call for a higher level of satisfaction. But the judge is not to go by his training experience and trained intuition alone. He has always got to cross check his conclusions about existence or non-existence of a fact with the norms of a prudent person in the community. In this view of the matter, even though the sovereign judicial power is not directly exercised by chosen representatives/jurors, the judge has to exercise his sovereign judicial power in such a manner as would be compatible with exercise of such powers by prudent persons in the polity, the ultimate repository of the sovereign power. The Judge has always got to remind himself that he exercises the sovereign judicial powers as a representative and on behalf of the prudent polity. Even when the Court does not have a jury, the Court (the Judge alone) will have to ensure that his decision about existence/non existence of facts conforms to the responses of prudent persons in the society whom he represents, though he is not elected directly by the constituency. 57. It is in this context that we perceive two levels of satisfaction within the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. The more rigorous one relates to the belief induced in a court (the expert Judge alone without the jury) of the existence/non-existence of the fact and the lesser level of satisfaction relates to the satisfaction of the court that a prudent person ought to proceed on the supposition that such fact exists or does not exist. 58. To continue with our efforts to geometrically represent the levels of satisfaction, we may note a point 'X' in the segment 'AB' and at point 'Y' in the segment 'CD'. A distinction can be drawn between the belief of a court and its satisfaction about the response of a prudent person. 58. To continue with our efforts to geometrically represent the levels of satisfaction, we may note a point 'X' in the segment 'AB' and at point 'Y' in the segment 'CD'. A distinction can be drawn between the belief of a court and its satisfaction about the response of a prudent person. Following figure may help to correctly appreciate the concept: X Y A B C D 59. 'AB' continues to be the level of satisfaction to be entertained to conclude that the fact is proved. Of this 'AX' represents the higher satisfaction i.e., the belief of a court; whereas the segment 'XB' refers to the satisfaction of the court that a prudent person ought to act on the supposition that the fact exists. 60. Similarly, the segment 'CD' continues to represent the level of satisfaction to conclude that a fact is disproved. 'YD' represents the belief of the court in the nonexistence of the fact and 'CY' represents its satisfaction that a prudent person ought to proceed on the supposition of non-existence of the fact. 61. Having so understood the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' intrinsically and the expression 'not proved' by excluding `proved' and `disproved' from the line of satisfaction, we now must advert to a very ingenious approach made by some jurists to postulate that both levels of satisfaction in the expressions `proved' and `disproved' in Section 3 are one and the same. They contend that there is no distinction between the former and the latter. They do not mutually exclude each other. Belief of a court is the same as its satisfaction that a prudent person must act on the supposition of the existence of the fact. In short, it is contended that there is no distinction between the two satisfactions and points 'X' and 'Y' cannot be said to exist within the segment 'AB' and 'CD'. 62. We have rendered our anxious consideration to this aspect. We are unable to agree. The new Oxford dictionary states that the word 'or' is a conjunction used to link alternatives. It is true that the dictionary also states that the word 'or' has another parallel meaning as a conjunction introducing a synonym or explanation of the preceding word or phrase. Example given in the dictionary is "the espionage novel, or as it is known in the trade, the thriller". 63. It is true that the dictionary also states that the word 'or' has another parallel meaning as a conjunction introducing a synonym or explanation of the preceding word or phrase. Example given in the dictionary is "the espionage novel, or as it is known in the trade, the thriller". 63. We have no hesitation to agree that the expression 'or' can at times be used to introduce a synonym or explanation of the preceding word or phrase. The argument advanced is that the expression 'believes' is explained to say that such belief means the satisfaction of the Court that a prudent person ought to act on the supposition that such fact exists. The latter is the explanation for the former and they are not two alternatives, contend the protagonists of this school of thought. 64. It is difficult to accept this. The definition of the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' not only uses the conjunction 'or'. The same is preceded by the word 'either'. The word 'either' as per the new Oxford Dictionary of English "is used before the first of two alternatives that are being specified the other being introduced by or". 65. We have to assume that the legislature was competent in grammar and semantics. At least in 1872 they must be firmly assumed to be so. The employment of the expression either ...... or" conveys to us eloquently that the legislature was referring to two alternatives and was not attempting to explain the expression 'belief' by the latter part of the definition. If the word 'or' alone were used and the word 'either' did not precede it, certainly such a contention might have been possible. But the rules of grammar and semantics eloquently declare that such an interpretation cannot now be accepted. 66. The protagonists of that approach further contend that the expression 'believes' is not defined. Exercise of sovereign judicial power would depend upon the understanding of the expression 'believes'. Without better guidelines as to how the expression 'believes' has to be understood, sovereign judicial power could not have been vested in any authority including the court. Unchannelled discretion is anathema to law especially when such discretion impinges on the right to life guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution. It cannot lightly be assumed that the legislature conceded to the court the unbridled discretion to decide when the court can believe in the existence/ nonexistence of fact. Unchannelled discretion is anathema to law especially when such discretion impinges on the right to life guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution. It cannot lightly be assumed that the legislature conceded to the court the unbridled discretion to decide when the court can believe in the existence/ nonexistence of fact. Hence it is contended that to give meaning, content and constitutional acceptability, it has to be held that the expression 'believes' is explained by the latter half of the definition. 67. We are unable to accept this argument. The expression 'believes' has a well settled meaning in language. The new Oxford Dictionary of English carries the meaning "accept as true" or "feel sure of the truth of" as the first meaning of the expression "believe". We have no hesitation to agree that the legislature had used the expression 'believes' in the former part of the definition 'proved' and 'disproved' in that sense. The court with its training, experience and trained intuition must "accept a fact as true" or "feel sure of the truth of that fact" and it is only then that the former satisfaction can be entertained by the court. 'Believes' is an expression which is fundamental in language and, according to us, it is idle to contend that no clear guidelines are available to understand the expression 'believes.' In law, as in language, the expression carries a clear meaning. In the context in Sec.3 the expression 'believes' must bear the meaning "accept as true; feel sure of the truth of". In these circumstances, the grievance that there are no guidelines to understand the expression 'believes' in the definition is found to be without any substance. In language itself sufficient guidelines are there. It is true that the expression 'believes' in other contexts may carry with it an element of uncertainty. Even before Galileo, some people may have believed that the earth is a globe and not flat. Without worrying about the rational basis also we may believe in God or Gods. The element of uncertainty which the expression 'believe' may carry in such situations and contexts cannot obviously be imported to come to an authentic understanding the expression 'believes' in the former part of the definition of expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. Without worrying about the rational basis also we may believe in God or Gods. The element of uncertainty which the expression 'believe' may carry in such situations and contexts cannot obviously be imported to come to an authentic understanding the expression 'believes' in the former part of the definition of expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. The meaning which the expression `believes' may carry when the belief relates to mere opinions or hypothesis cannot obviously apply when it is used in relation to existence or otherwise of facts. 68. The grievance about such an interpretation leading to possible arbitrariness does not also impress us at all. One must remember that it is a court that is to take the decision. The court is to take the decision "after considering the matters before it." The court is to consider the question "in the peculiar facts and circumstances" of each case. It has to believe a fact to exist that is the court must accept the fact as true or feel sure of the truth of that fact. Every court conceptually is bound to give reasons for its acts and beliefs. The decisions of courts are amenable to appellate/revisional powers to ensure correction. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the argument that such a wide discretion conceded to the court by such employment of the expression 'believes' without guidelines would offend the core constitutional values of equality and right to life under Arts.14 and 21 of the Constitution. 69. Another contention which has to be considered is whether there is any distinction really between belief of a court in existence/non-existence of a fact and its satisfaction that a prudent person ought to proceed on the supposition that such fact exists/does not exist. We have already noted that the court with its training experience and trained intuitions can be induced to believe a fact only if a higher and slightly different satisfaction is entertained by it on the materials/matters placed before it; whereas a lay prudent person relying heavily on his lay commonsense may draw an appropriate inference of fact. To us, it appears that there is a distinction between the former and the latter satisfactions and the framers of the statute had alertly taken note of the distinction between the two, when they incorporated the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' in the Evidence Act. To us, it appears that there is a distinction between the former and the latter satisfactions and the framers of the statute had alertly taken note of the distinction between the two, when they incorporated the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' in the Evidence Act. The plain language of the definitions 'proved' and 'disproved' in Sec.3 does also clearly show that the legislature reckoned these as two different alternative levels of satisfactions. 70. If that be so, please point out, at least, one instance where the former will be satisfied and the latter will not be or vice versa, argues the protagonists of the alternative theory. Even assuming that after lengthy narration of facts, we may be able to point out the distinction between the two satisfactions in a given case, we are satisfied that that would not be a worthwhile endeavour. Theoretically, at least, it is absolutely easy to conceive the existence of two levels of satisfaction which can at a sublime stage be mutually exclusive. Considerable amount of overlapping may be there. But it would certainly be possible in the peculiar facts scenario in a given case and the different inputs available to hold that within the segment 'AB' there can be a situation where a specific case would fall within 'AX' and not 'XB'. Even if one is not able to point out such a specific instance by detailed and exhaustive narration of facts, our conclusion about that thereotical possibility is not altered. 71. We have already noted that the expression 'proved' and 'disproved' are defined to include a range of satisfaction and not a specific point of satisfaction. In that view of the matter between 'A' and 'B' a range exists where instances of both satisfactions may overlapping. In these circumstances, the inability to specify a case with details straightaway cannot advance the arguments of the protagonists of the alternative theory. 72. Is not a judge a prudent person? Will not the judge also accept the prudent person's standards? If so, how can there be an instance falling under the former half of the definition which is not included in the latter half, it is queried. Certainly, a judge would be and is expected to be a prudent person who as indicated earlier already, in addition to the faculties of a lay prudent person is assumed to be possessing experience, training and trained intuitions. Certainly, a judge would be and is expected to be a prudent person who as indicated earlier already, in addition to the faculties of a lay prudent person is assumed to be possessing experience, training and trained intuitions. These faculties pressed into service additionally, which a Judge alone may have and the mere prudent person may not, hence can make the crucial distinction between the former and the latter satisfactions in the definition. 73. Perhaps all these arguments could be repelled with one very strong response. If what was intended was only that the court must be satisfied, on a consideration of the matters before it and in the peculiar facts of a given case, that a prudent person ought to act upon the supposition that the fact exists/ does not exist it was not necessary at all for the legislature to have spoken about two alternatives. In that event it would have been more than sufficient to define the expression 'proved/disproved' as follows: "A fact is said to be proved/disproved when considering the matters before it, the court considers its existence/non existence so probable that a prudent person ought under the circumstances of the case to act upon the supposition that it exists/does not exist." 74. Superfluousness and redundancy cannot obviously be attributed to the legislature by the interpreter unless he is driven to the wall. The legislature must be assumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. It is one of the axiomatic principles of interpretation that no words used by the legislature can be assumed or inferred to be unnecessary or redundant. In that view of the matter, we find no difficulty in rejecting the theory that the latter part of the definition only explains the former. The former and the latter are two alternatives, either of which must be entertained by a court, after considering the matters before it and under the circumstances of a particular case, to conclude that the fact exists/does not exist. 75. Having said so we come to the next limb of the controversy. An argument is raised that the former applies to criminal cases; whereas the latter applies to civil cases. 75. Having said so we come to the next limb of the controversy. An argument is raised that the former applies to criminal cases; whereas the latter applies to civil cases. The yardstick of proof beyond shadow of a reasonable doubt applicable in a criminal case is insisted by the former; whereas the yardstick of preponderance of possibilities and probabilities insisted in a civil case is demanded by the latter, it is contended. We are unable to agree. Both the alternatives in the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' must certainly be available in every case. We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that the latter shall not apply to criminal cases and shall apply only to civil cases. Both must certainly apply to civil and criminal cases and there can be no dispute on that proposition. If that argument were true, there would/could never have been a jury in a criminal trial. We do not, in these circumstances, find any justification for the contention that the latter part of the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' cannot apply in so far as a criminal case is concerned. Identical definitions are applied for both civil and criminal trials as seen earlier and we find no rational basis for the contention that in a criminal case the former limb of the definition alone will apply. An interpretation limiting the application of the latter limb to civil cases alone and excluding its application to criminal cases is opposed to reason, logic, commonsense and the very scheme of the Indian Evidence Act. 76. How then can you justify the higher degree of proof insisted in a criminal case? "Proof beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt" is the axiomatic standard traditionally insisted by the criminal courts to hold the charge to be proved in a criminal indictment; whereas proof by the test of preponderance of possibilities and probabilities is held to be sufficient axiomatically in a civil case. How then can the distinction be justified in the wake of identical definition for the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' for both civil and criminal trials, it is queried. 77. The query is interesting and one has to again travel back in history to ascertain how the distinction has come to exist. How then can the distinction be justified in the wake of identical definition for the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' for both civil and criminal trials, it is queried. 77. The query is interesting and one has to again travel back in history to ascertain how the distinction has come to exist. In the addresses to the jury, judges have always been cautioning the jury that the jury must employ great care and caution before returning a verdict of guilty against an indictee in a criminal case. In their addresses to the jury, judges have always repeated that the jury must employ great care and caution before holding an indictee guilty. Definition for the expressions 'proved' and 'disproved' is the same for a criminal trial as well as civil trial. But it is elementary human nature that depending upon the consequences which are likely to follow/ensue different standards will be adopted by a prudent person. Even in the matter of chastisement of one's own children lesser satisfaction will be sufficient to advice, admonish and to chastise verbally. Any discerning parent would insist on a higher level of satisfaction if he thinks it necessary to pick up the rod and inflict physical or corporeal punishment. Any prudent teacher or parent would instinctively adopt such a yardstick and same yardstick evidently is adopted by a purdent person sitting as juror or a judge. 78. A criminal proceeding leads to the result of deprivation of life or liberty. Deprivation of life and liberty is recognised by civilised society to be of great consequence to the individual. Before entering a finding of fact which has the effect of exposing the indictee to the consequence of deprivation of life or liberty it is only reasonable that a prudent person would insist on a higher and better degree of proof. To us, it appears that here lies the distinction/reason for the higher standards adopted by courts, as prudent persons, in a criminal indictment. In the wake of the graver consequence, as a prudent person, true to the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' and conscious of the latter part of the definition courts/prudent persons insist on a higher degree of satisfaction in a criminal trial. 79. Even in a criminal trial, the level of satisfaction to be entertained to hold a fact to be proved falls within the segment 'AB' in the above figure. 79. Even in a criminal trial, the level of satisfaction to be entertained to hold a fact to be proved falls within the segment 'AB' in the above figure. If the case falls within the segment 'CD' a fact is disproved. If it falls neither within 'AB' nor 'CD' it would fall within 'BC' and consequently the fact will be held to be not proved. This is so both in a civil case and in a criminal case. 80. Judges in their addresses to the jury have constantly reminded the jury of the fact that they are deciding a criminal case which has impact on the life and liberty of an individual. Caution is administered to the jury. The jurors, persons of lay commonsense, may be bowled over by their emotions and sentiments. Their disapproval or abhorrence against criminal conduct may upset their sentiments and emotions and may affect their rationality and detachment. Hence the courts have always cautioned the jury to look for satisfactory evidence before returning a verdict of guilty in a criminal case. 81. So far as a judge with training, experience and trained intuitions is concerned, it may not be necessary to administer or repeat such caution. But when it comes to a jury that becomes essential. If a fact is proved then alone a finding can be returned against the indictee. All the caution is administered to the jury only to ensure that the jury carefully considers matters and comes to a conclusion that the fact is proved. Not satisfied by asking the jury to ensure that the fact is proved, the judges have been demanding that the jury must insist that a fact is proved beyond doubt. This, according to us, is absolutely superfluous as a fact can never be proved if there is a doubt. To fall within the sweep of expression 'proved' ('AB'), there must be no doubt. If there be a doubt, the case can fall only within the interregnum space of 'not proved' -ie., 'BC'. To hold a fact to be proved, it should not fall within the sweep of the expression 'disproved' or 'not proved' - 'CD' and 'BC'. No prudent person can say that "I have a doubt; but I hold the fact to be proved". To hold a fact to be proved, it should not fall within the sweep of the expression 'disproved' or 'not proved' - 'CD' and 'BC'. No prudent person can say that "I have a doubt; but I hold the fact to be proved". That would be against the very fundamentals of the definition of the expression 'proved', `disproved' and `not proved' in Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, when the Judge tells the jury that a fact must be proved beyond doubt, what he means and intends is only that careful consideration is necessary to ensure that the case falls within the sweep of the expression 'proved' in Sec.3. If there be a doubt, it is essential, basic, fundamental and axiomatic that it cannot be held to be proved. What is meant by the expression 'proved beyond doubt' is only that careful consideration must be employed before a fact is held to be proved. It must be so in a civil trial and a criminal trial. But considering the graver consequences which are likely to follow in a criminal trial, the caution is more appropriate and apposite in a criminal trial. 82. Not satisfied with the caution that the case against an indictee must be proved beyond doubt, courts have gone further to assert that the proof must be beyond reasonable doubt. The employment of the expression 'reasonable doubt' according to us, does not in any way militate against the efficacy of the definition 'proved' in Sec.3. A doubt which is not reasonable is not in the eye of law a doubt at all. No prudent person can say "yes, I have a doubt; but not a very reasonable one". What we intend to say is only that when the judges in their addresses to the jury and in precedents insisted that there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt what they really intended was only that there must be proof beyond doubt which in turn only means that there must be proof to satisfy the definition of Sec.3 of the Evidence Act. 83. We now come to the further caution administered by judges to jury and in precedents that in a criminal case the offence must be proved beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Unless there be a reasonable doubt, there will not be a shadow of such doubt. 83. We now come to the further caution administered by judges to jury and in precedents that in a criminal case the offence must be proved beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Unless there be a reasonable doubt, there will not be a shadow of such doubt. A doubt which is not reasonable is no doubt at all. If there be a doubt, it can never be held that a fact is proved. 84. We have adverted to all these only to satisfy ourselves and declare that the expression 'proved beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt' does not mean or signify anything more in the context than that there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt. That, in turn, can only mean that there must be proof beyond doubt. That again, in turn, can only mean that there must be proof to satisfy the definition of the expression `proved' in Sec.3. Virtually the statement that there must be proof beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt in a criminal case is nothing but a caution administered to those who are called upon to decide facts in a criminal trial, that they must be cautious, considering the graver consequence of deprivation of life and liberty and that they must carefully ensure that the indictment is `proved' as defined under Sec.3. The system appears to have misconstrued the caution and incorrectly assumed that the difference in the level of satisfaction is one of species and not merely degree. 85. Human nature being what it is and responses of a prudent person being what it is, he may certainly insist on a higher degree of proof in a criminal indictment. In this context it may be possible to note that though it is not strictly necessary going by the definition, a prudent person is likely to insist on a higher standard of proof in a criminal indictment to hold that the fact is proved. Here comes the concept of benefit of doubt. A benefit which may not be readily conceded in a civil case may be conceded in a criminal case by a court adopting the standards of a prudent person considering the graver nature of the consequences to follow -ie. deprivation of life and liberty. It is in this context that courts have always held that the degree and extent of proof required in a criminal case is higher. deprivation of life and liberty. It is in this context that courts have always held that the degree and extent of proof required in a criminal case is higher. We make it clear that the difference is only regarding the degree and not species. The latter part of the definition of 'proved' and 'disproved' in Sec.3 inherently accepts that there can be insistence on a higher degree of proof in a criminal case. This concept inheres in the definition as the standard to be adopted is that of a prudent person and every prudent person is likely to insist on a higher degree of proof considering the graver consequences to follow. The higher standard in a criminal case is inbuilt in and is justified by the definition itself. The latter half of the definition inheres in itself the elasticity which justifies insistence on higher degree of proof in a criminal case. That is what a prudent person would do and the latter half of the definition permits adoption of the prudent man's standards. We repeat that the distinction is one only in the degree and extent of probabilities and is not a different satisfaction in species. The law permits by definition of Sec.3 (the latter part) that the court can insist on higher degree of proof in a criminal trial as any prudent person would insist. This and this alone is the justification for the insistence by courts on a higher degree of proof in a criminal indictment. 86. Having so understood the concept of benefit of doubt in a criminal trial, we may get back to the geometrical representation earlier. The benefit of doubt which is available to an accused in a criminal trial can be marked by segment 'BB', within the segment `AB' as shown below: X Y A B1 B C D In a civil case the entire segment of 'AB' can be said to fall within the expression 'proved'; but so far as a criminal case is concerned those falling within the narrow space between 'B' and 'B1' can be conceded the benefit of doubt. In a criminal case only those coming within 'AB1' can be reckoned as 'proved' and those coming within the short and narrow space between 'B' and 'B1' can be conceded the benefit of doubt. In a criminal case only those coming within 'AB1' can be reckoned as 'proved' and those coming within the short and narrow space between 'B' and 'B1' can be conceded the benefit of doubt. In short when the Court adopting the standards of a prudent person insists on a higher degree of proof in a criminal case the point `B' gets pushed to B1. 87. We have adverted to this aspect in such detail as we found that there is no specific precedent adverting to the difference if any between the former and the latter limbs of the definition of `proved' and `disproved' in Sec.3. Our scanning of precedents suggests that this aspect has not received the pointed attention of Courts anywhere so far. 88. Having so understood the concepts of 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' under Sec.3 of the Evidence Act and having thus understood the concept of benefit of doubt which can be conceded to the accused in a criminal case where the level of satisfaction falls within the narrow space between 'B' and 'B1' and adopting the standards of a prudent person contemplated under the latter part, (if not that of a court under the former part) of the definition of Section 3, we come to the firm conclusion that the circumstances proved in this case which we have already discussed above must lead a prudent mind definitely to the conclusion beyond reasonable doubt and with reasonable certainty that the injuries in Ext.P5 were suffered by the deceased at the hands of the accused. He did have motive. The injuries were suffered in the bed room of the house where the accused and the deceased reside. The injuries could not have been self-inflicted. The accused advanced a totally false initial version that the injuries were self inflicted. He had two injuries, atleast one of which is not explained satisfactorily by the accused. Less said about the explanation for the second injury, the better. The same cannot be swallowed as a reasonable one by a prudent mind at all. He had concealed MO11 and the same was recovered from the place of concealment on the basis of information furnished by him to the police in his confession statement. There is no animosity even suggested to exist for any other person to commit such crime against the deceased. He had concealed MO11 and the same was recovered from the place of concealment on the basis of information furnished by him to the police in his confession statement. There is no animosity even suggested to exist for any other person to commit such crime against the deceased. All the circumstances together in the light of the totally false and discredited explanation offered by the accused in the course of trial with the support of his obliging witnesses must lead a prudent mind to the safe conclusion that the accused had inflicted the injuries on the deceased. We find the conclusion of the court below to be absolutely justified. We are convinced that level of satisfaction that is entertained by this court is well within 'AB1' in the line 'AD' supra. The same does not warrant any interference at all. The challenge fails. 89. In the result: a) This appeal is dismissed. b) The impugned verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C are upheld.