JUDGMENT : K.A. Puj, J. The Petitioner-Bank has filed this petition under Articles-226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking direction to the Respondent No. 1 i.e. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad, restraining him from implementing the impugned notices at Exhibit-'C', 'E' and 'H' and for quashing further proceedings arising therefrom. The Petitioner-Bank has also sought for the direction that the notices at Exhibit-'C', 'E' and 'H' and the impugned action of the Respondent No. 1, threatening to arrest and attach the properties are ultra vires, unconstitutional and illegal. This petition was admitted and Rule was issued on 10.1.1992. The Court has passed detailed interim order and prima facie recorded that it cannot be disputed that the Respondent-Provident Fund Commissioner has power to issue notices in question. It also appears that it was not open to the Branch Manager of the Petitioner-Bank to ignore the notice of attachment dated March 19, 1991, issued under the provisions of Section 8-F of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Court further observed that despite notices the Branch Manager of the Petitioner-Bank has not complied with the same and hence the Court has thought it fit not to grant interim relief without conditions. The Court has, therefore, directed the Respondent No. l not to take any further action pursuant to the impugned notices on the condition that the Bank open an account in the name of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad, and credits the aforesaid amount of Rs. 16,20,955.75ps. in that account. The Court further directed that after opening the said account, the Bank shall invest the amount in Fixed Deposit initially for a period of one year and thereafter, the Bank shall go on renewing the Fixed Deposit together with interest accrued thereon till final hearing and disposal of the petition. The Court has also made it clear that at the time of final hearing appropriate order would be passed by the Court as to whether the amount together with interest accrued thereon should be paid to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or that it should be permitted to be retained by the Bank. 2. This interim order was challenged by the Petitioner-Bank before the Apex Court in SLP No. 1464 of 1992. 2. This interim order was challenged by the Petitioner-Bank before the Apex Court in SLP No. 1464 of 1992. By disposing of the said SLP No. 1464 of 1992 on 16.10.1995, the Court observed on the basis of the statement made by the learned Solicitor General on 21.4.1992 that no coercive process of recovery would be undertaken against the Petitioner-Bank and the said order would remain operative during the pendency of the writ petition before this Court. With this direction the said SLP was disposed of. The Apex Court has directed that the writ petition would be decided expeditiously. 3. It is the case of the Petitioner-Bank that the Respondent No. 2-Company which is under liquidation, was inter alia, dealing with the manufacture of textiles. The Respondent No. 2 is a constituent of the Petitioner-Bank since several years and availed of various credit facilities for the purpose of its business. Since, Respondent No. 2-Company was indebted to the Petitioner-Bank for a huge amount, it was constrained to file Special Civil Suit No. 690 of 1987 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, inter alia, praying for recovery of a sum of Rs. 203.35 Lacs on 11.12.1987. In the said suit, the Petitioner had sought interim relief. The learned Trial Judge, by his judgment and order dated 05.11.1988, passed interim order permitting the Respondent No. 2-Company to do the job work provided it fulfilled the terms and conditions mentioned in the said order. Since, the Respondent No. 2-Company was permitted to carry out the job work only with a view to help the employees to earn their livelihood, the Petitioner-Bank had, inter alia, agreed to permit Respondent No. 2 to operate a separate account in the Cambey Branch of the Petitioner Bank for doing the transactions of the proposed job work. The said account was on the terms and conditions mentioned in the order passed by the Civil Court. 4. It is also the case of the Petitioner-Bank that the Respondent No. 2 became a sick industrial Company as contemplated by the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and hence a Reference was made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) being Case No. 290 of 1987. 4. It is also the case of the Petitioner-Bank that the Respondent No. 2 became a sick industrial Company as contemplated by the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and hence a Reference was made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) being Case No. 290 of 1987. The B.I.F.R. in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 17(3), passed an order on 30.7.1990 and directed the Operating Agency to prepare and submit to the Board a scheme for revival/rehabilitation of the Respondent No. 2-Company. The Respondent No. 1 i.e. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner thereafter, applied to the B.I.F.R. for necessary consent to proceed against the Respondent No. 2 for recovery of the Provident Fund dues by invoking Section 8 and Section 14 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The B.I.F.R. by its order dated 7.1.1991, granted the said permission u/s 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies Act to the Provident Fund Commissioner to proceed its application. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner thereafter, issued a notice u/s 8-F of the Act on 19.3.1991, inter alia, stating that a sum of Rs. 31.32 Lacs is due from the Respondent No. 2-Company on account of Provident Fund and allied dues/damages payable under the said Act. The Petitioner-Bank was required u/s 8-F to pay to him the said amount due from the Bank to the creditor held by it for or on account of the said Company. The Petitioner-Bank gave reply to the said notice on 19.8.1991, along with which the Petitioner has credited an amount of Rs. 16,621.76ps. and also clarified that since the Respondent No. 2-Company is a sick unit and its reference is pending before the B.I.F.R., u/s 22(1) of the Act no one can attach its properties. The Petitioner-Bank gave reply to the said notice on 19.8.1991, along with which the Petitioner has credited an amount of Rs. 16,621.76ps. and also clarified that since the Respondent No. 2-Company is a sick unit and its reference is pending before the B.I.F.R., u/s 22(1) of the Act no one can attach its properties. Despite, this reply another notice was issued on 30.8.1991 informing the Bank that after 8.5.1991, if any, amount received as credit in the said account, were paid to some other party, the actions would be taken u/s 8-F and that the Recovery Officer will proceed against the Bank as per the provisions contained in Section 8-F of the Act by way of attachment of movable and immovable property or the property belonging to the Bank and appointment of a receiver for the properties and/or the properties of the Bank and by arrest and detention of the Bank's personnels in the prison and arrest and detention of any person of the Bank who has acted contrary to the directions. A reply to this notice was given to the Petitioner Bank on 6.1.1991 reiterating that the amount of Rs. 16,621.76ps was already remitted and thereafter there is no credit entry. 5. It is at this stage the present petition is filed by the Petitioner-Bank. 6. Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate appearing for the Petitioner-Bank raised his contentions before the Court. The Petitioner-Bank is not a debtor of the Respondent No. 2 nor can the Bank be said to be holding any monies for or on behalf of the Respondent No. 2-Company. The provisions of Section 8-F of the Employees Provident Act, are in the nature of the garnishee orders and do not stand on any higher footing than the orders of a Civil Court. The Bank was in fact a creditor of the Respondent No. 2 and the Bank had huge dues to the tune of more than Rs. 203 lacs to be recovered from the Respondent No. 2-Company. Thus, the Bank was a creditor of the Respondent No. 2-Company and was not a debtor. The amount, if any, lying to the credit of the Respondent No. 2 is available with the Bank, the Bank is entitled to appropriate the same against its dues as the Bank has general lien over all the funds of the employer against all the money in possession of the Bank. The amount, if any, lying to the credit of the Respondent No. 2 is available with the Bank, the Bank is entitled to appropriate the same against its dues as the Bank has general lien over all the funds of the employer against all the money in possession of the Bank. In view of these debts and general lien there is no debt due to be payable to the employer, and the Petitioner Bank is entitled to adjust any credit against its dues. In support of this submission he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Syndicate Bank Vs. Vijay Kumar and others. 7. Mr. Parikh has further submitted that in the present case the Bank is merely garnishe to pay any amount lying to the credit of the Respondent No. 2. As a garnishee the Bank has an equitable right to adjust any credit of the Respondent No. 2 against its dues and therefore, it can never be said that the garnishee could have been asked to pay the dues to RPFC in priority as against the dues of the Bank. The reference is made to the provisions contained in Section 132 of the Transfer of Property Act and also the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in the case of London and South Western Railway Company (1874) L.R. 28. 8. Based on these propositions and the case law on the subject, it is contended that there was no debt due from the Bank to the Respondent No. 2-Company nor can it be said that the Bank was holding any amount on their account and the proceedings u/s 8-F of the Act, were not maintainable. The powers u/s 8-F can be said to be powers similar to the powers of the Civil Court to issue garnishee orders. The principles applicable to the garnishee orders will squarely apply to the orders under this provision. The liability under this provision can arise only if there is any debt due or any amount is held on behalf of such a party. In the present case, under no circumstances, especially looking to the law discussed hereinabove, it cannot be said that there was any amount due from the Bank to the Respondent No. 2-Company or that the Bank was a debtor of the Respondent No. 2-Company. In the present case, under no circumstances, especially looking to the law discussed hereinabove, it cannot be said that there was any amount due from the Bank to the Respondent No. 2-Company or that the Bank was a debtor of the Respondent No. 2-Company. In absence of any debt being due or amount being held, the Bank was not required to pay any amount to the Respondent No. 1 and the powers u/s 8-F could not have been exercised and the Bank could not have been declared as an employer in default and no further steps could have been taken. Reliance is placed on the provisions contained in the Income Tax Act which are also similar to the provisions of CPC for garnishee. It has been held in number of decisions under the Income Tax Act, that there has to be a debt to be attached. The right of set off and all other legitimate defences are available to a person garnished under similar provision of the Income Tax Act and revenue cannot be claimed any prior right. Reliance is placed on the decisions of (i) K. M. Adam Vs. Income Tax Officer, II Additional II Circle, Madras, (ii) T.R. Rajakumari Vs. Tax Recovery Commissioner and Another, and (iii) Canara Bank Vs. Tecon Engineers and Others. 9. Mr. Parikh has also raised an alternative contention that so far as the account in question is concerned, the said account was opened as per the directions and order of the Civil Court and that the said account was required to be operated only as per the terms of the said orders and directions of the Civil Court. The Bank was only a receiver appointed by the Civil Court and could not have acted contrary to the orders of the Hon'ble Civil Court. If the Bank had so acted, the same would amount to contempt of the order of the Civil Court. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal Vs. D.R. Banaji and Others, and Krishna Kumar Khemka Vs. If the Bank had so acted, the same would amount to contempt of the order of the Civil Court. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal Vs. D.R. Banaji and Others, and Krishna Kumar Khemka Vs. Grindlays Bank P.L.C. and others, Based on this, it is contended that the action of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is not justified nor it is legal or permissible and in fact he could not have taken any action and the Bank cannot be held to have acted in contravention of the order of the Civil Court. 10. It is further contended that the Respondent No. 2-Company at the relevant point of time was before the BIFR and was a sick Company. It had the protection of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Bank could not, therefore, adjust its dues. The Respondent No. 1 being aware of this position approached the BIFR for permission and the BIFR permitted the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner only to complete adjudication but specifically denied their request for selling the properties of the Company. The enforcement of the order issued by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner in the nature of garnishee is definitely a distress proceeding, which would go beyond the permission granted by BIFR to Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner could not have been taken any action of actual recovery as the Company was before BIFR and the permission obtained by him was only to complete adjudication and not actual recovery. Therefore, they could not have issued any of the impugned notices and the same are bad in law. 11. Based on the above submissions Mr. Parikh has strongly urged that impugned notices issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner deserve to be quashed and set aside and the directions be issued, permitting the Petitioner-Bank to use the amount lying in the fixed deposit pursuant to the interim order of this Court for its own business purposes. 12. On behalf of the Respondent Ms. E. Shailaja, learned advocate appears and made her submissions. An affidavit in reply is filed on 7th October, 1996. 12. On behalf of the Respondent Ms. E. Shailaja, learned advocate appears and made her submissions. An affidavit in reply is filed on 7th October, 1996. Based on this affidavit in reply, she has submitted that before issuance of notice for enforcing the recovery of the outstanding amount, on 19.3.1991, the Respondent No. 1 has already obtained the permission of B.I.F.R. By virtue of the said notice the Petitioner-Bank was directed to pay the amount lying in the account of the establishment. She has further submitted that despite this notice, the Petitioner-Bank has entered into and permitted certain transactions in the Bank account in question and thereby committed default under the provisions of Sections 8-F(iii) of the Act. She has further submitted that the Petitioner has failed to comply with the notice issued by the Respondent No. 1. The notice was issued on 19.3.1991 and it was duly served on the Bank Manager on 20th Match, 1991. The Petitioner-Bank has wilfully ignored the said notices and did not pay any amount to the Respondent No. 1 till 7.5.1991. On 8.5.1991 an amount of Rs. 16,621/- was paid by freezing the Bank Account of the establishment. Prior to that date the Petitioner-Bank permitted number of withdrawal for the period from 20th March, 1991 to 7th May, 1991. She has further submitted that the interim relief passed by the Civil Court, would not prevent the Petitioner from making payment to the Respondent No. 1. She has further submitted that the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and scheme framed thereunder is a welfare piece of legislation to safeguard the interest of employees. By not freezing the Bank Account and by not paying the amount lying credited on the date of receipt of the notice, the Petitioner has done irreparable loss and damages to the poor employees. She has further submitted that the Provident Fund dues will have to be paid in preference to all other dues of the establishment and therefore, even the Petitioner-Bank is not entitled to adjust its dues first without making payment of the provident fund amount to the Respondent No. 1. 13. She has further submitted that the Provident Fund dues will have to be paid in preference to all other dues of the establishment and therefore, even the Petitioner-Bank is not entitled to adjust its dues first without making payment of the provident fund amount to the Respondent No. 1. 13. Having heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties and having considered their rival submissions in light of the statutory provisions and decided case law on the subject, the Court is of the view that the impugned notices issued by the Respondent at Exhibit-'C', 'E' and 'H' to this petition u/s 8-F of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, are not just and proper and the same shall not be implemented against the Petitioner-Bank. The Petitioner-Bank is, in fact the creditor of the Respondent No. 2-Company and the Respondent No. 2-Company had to discharge huge liabilities towards Bank. Despite the fact that the Bank had every right to appropriate the amount lying in the account of the Respondent No. 2-Company with the Bank, the Petitioner has not done so after receipt of the notice, issued by the Respondent No. 1. The Bank has simply allowed certain transactions and that too, pursuant to the order passed by the Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No. 490 of 1987. The Petitioner-Bank has general lien over the funds of the Respondent No. 2-Company and in view of this lien, the Petitioner-Bank is entitled to adjust any credit against its dues. Mr. Parikh has, therefore, rightly relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra), wherein it is held that: What is attached is the money in deposit account. The banker as a garnishee, when an attachment notice is served has to go before the Court and obtain suitable directions for safeguarding its interest. The Court, in such a situation has to take into account the banker's lien over the securities or deposits regarding which garnishee notice is issued. But as the Bank had the liberty to adjust from the proceeds of the FDRs towards the dues to the Bank if there was any balance left after such adjustment that will only be the amount which would belong to the depositor namely the judgment-debtor and only such amount, if any, can be attached in discharge of a decree. But as the Bank had the liberty to adjust from the proceeds of the FDRs towards the dues to the Bank if there was any balance left after such adjustment that will only be the amount which would belong to the depositor namely the judgment-debtor and only such amount, if any, can be attached in discharge of a decree. Similarly in the present case, the Petitioner-Bank's dues are more than Rs. 203 Lacs, if these dues are to be satisfied first from the amount lying in the account of the Respondent No. 2 with the Petitioner-Bank, nothing remains to be attached and in that case, the Respondent No. 1 shall not have any charge over that amount. 14. Mr. Parikh is also right in canvassing before the Court that after receipt of the notice u/s 8-F of the Act, the Bank is merely garnishee to pay any amount lying to the credit of the Respondent No. 2 Bank. As a garnishee, the Bank has an equitable right to adjust any credit of the Respondent No. 2 against its dues and therefore, the Bank being garnishee could not have been asked to pay the dues to the Respondent No. l in priority of dues of the Petitioner-Bank. In the case of the London and South Western Railway Company (supra), the Court of Queen's Bench has rightly held that: Under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, where a debt due from the garnishee to the judgment-debtor has been attached, the garnishee has no right to retain the amount of any debt due to him from the judgment creditor, and the judge must order execution to levy the whole amount due from the garnishee to the judgment-debtor. Here in the present case, there is no amount due from the Bank to the Respondent No. 2 on the contrary, the Bank has to recover a very huge amount from the Respondent No. 2. The powers exercised by the Respondent No. 1 u/s 8-F of the Act, are similarly to the powers vested with the Civil Court to issue garnishee orders. The principles which are applicable to the garnishee orders would apply with full force to the orders and/or notices, issued u/s 8-F of the Act. This power can be exercised only when there is any debt due or any amount held by the Petitioner-Bank on behalf of the Respondent No. 2-Company. The principles which are applicable to the garnishee orders would apply with full force to the orders and/or notices, issued u/s 8-F of the Act. This power can be exercised only when there is any debt due or any amount held by the Petitioner-Bank on behalf of the Respondent No. 2-Company. In K.M. Adam v. Income Tax Officer (supra), the Madras High Court has held that: Where a banker lends money on an overdraft and the customer is always in debit, there is no stage at which the banker is a debtor to the customer, nor any point of time at which he holds any money of the customer on the latter's account. In the case of unutilized overdraft account, Section 46(5-A) of the Income Tax Act cannot be resorted to as a credit-freeze and it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to issue such an order u/s 46(5-A) of the Act. In the case of Canara Bank v. Tecon Engineers and Ors. (supra), the Kerala High Court has held that: No attachment can be made when there is no existing debt due by the garnishee to the judgment-debtor, and if the judgment-debtor has already parted with his interest in the debt by assignment or created an equitable charge in respect of the same in favour of another person, the attaching creditor acquires no larger rights than his debtor. The Court further held in the said case that: An interest was created in favour of the Bank over the monies due to the contractor. Such interest related to the amount then due and amount accruing in future. Income Tax liability could not be enforced over the amounts which had already been transferred in favour of the Bank. 15. Mr. Parikh is also justified in canvassing before the Court that pursuant to the order passed by the Civil Court, the Bank is only acting as a receiver for the account in question and the Bank could not act contrary to the order of the Civil Court. If the Bank would have acted contrary to the order and parted with the amount, if any, lying in the said account in favour of the Respondent No. l pursuant to the notice issued u/s 8-F of the Act, it would amount to contempt of the order of the Court. In the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji and Ors. In the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji and Ors. (supra), it is held that: “It is settled law that proceedings taken in respect of a property which is in the possession and management of a Receiver appointed by Court under Order-XL Rule-1, Code of Civil Procedure, without the leave of that Court, are illegal in the sense that the party proceeding against the property without the leave of the Court concerned, is liable to be committed for contempt of the Court, and that the proceedings so held, do not affect the interest in the hands of the Receiver who holds the property for the benefit of the party who, ultimately, may be adjudged by the Court to be entitled to the same.” The Court further held in the said case that: “The general rule that property in custodia legis through its duly appointed Receiver is exempt from judicial process except to the extent that the leave of that Court has been obtained, is based on a very sound reason of public policy, namely, that there should be no conflict of jurisdiction between different Courts. If a Court has exercised its power to appoint a Receiver of a certain property, it has done so with a view to preserving the property for the benefit of the rightful owner as judicially determined. If other Courts or Tribunals of co-ordinate or exclusive jurisdiction were to permit proceedings to go on independently of the Court which has placed the custody of the property in the hands of the Receiver, there was a likelihood or confusion in the administration of justice and a possible conflict of jurisdiction.” 16. The same principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Khemka v. Grindlays Bank P.L.C. and Ors. (supra). 17. There is one more aspect of the matter because of which the impugned notices are not held to be just and proper. The very first notice was issued by the Respondent No. 1 on 19th March, 1991. As such, on that date, there was no transaction in the impugned current account of the Respondent No. 2 with the Petitioner-Bank. The very first entry of Rs. 538.41/- was in that account on 21st March, 1991. During the period of two months, several transactions were taken place and the credit entries are reflected in the said account. As such, on that date, there was no transaction in the impugned current account of the Respondent No. 2 with the Petitioner-Bank. The very first entry of Rs. 538.41/- was in that account on 21st March, 1991. During the period of two months, several transactions were taken place and the credit entries are reflected in the said account. The total credit found in that account are to the tune of Rs. 16,20,955/-. On 8.5.1991, the Petitioner-Bank had remitted an amount of Rs. 16,621.76ps. to the Respondent No. l as on that date, the said amount was available in the current account in question. Thus, at no point of time, the credit was to the tune of Rs. 16,20,955.76ps. It, therefore, appears to the Court that the Petitioner Bank has remitted more amounts than what was available in the said account on the date of issuance of the first notice u/s 8-F of the Act. Even on this ground, the action of the Respondent No. l is not justified. 18. In view of the above discussions, the Court holds that the impugned notices, issued by the Respondent No. l, deserve to be quashed and set aside and accordingly, the said notices as well as consequential action taken, if any, are held to be unjustified and are of no consequence. The resultant effect is that pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court on 10th January, 1992, an amount of Rs. 16,20,955.76ps. was kept in separate accounts and invested in Fixed Deposit along with interest. The said amount alongwith interest accrued thereon should not be paid to the Respondent No. 1 and it should be permitted to be retained by the Petitioner-Bank. 19. With these directions and observations, this petition is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute, without any order as to costs.