T. Sivaperumal v. The Superintendent of Police, Tirunelveli District
2010-12-23
K.CHANDRU
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner filed O.A.No.7839 of 2000 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner was working as a Grade I Police Constable. By the impugned order, the petitioner was sought to be reverted from the post of Grade I Police Constable to Grade II Police Constable on the ground that a charge memo under rule 3 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was pending against the petitioner in PR.No.218 of 1999. The Chief office vide its memo dated 28.09.1999 had clarified that his upgradation will be considered only after the exoneration from the charges and also fulfilling the other conditions of upgradation. 2. The Tribunal ordered notice of motion on 30.10.2000 and granted an interim stay. Subsequently, on 16.11.2000, the interim order came to be extended without specifying any time limit. The said interim order continues till date. No attempt was made by the respondent to vacate the interim order. 3. On notice from the Tribunal, the respondent has filed a reply affidavit, dated 26.2.2001. The reason for reversion was also stated that the petitioner was upgraded as Grade I Police Station on 7.10.1999 along with 77 others. After the order was issued, it was found that the petitioner was facing charge memo under Rule 3(b). Therefore, his earlier upgradation was inadvertent. As per the order of the Government and also the Chief office memo, he cannot be upgraded pending charge memo. They themselves had admitted that the petitioner was suspended on 17.9.1999 and charge was served on the petitioner under Rule 3(b) on 2.11.1999. Therefore, upgradation during the pendency of the charges is not permissible. But, the order of reversion clearly shows that the charge memo under rule 3(b) was pending on the date of reversion. It is no doubt true that the petitioner was faced with charge memo. But at the time when the charge memo came to be issued on 2.11.1999 even the Government guidelines seeking for pass over the promotional chances only talkes about the pendency of charge memo on major misconduct like charges issued under Rule 17(b) in case of Government servants and under Rule 3(b) in case of police officials. 4. In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this court and renumbered as W.P.No.41469 of 2006. 5.
4. In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this court and renumbered as W.P.No.41469 of 2006. 5. Both in the impugned order and in the reply affidavit, the respondent only relied upon the charge memo given under Rule 3(b) and not any other proceedings which are pending earlier to the date of the charge memo, i.e. 2.11.1999. Therefore, on the date when upgradation list was issued on 7.10.1999, technically there was nothing pending against the petitioner except his suspension pending enquiry into grave charges. The suspension only enables the department to keep the Government servant out of work spot. Unless the charge memo is issued, it cannot be said that disciplinary proceedings is pending. In such case, if promotion is given it is not as if the employer has got no remedy, because depending upon the outcome of the disciplinary action, it can always pass appropriate penalty against the Government servant. The questions raised is no longer res integra. 6. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra reported in (2007) 9 SCC 625 dealt with similar case. In paragraphs 10, 18 to 20, the Supreme Court had observed as follows: "10. Both, the first appellant as also Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. are “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Their action must, therefore, satisfy the test of reasonableness and fairness. Although an employee of a State is not entitled to promotion to a higher post as a matter of right, he is entitled to be considered therefor in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. A right of promotion can be withheld or kept in abeyance only in terms of valid rules. Rules operating in the field do not provide that only because some allegations have been made as against an officer of the company, the same would itself justify keeping a valuable right to be considered for promotion of an employee in abeyance. When a question of that nature comes up for consideration before a superior court, the extant rules operating in the field must necessarily be construed in the light of the constitutional scheme of equality. 18. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued. 19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us.
When a question of that nature comes up for consideration before a superior court, the extant rules operating in the field must necessarily be construed in the light of the constitutional scheme of equality. 18. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued. 19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties. [See Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan] 20. Even in such a case, the employer is not in a helpless situation. Despite such promotion, if the delinquent employee has suffered punishment, subsequently appropriate steps may be taken on the basis thereof." 7. The reasoning given by the Supreme Court will squarely apply to the facts of the case. The petitioner also on the strength of the interim order passed by the Tribunal is holding the upgraded post for the last 10 years. Since there was no charge memo issued on the date when upgradation list was released, the reasoning found in the impugned order is erroneous and legally unsustainable. Hence the writ petition will stand allowed. The impugned order insofar as the petitioner is concerned stands set aside. No costs.