JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This appeal under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is directed against the judgment and award dated 20.6.2006 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong in MAC Case No. 5 of 2004 awarding a compensation of Rs. 10,89,760 to the claimant-respondent payable by the appellant-insurer and the respondent-insurer in equal shares. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the appeal may be noticed at the outset. On 29.12.2003, while the deceased, Peacemaker Ryngnga, was traveling in an auto-rickshaw bearing registration No. ML-05/C-0995 from Polo Bazar to Nongmynsong, Shillong, and was near about Emersion Ghat, Polo, Shillong, the auto-rickshaw was hit by a Tata Sumo bearing registration No. ML-05/D-2305 in a rash and negligent manner. The accident was reported to Shillong Sadar Police Station, which registered a regular case being Shillong P.S. Case No. 5(1)2004 under Section 279/338/427/304A, IPC. against the driver of the Tata Sumo. The auto-rickshaw was damaged. Both the accident Vehicles were inspected by the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The deceased, who is the husband of the claimant-respondent, died in the accident. The deceased was working as Upper Division Clerk under the North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), was said to be 45 years old at the time of the accident and earned a net salary of Rs. 10,935 per month. This prompted the claimant-respondent to file a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation alleging that the accident had been caused by the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the Tata Sump. The owner of the Tata Sumo did not contest the claim petition despite due receipt of the notice. The owner of the auto-rickshaw entered appearance and filed a written statement but subsequently failed to contest the case. Consequently, on the application of the appellant, the Tribunal allowed it to contest the case on all grounds available to the owner of the auto-rickshaw. Similarly, on the failure of the owner of the Tata Sumo to contest the claim petition. Tribunal allowed the insurer of the vehicle to contest the case on all grounds. On the pleadings of the contesting parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the claim is maintainable in its present form? 2. Where there is cause of action for filing the claim application? 3. Tribunal allowed the insurer of the vehicle to contest the case on all grounds. On the pleadings of the contesting parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the claim is maintainable in its present form? 2. Where there is cause of action for filing the claim application? 3. Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of Tata Sumo No. ML-05/D-2305 or of the auto-rickshaw No. ML-05/C-0995? 4. Whether the opposite party is liable for compensation? 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation? If so, to what extent? 3. In the course of trial, three witnesses including the claimant-respondent were examined on behalf of the claimant, but no witness was examined by any of the opposite parties. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award. Aggrieved by this, this appeal has been preferred by the insurer of the auto-rickshaw. Mr. S. Jindal, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has submitted that the Tribunal has completely overlooked the evidence of the claimant-respondent, who was examined as CW1, as well as the evidence of the I.O. of the case (CW3), who supported the case of the appellant that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Tata Sumo and has in the process grossly erred in law in fastening liability upon the owner of the auto-rickshaw. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that as the claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, it is the duty of the claimant to prove that the driver of the Tata Sumo was negligent in his driving the vehicle which resulted in the accident causing the death of the deceased, but the Tribunal failed to appreciate that there was neither an eye witness nor any evidence to prove such negligence. According to the learned Counsel, when CW3 categorically deposed that the driver of the Tata Sumo fled from the place of accident, which raised sustainable presumption of negligence against the driver of the Tata Sumo, the Tribunal is not justified in attributing negligence upon the driver of the auto-rickshaw. According to the learned Counsel, when CW3 categorically deposed that the driver of the Tata Sumo fled from the place of accident, which raised sustainable presumption of negligence against the driver of the Tata Sumo, the Tribunal is not justified in attributing negligence upon the driver of the auto-rickshaw. It is further urged by the learned Counsel that both the FIR and the evidence of CW3 clearly established that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo by its driver and this glaring evidence has been completely ignored or not properly considered by the Tribunal: this resulted in perverse finding. It is also pointed out by the learned Counsel that in the absence of the evidence adduced by the driver, owner and insurer of the Tata Sumo, the Tribunal clearly erred in law in holding the drivers of both vehicles to be guilty of contributory negligence: as there was no pleadings to this effect, the conclusions of the Tribunal that both the vehicles are liable for compensation are perverse and not sustainable in law. The learned Counsel for the appellant also assails the finding of the Tribunal that "there was nothing to suggest that the Tata Sumo was on the wrong side of the road where it ought to be" when there is definite evidence to show, as per the sketch map and paper mark G that the Tata Sumo was at the time of the accident on the wrong side of the road as the said vehicle was proceeding from Nongmynsong to Polo side. It is also Submitted by the learned Counsel that the compensation awarded is on the high side. In support of his various contentions, the learned Counsel relies on the following decisions: (i.) Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla and Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 476, (ii) Machindranath Kernath Kasar v. D.S. Mylarappa and Ors. 2008 ACJ 1964 , (iii) Rajib Bhattacharjee v. Union of India and Ors. (2001) 1 TAC 563, (iv) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohanjit Kaur and Ors. 2005 ACJ 654 , (v) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amitabha Dey and Ors. (1993) 1 GLR 149 and (vi) Shankar Chakrvarty v. Brttania Biscuit Co. Ltd. 1979 SC 1652. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and award is clearly illegal and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. Ltd. v. Mohanjit Kaur and Ors. 2005 ACJ 654 , (v) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amitabha Dey and Ors. (1993) 1 GLR 149 and (vi) Shankar Chakrvarty v. Brttania Biscuit Co. Ltd. 1979 SC 1652. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and award is clearly illegal and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. S.P. Mahanta, the learned Counsel for the claimant respondent, however, supports the impugned judgment and submits that no interference by this Court is called for on the facts and circumstances of this case. Mrs. P.D.B. Baruah, the learned Counsel for the insurer-respondent No. 2, contends that the findings of the Tribunal are supported by the evidence on record. She points out that the certified copy of the judgment filed by the appellant is incomplete in that page 6 of the judgment has not been included therein and this has evidently caused the learned Counsel for the appellant to make ill-conceived and wrong submissions. Once the entire judgment of the Tribunal is examined, argues the learned Counsel, the Tribunal correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor for coming to the conclusion that head-on collision could not be ruled. According to the learned Counsel, in the absence of ocular evidence, the Tribunal has no alternative but make an endeavor to get the best possible evidence by taking into account the circumstantial evidence and the surrounding circumstances. According to the learned Counsel, though no plea of head-collision or the principle of res ipsa loquitor are admittedly pleaded by the claimant-respondent, the Tribunal was not barred from giving its finding on those issues when such issues are inherent by implication or when both the parties knew that those matters are at issue. Reliance is placed by her on the decision of the Apex Court in Bhagwati v. Chandramul AIR 1966 SC 735 to fortify her contention. She, therefore, submits that the findings of the Tribunal are perfectly in order and do not warrant the interference of this Court. 5. I have carefully gone through the materials on record including the impugned judgment. I have also given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the opposing parties. The bone of contention in this appeal is mostly on the question as to whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo or not. I have also given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the opposing parties. The bone of contention in this appeal is mostly on the question as to whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo or not. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the claimant, in a claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, must prove that the driver of the offending vehicle is guilty of rash and negligent driving. In the instant case, both the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident did not enter the witness box to tender their respective evidence. Admittedly, there is no other ocular witness to give direct evidence on the manner in which the accident took place. In the FIR as well as the evidence of CW1 and CW3, who themselves are not the ocular witnesses, it was alleged that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo. How did they know? There is no answer to this. In my opinion, on the basis of such allegation unsupported by any eye witness, if the Tribunal had chosen to come to the conclusion that the driver of the Tata Sumo was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused the vehicular accident, such conclusion would be held to be based on no evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, it is my considered view that the approach of the Tribunal in gathering the best possible evidence on the available record by a process of induction and deduction is highly commendable. It cannot simply fold its hand and dismiss the claim petition on the ground that there was no ocular or better evidence. Such an approach would lead to gross miscarriage of justice, particularly, when it was dealing with a motor accident claim case. 6. Coming now to the findings of the Tribunal on the question of negligence of the driver of the Tata Sumo or of the auto-rickshaw in the vehicular accident, it is seen from the impugned judgment that the Tribunal relied on the M.V.I, report and the sketch map prepared by the I.O. of the case (CW3) to apply the well-known principle of res ipsa loquitor. This is what he said: From the MVI report and the sketch map it can be seen that the right side of the Sumo was damaged, that is, right side head light, fog light and right side mudguard was damaged, then the Sumo proceeding from Nongmynsong towards Polo would be proceeding on the left side of the road, which is the correct side, opposite the Emersion ghat, when it allegedly hit the Auto-Rickshaw. Again, the Auto-Rickshaw was said to be proceeding from Polo towards Nongmynsong side. Then it would be adjacent to the Emersion ghat with its right side facing towards the right side of the Sumo. On impact, the front side or the right side of the Auto-Rickshaw would have been damaged. But the M.V.I. report apart from indicating that the front portion of the Auto-Rickshaw was damaged, at serial No. 9, shows that the front left side door was also damaged. This could never have happened unless the Auto-Rickshaw was coming towards the side of the Sumo. Head-on collision is, therefore, not ruled out. In my considered opinion, since there is no direct evidence to prove as to who was at fault for the accident, the Claimant having stated that whatever she has stated about the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Tata Sumo was only on the basis of the police report and the I.O., and since the I.O. had not examined any eye witness and as such, his evidence was also based on heresy. Therefore, on documentary evidence, particularly the M.V.I. report, Paper mark D and E which was compared with the original and can be treated as genuine and accurate. Applying the principle of res ipsa loquitor, I hold that the accident happened due to a head-on collision. In a case of a head on collision, the fault could be attributed as 50-50 to both the vehicles involved. 7. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with the aforesaid findings and conclusions of the Tribunal. In the instant case, as already noticed, neither the driver of the Tata Sumo nor the driver of the auto-rickshaw was examined or was available for examination. In a case of this nature, the probative value of the evidence showing extensive damage to the front portions of both the vehicles deserved serious consideration. In the instant case, as already noticed, neither the driver of the Tata Sumo nor the driver of the auto-rickshaw was examined or was available for examination. In a case of this nature, the probative value of the evidence showing extensive damage to the front portions of both the vehicles deserved serious consideration. The nature of the impact establishes a high degree of probability that the accident happened following head-on collision between the Tata Sumo and the auto-rickshaw. For a head-on collision, it is not necessary that the entire front portions of both the vehicles should be destroyed/damaged as contended by Mr. S. Jindal, the learned Counsel for the appellant. The application of the principle of res ipsa loquitor in a vehicular accident case was considered by the Apex Court in Pushpabhai Purshottam Udhesi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 745 . It was observed therein, thus: (SCC pp. 750-51, para 6) 6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitor is that the accident 'speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208 , the Apex Court also held: 4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208 , the Apex Court also held: 4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In such a situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor comes into play and the burden shifts on to the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part. 8. As the principle of res ipsa loquitor is demonstrably applicable, the burden shifts on to the appellant to prove that the accident was not a head-on collision, but it was due to the negligence of the driver of the Tata Sumo. No such proof is forthcoming. Under the circumstances, I do not find any reason to upset the findings of the Tribunal. Coming now to the quantum of compensation payable, the Apex Court in a recent case of Sarla Verma v. DTC (2000) 6 SCC 121 held that in cases falling under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, Davies method is applicable. Davies method is illustrated by the Apex Court in UPSRTC v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 in the following manner: (SCC p. 370, para 15) 15...X, male, aged about 35 years, dies in an accident. He leaves behind his widow and 3 minor children. His monthly income was Rs. 3500. First, deduct the amount spent on X every month. The rough and ready method hitherto adopted where no definite evidence was forthcoming, was to break up the family into units, taking two units for an adult and one unit for a minor. Thus, X and his wife make 2+2 = 4 units and each minor one unit, i.e., three units in all, totaling 7 units. Thus, the share per unit works out to Rs. 3,500 7 = Rs. 500 per month. It can, thus, be assumed that Rs. 1,000 was spent on X, Since he was a working member some provision for his transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. In the present case we estimate the out-of-pocket expense at Rs. 250. Thus, the share per unit works out to Rs. 3,500 7 = Rs. 500 per month. It can, thus, be assumed that Rs. 1,000 was spent on X, Since he was a working member some provision for his transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. In the present case we estimate the out-of-pocket expense at Rs. 250. Thus, the amount spent on the deceased X works out to Rs. 1,250 per month leaving a balance of Rs. 3,500-1,250 = Rs. 2,250 per month. This amount can be taken as the monthly loss to X's dependents. The annual dependency comes to Rs. 2,250 x 12 = Rs. 27,000. This annual dependency has to be multiplied by the use of an appropriate multiplier to assess the compensation under the head of loss to the dependents. Take the appropriate multiplier to the 15. The compensation comes to Rs. 27,000 x 15 = Rs. 4,05,000, To this may be added a conventional amount by way of loss of expectation of life. Earlier this conventional amount was pegged down to Rs. 3,000 but now having regard to the fall in value of the rupees, it can be raised to a figure of not more than Rs. 10,000. Thus, the total comes to Rs. 4,05,000 + 10,000 = Rs. 4,15,000. 9. In the instant case, the deceased died due to the accident at the age of 45 years and was at that time earning Rs. 10,935 per month. He is survived by his wife, the claimant-respondent, and his seven children. Applying Davies method, his family is broken up into units, taking two units for an adult and one unit for a minor. Thus, the deceased and the claimant make 2 + 2 = 4 and each minor, i.e., 7 units in all, totaling 11 units. The share per unit, therefore, works out to 10935 -r 11 = Rs. 994.10p (approx.). Thus, it can be assumed that Rs. 1,988 was spent on the deceased. Since he was a working member, some provision for his transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. I estimate his out-of-pocket expenses at Rs. 1,500 per month. Thus, the total amount spent on the deceased works out Rs. 3,488 leaving a balance of Rs. 10,935-3,488 = Rs, 7,447. This amount can be taken as the monthly loss to the dependents of the deceased. The annual dependency comes to Rs. 89,364. I estimate his out-of-pocket expenses at Rs. 1,500 per month. Thus, the total amount spent on the deceased works out Rs. 3,488 leaving a balance of Rs. 10,935-3,488 = Rs, 7,447. This amount can be taken as the monthly loss to the dependents of the deceased. The annual dependency comes to Rs. 89,364. As he was forty-five years old at the time of his death, the appropriate multiplier can be taken to be 12. The compensation payable will come to Rs. 89,364 x 12 = Rs. 10,72,368. Even adopting Davies method, the Tribunal is not wide of the mark in assessing the compensation payable to the claimant-respondent at Rs. 10,89,760 after adding Rs. 20,000 as funeral expenses and another Rs. 20,000 loss of love and affection. In the result, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and award. No other contentions survived for consideration. 10. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. It is stated at the bar that the respondent No. 2 has already satisfied the award in respect of its share. If that is so, the appellant shall now pay its share of the compensation to the claimant-respondent together with the interest so awarded within one month from the date of receipt of this judgment. However, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed