JUDGMENT : Bhagwati Prasad, J. The present appeal is filed by the Manager of the bank - appellant being aggrieved by the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court delivered on 1.4.2009 whereby the challenge to the award dated 20.9.2008 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Surat, in Reference (IT) No. 21 of 2007 was not sustained by learned Single Judge and the Special Civil Application was dismissed. The award was challenged by the appellant before learned Single Judge on two contentions which have been noted down by learned Single Judge in paragraph Nos. 5 and 5.1 of the judgment which are reproduced hereinafter : "para 5 - As mentioned above the award is challenged on two grounds. One of the contentions is to the effect that in respect of the petitioner bank which is a "banking company" as defined under Section 2(bb) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "I.D. Act"), the appropriate Government would be the Central Government and not the State Government and that therefore the reference could not have been made by an authority under the State Government but ought to have been made by the authority under Central Government. Para 5.1 - The second contentions is on the ground that even if it is assumed that the appropriate Government is State Government and order of reference was validly made then also the labour Court would not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute inasmuch as the subject of transfer is not one of the matters covered under Schedule 2 of the I.D. Act but is a subject covered under Schedule 5 of the I.D. Act." 2. Prior to this litigation there were other litigations in which both the parties have agreed on the matters being disposed of with certain directions and learned Single Judge of this Court had disposed of those proceedings with the following directions: "(i). The newly added respondent-Commissioner of Labour shall make reference to the concerned Industrial Tribunal on receipt of the request for joint reference as agreed by the parties here in above under Section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (ii). The appropriate authority i.e. the Commissioner of Labour shall make reference to the concerned Tribunal for adjudication within a period of ten days from the date of the receipt of the request of making joint reference by the respective parties." 3. (ii). The appropriate authority i.e. the Commissioner of Labour shall make reference to the concerned Tribunal for adjudication within a period of ten days from the date of the receipt of the request of making joint reference by the respective parties." 3. Dealing with the contentions raised by the petitioner, learned Single Judge in the present lis has rejected the first contention by observing in paragraph No. 10 which is reproduced as under: "Thus, when the orders against which the concerned 7 persons raised the challenge are orders made under Standing Orders of the petitioner bank, then the said orders would stand covered under entry No. 1 of 2nd Schedule or in any case, as mentioned earlier, under the residuary entry i.e. entry No. 6 of second schedule." 4. Learned Single Judge has rejected the second contention of the appellant while giving his findings at paragraph No. 25 which is reproduced here in below: "Be that as it may, so far as the present petition is concerned and the contention raised by the petitioner bank is concerned, the same stands settled by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Bharat Co-operative Bank (supra) and by the order passed by the Division Bench in the reference made in the case of Madhupura Mercantile Co-operative Bank Limited (supra) relying on said judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence the said contention also fails." 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the contentions which were limited before learned Single Judge on two counts were without authority of the litigant and therefore learned Single Judge ought not to have limited the judgment only on these two counts. We are not impressed by the argument of learned counsel for the appellant on this ground because all these questions if at all were required to be adjudicated they were required to be agitated before learned Single Judge and not before this Court. We are informed that a review petition was filed and the same has been rejected. In this background this argument is not available to learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of learned Single Judge could not have been limited to two grounds only. Learned counsel for the appellant furthering his arguments on ground No. 1 that the Reference being made by the State Government which was not an appropriate Government, hence reference was not maintainable. Learned counsel for the appellant furthering his arguments on ground No. 1 that the Reference being made by the State Government which was not an appropriate Government, hence reference was not maintainable. We are afraid that this argument is not available to the petitioner firstly on the ground that it was on his own volition that he took a direction by learned Single Judge of this Court in earlier proceedings and while the direction was sought for by the appellant, thoughtful consideration must have been given as to which is the appropriate Government. In any case the reasoning given by learned Single Judge in his judgment based on the finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co.Op Bank Employees Union Reported at 2007(4) SCC 685 that the State Government is the appropriate Government, does not appear to us in any way vitiated by any of the niceties which learned counsel for the appellant has tried to invoke because appropriate bank in a Banking Company which the appellant is in terms of the definition of Section 5 of the Banking Regulations Act. We have no doubt in holding that the ratio in the matter of Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. (supra) has been rightly applied by learned Single Judge. 6. The second contention as raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the transfer is not subject matter of dispute as covered by Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act but is a subject covered by Schedule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore is not liable to be referred. Learned Single Judge has dealt with this aspect in detail. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that this cannot be made the subject matter of industrial dispute does not appear to us to be based on sound reasoning because the transfer orders were made under Standing Orders and as per Second Schedule Clause (1) and Residuary Clause (6) as has been observed by learned Single Judge, the Reference was validly made. In any case the appellant has agreed before this Court in earlier litigation that the Reference can be made on the subject. In any case the appellant has agreed before this Court in earlier litigation that the Reference can be made on the subject. A reference in this regard may be made to the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of National Radio Corporation v. Their Workmen reported in 1963(1) LLJ 282 and G.E. Power Controls India And Others v. S. Lakshmipathy And Others reported (2005) 11 SCC 509 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the question of transfer where the matter was being referred to the Industrial Tribunal and in none of these cases it has been held that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the matters of transfer. In that view of the matter when the matter of transfer has been adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not said that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the matters of transfer, it cannot be concluded that in the matters where transfer orders are made under Standing Orders, the same cannot be made subject matter of the industrial dispute. 7. In view of the aforesaid, on both the counts the reasoning given by learned Single Judge is upheld. The arguments of learned counsel for the appellant are not accepted and hence rejected. There is no force in the appeal. Hence the appeal is dismissed. In view of disposal of the main matter, the Civil Application does not survive. It stands disposed of accordingly. Appeal dismissed.