Dinesh Chandra Kanaujia v. Neeraj Kumar and Others
2010-02-11
PRADEEP KANT, RITU RAJ AWASTHI
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
By The Court—Notices on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 4 have been accepted by Sri S.B.Pandey and on behalf of respondents No. 6 and 7, by Sri P.R.Kanaujia.2. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, notice need not be issued to respondent No. 5, as he is not a necessary party.3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant Sri D.R.Misra and Sri S.B.Pandey, for the respondents.4. This special appeal has been filed against the order dated 13.1.2010 passed by learned Contempt Judge in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2539 (C) of 2009, by means of which he has directed for sanction of the amount by the State Government to enable the subordinate officers to comply with the orders of this Court dated 27.7.2004, passed in Writ Petition No. 2237 (S/S) of 2004. The learned Contempt Judge, before issuing the aforesaid direction, came to consider the sole question as to whether the Director can proceed to engage a counsel of Basic Shiksha Parishad in respect of the proceedings in which he has been arrayed as contemnor for violating the orders of this Court. It appears that during the hearing of the contempt petition against the aforesaid order passed by learned Single Judge, since the Director was being defended by a private counsel, a question arose as to whether a private counsel can defend the contemnor, who is a Government officer, namely, the Director. Learned appellant’s counsel Sri D.R.Misra submits that in a matter of contempt, the officer is impleaded individually because it is his act of non-compliance or willful disobedience of the Court’s order and he is personally responsible for the outcome of such an action and, therefore, he is at liberty to engage any private counsel though he can engage a Government counsel also.5. A perusal of the order passed by learned Single Judge reveals that he, relying upon the observations made in the case of ‘Commissioner, Agra and others v. Rohtas Singh and others’, (1998) 1 SCC 349 , has come to the conclusion that this question need be considered by the Principal Secretary, Basic Education and has observed that he has noticed that the Director is appearing through counsel appointed by the Parisad.6.
In the case of Commissioner, Agra and others (supra), the question which engaged the attention of the High Court and thereafter of the Apex Court, was, whether the Additional Advocate General of the Government can be engaged for defending a contemnor, government officer. The answer was given in the affirmative.7. Leaving aside the question as to who should be allowed to defend the contemnor, namely, the Director or any other government officer in contempt proceeding, the aforesaid plea would not at all be relevant for being decided by a learned Single Judge in contempt proceedings. It is for the Director, Basic Shiksha Parisad or for that matter, a Government officer who is facing contempt proceedings or the State Government, to decide as to who should defend the contemnor, and unless there is any specific bar that a particular lawyer or a group of lawyers cannot appear on behalf of the contemnor, the courts would be reluctant in adjudicating upon this issue. We, thus, do not find any reason for a direction to the Principal Secretary, Basic Education to decide the question and then communicate the report to the Court. It is a different matter that the Principal Secretary, Basic Education looks into the matter, takes a decision and informs all the officers of the department, so that in future, they do not have to face any such ambiguity or problem.8. We also feel that in contempt proceedings, normally no direction can be issued to the departmental authorities for issuing a direction against the contemnor. The scope of contempt is limited only for seeing as to whether the substantive order passed by the Court has been complied with or not, and if not, the reason therefor and if there is willful disobedience of the Court’s order, the contemnor has to be punished.9. The order under appeal, therefore, stands modified to the extent as aforesaid and there would be no occasion to take any action against the Director. However, rest of the order, which seeks compliance of the Court’s order, is not being interfered with.10. With the aforesaid directions and observations, the special appeal stands finally disposed of._