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Karnataka High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 572 (KAR)

G. Hafeez v. K. Asif

2010-04-22

ARAVIND KUMAR

body2010
Judgment :- (This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of CPC, against the Order dated 25.08.2009 passed in O.S.No. 15734/2005 on the file of the XIII Addl. City Civil Judge, Mayohall Unit, Bangalore, (CCH 22), dismissing the application filed under order 7 Rule 11 (d) of Code of Civil Procedure.) This is a defendants’ revision petition questioning the correctness of the order passed by the XIII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, dated 25.8.2009 in O.S.No. 15734/2005 whereunder interlocutory application filed by the revision petitioners (defendants) under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 came to be dismissed. 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranks before Civil Court. The facts in nut shell are as follows: 2.1 Plaintiffs sought for an order of perpetual injunction against the defendants, their men, agents, representatives, henchmen in O.S.No. 15734/2005. The said suit was contested by the defendants. During the pendency of the suit an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) r/w Section 151 of Code of Civil Pro9cedure came to be filed by the defendants with a prayer to reject the plaint as same is barred by law. The said application was supported by an affidavit of 4th defendant. It was contended in the said affidavit that in respect of suit schedule property the defendants’ father had taken 15 guntas of agricultural land on tenancy basis from Kolad mutt Mahasamstanam during 1d965 and during his life time he was cultivating the land by giving half share to the mutt. It was also contended that father of the plaintiff slate G.Khaleel had filed an application for registration of occupancy rights before land Tribunal and the Tribunal by order dated 19-4-1989 had ordered late G.Khaleel to be registered as occupant of the Schedule property. The said order came to be set aside by this Court in W.P.No.25423/1993 by order dated 19.9.2001 and same came to be set aside at the instance of the mutt and was remitted back to the Land Tribunal. The matter is being adjudicated by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams as the land was a Devadaya land and during pendency of adjudication before Tribunal, above said G.Khaleel expired on 17-7-2004 and his legal heirs were prosecuting the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner. 2.2. The matter is being adjudicated by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams as the land was a Devadaya land and during pendency of adjudication before Tribunal, above said G.Khaleel expired on 17-7-2004 and his legal heirs were prosecuting the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner. 2.2. It was contended by the Defendants that when the mater was pending before the Tribunal, the plaintiffs have filed the present suit to deprive the rights of the defendants. It was also contended that suit schedule property was in joint possession of both plaintiffs and defendants and the defendants have already got impleaded themselves before the Tribunal and as such the plea regarding joint tenancy has to be referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961. Hence it was contended that the suit was not maintainable and barred by law. 2.3. The said application came to be resisted by the plaintiffs and it was contended that defendants cannot be permitted to preempt the trial by means of the present application, particularly when evidence has already been recorded in the main suit. It was also contended to avoid adjudication of the matter the application is filed to harass the plaintiffs and to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs. 2.4. On the basis of the rival contentions the trial Court framed the following points for its consideration: 1. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected; as barred by law? 2. What order? 2.5. After considering the arguments of respective advocates, the Court below by its order dated 25-8-2009, dismissed the application. It is this order which is questio0ned by the defendants in this Revision Petition. 3. I have heard Sri.Subramanya appearing on behalf of Upasana Associates and Sri.R.I.D’Sa learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs. 4. Sri.Subramanya would contend that all the defendants have impleaded themselves before the Special Deputy Commissioner, by order dated 5-6-2006. He would contend that under Section 30 of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as Inams Abolition Act, 1955), the provisions of Section 48A of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, r/w Rule 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules are made applicable. He would contend that under Section 30 of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as Inams Abolition Act, 1955), the provisions of Section 48A of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, r/w Rule 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules are made applicable. He would fairly submit that Section 32 of 1955 Act is not in paramateria with Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act and fairly concedes provision of Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Elaborating his submissions he would contend that prohibition under law as contemplated under Order VII Rule 11(d) would be Section 3 and Section 5 of Inams Abolition Act, which prohibits the Court from proceeding with the Civil Suit inasmuch as under Section 3 the land vests with the State and person in possession will continue to be in possession of the land and what is required to be enquired before the Special Deputy Commissioner before grant of occupancy rights will be with reference to the history and nature of holding of the land for grant of occupancy right under Section 5 of Inams Abolition Act. He would draw the attention of this Court to the order dated 5-2-2006 passed by Special Deputy Commissioner while allowing the impleading application of the defendants to come on record in the said proceedings to contend that deceased Khaleel i.e., father of the plaintiffs had deposed before the Tribunal that all his brothers (defendants in the suit and revision petitioners herein) were assisting him in his agricultural operations and as such he would contend under proviso to Section 3 of 1955 Act the defendants re deemed to be in possession along with the plaintiffs. He would contend that if the Civil Court is allowed to record a finding about his possession while adjudicating the suit it will have a bearing on proceedings before Special Deputy Commissioner and as such he contends that suit is to be held s barred by law. In support of his submissions he would rely upon the following judgment: (i) 2009 (4) AIR Kar. 21. Smt.Mallamma Vs. Chenne Gowda. Para 45) (ii) ILR 1994 Kar.230. Karnataka Bank Vs. T.Gopalaksihna Rao. (Head Note A) (iii) (1977) 4 SCC 467 T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V.Satyapal (para 5) (iv) AIR 1978 Kar. 136 Mudakappa Vs. Rudrappa and others. In support of his submissions he would rely upon the following judgment: (i) 2009 (4) AIR Kar. 21. Smt.Mallamma Vs. Chenne Gowda. Para 45) (ii) ILR 1994 Kar.230. Karnataka Bank Vs. T.Gopalaksihna Rao. (Head Note A) (iii) (1977) 4 SCC 467 T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V.Satyapal (para 5) (iv) AIR 1978 Kar. 136 Mudakappa Vs. Rudrappa and others. (para 12) (v) 1996 (6) Kar.L.J 129. (SC) Mudukappa Vs. Rudrappa and others. (head Note) 5. Per contra Sri.D’Sa learned counsel appearing for the respondent plaintiffs would submit that revision is not a substitution for appeal and the order in question can be examined only under three situations contemplated under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of interference and order questioned herein can be examined only in this back ground. Thus he would contend that order impugned in this revision petition does not come within any of these categories and hence supports the order passed by Court below. Elaborating his submission he would contend that there is no substantive bar under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act 1955 and as such the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d). He would submit that mere overlapping of jurisdiction would not be a bar to continue the suit. He would submit that what is required to be examined is whether there is a bar under any law to try the suit and if so what is the bar. Amplifying his submissions on this point he would contend that under the Inams Abolition Act, 1955 there is no bar for the Civil Court to try the suit and once the land vests with the State under Section 3 the ownership will be decided by the Tribunal for purposes of grant of occupancy rights possession would be considered. He would contend that petitioners were never applicants before the Tribunal. He would submit that the remedy available to the defendants in the event it is held it enures to the family the defendants will have to file a suit for partition contending that tenancy application had been filed on behalf of the family. He would submit that Special Deputy Commissioner cannot have jurisdiction to decide inter se inheritance dispute. He would submit that the remedy available to the defendants in the event it is held it enures to the family the defendants will have to file a suit for partition contending that tenancy application had been filed on behalf of the family. He would submit that Special Deputy Commissioner cannot have jurisdiction to decide inter se inheritance dispute. He would also submit that the Special Deputy Commissioner cannot consider whether Khaleel’s application is to be registered as an occupant and it cannot decide as to whether it was for the benefit of the family or not. He would also submit there is no rival claim before the Special Deputy Commissioner and as such the plaintiffs were entitled to approach the Civil Court for redressal of their grievance. In support of his submission he would rely upon the following judgments. (i) AIR 2008 SC 3174 (ii) 2006 AIR SCW 863 Kamala and others Vs. K.T,.Eswara sa and others. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Forltune Express & Ors. (para 11 & 12) (iii) 2005 (3) KCCR 1602 Doddamma Vs. Muniyamma and others. (iv) ILR 1994 Kar 2505 B.V.Subbachari Vs. B.K. Joyappa. (para 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, & 15) (v) 2009(2) KCCR 1130 Chennabasappa Vs. Land Tribunal Chincholi, Gulbarga District. (vi) AIR 2008 SC 363 C.Natarajan Vs. Ashim Bai and another. (i) AIR 2010 Rajasthan page 12. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties the following points arise for my consideration: (i) Whether there is a prohibition under any law for rejection of the plaint in O.S.No. 15734/2005 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and if so whether the plaint in question is liable to be rejected? (ii) Whether the order dated 25-8-2009 passed by XIII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, rejecting I.A. filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) suffers from any infirmity? (iii) To what order? 7. In order to decide the questions of law formulated hereinabove it would be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of law pressed into service and also some of the judgments relevant for consideration. And same are narrated in the succeeding paragraphs: PROVISIONS OF LAW The Mysore State (Religious And Charitable Inams Abolition Act, 1955 Section 3. 7. In order to decide the questions of law formulated hereinabove it would be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of law pressed into service and also some of the judgments relevant for consideration. And same are narrated in the succeeding paragraphs: PROVISIONS OF LAW The Mysore State (Religious And Charitable Inams Abolition Act, 1955 Section 3. Consequences of the vesting of an inam in the State.- (1) When the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 14 in respect of any inam has been published in the Mysore Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect on and from the date of vesting, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the following consequences shall ensure, namely:- (a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Code relating to alienated holdings shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the inam; and the provisions of the 1[Land Revenue Code and all other enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply to the said inam; (b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, cultivated lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries, shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of Mysore, free from all encumbrances; (c) the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the inam other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act; (d) xxxxx (e) xxxxx (f) xxxxx (g) xxxxx (h) xxxxx (i) xxxxx (j) xxxxx (k) xxxxx (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall operate as bar the recovery by the inamdar of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his rights s inamdar and any such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law which but for this Act would be available to him. Section 5. Section 5. Permanent tenants to be registered as occupants on certain conditions.- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every permanent tenant of the inamdar shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a permanent tenant immediately before the date if vesting: Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by an inamdar on or after the first day of July 1948, shall, except where the Deputy Commissioner after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise directs, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of such land. (2) In addition to the annual land revenue payable in respect of the land, a permanent tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant of any land under sub-section (1), shall be liable to pay to the Government, as premium for acquisition of ownership of the land, an amount equal to twenty times such land revenue. The amount of premium shall be payable in not more than ten annual instalments along with the annual land revenue and in default of such payments, the amount due shall be recoverable as an arrears of land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is payable. 1[Provided that where a permanent tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant of land under sub-section (1) is shown as a registered occupant in the settlement register and others records referred to in Section 117 of the 2[Land Revenue Code, or where the rent paid by a permanent tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant under subsection (1) is not more than the land revenue no premium shall be payable under this sub-section.]; 2[“5A. Protected tenant to be registered as occupant on certain conditions.-(1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (2), every protected tenant shall on and from the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a protected tenant immediately before the date of vesting. Protected tenant to be registered as occupant on certain conditions.-(1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (2), every protected tenant shall on and from the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a protected tenant immediately before the date of vesting. (2) In addition to the annual land revenue payable in respect of the land, a protected tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant of any land under sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay to the Government, as premium for acquisition of ownership of that land, an amount equal to fifty times such land revenue plus in the case of lands classified as dry but possessing property of the Government,- (i) Where two crops of paddy can be raised in a year or where sugarcane can be Raised. Rupees three hundred and thirty per acre. (ii) Where one crop of paddy can be raised in a year. Rupees two hundred and twenty per acre. (iii) Where semi-dry crops can be grown. Rupees one hundred and Ten per acre. The amount of premium shall be payable in not more than ten annual instalments along with the annual land revenue and in default of such payment the amount dues shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is payable.] Section 30. Enquiries by the Tribunal and Deputy Commissioner.- (1) In respect of every enquiry under this Act by the Tribunal, the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applicable to enquiries by the Tribunals under the said Act shall mutatis mutandis apply] (Emphasis supplied by me) 3[(2) The Deputy Commissioner may, by general or special order authorize any officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar subordinate to him to hold enquires on his behalf, under this Act: Provided that the Deputy Commissioner may in respect of any enquiry held by any such officer, direct such officer to hold a fresh or further enquiry or himself hold a fresh or further enquiry if in his opinion fresh or further enquiry is necessary. 3[(3) In respect of every enquiry under this Act by the Deputy Commissioner the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, relating to summary enquiry under the said Act. 3[(3) In respect of every enquiry under this Act by the Deputy Commissioner the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, relating to summary enquiry under the said Act. 3[(4) No legal practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceedings under this Act before the Tribunal or the Deputy Commissioner.] Section.32. Jurisdiction of Courts Barred in Certain Cases.- (1) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule thereunder. (2) (a) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any officer or servant of the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule thereunder without the previous sanction of the Government (B) No officer or servant of the Government shall be liable in respect of any such act in any civil or criminal proceeding, if the act was done in good faith in the course of the execution of the duties or the discharge of the functions, imposed by or under this Act. (3) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall be instituted against any officer or servant of the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder, after the expiry of six months from the date of the at complained of. 8. Under Section 30 of the above Act the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applicable in so far as to Enquiries by the Tribunals under the said Act is also made applicable to an enquiry under Inams Abolition Act, 1955. Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 Section 48A: Enquiry by the Tribunal, etc.-(1) Every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 45 may make an application to the Tribunal in this behalf. Every such application shall, save as provided in this Act, be made 3[before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the commencement of Section 1 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978] 4[xxxx] (2)On receipt of the application, the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the village in which the land is situated calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall also issue individual notices to the persons mentioned in the application and also to such others as may appear to it to be interested in the land. (3) The form of the application, the form of the notices, the manner of publishing or serving the notices and all other matters concerned therewith shall be such as may be prescribed. 1[The Tribunal may for valid and sufficient reasons permit the tenant to amend the application.] (4) Where no objection is filed, the Tribunal may, after such verification as it considers necessary, by order, either grant or reject the application. (5) Where an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant’s claim or setting up a rival claim, the Tribunal shall, after enquiry, determine, by order, the person entitled to be registered as occupant and pass orders accordingly. (5) Where an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant’s claim or setting up a rival claim, the Tribunal shall, after enquiry, determine, by order, the person entitled to be registered as occupant and pass orders accordingly. 2[(5-A) Where there is no objection in respect of any part of the claim, the Tribunal may at once pass orders granting the application as regards that part and proceed separately in respect of the other part objected to.] (6) The order of the Tribunal under this section shall be final and the Tribunal shall] send a copy of every order passed by it to the Tahsildar and the parties concerned: [Provided that the Tribunal may, on the application of any of the parties, for reasons to be recorded in writing, correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in any order passed by it:] Provided further that the Tribunal may on its own or on the application of any of the parties, for reasons to be recorded in writing, correct the extent of land in any order passed by it after causing actual measurement and after giving an opportunity of being heard to the concerned parties.] (7) The person to be registered as an occupant shall pay to the State Government as premium an amount equal to fifteen times the net annual income referred to in subsection (2) of Section 47 in the case of A Class, B Class and C Class lands referred to in Parts A of Schedule I and twenty times such income in the case of D Class land referred to in the said Part A, plus the amount, if any, payable under sub-section (3) of that section: Provided that the premium payable by a permanent tenant shall be six times the difference between the rent and the land revenue of the land. (8) Where no application is made within the time allowed under sub-section (1), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall hve no effect. Section 133. (8) Where no application is made within the time allowed under sub-section (1), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall hve no effect. Section 133. Suits, proceedings, etc., involving questions required to be decided by the Tribunal.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any lw for the time being in force.- (i) no civil or criminal court or officer or authority shall, in any suit case or proceedings concerning a land [xxxxx] decide the question whether such land is or not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March, 1974; (ii) such court or officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings insofar as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for decision; (iii) all interim orders issued or made by such court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be; (iv) the Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause (1) and communicate its decision to such court, officer or authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the civil or criminal court or the officer or authority from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in that sub-section.] Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, Rule 17. Procedure to be followed by the Tribunal.-(1) The tribunal shall in respect of applications made to it follow the same procedure as specified for a summary enquiry under Section 34 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 subject to the condition that the records of the proceedings shall be maintained in a language understood by all its members. (2) Order sheet shall be maintained by the Chairman in respect of each case heard by the tribunal, nothing in it the day-to-day proceedings of the tribunal relating to the conduct of the case. (3) When a meeting is adjourned, the date, time and place of hearing of adjourned meeting shall be made known to the parties present and their signature obtained on the order sheet. (3) When a meeting is adjourned, the date, time and place of hearing of adjourned meeting shall be made known to the parties present and their signature obtained on the order sheet. (4) The progress in the enquiry of each case shall be noted by the chairman immediately after hearing or the holding of spot inspection by the tribunal. (5) The opposite party shall be allowed to cross-examine the witness and if it does not wish to so cross-examine, a note shall be made accordingly. A brief summary of the evidence given by each witness shall be recorded by the Chairman. (6) If there are more applications than one for registration of occupancy rights by different persons in respect of the same land, those cases shall be clubbed together and a common order passed. (7) Prayer on an interlocutory application has to be considered by the tribunal strictly in relation to the reliefs sought for. (8) The order shall be signed, in addition to the Chairman, by the other members of the tribunal who heard the case. (9) All orders shall be speaking orders, namely, the points for decision, the decisions themselves and the reasons for the decisions shall be mentioned. The orders shall be pronounced in the open court. (10) No member of the tribunal shall participate in the deliberations or decision of a case in which he is personally interested. 9. Though several judgments are cited at the Bar the same having been perused by this Court, following judgments would throw light on the questions formulated hereinabove which requires to be determined in the instant case and as such the following decisions are extracted. (i) AIR 2008 SC 3174 Kamala & others vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa & others. Para 15 & 16 15. Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code has limited application. It must be shown that the suit is barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the averments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order VII, Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. Different clauses in Order VII, Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for invoking clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is the averments made in the plaint. For that purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. Absence of jurisdiction on the part of a court can be invoked at different stages and under different provisions of the Code. Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is one, Order XIV, Rule 2 is another. 16. For the purpose of invoking Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code, no amount of evidence can be looked into. The issues on merit of the matter which may arise between the parties would not be within the realm of the court at that stage. All issues shall not be the subject-matter of an order under the said provision. The principles of res judicata, when attracted, would bar another suit in view of Section 12 of the Code. The question involving a mixed question of law and fact which may require not only examination of the plaint but also other evidence and the order passed in the earlier suit may be taken up either as a preliminary issue or at the final hearing, but, the said question cannot be determined at that stage. It is one thing to say that the averments made in the plaint on their face discloses no cause of action, but it is another thing to say that although the same discloses cause of action, the same is barred by a law. The decisions rendered by this Court as also by various High Courts are not uniform in this behalf. But, then the broad principle which can be culled out therefrom is that the court at that stage would not consider any evidence or enter into a disputed question of fact of law. In the vent, the jurisdiction of the court is found to be barred by any law, meaning thereby, the subject matter thereof, the application for registration of plaint should be entertained. (ii) 2009 (4) AIR R 21 Smt. Mallamma vs. Channegowda & others. 45. In the vent, the jurisdiction of the court is found to be barred by any law, meaning thereby, the subject matter thereof, the application for registration of plaint should be entertained. (ii) 2009 (4) AIR R 21 Smt. Mallamma vs. Channegowda & others. 45. The Courts below have declined to grant the relief of possession to the plaintiff similarly on the ground that the Land Tribunal has granted occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd respondent and therefore he is in possession. As such in view of the bar contained in the afore4mentioned Sections the trial Court cannot examine the said aspect of the matter. No doubt, a plaint reading of the above provisions indicate that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to deal with any question which is required to be settled or decided by the authorities mentioned in Section 132 and sub-section (2) further makes it clear that no order of the authorities mentioned therein shall be called in question in any Civil Court or Criminal Court and Section 133 further makes it clear by specifically mentioning that the Civil Court or Criminal Court shall not decide the question as to whether the land is not a agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1-3-1974. 46. A careful reading of the aforesaid clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 133 therefore gives an indication as to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the questions referred to above in clause (1) of Section 133 of sub-section(1). (iii) AIR 1978 Karnataka page 136 para 12. Mudakappa vs. Rudrappa 12. Section 132 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers under the Act. It also further provides that no order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State Government made under the Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. It also further provides that no order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State Government made under the Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. The consequence of an agricultural land being held by a lessee immediately prior to 1-03-1974 is that with effect on and from the said date, it would stand transferred to and become vested in the State Government by virtue of S. 44(1) of the Act. The tenants holding such lands, would as against the State Government, be entitled only to such rights or privileges and would be subject to such conditions as provided by or under the Act. Any other rights or privileges which may have accrued to them in such lands before the date of vesting against the landlord or other person would cease and would not be enforceable against the State Government. Under S. 45 of the Act, every tenant would be entitled subject to such restrictions and conditions that are imposed by the Act to be registered as an occupant in respect of the lands of which he was a tenant before the date of vesting and which he had been cultivating personally. Sec. 48-A prescribes the procedure to be followed by a person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 45. For securing such registration, he has to make an application to the Tribunal constituted under the Act for that purpose in accordance with law. Under sub-section (5) of S. 48-A, where an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant’s claim or setting up a rival claim, the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry and determine whether the applicant is entitled to be registered as an occupant or not. Under sub-section (5) of S. 48-A, where an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant’s claim or setting up a rival claim, the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry and determine whether the applicant is entitled to be registered as an occupant or not. Sec. 112 (B) expressly requires the Tribunal to make necessary verification or hold an enquiry in all cases relating to registration of a tenant as an occupant under S. 48-A, S. 133 of the Act, states that when, in any suit or proceedings concerning a land, the question whether such land is or is not an agricultural land or whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land prior to 1st March, 1974, arises for consideration, such question should be referred to the Tribunal for its decision and the suit or proceedings should be disposed of in accordance with the finding of the Tribunal on the above question. When, as in this case, one person applies for registration of the lands as an occupant in his individual name and three others apply for registration of the said lands in their name along with the other applicant as joint occupants, it becomes the duty of the Tribunal to decide whether only one of them was the sole tenant of the lands in question before the appointed day or whether all of them were jointly in possession of the lands as tenants. Without deciding the said question, it would not be possible for the Tribunal to make an effective order under S. 48-A of the Act. In order to decide the said question, it becomes necessary for the Tribunal to decide whether the tenancy in question was held by one at them exclusively or by all the applicants jointly. We have to hold that under S. 48-A, the Tribunal has that power having regard to the scope of that section. Whenever a statute confers a duty on an authority to decide a question and a corresponding right on an individual or individuals it has to be assumed that the statute, has, by necessary implication conferred on that authority the power to decide all issues which are incidental and ancillary to the main question to be decide. Otherwise the Tribunal will have to keep all the applications pending until such issues are decided by the Civil Court. Otherwise the Tribunal will have to keep all the applications pending until such issues are decided by the Civil Court. In fact there is no procedure prescribed by the Act to refer such issues for the decision of the Civil Court. We do not think that it would be reasonable to hold that the Tribunal should await the decision of the Civil Court on such issues, in view of sub-section (5) of S. 48-A, which requires the Tribunal to hold an enquiry into all rival claims made in respect of the registration of the occupancy rights in respect of the agricultural lands before disposing of the applications made to it. We therefore hold that the Land Tribunal is competent to decide for the purpose of disposing of the applications under S. 48-A the question whether the lease-hold rights were held exclusively by the appellant or by the joint family consisting of the appellant and the respondents before the partition took place and thereafter by all of them as co-tenants till the appointed day. It is its duty to do so under the Act. The said question could not therefore be decided by the Civil Court in view of S. 132 of the Act. (iv) AIR 1996 (6) KLJ 129 Para 7 & 8. Mudakappa Vs. Rudrappa 7. In Chapter III heading is conferment of ownership on tenants. A conspectus of the provisions establishes the gamut of operation of the Act, namely, conferment of ownership of tenancy rights of the lands vested in the State Government. The preexisting right, title and interest of the landlord in relation to the lands in possession of the tenant, even against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certification for assumption was made or issued immediately prior to the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act other than the lands held by them under leases permitted under Section 5, with effect on and from the said date, i.e., March 1, 1974 stand transferred to and vested in the State Government. In other words the pre-existing relationship of the tenant with the landlord stood extinguished from the date of vesting in the State Government. In other words the pre-existing relationship of the tenant with the landlord stood extinguished from the date of vesting in the State Government. By operation of non obstante clause of sub-section (2) of Section 44, the lands which were resumed by or in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force with effect on and from the date of vesting and save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act shall cease. The consequences enumerated thereunder shall ensue, namely, all rights, title and interest held by the owners of such lands and other persons interested in such lands shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Consequently the pre-existing right, title or an interest of the owners of such lands shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Pending finalization of the registration with the State Government of a tenant, his possession of the land is protected and he should not be dispossessed. Section 45 gives right to the tenant to be registered as an occupant of land on specified conditions enumerated in Section 45 and the provisions of the succeeding Chapter. Every tenant who is personally cultivating the land shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of the lands of which he was a permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenant or sub-tenant before the date of vesting. The pre-existing tenancy rights with predecessor landlord have been extinguished and new rights have been created by the statute which would be ensued under the Act creating direct tenancy relationship with the State as a tenant. Section 49-A constitutes the forum and enjoins it to enquire into the application registered by it. It should direct every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 45 to make an application to the Tribunal in that behalf within the time specified thereunder. On receipt of such application, the Tribunal should publish or cause to be published a public notice in the village in which the land is situated calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the specified date. On receipt of such application, the Tribunal should publish or cause to be published a public notice in the village in which the land is situated calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the specified date. Personal notice shall be served on the persons named in the application or otherwise found to be entitled to be heard. By operation of Explanation II to Section 2 (11) if the land is being cultivated by or on behalf of the joint family or by any one of the members of the joint family, it should be deemed that the joint family is personally cultivating the land. The joint family is, therefore, the tenant and the land is lawfully in occupation of the joint family as a tenant. Sub-section (5) of Section 48-A postulates that when an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant’s claim or set up a rival claim, the Tribunal shall, after enquiry, determine, by order, the person entitled to be registered as tenant and pass orders accordingly. Therefore, when rival claims were set up for tenancy right and entitlement for registration, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to enquire into the dispute and to decide the same in the prescribed manner. Thereon an order should accordingly be made by the Tribunal and it would become final. Thereby it is clear that the Act extinguishes the pre-existing right, title and interest of the landowners as well as those who were inducted into possession by the erstwhile landholders. The new rights have been created in the Act itself in favour of the tenants in personal cultivation to claim registration as tenants so as to continue to enjoy the occupancy rights as a tenant as enumerated under Section 45. A forum was created and the forum is enjoined to enquire into not only the nature of the land but also the entitlement for registration as a tenant. When inter se rival claims for tenancy rights have been set up, it has been empowered with jurisdiction to decide that question as to who is the tenant in possession of the land prior to the date of vesting and entitled to be registered as a tenant with the State Government and its decision shall be final. When inter se rival claims for tenancy rights have been set up, it has been empowered with jurisdiction to decide that question as to who is the tenant in possession of the land prior to the date of vesting and entitled to be registered as a tenant with the State Government and its decision shall be final. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction under Section 9 of C.P.C. by necessary implication, therefore, stood excluded. 8. It is seen that the words ‘tenant’, ‘the Tribunal’, and ‘the joint family’ have been defined under the Act. If one of the members of the family cultivates the land, it is for and on behalf of the joint family. Under these circumstances, pending the suit, when the question arose whether the appellant or joint family is the tenant, that question should be decided by the Tribunal alone under Section 48-A read with Section 133 and not by the Civil Court. It is needless to mention that when the Tribunal constituted under the Act has been invested with the power and jurisdiction to determine the rival claims, it should record the evidence and decide the matter so that its correctness could be tested either in an appeal or by judicial review under Article 226 or under Article 227, as the case may be. But that cannot, by necessary implication, be concluded that when rival claims are made for tenancy rights, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is ousted or its decision is subject of the decision once over by the Civil Court. It is clear from Section 48-A(5) and Section 112-B(bbb) read with Section 133, that the decision of the Tribunal is final under Section 133, that the decision of the Tribunal is final under Section 133(iii). The Civil Court has power only to decide other issues. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that the rival claims for tenancy rights or the nature of the tenancy are exclusively left to dealt with by the Civil Court. (v) AIR 2006 AIR SCW 863 para 11 & 12 Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express & others. 11. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the defendant in his written statement or in an application for rejection of the plaint. (v) AIR 2006 AIR SCW 863 para 11 & 12 Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express & others. 11. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the defendant in his written statement or in an application for rejection of the plaint. The Court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the Court exercising the powers under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which has to be gathered on the basis of the averments made in the plaint in its entirely taking those averments to be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleadings relied on are in regard to misrepresentation, fraud, willful default, undue influence or of the same nature. So long as the plaint discloses some opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. In the present case, the averments made in the plaint, as has been noticed by us, do disclose the cause of action and, therefore, the High Court has rightly said that the powers under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code cannot be exercised for rejection of the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants. 12. Similarly, the Court could not have taken the aid of Section 10 of the Code for stay of the suit as there is no previously instituted suit pending in a competent court between the parties raising directly and substantially the same issues as raised in the present suit. (v) 2005 (3) KCCR page 1602 para 21 Doddamma vs. Muniyamma & others. (v) 2005 (3) KCCR page 1602 para 21 Doddamma vs. Muniyamma & others. (21) It is clear from the above said provisions of the Inams Abolition Act and the provisions of the Land Reforms Act that so far as the rights of the tenants are concerned, the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act are similar to the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act though the provisions may not be similar in respect of the owners of the lands under Karnataka Land Reforms Act and Inam holders and inamdars under the Inams Abolition Act. However, so far as the tenants are concerned, the effect of the above said proceedings is that from the appointed date, the relationship of the landlord and tenant ceases and the property vests with the Government and the tenant is entitled to conferment of occupancy right as per the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. The object of the Inams Abolition Act as already culled out from the observations made in Muniraj’s case (2004) (3) KLJ 570) is to see that the application attached to the inams are abolished by vesting of the property in the State and the tenants would get occupancy right under the Inams Abolition Act and in substance, there is change of tenure and property would vest with the State absolutely free from all encumbrances and the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases and on conferment of occupancy right, the tenant would get the right under the Inams Abolition Act. While considering the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and dealing with the question as to whether the occupancy right granted in favour of a member of the joint family would enure to the benefit of all the members of the joint family and whether a civil suit can be filed for partition and separate possession in respect of the occupancy right that is granted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balawwa and Another vs. Hasanabi and Others, (2000) 9 SCC 272 , has observed as follows:- “7. Having examined the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and the aforesaid two judgments of this Court, we have no doubt in our mind that the Civil Court cannot e said to be ousted of the jurisdiction, in granting the relief sought for. Having examined the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and the aforesaid two judgments of this Court, we have no doubt in our mind that the Civil Court cannot e said to be ousted of the jurisdiction, in granting the relief sought for. It is too well settled that when a Special Tribunal is created under a special statute and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is sought to be ousted under the said statute, it is only a respect of those reliefs which would be granted by the Special Tribunal under the special statute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to be ousted. 8. Looking at the provisions of Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and the relief which is ought for in the present case, it is difficult to hold that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to grant the said relief so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Under Section 48-A, the Tribunal can only grant the relief of declaring the occupancy right in favour of an applicant provided the preconditions for the same are satisfied, namely, that the land was in the possession of the tenant concerned on the relevant date. That being the position, and the Tribunal under the Land Reforms Act not having the jurisdiction to grant relief of partition, the Civil Court itself has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is, therefore, devoid of any force. 9. Coming to the second contention, as it appears, the decision of the learned Trial Judge granting the relief of partition in respect of two houses has not been assailed. The plaintiff is one of the daughters of Imamsab. Defendant 1 happens to be the widow of the son of Imamsab and defendant 3 is he husband of the other daughter of the said Imamsab. All these persons had a right in the property left by Imamsab. In this view of the matter, the High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the so-called order of the Land Tribunal under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act would enure to the benefit of the other members who ere otherwise eligible for a share in the property in question. In this view of the matter, the High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the so-called order of the Land Tribunal under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act would enure to the benefit of the other members who ere otherwise eligible for a share in the property in question. Therefore, we see no infirmity with that conclusion so as to be interfered with by this Court.” A Division Bench of this Court in Appi Belchadthi and Others Vs. Sheshi Belchadthi and Others, 1982 (2) KLJ 565 has observed as follows:- “18. The questions such as, the existence of a joint family, the rights of the members thereof, the position and power of the manager, and the nature of the property acquired by them are not so simple to the decided by a summary enquiry, and that too without the assistance of trained lawyers. The joint Hindu Family or coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law. The status of every Hindu Family is presumed to be joint, joint in food, worship and estate. That presumption is stronger in the case of brothers. Once the family is proved to be joint, that presumption continues until it is rebutted. Those who allege separation must prove unless it is admitted that there was a separation at some point of time. The question a to whether a particular family retains its character of jointness at a particular time is a difficult question for decision. Mere severance in food and worship des not effect a separation of the family nor separate residence by members operates as a severance of the joint status. We are only mentioning some of these principal features to impress upon that the decision on these questions requires a lot of brooding even by Courts of law. One could only images the difficulties of Tribunals without proper wherewithal.” The same principle is reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in Guruvappa and Another Vs. Manjappa Hengsu and Others, ILR 1985 (1) Kar 386. It is clear from the above said observations made by this Court that effect of abolition of the relationship of landlord and tenant or vesting of the property in the State and conferment of occupancy right on the tenant would only result in the change of tenular of the tenant as the same would not affect the personal inam of the parties. When there is a rival claim before the Land Tribunal with regard to the fact that the tenancy is individual or joint family tenancy, the Tribunal is bound to decide the said question while considering the rival applications filed by the members of the family. However, when application for conferment of occupancy right is filed by one of the members of the family, conferment of the occupancy right o0n the said applicant, would not preclude the other members of the family to contend that the said tenancy is the joint family tenancy and that they are entitled to partition and separate possession of the shares. Under the Inams Abolition Act, no power is given to the competent authority to pass a decree for partition and what is required to be considered by the authorities is only as to whether the applicant is entitled to conferment of occupancy right as a tenant under Section 5 of the Inams Abolition Act, which is relevant for the purpose of this case to decide the question as to whether he was a permanent tenant on the date of vesting. In a recent decision of this Court where there was divergent opinion between two Judges of this Court and the matter was referred to a third bench, the learned Judge has observed as follows in Sri Parashuram Nemani Kuduchakar and Others Vs. Smt. Shantabai Ramachandra Kuduchakar and Others, ILR 2004 Kar 3325, after referred to the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act: “(i) The Tribunal alone has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not of the land in question, and the civil Court has no jurisdiction or power to decide the same. (ii) If a rival claim is made before Land Reforms Tribunal one party contending that the tenancy rights exclusively belongs to himself and another contending that the tenancy rights exclusively belongs to himself and another contending that tenancy rights belongins to the joint family and therefore all of them are entitled to grant of occupancy rights, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to go into the question whether tenancy rights claimed belongs exclusively to one of the member of the joint family or it belongs to the joint family, as it is incidental and necessary to decide the question of grant of occupancy rights. (iii) If before grant of occupancy rights the Tribunal adjudicates the rival claims and holds that the tenancy pleaded exclusively belongs to the applicant in whose favour the occupancy right is granted and it does not belong to the joint family, the parties have to challenge the said order under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act only and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the said decision of the Land Tribunal nor can ignore the said finding and record a finding contrary to the one recorded by the Tribunal in a suit for partition. (iv)if tenancy is not disputed or rival claims by members of the joint family are not put forth agitated, after grant of occupancy rights by the Tribunal. Civil Court can entertain a suit for partition in respect of such property, decide whether such property is a joint family property or the separate property of the applicant to whom the occupancy right is granted, and grant a decree for partition. (v) if the question of tenancy belonging to the joint family is raised before the Land Tribunal and the Tribunal does not decide the said question one way or other and leaves it to be decided by Civil Court; Civil Court is not precluded from going into the said question after the tenancy rights has been granted in favour of one of the claimants, while considering the relief of partition. (vi) The Civil Court alone has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for partition and to grant the relief of partition and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain and grant a decree for partition”. The Court has referred to the provisions of Sections 2(17) and 2 (34) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, which defines “joint family” and “tenant”. Facts of the present case and Findings on Points Formulated: 10. Plaintiffs instituted the suit O.S.No. 15734/2005 against the defendants for relief of perpetual injunction. It was contended in the suit that their father Mr.G.Khaleel was granted occupancy right on 19-4-1989 and was in possession of the property. The said suit came to be filed on 26-2-2005. Facts of the present case and Findings on Points Formulated: 10. Plaintiffs instituted the suit O.S.No. 15734/2005 against the defendants for relief of perpetual injunction. It was contended in the suit that their father Mr.G.Khaleel was granted occupancy right on 19-4-1989 and was in possession of the property. The said suit came to be filed on 26-2-2005. The said suit was resisted by the defendants by filing a detailed written statement and contending that defendants are the members of the joint family and the application was filed by deceased G.Khaleel on behalf of the entire family and as such the suit was not maintainable. Additional written statement was also filed contending that they are co-applicants in the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner and thus with an intention to grab the suit schedule property the plaintiffs have filed the suit against the defendants who are also in joint possession. Accordingly they had sought for dismissal of the suit. 11. The consideration of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamala’s case referred to supra would be within limited jurisdiction. It must be shown that suit is barred under any law and conclusion that has to be arrived at by the Court would be with re4ference to the averments made in the plaint. As held therein there cannot be addition or subtraction. If it is found that jurisdiction of the Court is barred under any law plaint ought to be rejected. Keeping in view these principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is to be examined in the facts of the present case as to whether there is any bar under any law for the plaint being rejected. Sri.Subramanya has fairly conceded that bar available under Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act is conspicuously absent under the Inams Abolition Act, 1955. Thus, in the instant case it can be held that there is no bar under any of the provisions of Inams Abolition Act, 1955 for the suit being tried by a Civil Court as found in Section 133 of Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 12. Thus, in the instant case it can be held that there is no bar under any of the provisions of Inams Abolition Act, 1955 for the suit being tried by a Civil Court as found in Section 133 of Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 12. The alternate plea made by the learned counsel for the petitioner which is to the effect that consequent to the vesting of Inam land in the State, the possession of the tenants continue with them and in the instant case he would contend that Mr.Khaleel had filed an application on behalf of the family and also the impleading application of the defendants having been allowed and they also having been made parties before the Special Deputy Commissioner are deemed to be in possession of the suit schedule property as joint tenants along with plaintiffs. A perusal of the Form No.7 filed before the Tribunal dated 31-3-1984 by Late G.Khaleel would revel that it was filed in the name of G.Khaleel. It is seen from the perusal of the records that at earlier point of time when the Tribunal granted the occupancy right on 19-4-1989 in favour of G.Khaleel no claim was set up by the defendants. Defendants have contended that their father i.e., Gouse Shariff was the tenant and after his demise all his children continue to be in joint possession. The fact remains that occupancy rights was earlier granted in favour of G.Khaleel. It is no doubt true that the said order came to be set aside by this Court in W.P.NO.25423/1993 by order dated 19-9-2001 and the matter is now pending before the Special Deputy Commissioner for adjudication afresh. The Special Deputy Commissioner while adjudicating the impleading application of the defendant has made an observation to the following effect in the concluding portion of the order: “However, it is made clear that the observations made herein do not influence in finding ‘fact’ and taking decision in the matter” Which in effect would mean that as to whether the revision petitioners are in joint possession or not is required to be considered at the final stage and not, at that stage. 13. 13. Now coming to the decision of this Court in the case of Doddamma referred to supra it has been held that conferment of occupancy rights on one of the members of the family would not preclude the other members of the family to contend that said tenancy is the joint family tenancy and that they are entitled to partition and separate possession of their shares. It has also been held in the said judgment that no power is given to the competent authority to pass a decree for partition. However, the issue regarding joint tenancy or otherwise is a matter required to be adjudicated by the Special Deputy Commissioner. However, this does not preclude the Civil Court from proceeding with the suit as held therein to the following effect: “iv) if tenancy is not disputed or rival claims by members of the joint family are not put forth agitated, after grant of occupancy rights by the Tribunal. Civil Court can entertain a suit for partition in respect of such property, decide whether such property is a joint family property or the separate property of the applicant to whom the occupancy right is granted, and grant a decree for partition.” 14. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to in Owners and Parties case and Kamala’s case supra the averments in the plaint alone should disclose as to whether there is any bar for plaint to be rejected. In view of the same this Court is of the considered opinion that on perusal of the averments made in the plaint it discloses that there is no bar under any law for the plaint being rejected. Accordingly point No.1 is answered, holding that there is no Prohibition Under any law for rejecting the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Re:Point No.2: A perusal of the order passed by the trial Court it is seen that said order does not suffer from either jurisdictional error or it suffers from any material irregularity. The suit being at the stage of further cross examination of P.W.1 it would not be desirable to reject the plaint on the basis of the averments made in the written statement and which cannot also be embarked upon by this Court. The suit being at the stage of further cross examination of P.W.1 it would not be desirable to reject the plaint on the basis of the averments made in the written statement and which cannot also be embarked upon by this Court. Hence, question No.2 formulated hereinabove is answered by holding that the order of the Court below does not suffer from any error or infirmity. 14. Accordingly the following order is passed: The revision petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. The order passed by the Court below dated 25-8-2009 is hereby confirmed. No order as to costs.