JUDGMENT Hon’ble Virendra Kumar Dixit, J.—Heard Sri S.M. Royekwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajendra Kumar Dwivedi, learned AGA for the opposite party and perused the relevant documents on record. 2. The instant petition is being preferred under Section 482, Cr.P.C. challenging the entire proceedings relating to Case No. 124 of 2009 (State v. Rakesh Singh) under Sections 110/111, Cr.P.C., including the notice dated 25.11.2009 issued under Section 111, Cr.P.C., pending in the Court of Pargana Magistrate, Kaisarganj, Bahraich 3. It is submitted that the learned Pargana Magistrate. Kaisarganj, Bahraich proceeded to issue impugned notice under Section 111, Cr.P.C. on the basis of the police report dated 23.11.2009 without application of judicial mind. The impugned notice has been issued on a typed format in a cyclo styled manner. In the said typed format only the name, date and police station has been filled in the gaps. It is further submitted that in violation of Section 111, Cr.P.C., the Pargana Magistrate did not set forth the substance of the information received by him in the impugned notice which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance thereof vitiates the entire proceedings. 4. Learned Additional Government Advocate strongly contended the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the impugned proceedings under Sections 110/111, Cr.P.C. are in accordance with the provisions of law. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Madhu Limave v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate Monghya and others, 1970 (3) SCC 746 , Gopalanachari v. State of Kerala, AIR 1981 SC 674 : 1980 (Supp) SCC 649 SC and also in support of his arguments cited law laid down by this Court in the cases of, Siya Nand Tvagi v. State of U.P., 1993 (30) ACC 146; Ranjeet Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2002 (43) ACC 627; Shiv Kant Tripathi v. State of U.P. and another, 2005 (3) JIC 477 (All); Devendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2006 (1) JIC 196 (All); Har Charan v. State of U.P. and another, 2008 (2) JIC 418 ; Lola @ Manish Dhar Dubey @ Babloo v. State of U.P., 2009 (1) JIC 629 (All) and Mahesh Prasad Kannaujia v. State of U.P., 2009 (2) JIC 918 (All). 6. 6. Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under the heading "security for keeping peace and for good behaviour" authorizes the Magistrate to take appropriate steps for preventing a person from committing breach of public peace. Sections 110 and 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) are reproduced as under : 110. Security for good behaviour from habitual offenders.—When (an Executive Magistrate) receives information that there is within his local jurisdiction a person who— (a) is by habit a robber, house-breaker, thief, or forger, or (b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen, or (c) habitually protects or harbours thieves, or aids in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, or (d) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chapter II of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or under Section 489-A, Section 489-B, Section 489-C or Section 489-D of that Code, or (e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences, involving a breach of the peace, or (f) habitually commits. or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of— (i) any offence under one or more of the following Acts, namely : (a) the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 1940 (23 of 1940); (b) the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 1973 (46 of 1973) ; (c) the Employees’ Provident Fund (and Family Pension Fund) Act, 1952 (19 of 1952) (d) the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954); (e) the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955); (f) the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 (22 of 1955); (g) the Customs Act. 1962 (52 of 1962) ; (h) the Foreigners Act, 1946 (3 of 1946) ; or (ii) any offence punishable under any other law providing for the prevention of hoarding or profiteering or of adulteration of food or drugs or of corruption, or (g) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community, Such Magistrate may, in the manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit. 111. 111. Order to be made.—When a Magistrate acting under Section 107, Section 108, Section 109 or Section 110, deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required. A bare perusal of provisions of Section 110, Cr.P.C. would reveal that the proceedings under Section 110 are taken to prevent committing such acts, a person as mentioned therein. The object of Section 110 is to afford protection to the public against a repetition of crimes against their person or property; not a punishment of the offender for his past offences but securing good bahaviour for the future. The passing of preliminary order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. is a condition precedent for taking further steps, no final order in proceeding can be passed without giving an opportunity to such person to show cause. 7. In the case of Gopalanachari (supra), it was observed by Hon’ble the Apex Court “Law is what the law does, even as freedom is what freedom does. Going by that test, Section 110 cannot be permitted in our free Republic to pick up the homeless and the have-nots as it did when under British subjection because today to be poor is not a crime in this country. George Bernard Shaw, though ignorant of Section 110, did sardonically comment that “the greatest of evils and the worst of crimes is poverty.” 8. Since Section 110, Cr.P.C. confers drastic powers, bind down suspected persons, but not proved to have committed any of the offences specified in various clauses, the power should be used with extreme caution and judicial discretion and strictly according to procedure laid down, so that it may not be used as an engine of oppressions, black-mail or private vengeance and the Magistrate should not be influenced by vague rumour or gossip. 9. In the case of Gopalanachari (supra), Hon’ble the Apex Court observed in para -6 of the judgment as under : “The constitutional survival of Section 110 certainly depends on its obedience to Article 21, as this Court has expounded. 9. In the case of Gopalanachari (supra), Hon’ble the Apex Court observed in para -6 of the judgment as under : “The constitutional survival of Section 110 certainly depends on its obedience to Article 21, as this Court has expounded. Words of wide import, vague amplitude and far too generalised to be safe in the hands of the police cannot be constitutionalised in the context of Article 21 unless read down to be as a fair and reasonable legislation with reverence for human rights. A glance at Section 110 shows that only a narrow signification can be attached to the words in clauses (a) to (g), "by habit a robber", "by habit a receiver of stolen property.......", "habitually protects or harbours thieves.......", "habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of......." "is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community." These expressions, when they become part of the preventive chapter with potential for deprivation of a man’s personal freedom up to a period of three years, must be scrutinized by the Court closely and anxiously. The poor are picked up or brought up, habitual witnesses swear away their freedom and Courts ritualistically, commit them to prison and Article 21 is for them a freedom under total eclipse in practice. Courts are guardians of human rights. The common man looks upon the trial Court as the protector. The poor and the illiterate, who have hardly the capability to defend themselves, are nevertheless not non-persons, the trial Judges must remember. This Court in Hoskot case has laid down the law that a person in prison shall be given legal aid at the expense of the State by the Court assigning counsel. In cases under Section 110 of the Code, the exercise is often an idle ritual deprived of reality although a man’s liberty is at stake. We direct the Trial Magistrates to discharge their duties, when trying cases under Section 110, with great responsibility and whenever the counter-petitioner is a prisoner give him the facility of being defended by counsel now that Article 21 has been reinforced by Article 39-A. Otherwise the order to bind over will be bad and void. We direct the Trial Magistrates to discharge their duties, when trying cases under Section 110, with great responsibility and whenever the counter-petitioner is a prisoner give him the facility of being defended by counsel now that Article 21 has been reinforced by Article 39-A. Otherwise the order to bind over will be bad and void. We have not the slightest doubt that expressions like ‘by habit’, ‘habitual: ‘desperate’, ‘dangerous’, ‘hazardous’ cannot be flung in the face of a man with laxity of semantics.’ The Court must insist on specificity of facts and be satisfied that one swallow does not make a summer and a consistent course of conduct convincing enough to draw the rigorous inference that by confirmed habit, which is second nature, the counter-petitioner is sure to commit the offences mentioned if he is not kept captive. Preventive sections privative of freedom, if incautiously proved by indolent judicial processes, may do deeper injury. They will have the effect of detention of one who has not been held guilty of a crime and carry with it the judicial imprimatur, to boot. To call a man dangerous is itself dangerous; to call a man desperate is to affix a desperate adjective to stigmatize a person as hazardous to the community is itself a judicial hazard unless compulsive testimony carrying credence is abundantly available. A sociologist may pardonably take the view that it is the poor man, the man without political clout, the person without economic stamina, who in practice gets caught in the coils of Section 110 of the Code, although, we as Court, cannot subscribe to any such proposition on mere assertion without copious substantiation. Even so, the Court cannot be unmindful of social realities and be careful to require strict proof when personal liberty may possibly be the causality. After all, the judicial process must not fail functionally as the protector of personal liberty." 10. The powers under Section 110, Cr.P.C. must be exercised after observing all the formalities required under the law. The Magistrate can apply his power only on convincing testimony that the person is clear and present danger to the society. It is for the prevention, not the punishment of the crime. The Magistrate has to exercise his discretion in judicious manner. 11. The passing of preliminary order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. is obligatory. The Magistrate can apply his power only on convincing testimony that the person is clear and present danger to the society. It is for the prevention, not the punishment of the crime. The Magistrate has to exercise his discretion in judicious manner. 11. The passing of preliminary order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. is obligatory. An order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. is a condition precedent for taking further steps in any proceedings under Sections 107-110, Cr.P.C. The first thing that the Magistrate must do after receipt of the information referred to in Sections 107­110, Cr.P.C. is to apply his mind to such information and, if he is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding under this chapter, to pass an order in writing under Section 111, Cr.P.C. The order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. must be in a writing and broadly contain the elements (i) Substance of the information received under Sections 107-110, Cr.P.C. (as the case may be), (ii) Upon a consideration of such information he has formed the opinion that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and that it is necessary to proceed under the relevant sections (Sections 107-110, Cr.P.C. as the case may be). He is not bound to draw up an order under Section 111, Cr.P.C., merely because he has received a Police Report or other information, (iii) the amount of the bond to be executed, (iv) the term for which the bond is to remain in force, (v) The number, character and class of sureties required, in cases under Section 110, Cr.P.C., and if so required, under Section 107-109, Cr.P.C. On the other hand, the order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. need not give—(i) the source of the information received, or supply a copy of the Police report (ii) the list of witnesses in support of the information or the order, (iii) the definite acts which the person intends to commit where the substance of the information is communicated, (iv) a reference to Section 111, Cr.P.C. itself, if the substantive Section 107-110, Cr.P.C. as the case may be) is mentioned in the order, (v) the period of imprisonment to be suffered in default of execution of the bond, (vi) any extraneous matter. 12. 12. In the case of Madhu Limaye (supra), Hon’ble the Apex Court observed “Since the person to be proceeded against has to show cause, it is but natural that he must know the grounds for apprehending a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility at his hands. Although the section speaks of the ‘substance’ of the information it does not mean that the order should not be full. It may not repeat the information bodily but it must give proper notice of what has moved the Magistrate to take the action. This order is the foundation of the jurisdiction and the word ‘substance’ means the essence of the most important parts of the information.” 13. From the perusal of the record, it transpires that the impugned notice under Section 111, Cr.P.C. has been issued on a typed format in a cyclo styled manner and in the said typed format only the name, date and police station has been filled in the gaps and also the Pargana Magistrate did not set forth the substance of the information received by him in the impugned notice. 14. In the case of Madhu Limaye (supra) it was held by Hon’ble the Apex Court that the person proceeded against show cause notice must be informed of the allegations made against him, by giving him the substance of the information so that he may meet such allegations. 15. The preliminary order contemplated under Section 111, Cr.P.C. is a judicial order and has to be prepared and drawn up cautiously and carefully in compliance with the provisions of Section 111, Cr.P.C. and the order must contain reasons of the Magistrate satisfaction. The substance of the information is the matter upon which he has to show cause. If substance of information is not given in the order under Section 111, Cr.P.C. the person against whom the order has been made will remain in confusion. The extent of information which must be set forth depends in each case upon the circumstances of that case. The basic object of preliminary order being to give the person proceeded against an opportunity to meet the allegation made against him as well as nature of the order proposed. 16. In the instant case, the impugned order on the printed proforma without recording reasons show non-application of judicial mind. The basic object of preliminary order being to give the person proceeded against an opportunity to meet the allegation made against him as well as nature of the order proposed. 16. In the instant case, the impugned order on the printed proforma without recording reasons show non-application of judicial mind. Use of printed/cyclo styled proforma with some insertions here or there in passing such order is not proper rather on the face it is nothing short of a farce. Notice under Section 111, Cr.P.C. containing vague apprehensions and allegations on printed /cyclo styled proforma indicate pre-conceived notions. The impugned notice under challenge is void and proceedings against the petitioner are nullity and without jurisdiction as substance of information received as required is incomplete and ambiguous. Notice without substance of information vitiate the proceedings. The impugned notice issued under Section 111, Cr.P.C. and proceedings drawn on the basis of such vague notice are apparently abuse of process of Court. Failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 111, Cr.P.C. vitiate the preliminary order and consequently the proceedings. The procedure followed by the learned Magistrate is not in consonance with the provisions of law. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and the law propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court in above mentioned cases, it is a fit case where the inherent power of this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is required to be invoked for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. 18. Consequently, the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is allowed and the entire proceedings relating to Case No. 124 of 2009 (State v. Rakesh Singh) under Sections 110/111, Cr.P.C. including the notice dated 25.11.2009 issued under Section 111, Cr.P.C. pending in the Court of Pargana Magistrate, Kaisarganj, Bahracih, are hereby quashed. However, learned Magistrate is at liberty to draw a fresh proceedings against the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of law, as discussed above. ————