JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. Appellant herein stood charged before the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala under Section 376(1) of IPC in Sessions Trial No. 82(WT/A) of 2006 for commission of rape of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) on 9-10-2005 at 5 p.m. in her residence. After due trial, the trial Court recorded a finding of guilt of the Appellant and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 (six) months. The trial Court also directed that if fine money is realised the same shall be paid to the victim as compensation. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction and sentence as indicated above, Appellant filed this instant appeal from jail challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment and order of conviction and sentence rendered by the trial Court. 3. For proper appreciation and understanding of the merit of the appeal it would be appropriate for us to place the facts in brief appearing in the face of the records. Prosecutrix (P.W. 1) is the daughter of Samarendra Deb (P.W. 4) and Smt. Namita Deb (P.W. 3). On 9-10-2005 in the evening hours which was a Sunday, prosecutrix was alone at her residence. Her father Samarendra Deb (P.W. 1) had been to his tea stall situated at Gandhigram Market while her mother (P.W. 3) being a paralytic patient on advice of doctor was on the road walking to and fro. At about 5 p.m. the Appellant, a neighbour of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) came to their residence and made an entry thereto. Noticing his arrival prosecutrix (P.W.1) questioned him why he had come to their residence in absence of her parents and others. At this, Appellant slapped her and dragged her to a room and forced to fall on the bed. While prosecutrix tried to raise alarm rather hue and cry, he gagged her mouth so that no hue and cry could be raised by the prosecutrix. Thereafter the Appellant forcefully against the will of the prosecutrix committed rape on her and at the time of leaving there from he also warned the prosecutrix not to divulge the incident to any body else he would kill her. Thereafter the Appellant forcefully against the will of the prosecutrix committed rape on her and at the time of leaving there from he also warned the prosecutrix not to divulge the incident to any body else he would kill her. Sometime thereafter her mother (P.W. 3) arrived and she narrated the incident to her that she had been raped by the Appellant. When her father P.W. 4 came home her mother (P.W. 3) also informed him about the incident of rape by the Appellant on P.W. 1, P.W. 4 being the father brought the incident into the knowledge of the neighbours who assured that they would looked into the matter but when nothing had come true prosecutrix (P.W. 1) was compelled to lodge an FIR with Airport police station in writing, written by Bishnu Kr. Dey at her dictation on 17-10-2005 at 7 a.m. which was entered in the General Diary of the police station as GD Entry No. 616 dated 17-10-2005. The First Information Report was also registered as Airport PS. case No. 53 of 2005 dated 17-10-2005 under Section 376, IPC. Investigation commenced and during investigation prosecutrix (P.W. 1) was produced before the medical officers, P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 for the medical examination and for ascertainment of age. She was also produced before a Magistrate for recording her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. During investigation police also seized one frock (Kamiz) having designs, one orange colored Jangia (under garment) on 18-10-2005 at 9 a.m. in connection with the case in presence of the witnesses, namely, the prosecutrix and her father. Appellant was also produced before Dr. Jayanta Sankar Chakraborty (P.W. 11) on 20-10-2005 for his medical examination. At the closure of the investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the Appellant under Section 376, IPC. The evidence being one, triable by the Court of session the case was committed to the Court of session which was ultimately made over to the trial Court for trial of the Appellant. Having found grounds to presume that the Appellant did commit offence under Section 376, IPC after hearing prosecution and the defence a charge was accordingly framed to which the Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution to prove the charge under Section 376, IPC against the Appellant examined as many as 14 (fourteen) witnesses and proved various other documents during trial. Prosecution to prove the charge under Section 376, IPC against the Appellant examined as many as 14 (fourteen) witnesses and proved various other documents during trial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. Defence took the plea of denial and false prosecution. Appellant was examined under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. he in answer to the question No. 8 stated as under : I have been falsely implicated in this case. On the alleged date and time I was at Golbazar. As I did not marry Sangita for which I have been falsely implicated. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court recorded conviction and awarded sentence vide judgment dated 24-6-2009 indicated above and impugned in this appeal. 4. I have heard Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the State Respondent. 5. Issue before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record both oral and documentary the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is legally sustainable. 6. In support of the appeal and the grounds contended Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel strenuously argued that the learned trial Court committed error and illegality in recording the guilt of the Appellant under Section 376(1), IPC on the basis of unacceptable facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record. The learned trial Court according to Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik failed to assess the facts and evidence on record judicially in its proper perspective and thus prompted it to arrive at an erroneous finding. On the findings of the learned trial Court Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Appellant at the very out set tried to impress upon this Court that the entire case had been manufactured and engineered on account of refusal by the father of the Appellant to accept the prosecutrix (P.W.1) as his daughter-in-law. Such manipulation and embellishment according to Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik could be ascertained from the lodgment of the first information report by the prosecutrix herself. According to Mr. Such manipulation and embellishment according to Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik could be ascertained from the lodgment of the first information report by the prosecutrix herself. According to Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik the alleged occurrence took place on 9-10-2005 at 5 p.m. while the incident had been informed to police in writing on 17-10-2005 at 7 a.m. During this period ample opportunity came to prosecutrix (P.W.1) and her parents including the neighbours more particularly P.W. 2 to deliberate on the issue in between them so that the Appellant could be brought to book on the charge of rape on the victim, the P.W. 1. The explanation put forward by P.W. 1, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 in respect of delay in lodgment of FIR according to Mr. Kar Bhowmik cannot be accepted at all. Since at no point of time there was an attempt on the part of the neighbours and the parents to convene a salice with the village elders against the Appellant for the incident. On this issue there is no evidence on record Mr. Kar Bhowmik submitted. It was also submitted that though all the P. Ws., more particularly, P.W. 2, P.W. 4 and P. Ws. 5 to 8 stated before the trial Court on oath that for convention of a salice they approached the father of the Appellant on several occasions, father of the Appellant was not agreeable and accordingly no such salice could be held to arrive at an amicable settlement in between the parties. Evidence of the P. Ws. as indicated above in the context of holding of a salice to make an amicable settlement of the incident according to Mr. Kar Bhowmik cannot inspire confidence in view of inconsistencies appeared in between the evidence of the witnesses. Further it was argued that the explanation offered by the prosecutrix herself in regard to lodgment of the FIR on 17-10-2005 is also not believable. In the FIR as well as in her deposition she has stated that the Appellant threatened her not to divulge the incident to anybody and for that delay had been caused in filing the first information report. She also stated in her evidence that delay had been caused on account of fear and public criticism. It was argued by Mr. In the FIR as well as in her deposition she has stated that the Appellant threatened her not to divulge the incident to anybody and for that delay had been caused in filing the first information report. She also stated in her evidence that delay had been caused on account of fear and public criticism. It was argued by Mr. Kar Bhowmik that during the intervening period the prosecutrix and her parents along with other interested witnesses cooked up a false story against the Appellant to feed fed the grudge on refusal of the Appellant and his father to accept the prosecutrix as daughter-in-law. Introduction of evidence mostly through the mouth of P.W. 2, P. Ws. 5 to 8 that the incident was desired to be settled amicably is an attempt to negate the injury about to be sustained on account of delayed filing of the FIR, Mr. Kar Bhowmik in support of his contention relied in the case between Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 170 : (AIR 2007 SC 155). In paragraph 24 in the case (supra) the Apex Court held as under : 24. Counsel for the State submitted that the delay in lodging the first information report in such cases is immaterial. The proposition is too broadly stated to merit acceptance. It is no doubt true that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact that the report was lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of which the Court must take notice. This fact has to be considered in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case, and in a given case the Court may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been sufficiently explained. In the light of the totality of the evidence, the Court of fact has to consider whether the delay in lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution. that is a matter of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where there is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances appearing on record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. that is a matter of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where there is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances appearing on record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. There are cases where much time is consumed in taking the injured to the hospital for medical aid and, therefore, the witnesses find no time to lodge the report promptly. There may also be cases where on account of fear and threats, witnesses may avoid going to the police station immediately. The time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging of the report. It is also possible to conceive of cases where the victim and the members of his or her family belong to such a strata of society that they may not even be aware of their right to report the matter to the police and seek legal action, nor was any such advice available to them. In the case of sexual offences there is another consideration which may weigh in the mind of the Court i.e. the initial hesitation of the victim to report the matter to the police which may affect her family life and family's reputation. Very often in such cases only after considerable persuasion the prosecutrix may be persuaded to disclose the true facts. There are also cases where the victim may choose to suffer the ignominy rather than to disclose the true facts which may cast a stigma on her for the rest of her life. These are cases where the initial hesitation of the prosecutrix to disclose the true facts may provide a good explanation for the delay in lodging the report. In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect of delay in lodging the report with the police is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and the Court must consider the delay in the background of the facts and circumstances of each case. Different cases have different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind of the Court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own facts. Different cases have different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind of the Court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. (See Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad). Thus mere delay in lodging of the report may not by itself be fatal to the case of the prosecution, but the delay has to be considered in the background of the facts and circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by the Court of fact. The Apex Court in the case (supra) held that the time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of convenience available, are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging of the report. It also held that where the victim and the members of his or her family belong to such a strata of society that they may not even be aware of their right to report the matter to the police and seek legal action, nor was any such advice available to them. In the cases of sexual offences Supreme Court also held that the initial hesitation of the victim to report the matter to the police which may affect her family life and family's reputation. Delay in lodgment of FIR is possible. But in our instant case whether the explanation offered by the witnesses can be outright rejected that there was manipulation, concoction and embellishment in the lodgment of the FIR on 17-10-2005. Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Special P.P. appearing for and on behalf of the Respondent controverting the submissions advanced by Mr. Kar Bhowmik submitted that under the facts and circumstances of the case evidence of the witnesses on the point of delay in filing the FIR cannot be disbelieved. The witness have given a plausible explanation as to why delay had occurred in presenting the first information report to police, Mr. R.C. Debnath argued. In the context of rival submission it would be appropriate for this Court to make a short survey of the evidence appearing in the face of the record on this issue. In the FIR, Ext. The witness have given a plausible explanation as to why delay had occurred in presenting the first information report to police, Mr. R.C. Debnath argued. In the context of rival submission it would be appropriate for this Court to make a short survey of the evidence appearing in the face of the record on this issue. In the FIR, Ext. P/1 it has been indicated that delay had been caused in lodgment of the same with police for fear of public scandal and the Appellant Subrata Das. P.W. 1, the first informant in her evidence also stated the cause of delay in lodging the FIR saying that Appellant assured that he would compromise the matter. P.W. 2, Manju Deb in his evidence stated that Samarendra Deb, the father of the victim and Chandan Deb went to him and informed about the incident that the Appellant Subrata Das sexually assaulted his daughter (P.W.1). Accordingly he and Chandan Das has been to the house of the Appellant but could not find the Appellant's father. It is also stated that Appellant met him at tea stall at Gandhigram market who threatened him not to visit his residence. P.W. 3, the mother of the victim also stated that her husband reported the incident to the villagers to settle the dispute, but no settlement could be arrived at and thereafter complaint was lodged before police. P.W. 4, the father also stated in his evidence that the matter being reported to him by his wife, on the following morning, he went to Prabodh Deb (P.W. 5), Chandan Deb (P.W. 7), Kajal Deb and Manju Deb (P.W. 2) and reported the incident of sexual assault on his daughter by the Appellant on the previous day, who assured him that they would settle the matter amicably, but they failed to settle as the father of the Appellant did not accept the proposal made by them. It is also stated by him that on the advice of the persons, the matter was reported to police. P.W. 5, Probodh Ch. Deb, P.W. 7, Chandan Deb; P.W. 8, Kajal Gope all deposed that the father of the prosecutrix, P.W. 4 requested them to settle the incident between the parties. Attempt was made but it failed, accordingly, P.W. 4, the father of the prosecutrix was advised to report the matter to the police. 7. P.W. 5, Probodh Ch. Deb, P.W. 7, Chandan Deb; P.W. 8, Kajal Gope all deposed that the father of the prosecutrix, P.W. 4 requested them to settle the incident between the parties. Attempt was made but it failed, accordingly, P.W. 4, the father of the prosecutrix was advised to report the matter to the police. 7. From the above it has become apparent that after the incident it was informed by the P.W. 4 to P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 8 and P.W. 9 to make an amicable settlement of the incident that happened in between the parties. Since no settlement could be arrived at, advice was given to P.W. 4 to approach the police. For composition of such nature of incident by the village elders or the neighboring people of the locality time is bound to consume. Evidences of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 8 and P.W. 9 is silent in respect of the time frame for such amicable settlement. But for that it cannot be said that there was no attempt on the part of the witnesses to settle the incident between the parties. It is specifically stated by one of the witnesses indicated above that on approach the father of the Appellant, he refused to settle the matter. The contention of Mr. Kar Bhowmik that such type of evidence has been introduced by the witnesses to cover up the actual truth cannot sustain in view of consistent testimony of the witnesses regarding the delay in lodgment of the FIR. All the witnesses more particularly P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 8 and P.W. 9 consistently have deposed that they tried to make an amicable settlement of the incident between the parties. But it did not happen. Therefore, such an attempt to make an amicable settlement would certainly cause some delay in lodging FIR with police. About 8 days delay had been caused in the lodgment of the FIR with police. The reasons assigned by the witnesses to my considered view would be cogent and plausible for not filing the FIR immediately after the occurrence. The reasons for delay have been properly explained by the witnesses. About 8 days delay had been caused in the lodgment of the FIR with police. The reasons assigned by the witnesses to my considered view would be cogent and plausible for not filing the FIR immediately after the occurrence. The reasons for delay have been properly explained by the witnesses. Though delay is fatal to the prosecution if such delay is explained properly acceptable to the Court there would be no scope for the adversary party to argue that to cover up the truth or to add falsity, concoction, the FIR is lodged at a belated stage. In view of the evidence of the witness I failed to accept the argument advanced by Mr. Kar Bhowmik in the context of delay in filing the FIR. 8. Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Appellant also argued that the FIR has been falsely lodged against the Appellant on account of the Appellant family refusal to accept the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) as their daughter-in-law. It was argued by him that the family members of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) tried to give marriage of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) with the Appellant which was refused. Therefore, in order to pressurize or to submit to their desire, the family members of the prosecutrix engineered, manufactured the false case against the Appellant. Accordingly to Mr. Kar Bhowmik accused was a bachelor at the relevant point of time and an attractive catch of the prosecutrix. Referring to the evidence appearing in the cross-examination of the P.W. 1 was argued by Mr. Bhowmik that Subrata being the only child of his parents and owner of a Auto van purchased two and half months before the lodgment of the FIR, and father of the Appellant being a Government employee these factors in combination, according to Mr. Kar Bhowmik actuated the parents of the prosecutrix to offer a proposal for marriage in between the Appellant and the prosecutrix (P.W.1) which was however, turned down. Appellant being the only son of his parents and the owner of an Auto van proved to be very dearer to the parents of the prosecutrix and in order to put the Appellant under their belt they proposed for marriage of the P.W. 1 with the Appellant. When the parents of the P.W. 1 failed in the attempt they plunged a net to catch him by filing an FIR against him. Mr. When the parents of the P.W. 1 failed in the attempt they plunged a net to catch him by filing an FIR against him. Mr. Kar Bhowmik in support of his argument placed reliance. In the case between Jagannivasan v. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 204: (1995 Cri LJ 3229). On this point we have not come across any evidence whatsoever except the suggestion offered to the witnesses. Unless material evidence is brought on to the record mere suggestion that the parents of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) tried to give her in marriage with the Appellant would not be sufficient. Much stress is given by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on this point but in absence of material evidence such argument cannot survive that a false FIR had been lodged by the P.W. 1 to embrace the Appellant as her husband. I find no force in the argument advanced by Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik learned Counsel for the Appellant. 9. Now, the pertinent issue which is required to be decided is whether the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) had been raped by the Appellant on 9-10-2005 at 5 p.m. in absence of inmates of her house. This issue can be answered if evidence on record, more particularly evidence of the prosecutrix is found truthful acceptable and consistent. Therefore, in order to answer the issue let us first take rather consider the evidence of prosecutrix (P.W. 1) as well as doctors who conducted medical examination of the prosecutrix. It is indicated herein before that the prosecution examined the prosecutrix as P.W. 1 while the doctors who examined the prosecutrix medically are examined as P.W. 10 and P.W. 13. P.W. 1 the prosecutrix in her evidence categorically stated that Appellant Subrata Das is their neighbour. On 9-10-2005, which was a Sunday, in evening hours at around 5 p.m. she was watching the TV sitting alone in their residence. At that time, the Appellant suddenly entered into their house and when queried the reasons for such entrance and asked to leave the house he slapped her and threw her on a cot. She tried to raise alarm but the Appellant gagged her mouth by his hand. Thereafter he dragged her to another room and forcefully undressed her and committed rape on her against will. She tried to raise alarm but the Appellant gagged her mouth by his hand. Thereafter he dragged her to another room and forcefully undressed her and committed rape on her against will. After sex Appellant left the house with an warning not to disclose rather divulge the incident to anybody else he would kill her. At around 5.30 p.m. while her mother (P.W. 3) came home after finishing her walk she informed her about the incident, who subsequently on arrival of her father (P.W. 4) disclosed the incident that the Appellant committed rape on their daughter. Knowing the incident her father (P.W. 4) informed the village elders seeking justice and settlement. On 17-10-2005 she and her father (P.W. 4) went to Airport police station and reported the matter in writing with police. The first information, Ext. P/1 lodged with the police was written by Bishnu Kr. Deb (P.W. 6) her maternal uncle. Police produced her before the Magistrate who recorded her statement, Ext. P/2. She also stated that after lodgment of the FIR she was also medically examined by doctors. She was also examined by the investigating officer and during investigation she handed over her wearing apparel to the police which were put on at the time of incident. It is further stated by her that Darogababu seized one Kamiz and one orange colored Jangia (panti) vide seizure memo, Ext. P/3. She also identified the seized articles during trial as material exhibit as M.O. 1 series. She also stated that delay had been caused in lodging the FIR as the Appellant assured that the matter would be compromised with them. Defence though cross-examined this witness at length nothing substantial could be brought out favourable to the defence except some suggestions put to her. In respect of certain omissions questions were put to this witness which cannot however, be branded as contradiction, the manner in which a contradiction is to be recorded, the trial Court failed to follow it rather answered such question from its own. In respect of purchase of Auto Van prior to two and half months of the incident has not been denied by P.W. 1 nor regarding the employment of the Appellant's father. She also admitted that Rabindra Chakraborty, Laxmi Debnath are their neighbours while Rabindra Debnath and Amar Sankar are the members of their gaon panchayat. In respect of purchase of Auto Van prior to two and half months of the incident has not been denied by P.W. 1 nor regarding the employment of the Appellant's father. She also admitted that Rabindra Chakraborty, Laxmi Debnath are their neighbours while Rabindra Debnath and Amar Sankar are the members of their gaon panchayat. She also admitted that P.W. 5 Prabodh Deb is her grand-father while Chandan Deb, P.W. 7 is her maternal uncle. In respect of absence of Appellant on the date i.e. 9-10-2005 from the locality and remained busy in carrying goods of one Laxman Saha at Gandhigram by his Auto Van from Golbazar has been flatly denied by P.W. 1. She also denied about proposal made to the Appellant's family for her marriage with the Appellant and also denied that on that issue false information was lodged with police against the Appellant. Except this above, nothing could be brought out from the mouth of the P.W. 1. 10. If a meticulous scrutiny is made to the evidence of P.W. 1 it would remain clear that on 9-5-2010 at about 5 p.m. no inmate was present except the prosecutrix in their house. From her evidence it is also noticed that at the relevant time her mother (P.W. 3) was on the road walking on the advice of the doctor she being a paralytic patient. It also appears from her evidence that her father P.W. 3 was at Gandhigram Market running his tea stall business. So these facts go to show that there was none at that time when the accused came to their house. Her evidence also is very much specific that when the Appellant came to their residence she asked him to go out for which he slapped her and threw her on a cot. When she tried to raise hue and cry Appellant gagged her mouth by his hand and dragged her to another room where she had been forcefully undressed and raped. This piece of evidence has not been rebutted by defence and, therefore, evidence of P.W. 1 in respect of commission of rape on her forcefully by the Appellant cannot be disbelieved as it has been indicated that cross-examination of the P.W. 1 appears to be insufficient in the context of rape on P.W. 1. This piece of evidence has not been rebutted by defence and, therefore, evidence of P.W. 1 in respect of commission of rape on her forcefully by the Appellant cannot be disbelieved as it has been indicated that cross-examination of the P.W. 1 appears to be insufficient in the context of rape on P.W. 1. The defence remained satisfied itself in putting some other questions which appear to be not integral to adopt a different view. It mostly confined in regard to the relationship of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and also in regard to the business of the Appellant and the alleged marriage proposal made by the family of the prosecutrix to the family of the Appellant. It also confined in respect of alibi taken contending that Appellant was not present on 9-10-2005 in the locality and was busy in carrying goods of one Laxman Saha and others with his Auto Van from Golbazar to various distinctions. Mere suggestion in respect of a particular fact deposed on oath cannot make such statement unbelievable unless such statement is rebutted through cross-examination by cogent and acceptable fact. Hundreds of suggestions made to the witnesses during cross-examination cannot however throw away the material evidence of that particular witness stated on oath. This situation occurs in respect of P.W. 1. Several suggestions were put to the P.W. 1 by the defence on various aspects but every time the witness denied the suggestion put to her. In this circumstances, evidence of P.W. 1 cannot be said to have been denied or rebutted in material particulars in the context of rape on her by the Appellant. 11. From the evidence of P.W. 1 we have noticed that rape had been committed on her. Now, let us see whether P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 who medically examined the prosecutrix support her case or not. Before discussions of the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 it would be appropriate for us to state at this stage that the prosecutrix was produced before them on 17-10-2005 after about 8 days from the date of incident. Occurrence took place on 9-10-2005 while FIR was lodged on 17-10-2005. After lodgement of the FIR she was produced before P.W. 10 and P.W. 13, the Medical Officers for her medical examination. P.W. 10, Dr. Soumitra Majumder deposed that on 17-10-2005 he was at G.B. Hospital, Agartala serving as Medical Officer. Occurrence took place on 9-10-2005 while FIR was lodged on 17-10-2005. After lodgement of the FIR she was produced before P.W. 10 and P.W. 13, the Medical Officers for her medical examination. P.W. 10, Dr. Soumitra Majumder deposed that on 17-10-2005 he was at G.B. Hospital, Agartala serving as Medical Officer. His educational qualification is MD. On that day around 14.15 hours he examined P.W. 1 in connection with Airport PS. No. 53 of 2005 under Section 376, IPC who was identified by Mrs. Anu Roy Chowdhury, a constable of the Airport P.S. She was examined in presence of staff nurse on duty and on examination, he did not find any injury mark on her person. He found hymen not intact, fourchette depressed, no injury mark detected in her private part. This witness further stated that since the P.W. 1 was menstruating on that day, proper examination could not be made and accordingly suggested her examination once again on 21-10-2005. But on examination on 21-10-2005 nothing new could be discovered other than the discoveries when examined on 17-10-2005. This witness was cross-examined by the defence. He deposed on cross-examination that on examination he did not find any sign of rape on the body of the victim. P.W. 13 is Dr. Laxmi Kanta Sinha. He also stated on oath that on 17-10-2005 he was posted as medical officer at G.B. Hospital, Agartala. His qualification is MD. On that day, he examined P.W. 1 aged about 17 years produced by Airport police to ascertain her age in connection with Airport P.S. Case No. 53 of 2005 under Section 376, IPC and after ossification test her age was 14 to 16 years. He accordingly prepared a report Ext. P/6. But this witness in his cross-examination admitted that his report in regard to age of P.W. 1 is not conclusive. 12. So, from the reading of the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 13, both doctors who examined the prosecutrix (P.W. 1) it appears to us that no marks of violence could be detected on her person nor any sign of recent sexual intercourse. Evidence of P.W. 10 indicates the rapture of hymen and also the depression of fourchette. Evidence of P.W. 13 who determined the age of the girl from ossification test stated her age was 14 to 16 years. Evidence of P.W. 10 indicates the rapture of hymen and also the depression of fourchette. Evidence of P.W. 13 who determined the age of the girl from ossification test stated her age was 14 to 16 years. So neither of the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 indicates any sign of recent sexual intercourse. Admittedly the prosecutrix was examined after 8 (eight) days of the occurrence, i.e. alleged rape. No sign of recent sexual intercourse could be detected. P.W. 10 also failed to discover any injuries on the body of the P.W. 1, in other words marks of violence. It would be primary issue before us whether in absence of any positive finding by the doctors who examined the prosecutrix, evidence of prosecutrix can be rejected. Had the examination been done immediately after the alleged rape or on the next day at least if such evidence as is found from the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 a different finding could have been arrived at that as deposed by the prosecutrix, P.W. 1, no rape had been committed on her by the Appellant. But, that is not the case in our hand. She was examined after a gap of 8 (eight) days, therefore, there is less possibility of discovery of mark of recent sexual intercourse or any marks of violence on the body of the prosecutrix. Though the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 appear not supporting the evidence of P.W. 1, their evidence materially cannot effect the evidence of the prosecutrix (P.W. 1). Though Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the Appellant relied on the decisions in the cases reported in (2006) 9 SCC 713 (Yerumalla Latchaiah v. State of A.P.); (2006) 10 SCC 92 (Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra); (2007) 6 SCC 465 : (2007 Cri LJ 2733) (Narayan alias Naran v. State of Rajasthan); 2006 GLT 366 (Atul Borgohain v. State of Assam) and (2007) 4 GLR 89 (Indrajit Chandra Nath v. State of Assam), I find no cogent and sufficient reason to disbelieve rather reject the evidence of P.W. 1, the prosecutrix in view of examination of the prosecutrix after a time gap of 8 (eight) days from the date of occurrence. Though much emphasis has been put on the decisions by Mr. Though much emphasis has been put on the decisions by Mr. Kar Bhowmik, the learned Counsel for the Appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record such decisions would be not applicable in the present appeal. 13. Now, let us see/consider whether the evidence of remaining prosecution witnesses can negate the evidence of P.W. 1 on materials particulars. It is indicated earlier that P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 are the parents of the P.W. 1 Both are found consistent in the context of their absence from home on the relevant day. On their arrival the incident was divulged to them by P.W. 1, the prosecutrix. Both have stated that an attempt was made to resolve the incident amicably and accordingly P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 to P.W. 8 were requested to make an amicable settlement which however did not come true. P.W. 4 in particular stated that as no amicable settlement could arrive at on rejection of father of the Appellant for settle the dispute. They had no alternative then to approach the police on 17-10-2005. From the evidence it appears that P.W. 1 on the same day reported the incident to them which prompted the P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 to approach/take assistance from P.W. 2, P.W. 5 to P.W. 8 for an amicable settlement. In the same way the witnesses, more particularly P.W. 2, P.W. 5 to P.W. 8 stated in their evidence categorically that P.W. 4 informed about the incident to them and accordingly requested them to make an amicable settlement. They tried their best but failed and ultimately advised P.W. 4 to take help of police for justice. So from the evidence of P.W. 4 it can be noticed that he divulged the incident to P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 to P.W. 8 in regard to reporting of the incident as well as attempt on their part to make an amicable settlement. Their evidence, therefore, apparently lend support to the evidence of P.W. 1, the prosecutrix. 14. In the context of non-raising of hue and cry by prosecutrix, it was argued by Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Appellant that in such a situation evidence of P.W. 1 cannot inspire confidence in the mind of the Court. Their evidence, therefore, apparently lend support to the evidence of P.W. 1, the prosecutrix. 14. In the context of non-raising of hue and cry by prosecutrix, it was argued by Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Appellant that in such a situation evidence of P.W. 1 cannot inspire confidence in the mind of the Court. It was argued by him that it would have been natural on the part of the P.W. 1 to raise hue and cry when the Appellant tried to commit rape forcefully on her but no evidence forthcoming from the evidence of P.W. 1 in particular that she did raise hue and cry to invite the attention of the neighboring people, which according to Mr. Kar Bhowmik, the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the P.W. 1, the prosecutrix was the consenting party. Whether such argument advanced by Mr. Kar Bhowmik can sustain when P.W. 1, the prosecutrix specifically stated that when she tried to raise hue and cry she was gagged by the Appellant and thereafter committed rape on her forcefully. A question might be paused why P.W. 1 did not raise hue and cry at the time of undressing her forcefully by the Appellant. It is in the evidence that P.W. 1 was dragged to another room forcefully by the Appellant where she had been undressed. If at all P.W. 1 in the process raised any alarm perhaps such alarm failed to invite the attention of the neighboring people. Nowhere in the evidence of record it has been brought out by the defence that at that time P.W. 3, the mother was walking nearby their house. Though Mr. Kar Bhowmik put reliance in the decision reported in 2006 (10) SCC 92 in respect of not raising any alarm, hue and cry by the prosecutrix, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence of P.W. 1, I am unable to accept to his argument and on the basis of the testimony of the P.W. 1 same is liable to be rejected. 15. From a careful scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 1 in particular, this Court fails to locate basic infirmities in the evidence of P.W. 1, which may discourage the credence of her evidence. Evidence of P.W. 1 in the facts and circumstances of the case found truthful, believable and acceptable. 15. From a careful scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 1 in particular, this Court fails to locate basic infirmities in the evidence of P.W. 1, which may discourage the credence of her evidence. Evidence of P.W. 1 in the facts and circumstances of the case found truthful, believable and acceptable. She has given consistent evidence in respect of the commission of the rape on her by the Appellant. There is no conflict in between the evidence of the prosecutrix deposed during the trial, statement recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure. and her initial statement in the form of an FIR. All the three are found consistent in material particulars. To warrant conviction in case of rape if the evidence of the prosecutrix is found truthful, satisfactory, acceptable and consistent no corroboration is required even from the medical testimony. We have already discussed about the medical evidence and come to a finding that there cannot be any corroboration in between the medical testimony and the testimony of the prosecutrix in view of examination of the prosecutrix after 8 days of the occurrence. 16. Having given anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record, I am constrained to hold that the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence does not call for any interference from this Court. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is accordingly affirmed. 17. Appeal dismissed. Send back the records forthwith. Appeal dismissed