JUDGMENT 1. This petition by the employer is directed against an award by the learned Presiding Officer of the First Labour Court, Nagpur, whereby he directed the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.1/workman with 50% back wages from the date of termination till reinstatement with 50% back wages. 2. Facts relevant for deciding the petition are as under : Respondent No.1workman claimed to have been engaged as helper on daily wages since 1976 at Khaparkheda and Koradi Thermal Power Stations of the petitioner till 4101982. On 4101982, his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Respondent No.1 contended that rule of 'last come first go' was not followed and several juniors of respondent No.1 were retained. Therefore, branding his termination as illegal, he issued approach notice. Since the conciliation proceedings failed, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour made a reference to the Labour Court. 3. The petitioner claimed that employment at Khaparkheda unit could not be clubbed with that at Koradi unit, since they are separate and independent units. At Koradi unit, from 821980 to 411982, respondent No.1 was engaged only for 275 days and never for 240 days in any continuous period of one year. From 4101982, the petitioner outsourced maintenance work on which respondent No.1 and others were engaged and no junior of respondent No.1 was retained. Therefore, the petitioner had prayed before the learned Judge, Labour Court, that the reference may be answered in the negative. 4. After considering the evidence tendered before him, the learned Judge held that the termination of services of the workman was illegal and, therefore, answered the reference in the affirmative, directing reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and 50% back wages. Aggrieved thereby, the employer is before this Court. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned counsel for respondent No.1 Workman. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the work on which respondent No.1 was engaged was that of maintenance and overhauling. Therefore, as and when the work was available, notices used to be put up in the concerned establishment and the workers used to report. They were then engaged on the work of maintenance and overhauling and after the work was over, they ceased to be in the employment. Therefore, as and when the work was available, notices used to be put up in the concerned establishment and the workers used to report. They were then engaged on the work of maintenance and overhauling and after the work was over, they ceased to be in the employment. He submitted that possibly the same group of workers may have been reporting for this maintenance and overhauling work in Koradi and Khaparkheda units, since both the units are not far away from each other. But that, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot result in an inference that the two units are a part of one establishment. He submitted that the two Thermal Power Stations are independent establishments and, therefore, the work put up by the workman in the two establishments cannot be computed together for concluding that the workman concerned had put in 240 days of service. 7. The learned counsel for respondent No.1/workman submitted that the two units of the petitioner may be working under independent officers, but that does not given them a separate juristic personality and for all practical purposes, the employer would be the petitioner Corporation, which was running the two Thermal Power Stations. Therefore, as rightly submitted the learned counsel, whether the workman worked at Koradi or Khaparkheda would be irrelevant and the total number of days put in by the employee would have to be computed for finding out whether he was entitled to continuation. 8. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 pointed out that the petitioner had only stated about the work put up by the respondent at Koradi Thermal Power Station from 821980 to 4101982. He placed reliance on the certificate issued by the Superintending Engineer on 5121991, which is annexed by the petitioner to the petition at page 37, which shows that in the year 1980, the workman had put in 228 days of work at Khaparkheda. If to this, 25 days of work put in at Koradi in that year are added, it would be clear that in the year 1980 the workman had put in more than 240 days of work. Ravindra Baburam Ukey, who prepared this statement of employment at Khaparkheda Thermal Power Station, was examined by the petitioner as witness No.3. If to this, 25 days of work put in at Koradi in that year are added, it would be clear that in the year 1980 the workman had put in more than 240 days of work. Ravindra Baburam Ukey, who prepared this statement of employment at Khaparkheda Thermal Power Station, was examined by the petitioner as witness No.3. He stated that Exhibit 33 (annexure at page 37 of this petition) shows that the workman had put in 228 days of work in 1980. He claimed that it was his mistake in showing the number of working days as 228 and added that in 1980, the workman had put in 76 days of work. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had prepared the certificate on the basis of attendance register. He stated that he had taken attendance register and chart prepared by him for obtaining the signatures of the Superintending Engineer on the certificate and then the certificate was signed by the Superintending Engineer and then issued to the workman. He admitted that unless muster roll is seen, it could not be said as to which was the correct chart. He claimed that he came to know two years before his deposition that the certificate issued by him was wrong. He stated that the muster roll was not available. 9. When muster rolls were not available, it is not clear as to how the employee Ravindra Uke could say that certificate prepared by him wrong. In face of a certificate, which is not proved to be false, it would not be open to the petitioner to claim that the workman had not put in 240 days of service. Therefore, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Judge, Labour Court, are perverse or are not borne out from the record. 10. There can be no doubt that the petitioner would have the right to allot the work of maintenance to the outside agency. But while doing so, if some worker was required to be retrenched, procedure under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act should have been followed. It is admittedly not followed. The petitioner simply stopped employing the respondent workman from 4101982. The petitioner claimed that all the workers engaged on maintenance and overhauling work had been discontinued. But while doing so, if some worker was required to be retrenched, procedure under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act should have been followed. It is admittedly not followed. The petitioner simply stopped employing the respondent workman from 4101982. The petitioner claimed that all the workers engaged on maintenance and overhauling work had been discontinued. But the respondent workman stated before the Labour Court that Dhanraj Lokhande and Nathu Moreshwar Mahule , who were juniors to him, had been retained by the petitioner. He admitted in cross-examination that the names of Dhanraj Lokhande and Nathu Mahule were not mentioned by him in his statement of claim, because the dates of appointments and names of workmen were not available with him. But it is not suggested to the witness and Dhanraj and Nathu had not been retained by the petitioner in the employment. The workman had been examined before the Labour Court on 221998 as per page 44 of the paper book. The petitioner's witness Namdeo Khaire, Superintendent in the Establishment Department of the petitioner, was examined on 631999, that is, almost after one year. He merely states about the number of days for which the workman worked. Witness No.2 Digamber Patharkar, who was the Head Time Keeper and who was examined on 631999, states about the number of days and the same is the case of witness No.3 Ravindra Ukey, who was examined on 1091999. Thus, there is nothing in the evidence tendered by the petitioner to show that Dhanraj and Nathu had not been retained by the petitioner in the employment, or that Dhanraj and Nathu were not juniors to the respondent workman as claimed by him. Therefore, it would be difficult to uphold the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the workman did not establish breach of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in Regional Manager, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, reported at (2006) 1 SCC 530 , the Supreme Court held that if plea in respect of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act is not raised, no amount of evidence can be looked into unless such a plea is raised. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in Regional Manager, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, reported at (2006) 1 SCC 530 , the Supreme Court held that if plea in respect of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act is not raised, no amount of evidence can be looked into unless such a plea is raised. Therefore, according to him, since no such plea was raised by the workman in his statement of claim before the Labour Court, his evidence that the two workmen, namely Dhanraj and Nathu had been retained, could not be looked into. It may be seen that the employee had specifically stated in para 6 of his statement of claim that the principle of 'first come last go' had not been followed and the petitioner had retained several juniors in service, though the petitioner was bound to follow the principle of seniority. Breach of the provisions of Section 25G had also been specifically pleaded in para 6. The only thing that was not stated was the names of two workers, who were junior to respondent workman and who were retained. This cannot be equated to absence of plea. In any case, the respondent workman had explained in cross-examination that he had not named them in his statement of claim, because he did not have the requisite details at that time. 12. The object of insistence upon pleadings is to ensure that the parties to a lis have an advance notice of the case, which they are required to meet. Here the respondent workman had stated the names of Dhanraj and Nathu in his evidence before the Court and the petitioner had a full year to rebut this claim before the petitioner's witnesses entered the witness box. While there can be no doubt that the rule of pleadings must be followed in order to ensure that the parties are not taken by surprise, it cannot also be ignored that in Civil Court the parties have necessarily assistance of lawyers, but in Labour and Industrial Courts many times the parties are represented by their Unions or do not have assistance of lawyers. It may be seen that in a reference made by the Conciliation Officer, the procedure is not similar to that of a suit and does not begin with a plaint followed by written statement. The parties are expected to file statement of claim. It may be seen that in a reference made by the Conciliation Officer, the procedure is not similar to that of a suit and does not begin with a plaint followed by written statement. The parties are expected to file statement of claim. Therefore, strict rules of pleading every fact in advance cannot be applied to the proceedings of this nature. At the cost of repetition, it has to be stated that the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to rebut the case that Dhanraj and Nathu were juniors to the respondent workman and that they were retained while the respondent workman was sacked, which opportunity the petitioner did not avail. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Judge, Labour Court, erred in concluding that the workman proved that while he was removed, his juniors were retained, in breach of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment of this Court in Ramdayal v. Principal, Industrial Training Institute, reported at 2009(11) FLR 876, where it was held that the termination of the services of a daily wager does not amount to retrenchment. In that case, this Court ordered payment of compensation of Rs.15,000/. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of this judgment, even if it is taken that the respondent workman's engagement was discontinued, he cannot claim that noncompliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act would result in the termination being bad. He submitted that the provisions of Section25G of the Industrial Disputes Act would also not be attracted. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent workman submitted that the judgment must be held to have been given in the context of facts in that case, particularly considering as to who was the employer. He submitted that the same Hon'ble Judge, while deciding Writ Petition No.2216 of 1992, by judgment dated 25-4-2005, held that a daily wager engaged from September, 1981, and removed from service on 171982 without following the procedure as contemplated in Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, was rightly held by the Labour Court to be entitled to reinstatement with continuity and full back wages. He submitted that in the said writ petition, the present petitioner itself was the petitioner. He submitted that in the said writ petition, the present petitioner itself was the petitioner. The learned counsel for the respondent workman submitted that the Letters Patent Appeal against this judgment had been dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the facts in the said writ petition are different and that in case an adverse inference came to be drawn for failure to produce muster roll. All the same, the fact remains that it was a case of a daily wager and compliance of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act was held to be necessary. Further even in the case at hand, the petitioner's witnesses had neither produced attendance/muster rolls to disprove the case of engagement for 240 days, nor did they say a word about retention of two juniors of respondent No.1, and thus allowing to go respondent No.1's word on oath unrebutted. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent workman also pointed out that a number of writ petitions by the workmen of the present petitioner, who had completed 240 days of continuous service on daily wages had been allowed by this Court, setting aside the orders passed by the Labour Court. In those cases too, the question of breach of the provisions of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act was considered. He has produced for my perusal the copy of judgment delivered by this Court on 731991 in a bunch of writ petitions bearing No.1077, 1079, 1147, 1151 and 1166 of 1988. He also submitted that a Special Leave Petition against this judgment bearing No.1026 of 1995 had been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 1012001. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, Amravati and another v. Sanjay Krishnarao Shrungare, Amravati, reported at 2008 III CLR 301, to which I was a party. In that case too, the Peon on daily wages had successfully complained of breach of the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, it cannot be contended that a person on daily wages has no right to continue or that, therefore, his services could be dispensed with without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. Therefore, it cannot be contended that a person on daily wages has no right to continue or that, therefore, his services could be dispensed with without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent workman also submitted that the plight of the employees, who are summarily sacked after putting in years of work on daily wages, cannot be ignored even in the face of laissezfaire. For this purpose, he drew the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., reported at 2010(1) SCALE 1613, which read as under : "23. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison dare of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating bylanes and sidelanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for year together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. It need no emphasis that if a man is derived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. It need no emphasis that if a man is derived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer public or private." Hon'ble Shri Justice Ganguly observed in paragraphs No.37, 38, 42 to 45 as under : "37. In view of such clear enunciation of the legal principles, I am in clear agreement with Brother J. Singhvi that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. In doing so this Court should make an effort to protect the rights of the weaker sections of the society in view of the clear constitutional mandate discussed above. 38. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 42. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid view and I share the anxiety of my Lord Brother Justice Singhvi about a disturbing contrary trend which is discernible in recent times and which is sought to be justified in the name of globalisation and liberalisation of economy. 43. I am of the view that any attempt to dilute the constitutional imperatives in order to promote the so called trends of "Globalisation", may result in precarious consequences. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in tho0usands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in tho0usands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Here if I am quote the immortal words of Tagore : "We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariotdrive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask "progress toward what and progress for whom", it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot, but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path." 44. How stunningly relevant are these words and how deep are the ditches created in our society by the so called advance of globalization. 45. At this critical juncture the judges' duty, to my mind, is to uphold the constitutional focus on social justice without being in any way mislead by the glitz and glare of globalization." 18. There can be no doubt that the protection provided by the Industrial and Labour Laws to the workmen cannot be thrown overboard in the name of promoting Commerce and Industry. Stability and peace of mind are important for getting the best out of employees. This is not a case where the respondent workmen was found remiss in his duties. There is nothing wrong in the petitioner deciding to outsource the work, but it should have followed the dictates of the law by paying the retrenchment compensation to the respondent, who was rendered jobless and by ensuring that he was not discriminated against by being thrown out of the job while his juniors were retained. There is nothing wrong in the petitioner deciding to outsource the work, but it should have followed the dictates of the law by paying the retrenchment compensation to the respondent, who was rendered jobless and by ensuring that he was not discriminated against by being thrown out of the job while his juniors were retained. In this case, the evidence clearly points to the fact that the petitioner had attempted to split up the respondent's engagement in two of its plants in order to deny to him the benefit of having worked continuously for more than 240 days, in spite of the fact that its officer had issued a certificate in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner also unjustly tried to take benefit of absence of names of Dhanraj and Nathu as the junior workmen, who were retained, in the statement of claim filed by the respondent workman, but avoided to explain as to why they were retained while the petitioner was sacked, though they were named by respondent No.1/workman in his evidence tendered an year before the petitioner's witnesses were examined. 19. In view of this, it cannot be held that the learned Judge, Labour Court, erred in directing reinstatement of the respondent workman with 50% back wages. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a sum of Rs.2,56,279/ has already been paid to the respondent workman and in view of the judgment of this Court in Ramdayal v. Principal , Industrial Training Institute, cited supra, this should be adequate compensation for the respondent's retrenchment. 21. It seems that in this case while admitting the petition, stay had been granted to reinstatement of the respondent workman on the condition of deposit of 50% back wages as ordered by the Labour Court, which amount has been deposited and disbursed to the respondent. Considering the fact that the petitioner is a Public Corporation as also the fact that the respondent workman has been paid a substantial sum of Rs.2,56,279/, interest of justice would be served if the award so far as it directs reinstatement with continuity of service is maintained, restricting the claim of back wages to the amount already paid. 22. Considering the fact that the petitioner is a Public Corporation as also the fact that the respondent workman has been paid a substantial sum of Rs.2,56,279/, interest of justice would be served if the award so far as it directs reinstatement with continuity of service is maintained, restricting the claim of back wages to the amount already paid. 22. The petition is, therefore, partly allowed restricting the award insofar as it directs payment of back wages to the amount already paid to respondent No.1 workman, maintaining the part of the award directing reinstatement with continuity of service Judge.