JUDGMENT :- (Per Ghulam Mohammed, J.) 1. This writ petition is directed against an order passed on 22.4.2004 by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Chennai in MA No. 37 of 2003, which appeal has been moved by the 1st respondent – State Bank of India, henceforth referred to as `Bank’. 2. The writ petitioner was a Promoter and the Managing Director of the 5th respondent company, which was ordered to be wound up pursuant to the proceedings initiated in RC No. 10 of 1994 before the Board for Industrial Finance and Reconstruction (BIFR). The Official Liquidator attached to this court has taken charge of the assets of the company under liquidation on 29.3.1998. Respondents 1, 2, 3 herein which are public sector undertakings, acting in consortium through the 1st respondent – Bank, initiated recovery proceedings for a sum of Rs.13,12,48,000/- (Rupees Thirteen crores twelve lakhs and forty eight thousand only) by instituting OA No. 1144 of 1995 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, which was allowed on 13.1.1997 as against the company as the principal debtor and the writ petitioner herein in his capacity as the guarantor of the debts of the said company. Since no appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in OA No. 1144 of 1995, it became final and consequently a Recovery Certificate was issued on 16.5.1997. A notice of demand was raised by the Recovery Officer, which was served on the 5th respondent company on 20.8.1997. The facts relating to this aspect have been pleaded in para III of the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition, as under: “…. A Recovery Certificate which was signed on 16.5.1997, and was thus treated as of that date, was issued by the said Tribunal enabling the Recovery Officer to proceed against the assets of the company for the recovery of the amounts mentioned in the Schedule to the Recovery Certificate in case of non-payment. Thereafter, a Notice of Demand was issued by the Recovery Officer which was received by the 5th respondent company herein on 20.8.1997. The said Notice of Demand was issued under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 which provided the procedure for recovery of tax….” 3. Thereafter, a Notice of Demand was issued by the Recovery Officer which was received by the 5th respondent company herein on 20.8.1997. The said Notice of Demand was issued under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 which provided the procedure for recovery of tax….” 3. Since the notice of demand was not honoured, an order of attachment of immoveable properties belonging to the writ petitioner was issued in Form No. 16 on 31.7.2001. A sale proclamation under Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act was also published putting up the immoveable properties of the writ petitioner to sale on 7.10.2002. At this stage, the writ petitioner moved Misc. Petition No. 3 of 2001, in Recovery Proceedings No. 375 of 2001 objecting to the proposed sale of his immoveable properties on 7.10.2002. It was inter alia pleaded by the petitioner that the proclamation of sale is barred by the period of limitation contained in Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act inasmuch as the order of attachment dated 31.7.2001 should be treated to have dated back to 20.8.1997, the date on which the demand was raised by the Recovery Officer and hence the proclamation of sale is bad in law. The Recovery Officer dismissed the said objection. The writ petitioner carried the matter in appeal against that order of the Recovery Officer by instituting Recovery Appeal No. 1 of 2002 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. That appeal was initially dismissed on 4.10.2002. However, the writ petitioner has moved a review application by instituting MA No. 95 of 2002. The Debts Recovery Tribunal allowed this review application on 6.1.2003 and it has set aside the earlier order dated 4.10.2002. It was held that the proposed sale of immovable property of the petitioner is barred by limitation. The 1st respondent – Bank then went in appeal by instituting MA No. 37 of 2003 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai. That appeal was allowed on 22.4.2004, holding that the period of limitation for execution of the recovery order was 12 years and hence the proclamation of sale on 7.10.2002 is not barred by period of limitation. Calling in question the legality and validity of this order, the present writ petition has been instituted. 4. That appeal was allowed on 22.4.2004, holding that the period of limitation for execution of the recovery order was 12 years and hence the proclamation of sale on 7.10.2002 is not barred by period of limitation. Calling in question the legality and validity of this order, the present writ petition has been instituted. 4. We have heard Sri J.V.Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner and Sri Deepak Bhattacherji, learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent – Bank. 5. Sri J.V.Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel would contend that that Section 25 of the Recovery of debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 for short `DRT Act’ has provided for various modes of recovery of debts as under: (1) Attachment and sale of movable and immoveable properties. (2) Arrest and detention of the defendant and (3) Appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant. 6. It was further contended that Section 28 has also provided for other modes of recovery than those set out under Section 25. Section 29 of the DRT Act has provided that the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time, shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications, as if the said provisions and the rules referred to are made under the DRT Act instead of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel contended that the entire scheme of recovering the debts due under the DRT Act is liable to be regulated in accordance with the provision enunciated under Section 29 of the DRT Act. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that in view of the overriding effect provided to the provisions of the DRT Act, under Section 34, only the procedure as contemplated and provided for under Section 29 alone will have to be applied in the matter of recovery of debts due. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that in terms of Rule 51 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, the order of attachment must necessarily relate back to the notice of demand. Since the notice of demand has been served on the 5th respondent company on 20.8.1997, for all purposes, it is that date which will have a bearing. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that in terms of Rule 51 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, the order of attachment must necessarily relate back to the notice of demand. Since the notice of demand has been served on the 5th respondent company on 20.8.1997, for all purposes, it is that date which will have a bearing. It was then contended that Rule 68B of the Second Schedule has clearly stipulated that no sale of immoveable property shall be made after the expiry of three years (which was later amended to four years) from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand for recovery of which amount the immoveable property has been attached, has become conclusive or final. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the demand notice of recovery having been served on the company on 20.8.1997, the relevant financial year would end by 31.3.1998 and from that date when the period of three years or even subsequently amended period of four years is so reckoned, the same would have expired either on 31.3.2001 or 31.3.2002 and therefore the proclamation of sale of immoveable property of the writ petitioner ordered on 7.10.2002 is clearly impermissible under law. 7. Sri J.V.Suryanarayana has placed reliance upon the following judgments: Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (2000) 4 SCC 406 Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association (2002)4 SCC 275 ; Punjab National Bank v. Chajju Ram (2000) 6 SCC 655 ; Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 2 SCC 230; M/s. Transcore v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 712 ; Noorudin v. Tax Recovery Officer [2002] 121 Taxman 10 (Mad.). 8. It will be appropriate to note right at this stage that though several other contentions have also been raised in the writ petition, but the learned senior counsel has preferred to confine his attack only in terms of the aforementioned contention that the proposed sale of immovable property undertaken is barred by limitation. Therefore, we have also confined our scrutiny to this issue alone. 9. The 1st respondent – Bankhas contested the factual statements made by the writ petitioner, by disputing the same in the following manner: “5. Therefore, we have also confined our scrutiny to this issue alone. 9. The 1st respondent – Bankhas contested the factual statements made by the writ petitioner, by disputing the same in the following manner: “5. I state that after passing of the said recovery order dated 13.01.1997, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore issued demand notices to the petitioner and the 5th respondent and the same were received by them on 20.08.1997. As the petitioner and the 5th respondent have failed to pay the debt due to the respondents 1 to 3 as per the recovery order dated 13.01.1997, the respondents 1 to 3 have filed a petition on 23.06.1988 before the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore for attachment of the house property bearing Plot No. 168 ademasuring 2493 sq yards of Shaikpet village (presently known as Jubilee Hills), Hyderabad and for sale of the same to realize the debt. The said petition was kept pending for long time as the constitution of the Debts Recovery Tribunal for Hyderabad was in progress and also as the post of Recovery Officer of the Tribunal was vacant. On constitution of the Tribunal for Hyderabad, the matters were got transferred from the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. Therefore, consideration of the said petition for attachment was delayed. After appointment of the Recovery Officer for the Tribunal at Hyderabad, the respondents 1 to 3 have pursued their application for attachment before the Hon’ble Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad. The Hon’ble Recovery Officer after considering the matter passed attachment orders on 31.07.2001 and issued order of attachment of immovable property (Form No.16) and notice for setting sale proclamation (Form No.17) to the petitioner and the 5th respondent and accordingly the above said house property was attached and the Form Nos. 16 and 17 were served on the petitioner on 3.8.2001. Proclamation of sale was also issued for sale of the above said property on 7.10.2001…” 10. Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent – Bank Sri Deepak Bhattacherji, would contend that that Section 24 of the DRT Act has provided for the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and hence the order passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal holding that the period for execution of a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal as 12 years is correct in law and does not warrant any interference at our hands. 11. 11. Therefore, the all important question that falls for our consideration is, whether the period of limitation for recovering a debt due in terms of the Recovery Certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, is liable to be reckoned as 12 years or 4 years? 12. The DRT Act has been ushered in providing for establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. The Parliament felt it appropriate to provide for a specialized mechanism for adjudication and recovery process of debts due to banks and financial institutions as the enormity of debts due to such institutions was nearly crippling the economy and threatening the very efficacy of the banking system and the banks and financial institutions. For achieving this greater objective, special fora have been created for adjudication and recovery of the debts under Section 3. Section 17 of the DRT Act has conferred jurisdiction and powers on the Debt Recovery Tribunal to entertain and decide applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to them. Section 18 has correspondingly barred the jurisdiction of all other courts excepting the Supreme Court and the High Courts in respect of matters specified under Section 17. Chapter IV of the DRT Act, which begins with Section 19 and ends with Section 24, has spelt out in detail the procedure to be followed and adopted by the Tribunals. Chapter V which starts with Section 25 and ends up with Section 30, dealt with recovery aspects of debts determined by the Tribunal. It is important to bear in mind that the adjudication process, pursuant to an application moved by a bank or a financial institution, is undertaken by the Tribunal, while the recovery process in accordance with Section 25 of the Act, is taken up by the Recovery Officer. 13. Section 19 has spelt out that any bank or financial institution which seeks to recover any debt from any person may make an application to the tribunal situated within the local limits. Thus, the process of recovering debts due to the banks and financial institutions commences with the application to be made by them. In this context, it is important to notice that Section 24 has been incorporated in Chapter IV. Section 24 reads as follows: “24. Thus, the process of recovering debts due to the banks and financial institutions commences with the application to be made by them. In this context, it is important to notice that Section 24 has been incorporated in Chapter IV. Section 24 reads as follows: “24. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal.” 14. The crucial expressions to understand the scope and width of applicability of Section 24 can be found in the following words: 15. If this provision is construed by the plain language employed therein, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply only to an application, liable to be made to a Tribunal. As already noticed, it is by way of an “application” under Section 19 of the DRT Act that the process of recovering the debts due to banks and financial institutions is initiated. Therefore, it is in that sense, the provisions of the Limitation Act have been rendered applicable only to an application to be moved before the tribunal. In other words, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, have not been rendered applicable to the rest of the proceedings that follow the stages beyond making of an application to the tribunal. 16. It will be apt at this stage to decipher the legislative intent as to whether the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been confined only to applications which are liable to be made to the Tribunal or even to proceedings, which are in the nature of recovery of the debt so determined by the Tribunal, which proceedings are liable to be made before the Recovery Officer. 17. The intention of the Legislature is normally understood to have comprised of two aspects. The first relates to the concept of `meaning’, i.e., the commonly understood meaning of the expressions chosen to be used and the second aspect conveys the `purpose and object’ or the `reason and spirit’ pervading through the statute. The process of construction of a statute, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the plain meaning of the words used in an enactment, in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy for which the enactment is intended. The process of construction of a statute, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the plain meaning of the words used in an enactment, in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy for which the enactment is intended. In normal circumstances, primarily the language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of legislative intention. The first and primary rule of construction, therefore, is that the intention of the Legislature must be gathered from the words used by the Legislature itself. 18. Lord Atkin, when confronted with the question whether an alleged statement of the accused made to the police before his arrest was protected by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code or not, had occasion to consider the principles relating to the Interpretation of Statutes, in Pakala Narayana Swami Vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 and has said as under: “The provisions of the Limitation Act ….. apply to an application made to a tribunal.” If such an exception were intended one would expect to find it expressed: and their Lordships cannot find sufficient grounds for so departing from the plain words used. If one had to guess at the intention of the Legislature in framing a Section in the words used, one would suppose that they had in mind to encourage the free disclosure of information or to protect the person making the statement from a supposed unreliability of police testimony as to alleged statements or both. In any case the reasons would apply as might be thought a fortiori to an alleged statement made by a person ultimately accused. But in truth when the meaning of words is plain it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions. In any case the reasons would apply as might be thought a fortiori to an alleged statement made by a person ultimately accused. But in truth when the meaning of words is plain it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions. I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally adopted, at least in the Courts of law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther: Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.G. 61 at p. 106. My Lords, to quote from the language of Tindal C.J. when delivering the opinion of the Judges in Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 C.L. & F 85 at page 143, 'The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such case best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble which according to Dyer C.J. Stowel v. Lord Zouch (1562) 1 Plowd 353 at p. 369] is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they are intended to redress': Lord Halsbury L.C. in Income-tax Commissioners v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 at p. 542. 11. In this case the words themselves declare the intention of the Legislature. It therefore appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or the accused. (Emphasis is brought out) 19. 11. In this case the words themselves declare the intention of the Legislature. It therefore appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or the accused. (Emphasis is brought out) 19. Therefore, the question is not what may be supposed to have been intended by those words in the Statute but what exactly has been said. 20. If the words used in a statute are precise and unambiguous, then there may not be anything necessary to do, to expand those words. When clear and unambiguous words are used, they convey the force of intent of the Legislature and when the words used in a statute admit of only one meaning, the question of construction of a statute by any other process would not arise. “Again and Again”, said Viscount Simonds, L.C., “this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48” Gajendragadkar,J, as the learned Chief Justice of India then was, speaking for the Court in Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, AIR 1957 SC 907 , said : However, in applying these observations to the provisions of any statute, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct. 21. Therefore, not only by its setting, imminently in Chapter IV but by employing the words “to an application” and “made to a Tribunal”, it is reasonable to decipher that the Legislature has indeed intended the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to be applied only to cases of applications made to the Tribunal, but not to all other proceedings. 22. Learned counsel Sri Deepak Bhattacherji has placed strong reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (supra) and contended that the issue relating to the period of limitation for execution proceedings has been concluded by the Supreme Court in the above judgment holding that it is 12 years and hence he suggested that this question does not require any further examination on our part. It is true that the Supreme Court in the above case cited supra has held as under: “24. Since Section 24 of the RDB Act applies the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing an Execution Petition, hence now no such application can be filed since that period of 12 years expired on 15. 1. 1999. Hence, in our opinion the debt became time barred after 15. 1. 1999.” 23. As is well known, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is what carries with it the weight of a binding precedent. It is well settled that an order of the Supreme Court must be construed having regard to the text and context in which the same was passed. 1. 1999.” 23. As is well known, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is what carries with it the weight of a binding precedent. It is well settled that an order of the Supreme Court must be construed having regard to the text and context in which the same was passed. A judgment cannot be read as a statute. Construction of a judgment should be made in the light of the factual matrix involved therein. More important is to see the issue involved therein and the context wherein the observations were made. Any observation made in a judgment should not be read in isolation and out of context. [See Bombay Dyeing v. Bombay Environmental Action Group – (2006) 3 SCC 434 (para 312)]. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said in the judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a decision binding is the principle upon which a case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and to isolate from it the ratio decidendi. Every decision contains three basic postulates. (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effects of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. 24. It will be important to notice that that the Supreme Court in Raghunath Rai’s case (supra) was called upon to examine the legality and validity of the judgment and order passed on 26.5.2005 transfering the execution petition to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh for being disposed of in accordance with law. It was noticed that by an order passed on 23.10.1983, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana ordered winding up of the company in CP No. 57 of 1983 and the Official Liquidator was appointed who took over possession of the properties of the company. It was noticed that by an order passed on 23.10.1983, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana ordered winding up of the company in CP No. 57 of 1983 and the Official Liquidator was appointed who took over possession of the properties of the company. Thereafter, Punjab National Bank filed a suit (CP No. 46 of 1984) for recovery of Rs.14,53,577/- with interest and a preliminary decree for recovery of Rs.19,07,800/- with future interest at 12% per annum was ordered by the said High Court on 2.12.1985. A final decree was also passed in favour of the bank on 15.1.1987. Thereafter, the bank/decree holder has taken out three execution petitions. The 1st one was dismissed on 8.11.1990 for its failure to list the property sought to be attached along with the said execution petition. The 2nd execution petition was dismissed, upon contest as it sought to attach and bring to sale certain properties which did not belong to the judgment debtor, but belong to a different company. Then a company petition was taken out on 4.9.1998 which was allowed by the company court of the Punjab & Haryana on 18.12.1998 recording that the counsel for the parties are agreed that the petitioner be granted leave to file execution petition. Thereafter, the decree holder – bank filed the third Execution Petition No. 1 of 1999 dated 11.1.1999. The company court has noted the submission made by the Official Liquidator that there are no assets of the company, movable or immovable, available with the Official Liquidator and hence liberty was granted to file proper petition against the other judgment debtors in accordance with law. On 3.1.2005, the decree holder – bank filed CA No. 55 of 2005 under Rule 9 of the Company (Court) Rules, 1959 read with Sections 17 and 18 of the Act for transfer of the execution petition to the Tribunal. On 26.5.2005, the High Court transferred the execution petition. In the context of the aforementioned fact situation, the Supreme Court, noticing the provision contained under Section 24 of the DRT Act held that in terms of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation of 12 years for filing an execution petition has been provided. That is how, in paragraph 24 of the judgment the issue came to be decided. 25. That is how, in paragraph 24 of the judgment the issue came to be decided. 25. With all humility and respect, we feel that the judgment in Raghunath Rai Bareja’s case (supra) is not an authority for the proposition of law as to the period of limitation for sale of immovable properties of a judgment debtor, at the hands of the Recovery Officer under the DRT Act. The main question that has engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja’s case was whether the company court of Punjab & Haryana High Court could have transferred execution proceedings taken out by a decree holder-Bank for the purposes of execution to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh inasmuch as the said execution proceedings are not pending as at the time the DRT Act has been brought into force. The Supreme Court was never called upon to set out the extent of applicability of Section 29 of the DRT Act in the matter of execution proceedings. Therefore, such a question was not one which was considered by the Supreme Court and hence Raghunath Rai’s case (supra) is not a binding precedent for the question that has been raised before us. 26. Further, Chapter V of the Act exclusively dealt with matters relating to aspects of recovery of debts as determined by the Tribunal. Therefore, the provisions contained in Chapter V have exclusively dealt with all aspects which are posterior to the determination of the debt by the tribunal. Since Parliament has preferred to include Section 24 in Chapter IV, we feel it appropriate to construe that the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable only insofar as the applications to be made to the Tribunal are concerned, but not to all other proceedings which follow them. To our mind, in respect of matters concerning recovery of the debt as determined by the tribunal, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not rendered applicable. 27. Section 25 specifies the modes of recovery to be adopted by the Recovery Officer, and it reads as under: “25. Modes of recovery of debts. To our mind, in respect of matters concerning recovery of the debt as determined by the tribunal, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not rendered applicable. 27. Section 25 specifies the modes of recovery to be adopted by the Recovery Officer, and it reads as under: “25. Modes of recovery of debts. The Recovery Officer shall, on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of section 19, proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more of the following modes, namely: - (a) attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the defendant; (b) arrest of the defendant and his detention in prison; (c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant.” 28. The reference made to sub-section (7) of Section 19, herein above, is an obvious error. More of it a little later on. 29. Section 29 dealt with application of certain Rules made and appended to Income Tax Act. Since it will have a bearing upon the controversy on issue, it would be appropriate to extract the same. “29. Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act.- The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income-tax: Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the “assessee” shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act.” (emphasis is mine) 30. Thus, the provisions contained in the Second and Third Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, as well as the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, have been telescoped into this DRT Act. They are liable to be treated as if such provisions, with necessary modifications, are made under this DRT Act. Telescoping certain provisions of another piece of legislation, is a well known legislative device adopted conveniently to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of an earlier Act. By such a measure, those provisions become part and parcel of the later enactment, as if they had been bodily transposed into the later Act. Telescoping certain provisions of another piece of legislation, is a well known legislative device adopted conveniently to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of an earlier Act. By such a measure, those provisions become part and parcel of the later enactment, as if they had been bodily transposed into the later Act. The Legislature would prefer to draw upon its past experience and therefore prefers to fall back upon those very provisions, which were already made in somewhat similar contexts. That would not only save the precious time of the Legislature, but, it would help in consolidating the gains made by the deployment of similar provisions, which would have received appropriate consideration and construction by various courts and also simultaneously taking advantage of the settled principles of practice over a period of time under a previously made legislation. In the instant case, it is apt to note that, only the Second and Third Schedules of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the Certificate Proceeding Rules, have been brought forth into the present DRT Act, as, perhaps, the Legislature felt that there was no further necessity to similarly implore any other provisions contained in the Income-tax Act. Section 222 of the Income-tax Act dealt with the issuance of certificate to Tax Recovery Officer whereas, in terms of Section 19(22), it is the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal who issues the Certificate under his signature, on the basis of the order made by it, to the Recovery Officer. To the extent, it will be relevant for our scrutiny, it is apt to notice that sub-section (1) of Section 222 of the Income-tax Act made it clear that when an assessee is in default of payment of tax, the Tax Recovery Officer may draw up a statement (called as a `certificate’) specifying the amount of arrears due and shall proceed to recover from such assessee the said amount by one or more of the following modes in accordance with rules laid down in the Second Schedule. The four modes laid down therein are (1) attachment and sale of the assessee’s movable property (2) attachment and sale of the assessee’s immovable property (3) arrest of the assessee and his detention in the prison and (4) appointing a receiver for the management of the assessee’s movable and immovable properties. The four modes laid down therein are (1) attachment and sale of the assessee’s movable property (2) attachment and sale of the assessee’s immovable property (3) arrest of the assessee and his detention in the prison and (4) appointing a receiver for the management of the assessee’s movable and immovable properties. Similarly, Section 276 of the Income-tax Act dealt with fraudulent removal, concealment, transfer or delivery to any person, any property or any interest therein by a defaulting assessee so as to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken in execution of a certificate under the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act. From what is noticed supra, it becomes clear that Section 25 of the DRT Act is almost in para materia with Section 222 of the Income-tax Act, and the same modes of recovery are provided in both these enactments. Providing for appropriate modes of recovery of debts, being a substantive act, requiring the application of mind by the Legislature, the Legislature has taken care to engraft the same vividly under Section 25 of the DRT Act. The procedural aspects of working out these modes, having already been specified in the Second Schedule as well as Third Schedule of the Income-tax Act, the same procedural aspects have thus been borrowed into the DRT Act, rather than being reframed. 31. A look at the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act would indicate that Part I thereof contained the general provisions listed in Rules 1 to 19. Rule 2 therein clearly indicates that when a certificate has been drawn up by the Tax Recovery Officer, he shall cause to be served upon the defaulter, a notice requiring payment of the amounts specified in the said certificate within 15 days from the date of service of such a notice and also intimating that in default, steps would be taken to realize the said amounts in accordance with the provisions contained in the Second Schedule. Thus, the certificate drawn by the Tax Recovery Officer is required to be served on every defaulter, giving him a clear 15 days time period to make the payment of the amount specified therein and thus wipe out any default, thus far may have been committed and avoid the rest of the follow up actions. Thus, the certificate drawn by the Tax Recovery Officer is required to be served on every defaulter, giving him a clear 15 days time period to make the payment of the amount specified therein and thus wipe out any default, thus far may have been committed and avoid the rest of the follow up actions. Hence, Rule 3, informs that no steps in execution of a certificate, in ordinary circumstances, shall be taken until the period of 15 days is elapsed from the date of service of such a notice. Pausing here, for a moment, it will be apt to notice that Section 156 of Income-tax Act requires the Assessing Officer to serve upon the assessee a notice of demand specifying the sum payable. Section 220(1) of the Income-tax Act, sets out that the sum specified in the notice of demand raised under section 156, be paid within 30 days. Subsection (2) specified if the said sum is not paid within the period limited by sub-section (1), the assessee was required to pay interest at the rate specified therein. Sub-section (3) empowers enlargement of time period, in certain circumstances. Sub-section (4) then sets out that if the assessee does not pay the amount still, then such an assessee shall be deemed to be in default. Therefore, a notice of demand in terms of Section 156 is a condition precedent for any action to be initiated in terms of the second Schedule of the Income Tax. Otherwise all such follow up actions get vitiated. We may, at once notice here that the Debts Recovery Tribunal was required to serve a copy of every order passed by it to the applicant and the defendant in terms of sub –section 21 of Section 21 of the DRT Act. As per Rule 19 of the Rules, every such order was required to be served through Registered post. Therefore, when we read sub-sections (21) and (22) of Section 19 together, it emerges that the Certificate of Recovery issued by the Presiding Officer under his signature to the Recovery Officer, is akin to the notice of demand talked of in Sections 156 and 220 of the Income Tax Act. We have also noticed from the paper book at page 49, the notice of demand raised by the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore on 16.7.1997. We have also noticed from the paper book at page 49, the notice of demand raised by the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore on 16.7.1997. That notice was drawn by him in terms of Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to Income-tax Act. 32. Rule 4 has specified the modes of recovery all over again, though Section 222 has spelt them out. Part II of Second Schedule dealt with attachment and sale of movable property of a defaulter and the procedure in that regard has been listed out in Rules 20 to 47. Part III of Second Schedule dealt with the procedure to be followed in the matter of attachment and sale of immovable property and the entire procedure in that regard has been spelt out in Rules 48 to 68B. Part IV dealt with appointment of Receiver and Part V dealt with Arrest and detention of the defaulter. Part VI with Miscellaneous Provisions ending up with Rule 94. For our inquiry, therefore Part III of the Second Schedule acquires significance. 33. Rule 48 enabled attachment of immovable property of the defaulter prohibiting, transfer or creation of any charge in such a property in any manner by the defaulter as well as prohibiting persons from taking any benefit under any such transfer or charge created on such immovable property. Rule 49 specified that a copy of the order of attachment is to be served on the defaulter. Rule 50 required the said order of attachment to be proclaimed at some place or at adjacent place of the property so attached, so as to make others also to come to know about the factors of attachment. Rule 51 reads as under: “51. Attachment to relate back from the date of service of notice.- Where any immovable property is attached under this Schedule, the attachment shall relate back to, and take effect from, the date on which the notice to pay the arrears, issued under this Schedule, was served upon the defaulter.” Thus, Rule 51 specified that where any immovable property attached under the Second Schedule, the attachment shall relate back to, and take effect from, the date on which the notice to pay the arrears, issued under the said Schedule was served upon the defaulter. In other words, the true purport of Rule 51 is to ensure that the order of attachment of immovable property made in accordance with Rule 48 relates back to the date on which the notice of certificate, under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule, is served by the Tax Recovery Officer on the defaulter. As already noticed supra, the order of attachment carried out under Rule 48 was required to be served also on the defaulter in terms of Rule 49. Therefore, to avoid any possible ambiguity as to the date with effect from which the attachment order under Rule 48 would become effective, Rule 51 conceputalised that it relates back to the date of service of notice requiring the defaulter to pay the amount contained and mentioned in the Certificate, which is what Rule 2 requires the Tax Recovery Officer to do. 34. Section 19 spelt out the whole gamut of procedure to be followed by the Tribunal starting with institution of proceedings for recovery of any debt by a bank or financial institution ending up with the final orders to be passed by the Tribunal. Sub-section (7) of Section 19 reiterated that the written statement filed by the person against whom the debt is sought to be recovered, to have the same effect as a plaint in a cross suit, so as to enable the tribunal to pass a final order in respect of both the original claim and also of the set off. Plainly, sub-section (7) obviated the necessity of another legal proceeding at the instance of the alleged borrower, who is said to have committed the default in repayment of the debt. Therefore, no certificate is liable to be issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (7) of Section 19. Similarly, Sub-section (12) empowered the tribunal to make an interim order debarring defendant from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any property or asset belonging to him without the prior permission of the tribunal. Therefore, no certificate is liable to be issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (7) of Section 19. Similarly, Sub-section (12) empowered the tribunal to make an interim order debarring defendant from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any property or asset belonging to him without the prior permission of the tribunal. Sub-section (13) empowered the tribunal, at any stage of the proceedings, if satisfied that the defendant with an intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or he is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest thereon, in such circumstances, the Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified by it, or to produce the property at any time so as to satisfy the Certificate for the recovery of the debt likely to be issued later on. Sub-section (18) enables the Tribunal if it is satisfied to do so, to be just and convenient to appoint a receiver of any property or remove any person from the possession or custody of the property or commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver, or confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits in the courts or filing and defending applications before the Tribunal and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of the documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and appoint a Commissioner for preparation of an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof. Sub-section (17) empowers the Tribunal to pass an order of attachment of the properties of the person who is guilty of disobedience of any order passed by it under sub-sections (12), (13) or (18). Sub-section (17) empowers the Tribunal to pass an order of attachment of the properties of the person who is guilty of disobedience of any order passed by it under sub-sections (12), (13) or (18). Sub-section (20) is the final stage at which, after giving the applicant and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such interim or final order, including the order for payment of interest. Thus, the final process of adjudication undertaken by the Tribunal, culminates in its passing the final orders determining the amount due and payable by the defendant under sub-section (20). Thereafter in terms of sub-section (21) the Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it both to the applicant and defendant. Sub-section (22) is significant and it reads as under: “(22) the Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate.” Thus, the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal was required to issue a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the Tribunal passed under sub-section (20) to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the Certificate. If one can legitimately draw a parallel, sub-section (20) of Section 19 is the same as that of a judgment to be rendered by a civil court in a suit brought before it, in terms of Section 33 read with Order XX Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, while subsection (22) is the same as a decree to be drawn by the civil court based upon the adjudication contained in the judgment in terms of Order XX Rule 6A. Thus, issuance of a Certificate to the Recovery Officer for the purpose of recovering the debt specified therein arises under sub-section (22) but not under sub-section (7) of Section 19. 35. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to notice the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2002 SC 1334 in paragraph 15. 15. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. 15. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (at All ER p.544-I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664-I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”] 36. Therefore, in my humble opinion, the reference made to sub-section (7) of Section 19, in Section 25 of the DRT Act is an erroneous one. It should read as a reference to sub-section (22) of Section 19, to make this provision of law meaningful. When so read, it becomes clear that that Section 25 contemplated proceedings which are akin to execution proceedings of decrees of civil courts, as provided for under Order XXI, CPC. Since the main purpose of the DRT Act is to effect recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions as expeditiously as possible, the whole cumbersome procedure specified in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure has been shortened by providing for the quick modes of recovery of the debts due, in Section 25. Since the main purpose of the DRT Act is to effect recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions as expeditiously as possible, the whole cumbersome procedure specified in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure has been shortened by providing for the quick modes of recovery of the debts due, in Section 25. Therefore, Section 25 has got to be read conjointly with Section 29. When so read, we are fortified that the procedure to be followed in the matter of execution of the certificate of recovery issued by the presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, is by following the same procedure spelt out in Schedule II and Schedule III of the Income-tax Act. Once, such a certificate is issued by the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal except for purposes of carrying out any corrections, either arithmetical or otherwise, the proceedings before the Tribunal come to an end. Our conclusion that Section 24 is applicable only with regard to the applications to be taken out before the Tribunal therefore receives additional reinforcement when we read sub-section (22) of Section 19 together with Section 25 and 29 of the DRT Act. 37. Further, the Limitation Act, 1963 is a general enactment, where as the DRT Act is a special piece of legislation and hence the provisions in the later and special legislation will prevail. 38. That takes us to the most crucial and important aspect of deciphering, whether the period of limitation provided for accomplishing the sale of attached immovable property undertaken by the Recovery Officer, is merely directory or mandatory? 39. Rule 68B contained in part III of the Second Schedule reads as under: 68B. 38. That takes us to the most crucial and important aspect of deciphering, whether the period of limitation provided for accomplishing the sale of attached immovable property undertaken by the Recovery Officer, is merely directory or mandatory? 39. Rule 68B contained in part III of the Second Schedule reads as under: 68B. (1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this Part after the expiry of three years (Extended to four years : Notification No. 9995, dated 1.3.1996) from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I, or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX : Provided that where the immovable property is required to be re-sold due to the amount of highest bid being less than the reserve price or under the circumstances mentioned in rule 57 or rule 58 or where the sale is set aside under rule 61, the aforesaid period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property shall stand extended by one year. (2) In computing the period of limitation under sub-rule (1), the period (i) during which the levy of the aforesaid tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum is stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or (ii) during which the proceedings of attachment or sale of the immovable property are stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or (iii) commencing from the date of the presentation of any appeal against the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under this Schedule and ending on the day the appeal is decided, shall be excluded : Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property is less than 180 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 180 days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly. (3) Where any immovable property has been attached under this Part before the 1st day of June, 1992, and the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has also become conclusive or final before the said date, that date shall be deemed to be the date on which the said order has become conclusive or, as the case may be, final. (4) Where the sale of immovable property is not made in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1), the attachment order in relation to the said property shall be deemed to have been vacated on the expiry of the time of limitation specified under this rule.] (underlining is supplied) 40. Since Section 29 has already indicated that what contained in the Second and Third Schedules of the Income-tax Act would apply with necessary modifications, we must construe references contained in Rule 68B also suitably. 41. To my mind, Rule 68B made an attempt to fix a time limit when it said that no sale of immovable property shall be made after expiry of three years [which was extended to four years by Notification No. 9995 dated 1.3.1996] from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any amount, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive or final. Therefore, Rule 68B enunciated a scheme to compulsorily accomplish the task of bringing about the sale of the immovable property of the defaulted assessee (borrower in our case), which property has been attached by the Recovery Officer in terms of Rule 48, in quick time. Therefore, Rule 68B imposed a duty upon the Recovery Officer to start acting promptly from the date the order giving rise to the demand attains finality. The Recovery Officer, being a public authority is really expected to act with necessary expedition and urgency, in the matter. But, however, in a variety of circumstances, including the vacancy in the office, like in the instant case, or heavy work load or consumption of time for identification of the precise asset of the defaulter to be proceeded against etc., there can occur delays, unintentionally, though. But, however, in a variety of circumstances, including the vacancy in the office, like in the instant case, or heavy work load or consumption of time for identification of the precise asset of the defaulter to be proceeded against etc., there can occur delays, unintentionally, though. Since the contents of Rule 68B have to be suitably understood in the context of sub-section (22) of Section 19 of the DRT Act, the finality attained to such an order is of relevance. Under Section 20 of the DRT Act, an aggrieved party has been conferred a right to prefer an appeal against the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal and such appeal should be filed within a period of 45 days. Thus, until and unless the certificate issued by the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in terms of sub-section (22) of Section 19 has attained finality, the Recovery Officer acting under Section 25 of the Debts Recovery Tribunals Act cannot start initiating one or the other modes of recovery. In other words, the Recovery Officer while acting in furtherance of Section 25 in the process of recovering the debts due to banks and financial institutions, must endeavour to complete the transaction of sale within three/four years or in proximate closeness thereof. Since Rule 68B has used the expression “the end of financial year”, the proximate closeness period would end with 31st March of the succeeding year when the three/four years period is completed. Hence, we feel that the language used in Rule 68B is not peremptory in content, but, purely indicative of a time frame limit for accomplishing the sale. If performance of a public duty is required to be done within a specified time, which is also related to a right given to a person, the provision as to time will still be held as directory unless it is shown that the person on whom the related right is conferred is prejudiced because of the non-performance of the duty within the specified time. It may be relevant to see whether the requirement of time is addressed to a party or an officer, for in the former case it may be mandatory. It may be relevant to see whether the requirement of time is addressed to a party or an officer, for in the former case it may be mandatory. Further, when a public authority is required to do a certain thing within a specified period, the same is ordinarily construed as directory, and it is equally well settled that when consequences for inaction on the part of the statutory authority within the specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative. (See Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd – AIR 2003 SC 511 Para-32. The principle was stated by the Privy Council in the following words: “When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those who are entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provision to be directory only. (See Montreal Street Railway v. Normandin – (1917) AC 170 : AIR 1917 PC 142, p. 144). 42. The question, whether a particular provision of a Statute or a Rule having statutory force, is mandatory or is, merely, directory, can be decided only after gathering the purpose and object behind such a Statute. Invariably, the question depends upon examining carefully, the scheme and setting of the Statute, the fall out consequences that might flow from insisting upon a strict observance of a particular provision and, more importantly, the general intendment of the rest of the provisions in which the provision concerned is set in. Unless the object and purpose, which is sought to be attained by the legislature is served, the expressions, which might appear, generally, to be mandatory or peremptory, will not tilt the balance in construing them to be so. The serious inconvenience or injustice, which might result when the provision is treated as a mandatory-one, has also got to be taken into reckoning and consideration. The serious inconvenience or injustice, which might result when the provision is treated as a mandatory-one, has also got to be taken into reckoning and consideration. It is, therefore, appropriate to notice as how the Supreme Court evolved the legal principles concerning this aspect in the following cases: In DATTATRAYA MORESHWAR v. STATE OF BOMBAY AIR 1952 SC 181 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through S.R. Das,J, as the learned Chief Justice of India, then was, has held as under: “In my opinion, this contention of the learned Attorney-General must prevail. It is well settled, that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only to neglect them not affecting the validity of the acts done.” In K. NARASIMHIAH v. H. C. SINGRI GOWDA AIR 1966 SC 330 , Sri Justice_K.C. Das Gupta, speaking for the Bench has said as under in Paragraph No.12: “( 12 ) THE question then is: Is the provision of three clear days' notice mandatory, i. e. , does the failure to give such notice make the proceedings of the meeting and the resolution passed there invalid? The use of the word "shall" is not conclusive on the question. As in all the other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislature's intention. Was it the legislature's intention in making the provision that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. As in all the other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislature's intention. Was it the legislature's intention in making the provision that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. To ascertain the intention the Court has to examine carefully the object of the statute, the consequences that may follow from insisting on a strict observance of the particular provision and above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which it forms a part.” Justice O.Chennapa Reddy, has laid down the test, which can determine the nature of the provision, in the following words, in DALCHAND v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BHOPAL AIR 1983 SC 303 : “There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidable the act complained of. It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit. The negligence of these to whom public duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. The negligence of these to whom public duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. It is as well to realise that every prescription of a period within which an act must be done, is not the prescription of a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period.” Dealing with the same question in the context of rent control legislation, Justice Ratnavel Pandian, speaking for the Court in RUBBER HOUSE v. EXCELSIOR NEEDLE INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED AIR 1989 SC 1160 , has set out the principles as under: “( 20 ) MR R. F. Nariman laid stress on the word "shall" occurring in the above rules particularly Rule 4 (c) and contended that these rules are mandatory in character and so the non-compliance would amount to violation of the imperative (i. e. mandatory) provisions of these rules. According to him the respondent/landlord has not specified the 'amount of arrears due in strict substantial compliance of Rule 4 (c) and as such the present application for ejectment has to be thrown out. The answer to the above contention depends upon whether these rules are mandatory or directory which question has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. No doubt, if the statute is mandatory the things done not in the manner or form prescribed have no effect or validity, but if it is directory, the non-compliance may not lead to any serious and adverse consequence. A valuable guide for ascertaining the intention of the legislature is found in Maxwell ``the Interpretation of Statutes", 12th end. , Ch. 13 at page 314 under the caption "intentions attributed to the legislature when it expresses none" which 'reads thus : Passing from the interpretation of the language of statutes, it remains to consider what intentions are to be attributed to the legislature on questions necessarily arising out of its enactments and on which it has remained silent. . . . It is impossible to law down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. . . . It is impossible to law down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. (21) LORD Cambell in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner observed : No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. (22) LORD Penzance in Howard v. Bodington said : I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory. (23) IN Craies Statute Law, 6th end. at page 63, the following quotation is found: When a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, and prescribes the formalities which are to attend its performance, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of the thing when done are called imperative or absolute; but those which are not essential and may be disregarded without invalidating the thing to be done, are called directory. (24) WITH reference to non-compliance of the directory enactment in Craies Statute Law it is said at page 261 : But on the other hand, if a statute is merely directory, it is immaterial, so far as relates to the validity of the thing to be done, whether the provisions of the statute are accurately followed out or not. (25) IN Woodward v. Sarsons it is explained as to what is called an absolute enactment or mandatory enactment as follows: An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. (25) IN Woodward v. Sarsons it is explained as to what is called an absolute enactment or mandatory enactment as follows: An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. (26) IN Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India a question arose whether S. 175 (3 of the government of India Act, 1935 which requires that contracts on behalf of the government of India shall be executed in the form prescribed is mandatory or directory. The Supreme court at pages 893-94 expressed its view as follows : Where a statute requires that a thing shall be done in the prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences of non-compliance, the question whether the provision was mandatory or directory has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thing done not in the manner or form prescribed can have no effect or validity: if it is directory, penalty may be incurred for non-compliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as good. (27) IN Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, certain questions arose for consideration whether the whole of S. 131 (3 of U. P. Municipalities Act was mandatory or the part of it requiring publication in the manner laid down in S. 94 (3 of the said Act i.e. in a Hindi newspaper was merely directory. Wanchoo, J. as he then was speaking for the majority said : The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory, inasmuch as it uses the word "shall" as In the present case is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute In making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision) have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. (28) SEE also K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, Subbarao v. Member, Election tribunal, Hyderabad. (29) IT is apposite to refer to the observation of this court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque dealing with this problem : (30) REFERENCE may be had to (1 State of U. P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya and (2 Ajit Singh v. State of Punjabi (31) THE word "shall" in its ordinary import is obligatory. Nevertheless, the word "shall" need not be given that connotation in each and every case and the provisions can be interpreted as directory instead of mandatory depending upon the purpose which the legislature intended to achieve as disclosed by the object, design, purpose and scope of the statute. While interpreting the concerned provisions, regard must be had to the context, subject matter and object of the statute in question. (32) ON a close scrutiny of the relevant rules referred supra in the light of the above principles of statutory interpretation, we are of the view that the non-compliance of Rule 4 (c) i. e. the non-mentioning of the quantum of arrears of rent, does involve no invalidating consequence and also does not visit any penalty.” It is well established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory, and that the use of the word "shall" does not conclude the matter. Subsequently, in T.V. USMAN v. FOOD INSPECTOR, TELLICHERRY MUNICIPALITY AIR 1994 SC 1818 , the Supreme Court has reiterated the same principles. 43. N.S. Bindra’s classical work of Interpretation of Statutes – Butterworths Ninth Edition at Page No.935, has quoted, in this context as to how the Ohio Court has said, in MILLER v. LAKEWOOD HOUSING COMPANY [(1932) 125 Ohio St 152): “Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effect. 43. N.S. Bindra’s classical work of Interpretation of Statutes – Butterworths Ninth Edition at Page No.935, has quoted, in this context as to how the Ohio Court has said, in MILLER v. LAKEWOOD HOUSING COMPANY [(1932) 125 Ohio St 152): “Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directory, but if not, it will be mandatory.” 44. It would also be useful to notice what Lord Reid in COUTTS AND COMPANY v. I.R.C. 1953 APPEAL CASES 267, said: “In general if it is alleged that a statutory provision brings about a result which is so startling, one looks for some other possible meaning of the statute which will avoid such a result, because there is some presumption that Parliament does not intend it’s legislation to produce highly inequitable results.” 45. In the instant case, no particular rights can be deciphered in favour of the defendant writ petitioner, from the DRT Act or the Second Schedule appended to Income Tax Act. More importantly no consequences for the inaction of the Tax Recovery Officer are provided in these Rules. These Rules talk of the duties assigned to a Tax Recovery Officer. Similarly, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the interests of the writ petitioner due to delay in accomplishing the sale. On the contrary, the 1st respondent Bank has specifically pleaded that due to shift in jurisdiction of the DRT from Bangalore to Hyderabad and due to the vacancy in the Office of the Recovery Officer, the sale of the immoveable property could not be accomplished for more than three years. Thus, the 1st respondent Bank has no control over the duties or activities of the Recovery Officer. Further, injustice would be caused otherwise to the 1st respondent Bank. This apart, this special piece of legislation has been ushered into secure recovery of dues to Banks and Financial Institutions. Therefore, the Parliament would not have done anything that might produce the opposite of this objective, as the Banks or Financial Institutions can never be conceived to have any say, much less regulate, the acts of Recovery Officers. This apart, this special piece of legislation has been ushered into secure recovery of dues to Banks and Financial Institutions. Therefore, the Parliament would not have done anything that might produce the opposite of this objective, as the Banks or Financial Institutions can never be conceived to have any say, much less regulate, the acts of Recovery Officers. Therefore, we hold that the time limit provided in Rule 68B to be merely directory but not mandatory, as can be gathered from various expressions used therein, which may not fit into a tight time frame limit. (For this purpose, we have highlighted those words while extracting Rule 68B) 46. One other mode of recovery provided for under Section 25 is arrest and detention of the defendant in prison. When a statute confers a choice between sale of movable or immovable properties and arrest and detention in a civil prison, as ways of satisfying the liability created by a certificate issued in terms of sub-section (22) of Section 19, the obvious choice would have been to get the liability liquidated by sale of movable or immovable properties rather than seek to deprive the liberty of an individual by arrest and detention in prison. Life and liberty of individuals is of paramount importance in our constitutional scheme, than the right to hold the property. Therefore, when required, courts must interpret a provision of law which would not result in deprivation of liberty of an individual. If we were to treat the period specified in Rule 68B as mandatory, for the sheer lack of corresponding provision in the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, with regard to period of limitation to seek detention of the defaulter, the obvious choice would be, to seek detention of such a defaulter in civil prison; then the option for detention as a mode of recovery acquires a stage of compulsion, nay, preference over sale of moveable or immoveable properties. That should be avoided. Hence, for this reason also we feel that the time limit in Rule 68B is not an exhaustive or mandatory one, but merely a desirable one. We, therefore feel that the writ petition is without any merit and deserves to be dismissed. 47. That should be avoided. Hence, for this reason also we feel that the time limit in Rule 68B is not an exhaustive or mandatory one, but merely a desirable one. We, therefore feel that the writ petition is without any merit and deserves to be dismissed. 47. Sri J.V.Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (supra) to drive home his contention that that the provisions of the DRT Act being special piece of legislation oust the other modes or methods specified in the general enactments including the Companies Act. He has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association (supra), for the above said proposition of law. He has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v. Chajju Ram (supra) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (supra) for purpose of demonstrating that the provisions of the DRT Act will have overriding effect over the other enactments. The learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in M/s. Transcore v. Union of India (supra) in support of his place that the general principles contained under Article 136 of the Limitation Act should not be applied for purposes of execution proceedings under the DRT Act, as the DRT does not act as a civil court and no decrees are passed by it. There is no quarrel with regard to any of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above judgments. In our opinion, they have no direct bearing upon the controversy involved in this case. However, the learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Madras High Court in Nooruddin v. Tax Recovery Officer (supra) in support of his contention that Rule 68B is a rigid one and any sale of immovable property after the limitation prescribed therein would be clearly illegal and void. We have considered the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in Nooruddin’s case (supra). We have considered the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in Nooruddin’s case (supra). But, however, with respect, we are unable to subscribe to the reasoning adopted by the said learned single Judge, for the learned Judge has not considered whether the time limit contained therein is mandatory or directory. 48. Therefore, the writ petition stands dismissed. The respondents 1 to 3 - Banks are, at liberty to realize the debt due to them by way of the proposed sale of the immovable property, or fall back upon the other available modes of recovery of the debt due to them, if considered necessary. 49. Parties do bear their respective costs.