Judgment :- Prabha Sridevan, J. 1. The grievance of the Writ Appellant is that the learned Single Judge having held that the Court cannot go into the disputed question of fact relating to employer and employee relationship, proceeded to grant them relief under Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also his grievance that, when admittedly, there is an effective alternative remedy, before a forum which can decide questions of fact, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. 2. The Appellant is a unit of Nuclear Fuel Complex, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Palayakayal, Tuticorin District. Because of the strategic importance attached to the Nuclear Fuel Complex, Department of Atomic Energy, the Department is directly under the control of the Prime Minister of India and according to the Appellant, there are some very special provisions such as (a) exemption from UPSC for recruitment/promotions, (b) exemption from DGS & D for procurement of materials, (c) exemption from approaching CPWD for construction activities. According to the Appellant, therefore, the security issue of this Department is highly sensitive one and all the operating units in this Department are guarded by para military forces like Central Industrial Security Force. 3. The Appellant entered into an agreement with the Third Respondent, which is an agency providing security and the Third Respondent by the agreement undertook to provide complete security coverage for the project area and township. Clause 16 of the agreement between the Appellant and the Third Respondent provides that the agreement will be in force for a period of one year or till the induction of CISF, which ever is earlier. The clause also provided for termination of the agreement by notice. 4. The members of the Writ Petitioner union were engaged by the Third Respondent. They apprehended that their services would be terminated when they saw 50 personnels belonging to CISF arrived at the project site. Conciliation proceedings were initiated by notice dated 28.7.2009 and the Third Respondent claimed protection under Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to them, the contract between the Appellant and the Third Respondent was a sham one to deny the benefits of labour legislation. Most of the members of the Writ Petitioner union had crossed the age of 40 years and therefore, the possibility of alternative employment was very bleak. According to them, the contract between the Appellant and the Third Respondent was a sham one to deny the benefits of labour legislation. Most of the members of the Writ Petitioner union had crossed the age of 40 years and therefore, the possibility of alternative employment was very bleak. Therefore, they filed a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Second and Third Respondents not to alter to the prejudice of the workman concerned their service applicable to them immediately before the Conciliation proceeding during the pendency of the Conciliation proceedings. The Appellant, of course, claimed that the Wit Petition was not maintainable and that the remedy of the Writ Petitioner was to invoke the jurisdiction of the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Learned Single Judge after hearing the submissions made on both sides, held that “the Petitioner, Second and Third Respondents have come forward with certain rival claims in respect of employer-employee relationship; this Court cannot go into all these aspects at this stage as all the disputes are pending in the Conciliation proceedings before the First Respondent. It is for the Petitioner as well as for the Second and Third Respondents to establish their respective claim before the Conciliation Officer.” After having held so, the learned Single Judge proceeded to issue the directions as prayed for. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on the following judgments: (i) (ii) Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others, 2001 (4) CTC 48 (SC): 2001 (7) SCC 1 . Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(MD) No.18923 of 1999 dated 16.2.2005. (iii) Judgment of this Court in W.P.(MD) Nos.11332 of 2005, 9345 of 2006 and 6432 of 2007 dated 03.03.2008 (iv) Indian Bottling Plant Sramika Congress v. Indian Oil Corporation and others, 1996 (1) LLN 665. (v) Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi (3) and others, 2006 (4) SCC 1 . (vi) Binny Ltd. v. Sadasivan, 2005 (5) CTC 117 (SC): 2005 (6) SCC 657 . (vii) Orissa Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd v. Bharati Industries, AIR 2006 SC 198 . (viii) P. Pitchumani, etc. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., 2004 (3) CTC 1 . (ix) Samudra Devi & Others v. Narendra Kaur & others, 2008 (9) SCC 100 . 8. (vii) Orissa Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd v. Bharati Industries, AIR 2006 SC 198 . (viii) P. Pitchumani, etc. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., 2004 (3) CTC 1 . (ix) Samudra Devi & Others v. Narendra Kaur & others, 2008 (9) SCC 100 . 8. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner Union submitted that it is not as if the Writ Petitioner had prayed for a relief that it could have got in the Industrial Disputes Act. All that the employees wanted was that during the pendency of the Conciliation Proceedings, they would not be thrown out. The Protection could not be extended after the conclusion of Conciliation proceedings. The learned Counsel submitted that as regards the regularisation of their services, the Petitioner may have a remedy before the Industrial Tribunal. But, this is an immediate and urgent relief. The learned Counsel further submitted that, without prejudice to the other contention regarding the rights of the Respondents, they may at least be considered for the residential quarters even in the Application for CISF. 9. The learned Counsel referred to Bharath Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., Chennai v. Petroleum Employees Union, Chennai and 3 others, W.A. No.1410 of 2003 dated 27.3.2003, where a Division Bench of this Court, at the instance of the management, issued directions forbearing the workmen from resorting to illegal strike, pursuant to their strike notice. There the Division Bench had cited al the earlier judgments, which relate to this question and thereafter, held that since strike notice was illegal and, in utter disregard of Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the prayer sought for must be granted. 10. We have considered the rival submissions. 11. It is true that in the judgment cited above, the Wirt Petition was allowed as prayed for. But, on certain factual aspects, there are differences and therefore, it will be very difficult for us to follow the same. For instance, in the above case of Bharath Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., Chennai v. Petroleum Employees Union, Chennai and 3 others, W.A.No.1410 of 2003 dated 27.3.2003, there was no dispute regarding the existence of employer-employee relationship. Therefore, it was only a question of whether strike notice was illegal or not. Perhaps that is why, the Division Bench was pleased to pass the order and further, it was a high priority industry. We cannot examine the correctness of the above decision. Therefore, it was only a question of whether strike notice was illegal or not. Perhaps that is why, the Division Bench was pleased to pass the order and further, it was a high priority industry. We cannot examine the correctness of the above decision. We can, however, distinguish it. 12. In this case, the learned Single Judge himself was conscious of the fact that there are different stands taken by the Appellant, Third Respondent and the Wirt Petitioner regarding the employer-employee relationship. Only when that question is decided, the rights under the Industrial Disputes Act follow. After having held that the basic question must be decided according to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the further direction, on the basis that, in fact, such an employer-employee relationship exists, ought not to have been given. 13. We are not for a moment giving a finding that an employer-employee relationship does not exist. All that we are saying is that when once this Court has held that the Industrial Dispute must be settled, any direction can be granted only when the dispute, in fact, has been settled. 14. In Orisa Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd v. Bharati Industries, AIR 2006 SC 198 , it is observed as follows: “3. …. After considering the rival stands the High Court came to a conclusion that since there were disputed facts, those cannot be adjudicated in a Writ Petition. It was noted by the High Court that after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties it was noticed that a lot of statements were made by the Writ Petitioner which were disputed by the opposite party-Corporation. The main dispute revolved round the value of articles lifted by the Writ Petitioner. After having concluded that the disputed facts cannot be adjudicated in a Writ Petition, the High Court came to apparently contradictory conclusions/findings…. 9. A bare perusal of the High Court’s judgment shows that there was clear non-application of mind. On one hand the High Court observed that the disputed questions cannot be gone into a Writ Petition. It was also noticed that the essence of the dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the above conclusions the High Court should have dismissed the Writ Petition. On one hand the High Court observed that the disputed questions cannot be gone into a Writ Petition. It was also noticed that the essence of the dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the above conclusions the High Court should have dismissed the Writ Petition. Surprisingly, the High Court proceeded to examine the case solely on the Writ Petitioner’s assertion and on a very curious reasoning that though the Appellant-Corporation claimed that the value of articles lifted was nearly Rs.14.90 lakhs no details were specifically given. From the Counter-Affidavit filed before the High Court it is crystal-clear that relevant details disputing claim of the Writ Petitioner were given. Value of articles lifted by the Writ Petitioner is a disputed factual question. Where a complicated question of fact is involved and the matter requires thorough proof of factual aspects, the High Court should not entertain the Writ Petition. Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend upon the nature of dispute and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High Court should not entertain the Writ Petition. As noted above, the Writ Petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach of contract. Question whether the action of the opposite party in the Writ Petition amounted to breach of contractual obligation ultimately depends on facts and would require material evidence to be scrutinised and in such a case writ jurisdiction should not be exercised. 11. In the instant case the High Court itself observed that disputed questions of fact were involved and yet went on to give directions as if it was adjudicating the money claim in a Suit. The course is clearly impermissible. … 14. Above being the positing the High Court’s judgment is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. However, our interference in the matter shall not stand in the way of the Writ Petitioner seeking any other remedy as is available in law. 15. In P. Pitchumani, etc. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., 2004 (3) CTC 1 , it is observed as follows: “14. However, our interference in the matter shall not stand in the way of the Writ Petitioner seeking any other remedy as is available in law. 15. In P. Pitchumani, etc. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., 2004 (3) CTC 1 , it is observed as follows: “14. In view of what stated supra, we hold that – (i) Only such violations under I.D. Act, which involve public duties, are amenable to Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India; (ii) dismissals, transfers and other matters concerning the service conditions of employees governed by I.D. Act have to be adjudicated only by the forums created under the said statue and not otherwise; (iii) it is needless to mention that the disputes relating to matters not governed by I.D. Act have to be resolved only by common law Courts; (iv) the transfers effected in these cases do not involve any public duties and involve the disputed questions of fact and they should be resolved only before the forums under the I.D. Act; (v) the Appellants/Petitioners-employees shall be entitled to seek for reference by filing Application under Section 10 of the I.D. Act within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (vi) if any industrial disputes are raised, then the concerned forums, be it Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, shall dispose of the same within four months from the date of receipt of the reference, after affording opportunity to either party; (vii) without prejudice to the contentions of the Appellants/Petitioners-employees, one week time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is given to the employees to join at the transferred places and in respect to such of those dismissed employees, for non-joining at the transferred places, the delay is condoned if they join as stipulated above and in that event, dismissal orders passed against them disappear automatically; and (viii) the Respondents-Managements shall sympathetically consider the payments of wages/salaries to the Appellants/Petitioners-employees so as to maintain the industrial peace and harmony.” 16. The Writ Petitioner-Union can prosecute its claim for regularisation and if the Industrial Tribunal holds in their favour regarding employer-employee relationship, then the Writ Petitioner can also claim the relief that will follow viz., wages during the period of conciliation when right under Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act is protected. The Writ Petitioner-Union can prosecute its claim for regularisation and if the Industrial Tribunal holds in their favour regarding employer-employee relationship, then the Writ Petitioner can also claim the relief that will follow viz., wages during the period of conciliation when right under Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act is protected. All these will follow only if they succeed in establishing the proof that the employer-employee relationship exists. Until this basic question of facts is settled, we cannot grant the relief prayed for. 17. On this ground alone, the Writ Appeal is allowed. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs. We repeat we have not decided the existence or nonexistence of the relationship of employer-employee. The remedy under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act is intact and it can be pursued under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that even assuming without admitting that the Appellant requires CISF for the plant, then the member of the Respondent-Firm may be employed for the residential quarters. This request can also be made before the I.D. forum.