JUDGMENT : D.H. Waghela, J. Even as the impugned oral judgment dated 26.2.2010 of learned single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.4193 of 2000 with Special Civil Application No.4550 of 2000 is expressly rendered invoking and referring Article 227 of the Constitution, it was argued at the outset by learned counsel Mr.Joshi, appearing for the appellant, that the original petition, in terms, in its title itself, invokes Article 226 as also Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. He, therefore, asserted that the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was maintainable and required to be entertained for final resolution of the dispute. 2. It was seen from the record that the original industrial dispute was raised in the year 1984 for grant of permanent status to 70 temporary employees of the appellant and that industrial dispute was referred and then transferred to the Industrial Tribunal at Bhavnagar, where it was registered as Reference (IT) No.39 of 1993. After pendency of that dispute for nearly 26 years and full opportunity to the parties for leading their evidence, award dated 11.2.2000 was made with the order that daily-wagers amongst the employees concerned were to be treated as temporary employees, after five years from the date of reference, and after further period of five years, they were to be treated as permanent employees. The benefits and arrears arising from the aforesaid order were to be paid within 30 days of publication of the award. 3. Parties on both sides in the above adjudication preferred Special Civil Applications in the year 2000, and those petitions have been dismissed by the impugned judgment of learned single Judge. During the pendency for 10 years of both the petitions, the appellant appears to have sought injunction against operation of the award of the Tribunal. The interim arrangement arrived at amongst the parties appears to have been incorporated in order dated 7.7.2000 in the petitions in the following terms; "Both these petitions are arising out of a common judgment and award dated 11.2.2000 passed by Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar in Ref.(IT) No.39 of 1993.I have also heard the learned counsel on behalf of the respective parties on interim relief. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner in SCA No.4192 of 2000 submitted that there is an agreement between the parties that during the off season the employer will pay seasonal allowance to the workmen. It is agreed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective party in both the petitions that the interim prayer may be disposed of finally. Therefore, the employer shall pay to the workmen the wages-seasonal allowance as per the terms of settlement. Both the petitions will be taken up for hearing on 27.7.2000. List these petitions in the first board for hearing." After the above order, it is not clear as to why and how the petitions were not heard for more than 10 years. 4. Arguing the appeal, learned counsel Mr.Joshi submitted that, even as the findings of fact were recorded in the award of the Tribunal after appreciation of the evidence on record, the appellant proposed to submit additional evidence in the form of certificate dated 28.3.2000 issued by Central Salt & Marine Chemicals Research Institute and certificate dated 27.3.2000 of Scientific & Technical Consultancy Services, to show that appellant's industry was a seasonal industry and it was not proper to direct grant of permanent status to the workmen concerned. It could not be gainsaid that the aforesaid certificates were obtained after the date of the award and, in fact, the relevant documents for which the workmen had made demand before the Tribunal were consciously and deliberately not produced by the appellant. The Tribunal had dealt with all the defences taken by the appellant, including the plea of financial burden, requirement of continuous service of the workmen concerned and the number of vacancies remaining unfilled on various posts on the permanent set-up of the appellant. With the passage of more than two decades, admittedly, out of the original group of more than 70 aggrieved workmen, many have resigned or retired, 4 of the workmen have been discharged, and as on today, 21 workmen stand to benefit by the award of the Tribunal. With the passage of more than two decades, admittedly, out of the original group of more than 70 aggrieved workmen, many have resigned or retired, 4 of the workmen have been discharged, and as on today, 21 workmen stand to benefit by the award of the Tribunal. According to the statements of calculations furnished by the appellant, after specific order in that regard, the total monetary liability in respect of the remaining lot of 21 workmen runs into approximately rupees one crore and the total liability, according to the appellant, taking into account the workmen, who have been discharged or who have resigned under a voluntary retirement scheme, is nearly Rs.1,10,00,000/-. 5. The above record of facts and the course of events would clearly show that the appellant has been merrily carrying on the litigation for 26 years and proposes to carry the fight forward only on the basis of the so-called certificates, which are obtained and produced straightway before the High Court. of course, the appellant has also sought to rely upon a letter dated 21.6.1997 written by Section Officer, Energy and Petrochemicals Department, State of Gujarat to the Chief Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board. That document is also not only sought to be newly introduced directly before the High Court, but it appears to be totally irrelevant and inadmissible in evidence. However, production of these documents before learned single Judge is made the basis for arguing that the petition was duly invoking Articles 226, 14 and 19, as important evidence was proposed to be adduced before learned single Judge and, to that extent and for that purpose, the original jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked. 6. Thus, practically without the necessary documentary evidence being produced by the appellant and after due appreciation of the evidence on record, the findings of fact, which are recorded by the Tribunal and confirmed by learned single Judge, after hearing the parties, are sought to be called into question once again before this Court. Even if that exercise were permissible, there is no material or valid ground to hold that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal were in any way perverse or that learned single Judge had failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 7. Even if that exercise were permissible, there is no material or valid ground to hold that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal were in any way perverse or that learned single Judge had failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 7. Learned counsel Mr.T.R. Mishra, appearing for respondent No.1, submitted that the workmen concerned were suffering injustice and exploitation since two decades and the appellant was carrying on litigation while the workmen concerned were either losing interest or their working lives and against such workmen it was easy for the appellant to fight only out of the interest which would accrue by withholding the amounts of due benefits, admittedly in excess of rupees one crore. He, therefore, urged and insisted that the workmen concerned must be ordered to be paid the amounts of due benefits atleast at this stage, with interest at the appropriate rate and appropriate amount of costs must be imposed, in the interest of justice. 8. Since the respondent workmen concerned are awarded the benefits which are quantifiable in terms of money and such monies are withheld by the appellant and the workmen have been deprived of the money to which they were entitled more than a decade ago, not awarding interest on the amounts due shall be clear denial of justice and the amounts due shall stand substantially reduced in real terms just by passage of time and galloping rate of inflation. While the monies due would have multiplied at compound rate in the hands of the employer, the workmen and their family would have suffered such deprivation as cannot be really and fully compensated in terms of money. Such an obvious phenomenon cannot be allowed to happen at the hands of the Court, by sheer pendency of the proceeding for an inordinately long period, so as to indirectly put a premium upon dilatory factors. Theoratically and ideally, the party who suffers loss of money to which it is legally entitled must be fully compensated by factoring in interest as well as inflation and loss of purchasing power of money. The maxim: "actus curiae neminem gravabit" - act of court injures no one", has direct application in such cases. Theoratically and ideally, the party who suffers loss of money to which it is legally entitled must be fully compensated by factoring in interest as well as inflation and loss of purchasing power of money. The maxim: "actus curiae neminem gravabit" - act of court injures no one", has direct application in such cases. At least for the award of interest on the amount due there are direct legal provisions in the Interest Act, 1978 and section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 8.1 The Division Bench of this Court in Saijpur Bogha Nagar Palika Octroi Karmachari Mandal v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation [ 1991 (2) GLR 956 ] held award of interest @ 15% p.a., on the amounts of wages withheld, to be just and proper. The Apex Court held in Jagdish Rai v. Union of India [ (1999) 3 SCC 257 ] that interest @ 12% p.a. was required to be awarded by the High Court even though it was not originally claimed. It was in terms held that the award of interest under section 34 of C.P.C. is a matter of procedure and ought to be granted in all cases when there is decree for money, unless there are strong reasons to decline the same; and awarded interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of decree. Recently, in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi & Ors. v. Union of India [ AIR 2009 SC 3098 ], the Apex Court observed that though the appellant could not be faulted for the delay in making of the award by the Railway Claims Tribunal, it was deprived of beneficial use of the amount awarded to it and payment of interest was basically compensation for being denied the use of the money. Therefore, denial of interest, in such cases, was improper. As for the rate of interest, between an employer and workmen, it being a contractual relationship, the rate at which moneys are advanced by nationalised banks should be the guiding factor and court can take judicial notice of the rates at which moneys are lent to the industries and commercial enterprises by such banks. As for the rate of interest, between an employer and workmen, it being a contractual relationship, the rate at which moneys are advanced by nationalised banks should be the guiding factor and court can take judicial notice of the rates at which moneys are lent to the industries and commercial enterprises by such banks. Therefore, even without taking into consideration the galloping rate of inflation and the wrongful deprivation of money for the working class, who need the money for their everyday needs, the rate of interest ought to be not less than 12% p.a. This view is supported by the relevant observations of the Apex Court in Gursharan Singh etc. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee ( AIR 1996 SC 1175 ) and Food Corporation of India v. M/s. SEIL Ltd. ( AIR 2008 SC 1101 ). As recently reminded by the Apex Court in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation [ (2010) 3 SCC 192 ] approach of the Courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the directive principles of State policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer - public or private. Article 38 echoes the preambular promise and casts a duty upon the judiciary to promote a social order in which justice, economic and political, informs all the institutions of the national life. The Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. 9. Having considered the rival submissions and in absence of any valid ground to interfere with the impugned judgment, the appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine. However, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, gross and inordinate delay in process of adjudication before the Tribunal and unexplained and unjustified pendency of the petitions for 10 years before this Court, it is incumbent upon this Court to direct the appellant to properly calculate and disburse to the workmen concerned the amounts due as on the date of the award, within one month, with simple interest @ 12% from the date after one month of publication of the award of the Tribunal till the date of payment. The amounts falling due from time to time under the award, one month after publication of the award, shall also be paid within one month from today with interest @ 12% p.a. for the periods commencing from the day such amounts fell due till the date of payment. Subject to those directions, the appeal is dismissed in limine along with the civil application, with cost quantified at Rs.15000/- to be paid by the appellant to respondent No.1, within a period of one month. Appeal dismissed.