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Gujarat High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 599 (GUJ)

Uttar Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. v. Arbuda Chemicals

2010-12-21

AKIL KURESHI

body2010
Judgment Akil Kureshi, J.—This petition is filed by the Electricity Company challenging an order dated 24.11.1999 passed by the Electricity Inspector as upheld by appellate order dated 13.9.2002 passed by the appellate authority. 2. Facts in brief are as follows : 2.1 Respondent no.1 is a consumer of electricity supply of the petitioner company. The meter installed by the company was checked in June 1999 and found to be running slow. Same was based on laboratory testing. It was found to be running slow by 66.91%. Supplementary bill of Rs. 7,10,007/- was therefore, issued. Respondent no.1 consumer questioned the legality of such demand by approaching the Electrical Inspector. Electrical Inspector by impugned order though upheld the degree of slowness of the meter, was of the opinion that supplementary bill cannot be for a period interior to May 1999. No reasons are however, indicated that he curtailed the period of bill from May 1999 alone. The petitioner challenged the said decision of the Electrical Inspector before the Appellate Authority. Appeal however, came to be dismissed on 13.9.2002. In the appellate order, the contention of the consumer that meter was defective from 26.5.1999 was accepted. On the ground that the petitioner failed to show that the meter was running slow since six months, order of Electrical Inspector was confirmed. 3. Under Section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which is applicable in the present case, the Electricity Company would have power to levy differential charges of electricity consumption upto maximum of six months prior to the date of checking. 3. Under Section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which is applicable in the present case, the Electricity Company would have power to levy differential charges of electricity consumption upto maximum of six months prior to the date of checking. Section 26(6) of the Act reads as follows : “(6) Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any meter referred to in Sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has, in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be correct, such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct; but save, as aforesaid, the register of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount or quantity; Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this sub-section, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days’ notice of his intention so to do.” 4. In the present case, the Electrical Inspector curtailed the said period and permitted the Electricity Company to levy such additional charges from May 1999. This decision was however, not based on any material on record. There is no discussion in the order by the Electrical Inspector why he chose from May 1999, charges could be collected. The appellate authority merely observing that the Electricity Company failed to show that meter was slow for the entire period for six months accepted the stand of the consumer that meter was checked on 26.5.1999. There is however, no evidence to establish this fact. In my opinion, therefore, Electrical Inspector as well as appellate authority committed serious error in cutting down past period during which differential charges could be collected by the Electricity Company. If there was any evidence that either the meter was changed in 1999 or that it was checked and found accurate, authorities could have prevented the Electricity Company from collecting additional charges interior to such a date. 5. In the present case, however, there is no evidence in this regard. If there was any evidence that either the meter was changed in 1999 or that it was checked and found accurate, authorities could have prevented the Electricity Company from collecting additional charges interior to such a date. 5. In the present case, however, there is no evidence in this regard. In the result impugned order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the Electricity Inspector and order dated 13.9.2002 passed by the appellate authority are quashed. 6. Petition is disposed of. Rule made absolute accordingly. P P P P P