Judgment :- 1. The Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Court, Ponneri, passed in A.S. No.3 of 2001 dated 21.12.2001, reversing the judgment and decree of the District Munsif Court, Ponneri, passed in O.S. No.735 of 1996 dated 30.11.2000. 2. The averments in the Plaint are as follows: (i) The Plaintiff had purchased the suit properties under a registered Sale Deed dated 05.09.1964. After purchase, she had made an improvement on the suit properties and has been cultivating the same. From the date of purchase onwards, she is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties as an absolute owner. She has also created an equitable mortgage in the Punjab National Bank, Chennai and obtained loan by depositing the title deeds and Encumbrance Certificate in the year 1984. The documents of title deed have been misplaced by the bank. It was yet to be received by the Plaintiff, even though, she had discharged the loan. (ii) The Defendants have no right of any nature over the suit properties. The Defendants had an idea of purchasing the suit properties. When the sale price was not agreeable, the Plaintiff did not agree to sell the suit properties. So, the Defendants have become enimical towards the Plaintiff and they openly proclaiming in the suit village and holding treats of forcible dispossession of the Plaintiff from the suit properties. Hence, the Plaintiff is constrained to file the Suit for declaration of title and also for permanent injunction. 3. The gist and essence of Written Statement filed by the First Defendant adopted by Defendants 2 and 3, are as follows: (i) It is true that the Plaintiff purchased the suit properties from one Ekambara Reddy and others on 05.09.1964 for Rs.4,000/-. But, the entire sale consideration has not been paid by her. The Sale Deed has been executed by Ekambara Reddy and others in favour of Plaintiff only to discharge the debt due to one Lakshmipathy Naidu and even though, the Plaintiff herself undertook to clear the loan amount due to Lakshmipathy Naidu, she has not cleared it for a long time. (ii) Items 1 and 2 of the suit properties alone are patta lands and Items 3 and 4 of the suit properties are anadheenam Poromboke land for which the Government is the ultimate owner. The suit lands were lying fallow for a long time. (ii) Items 1 and 2 of the suit properties alone are patta lands and Items 3 and 4 of the suit properties are anadheenam Poromboke land for which the Government is the ultimate owner. The suit lands were lying fallow for a long time. The Plaintiff is none other than the daughter of the First Defendant’s paternal aunt, viz., Chellammal. The First Defendant stood by and arranged for the said sale in favour of the Plaintiff by Ekambara Reddy and others. Hence, Ekambara Reddy demanded money due to him and in the year 1975, the Plaintiff not only expressed her inability to pay the amounts due to Ekambara Reddy, but in turn agreed to sell the suit properties to the First Defendant for a sum of Rs.20,000/-. Accordingly, the First Defendant orally purchased the suit properties from the Plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20,000/-, in the Karthigai month of 1975. Immediately after the oral purchase, the First Defendant took possession of the suit properties reclaimed it and made it fit for cultivation and also started cultivation. The First Defendant’s father Balarama Reddy, died even earlier, the First Defendant as the Kartha and manager of the joint family, he is in possession and enjoyment of the same. Since, the Plaintiff is a relative, the First Defendant not insisted for execution of the Sale Deed. In 1978, the Plaintiff has expressed her desire to get back the suit properties from the First Defendant by paying back a sum of Rs.20,000/- paid by the First Defendant. Hence, the Plaintiff along with her husband attempted to dispossess the First Defendant from the suit properties as early as in 1978, which was duly resisted by the Defendants. (iii) Patta also stands in the name of Ekambara Reddy. Then, the patta has been changed in the name of First Defendant and the Patta Number is 338, subsequently, it was changed to Patta No. 302. The kist has been paid by him. The suit properties have been divided between the brothers along with other family properties on 24.06.1992. In the said partition, the First Defendant has been allotted 0.74 cents in first item and also the land in second item of property. The Second Defendant has been allotted 2.66 cents in first item of suit property. Third Defendant has been allotted 2.65 cents in first item of property. In the said partition, the First Defendant has been allotted 0.74 cents in first item and also the land in second item of property. The Second Defendant has been allotted 2.66 cents in first item of suit property. Third Defendant has been allotted 2.65 cents in first item of property. Since, Items 3 and 4 of the suit properties being Anadheenam Poromboke land, it is in possession and enjoyment of the Defendants. Even on the date of filing of the Suit, the Plaintiff was not at all in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Hence, the Defendants are in long, open, peaceful continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit properties adverse to the interest of the true owner for more than a statutory period, so, they prescribed title by adverse possession. The Defendants are in possession of the suit properties. Hence, they prayed for the dismissal of the Suit. 4. The Trial Court after considering the averments both in the plaint and Written Statement had framed five points for determination and considering the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2, DWs 1 and 2 and Exs.A1 to A7 and Exs.B1 to B15, dismissed the Suit. Against that, the Plaintiff preferred an Appeal. The First Appellate Court after considering the arguments of both counsels had framed five points for consideration and allowed the Appeal, setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court and decreed the Suit as prayed for in the Plaint. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the Defendants. 5. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration: i. Was it correct for the lower Appellate Court to hold that the Appellants had not prescribed title to the suit properties by adverse possession in view of Ex.B5, Ex.B6, Ex.B8, Ex.B9 and Ex.B10? ii. Whether the Appellants have prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession as per Ex.B5 to Ex.B10? iii. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court are liable to be set aside for non-consideration of relevant evidence available on record? 6. Substantial Questions of law Ns. ii. Whether the Appellants have prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession as per Ex.B5 to Ex.B10? iii. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court are liable to be set aside for non-consideration of relevant evidence available on record? 6. Substantial Questions of law Ns. i to iii: The Respondent as Plaintiff filed a Suit for declaration of title and injunction stating that the suit properties have been purchased by her by a registered Sale Deed-Ex.A1 dated 05.09.1964 from one Ekambara Reddy and she was in possession and enjoyment of the same. She dealt with the properties by way of creating an equitable mortgage in the Punjab National Bank and depositing of title deeds. The Appellants herein/Defendants sought to purchase the property, but the sale price was not agreeable, hence, the Respondent/Plaintiff refused to sell the property. So, the Appellants/Defendants attempted to interfere with the possession. Hence, the Respondent/Plaintiff had come forward with the Suit for declaration of title and injunction. The Appellants/Defendants resisted the Suit stating that it is true that the Respondent/Plaintiff had purchased the property from Ekambara Reddy, but, she has not paid the sale consideration. So, the First Appellant/First Defendant, who arranged the sale from Ekambara Reddy has paid Rs.20,000/-and he orally purchased the property from the Plaintiff/Respondent. From the date of oral purchase onwards, he is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Hence, he is the owner of the suit properties. He further urged that the prescribed title by adverse possession. From 1976 onwards his possession has been in open, continuous, uninterrupted possession. Hence, he prescribed title by adverse possession. The Trial Court after framing necessary issues and considering the ral and documentary evidence, dismissed the Suit. But, however, the First Appellate Court has allowed the Appeal. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the Defendants. 7. Admittedly, the suit properties are owned by one Ekambara Reddy and others. Ex.A1-Sale Deed dated 05.09.1964 is admitted by both parties. The case of the Appellants/Defendants is that, as per Ex.A1, the Respondent herein/Plaintiff had undertaken to discharge the loan incurred by Ekambara Reddy and others. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the Defendants. 7. Admittedly, the suit properties are owned by one Ekambara Reddy and others. Ex.A1-Sale Deed dated 05.09.1964 is admitted by both parties. The case of the Appellants/Defendants is that, as per Ex.A1, the Respondent herein/Plaintiff had undertaken to discharge the loan incurred by Ekambara Reddy and others. The Sale Deed-Ex.A1 has been executed by Ekambara Reddy and others in favour of Plaintiff only to discharge the debt due to one Lakshmipathy Naidu and even though, the Plaintiff herself undertook to clear the loan amount due to Lakshmipathy Naidu, she has not cleared the same. Ekambara Reddy approached the First Defendant, since he stood by and arranged for the said sale in favour of the Plaintiff. In 1975, when Ekambara Reddy demanded the money due to him, the Respondent/Plaintiff expressed her inability to pay the amounts due to Ekambara Reddy and also in turn agreed to sell the suit properties to the First Defendant/First Appellant for a sum of Rs.20,000/-. Accordingly, the First Defendant orally purchased the suit properties from the Plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20,000/- and from the date of oral sale, he is in possession of the suit properties. His possession is adverse to the interest of the Respondent/Plaintiff. Hence, he prescribed title by adverse possession. But the Trial Court has failed to consider the same. Hence, he prayed for allowing of this Appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that the oral sale in respect of an immovable property for the value more than one hundred rupees in not valid under law. So, the oral sale has been rightly rejected by the First Appellate Court. The learned counsel further contended that the First Appellant/First Defendant is not in possession of the property, with the knowledge of the Plaintiff/Respondent, adverse to her interest. The suit properties has been purchased by the Plaintiff/Respondent by a registered Sale Deed-Ex.A1 dated 05.09.1964 from one Ekambara Reddy and she was in possession and enjoyment of the same. Hence, the Defendants/Appellants have not prescribed title by adverse possession. 9. The suit properties has been purchased by the Plaintiff/Respondent by a registered Sale Deed-Ex.A1 dated 05.09.1964 from one Ekambara Reddy and she was in possession and enjoyment of the same. Hence, the Defendants/Appellants have not prescribed title by adverse possession. 9. The learned counsel for the Respondent further urged that as per Section 100 of C.P.C., it is not permissible for the Second Appellate Court to interfere with the findings of the First Appellate Court only on the ground that the First Appellate Court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the Appellate Trial Court. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Appeal. The learned counsel further urged that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the Respondent/Plaintiff is not in possession, possession follows title. As per Ex.A1, the Respondent/Plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties. So, the Respondent/Plaintiff is entitled to injunction. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Appeal. 10. The learned counsel for the Appellants relied upon the decision reported in N. Boraiah v. Pandurangan and another, 2007 (5) CTC 760 , and urged that Items 3 and 4 of the suit properties are anadheenam Government Poromboke property. So, the Government is a necessary party to the proceedings and therefore, the noon-impleading of Government is bad in law. 11. It is true that the Suit is for declaration of title and injunction. It is also admitted by the Appellants/Defendants that originally, the suit properties belonged to one Ekambara Reddy, he sold the same and it has been purchased by the Plaintiff/Respondent by a Sale Deed-Ex.A1 dated 05.09.1964. When the Plaintiff/Respondent purchased the property, he undertook to discharge the loan due to one Lakshmipathy Naidu, but she has not discharged the same. While perusing Ex.A1, in that, it was stated as follows: TAMIL So, it is true that the sale has been effected to discharge the loan due to Lakshmipathy Naidu. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that there is no evidence to show that the Respondent herein/Plaintiff has not discharged the loan due to Lakshmipathy Naidu. Here, neither Lakshmipathy Naidu nor any person connected with the document have been examined before this Court. Ekambara Reddy or his heirs were not examined before the Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that there is no evidence to show that the Respondent herein/Plaintiff has not discharged the loan due to Lakshmipathy Naidu. Here, neither Lakshmipathy Naidu nor any person connected with the document have been examined before this Court. Ekambara Reddy or his heirs were not examined before the Court. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent/Plaintiff was not examined before the Court, on her behalf, her son has been examined as PW1-K.Rajendran. The First Defendant/First Appellant was not examined before the Court. Per contra, the Third Appellant Annamalai has been examined before the Court as DW1. DW2-Chellan, in his evidence, he has stated that in 1964, he is only 12 years, he is studying in VIth standard and he does not know about Ex.A1. In such circumstances, I am of the view that even though, the Defendants/Appellants have alleged that the Plaintiff/Respondent has not paid the sale consideration ad she has not discharged the loan as undertaken by her, but there is no evidence to prove the same. The evidence of DW1/Third Defendant is also not helpful to come to the conclusion that in pursuance of Ex.A1-Sale Deed, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein has not paid the amount due to Lakshmipathy Naidu. 12. Now this Court has to decide, whether the oral sale alleged by the Defendants/Appellants is acceptable. 13. As per Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, it deals with sales of immovable property. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. In such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversin or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. At this juncture, it is appropriate to incorporate Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, which reads as under: “54. “Sale” defined.-“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.-Such a transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a Reversin or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. “Sale” defined.-“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.-Such a transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a Reversin or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.-A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” So, if the value of the property is more than one hundred rupees and more, the document has to be written and registered. If the value of the property is below one hundred rupees either it may be registered or mere delivery of possession is sufficient. But here, the Appellants/Defendants have averred that delivery of possession has been given, but the value of the property is Rs.20,000/-. In his Written Statement, in paragraph 8, the First Defendant/First Appellant has stated as follows: “… Hence Ekambara Reddy demanded money due to him only through this Defendant and finally in the year 1975, when approached, the Plaintiff not only expressed her inability to pay the amounts due to Ekambara Reddy, but also in turn agreed to sell the suit properties to this Defendant for a sum of rs.20,000/-. Accordingly this Defendant orally purchased the suit properties from the Plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20,000/- in the tamil month of Karthigai of 1975 and it is only thereafter the amounts due to Ekambara Reddy himself was paid by the Plaintiff. That immediately after the purchase this Defendant took possession of the suit properties reclaimed it and made it fit for cultivation and also started to cultivate the suit properties by himself.” But, legally the oral sale of an immovable property of a value more than one hundred rupees is not valid in law. That immediately after the purchase this Defendant took possession of the suit properties reclaimed it and made it fit for cultivation and also started to cultivate the suit properties by himself.” But, legally the oral sale of an immovable property of a value more than one hundred rupees is not valid in law. So, the oral sale put forth by the learned counsel for the Appellants is not valid under law. The Appellants have not conferred any right or title in respect of the suit property. 14. Now, this Court has to decide, whether the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 15. At the stage of Second Appeal, the Appellants/Defendants have raised the plea that the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. To substantiate their case, the learned counsel for the Appellants/Defendants relied upon the decision reported in N. Boraiah v. Pandurangan and another, 2007 (5) CTC 760 , wherein this Court has held as under: “23. It is clear that the Courts below have come to the right conclusion that the plaintiff has not proved his right to use the suit pathway in S.F. No. 1750/1 due to prescriptive rights, by showing that he has been using the said pathway for more than the required number of years. The Courts below have rightly held that the suit is bad in law for nonjoinder of necessary parties, namely, the Government and Bharath Petroleum Corporation.” On considering the Written Statement of First Defendants/First Respondent, it is seen that he has not raised any such plea in his Written Statement that the presence of Government is necessary for proper adjudication of the Suit. Hence, without pleading, he cannot raise such a plea at the stage of Second Appeal. So, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Appellants and the decision relied upon by him reported in N. Boraiah v. Pandurangan and another, 2007 (5) CTC 760 , is not relevant to the facts of the case in hand. 16. Nextly, the learned counsel for the Appellants relied upon the decision reported in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, 2008 (6) CTC 237 (SC) : 2008 (4) SCC 594 and Abdul Nabi Sahib v. Bajan Sahib and another, AIR 1944 Mad. 16. Nextly, the learned counsel for the Appellants relied upon the decision reported in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, 2008 (6) CTC 237 (SC) : 2008 (4) SCC 594 and Abdul Nabi Sahib v. Bajan Sahib and another, AIR 1944 Mad. 221 and submits that the Plaintiff/Respondent is not in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and in such circumstances, he ought to have filed the Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, but, he filed only a Suit for declaration of title and injunction and therefore, the Suit itself is not maintainable. In the decision cited supra, viz., Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, 2008 (6) CTC 237 (SC): 2008 (4) SCC 594 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “13.3. Where the Plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the Defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from the Defendant, the Plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, necessarily the Plaintiff will have to file a Suit for declaration, possession and injunction.” 17. In the decision reported in Abdul Nabi Sahib v. Bajan Sahib and another, AIR 1944 Mad. 221 , this Court has held as under: “4. Starting from this position the Appellant’s learned Advocate argues that if possession of the property was not with the Plaintiffs on the date of Suit, then since that Plaint contains merely a prayer for an injunction against the Defendants the Suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. In support of this argument, he relies mainly upon the decision reported in Ratnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer, 1910 (33) Mad. 452, which has been cited with approval in the recent Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kandasami Thambiran v. Vagheesam Pillai, AIR 1941 Mad. 822 and also in a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court reported in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee, AIR 1938 Lah. 369. In the case in Ratnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer, 1910 (33) Mad. 822 and also in a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court reported in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee, AIR 1938 Lah. 369. In the case in Ratnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer, 1910 (33) Mad. 452 the learned Judges (Sankaran Nair and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ.) stated the position as follows: As regards the first position, assuming that Section 42, Specific Relief Act, is to be understood as not requiring the whole consequential relief to be claimed, we think a Plaintiff out of possession is not entitled to ask for an injunction merely against the person in possession. This question has been fully discussed in the judgment of Subramania Ayyar, J., in 14 MLJ 290 though his actual decision in the case was not upheld on Appeal on another ground. Upon a review of the English cases the learned Judge came to the conclusion that injunction is not the appropriate relief where the Plaintiff is entitled to claim possession against the Defendants. Kerr on Injunctions (End.4) states at p.82, ‘the result of the cases apart from the alteration made by the Judicature Act of 1873 was that where the Plaintiff was out of possession the Court would refuse to interfere by granting an injunction unless there was fraud or collusion or unless the acts perpetrated or threatened were so injurious, as to tend to the destruction of the estate.’ Again at p.114, ‘if the trespass or damage is complete and the title is a pure legal title the Court would not in general interfere by way of mandatory injunction, there being a full remedy at law by ejectment.’ The passages above cited are supported by a number of English cases some of which Subramania Ayyar, J. Has referred to in his judgment in Vengan Poosari v. Patchamuthu, MANU/TN/0087/1903 : 1904 (14) MLJ 290 . It is true that the language of Section 25, Sub-section (8), Judicature Act of 1873 is wider and allows an injunction whether the person against whom such injunction is sought is or is not in possession under any claim of title or otherwise. But notwithstanding the generality of the language the principle laid down by Kindesley, Vice Chancellor in Lowndes v. Bettle, 1864 (33) L.J.Ch. 451 and approved of by the Court of Appeal in Stanford v. Huristone, (1987) 9 Ch. But notwithstanding the generality of the language the principle laid down by Kindesley, Vice Chancellor in Lowndes v. Bettle, 1864 (33) L.J.Ch. 451 and approved of by the Court of Appeal in Stanford v. Huristone, (1987) 9 Ch. 116 has been re-affirmed, viz., that while Defendant is in possession, and the Plaintiff seeks an injunction without possession, his claim will not be upheld: see Leeds and Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Horsefall, 33 S.J. 183. An injunction is a discretionary relief under Section 52, Specific Relief Act, and the considerations adverted to by Subramania Ayyar, J., in the case in Vengan Poosari v. Patchamuthu, MANU/TN/0087/1903: 1904 (14) MLJ 290 , against the grant of such relief in this country where the Plaintiff is entitled to ask for possession against the Defendant are entitled to full weight. The Full Bench decision in Kandasami Thambiran v. Vagheesm Pillai, AIR 1941 Mad. 822 , also refers to a much earlier decision reported in Ramanuja v. Devanayaka, 1885 (8) Mad. 361, where the learned Judges (Turner C.J., and Muttuswami Ayyar, J.) observed: Possession, whether it is of property or of an office may be regarded as either a physical fact, or in contemplation of the legal right to it, and it is in the former sense it should be understood in coming to a finding under Section 42 as to whether the Plaintiff is, or is not, able to seek further relief. This statement of the law supports the second contention urged on behalf of the Appellant by his learned Advocate that it is actual possession that matters in cases of this description where the question to be determined is whether the Suit is not maintainable for the reason that the Plaintiff has not asked for possession in addition to the subsidiary remedy of injunction. Applying this principle of law it is clear that on the facts of the present case since the Plaintiffs or any one of them did not have possession of the subject-matter of the litigation the Suit in which the only relief asked for was a permanent injunction was not maintainable……” 18. Applying this principle of law it is clear that on the facts of the present case since the Plaintiffs or any one of them did not have possession of the subject-matter of the litigation the Suit in which the only relief asked for was a permanent injunction was not maintainable……” 18. But, the above argument does not hold good, because, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein has pleaded that she is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and in such circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Appellants that the Suit itself is not maintainable does not merit acceptance. 19. The learned counsel for the Appellants would contend that from 1975 onwards, the First Respondent/First Defendant is in possession of the suit properties in pursuance of the oral sale. Even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the oral sale is not valid in law, his possession is adverse to the interest of the Respondent/Plaintiff, so he prescribed title by adverse possession. 20. It is true that adverse possession must be pleaded and proved. But here, in paragraph 14 of his Written Statement, he had pleaded adverse possession. Now, this Court has to decide, whether adverse possession has been proved. 21. It is pertinent to note that after the purchase of the suit properties, in 1984, the Respondent herein/Plaintiff has dealt with the property by creating an equitable mortgage and depositing the documents of title in the Punjab National Bank as per Ex.A2, dated 29.09.1984. In that, a notice has been issued to Respondent/Plaintiff and her husband A.G. Radhakrishnan stating that Jeyalakshmi, the Respondent herein/Plaintiff obtained loan on 12.04.1973 for the purchase of electric pump set with motor and another loan on 04.07.1977 and deposited the title deed. So, from 1973 onwards, the Plaintiff/Respondent is having transaction. The Plaintiff/Respondent deposited the title deed pertaining to 18 acres 30 cents including the present suit properties along with other properties. Since, the Plaintiff/Respondent has not repaid the amount, a Suit in O.S. No. 3 of 1986 on the file of Sub-Court, Tiruvallur, has been filed against the Plaintiff/Respondent herein and others. The copy of the Plaint has been marked as Ex.A3. In that, a letter of request for loan dated 02.04.1973 has been filed. The Sale Deed has also been mentioned. After the decree, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein had repaid the loan. The copy of the Plaint has been marked as Ex.A3. In that, a letter of request for loan dated 02.04.1973 has been filed. The Sale Deed has also been mentioned. After the decree, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein had repaid the loan. On 24.04.1996, Punjab National Bank has given a letter-Ex.A4 stating that the loan has been discharged. Ex.A5 is the Encumbrance Certificate. Exs.A6 and A7 are kist receipts. The First Appellate Court had considered this aspect, if really, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein sold the property in the year 1975 then why he should discharge the loan. But, notice has been issued in 1984 and the Suit has been filed in 1986. Since, the Plaintiff/Respondent is having the right in the property, she has discharged the same. That aspect has been considered by the First Appellate Court and come to the correct conclusion that the Plaintiff/Respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The Kist Receipts-Exs.A6 and A7 are for the Fasli 1407 and 1408. It was after the Suit. 22. Per contra, the Appellants herein/Defendants have filed the kist receipt and patta. The patta number for the suit properties is 338. Patta has been marked as Ex.B2, but, the year mentioned is not clear. Patta was issued in the name of Govinda Reddy, First Appellant/Fist Defendant in respect of S.No. 365-9, Item 2 and S.No. 376-1A. Ex.B3 is for Fasli 1392 and 1393 pertaining to 1981 onwards and the other documents are marked as Exs.B3, B4 and B5. The revenue record has clearly proved that stands in the name of Govinda Reddy and his brothers. 23. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the evidence of DW1-Annamalai/Third Defendant. He has already worked as Village Administrative Officer. Then only, he had resigned the post and gone to the teaching profession. In his cross, he has stated that from 1984 to 1990, he was working as Village Administrative Officer. He fairly conceded, since, he was a Village Administrative Officer, he know other Village Administrative Officers. In his evidence, DW1 has stated as follows: TAMIL Since, he was working as a Village Administrative Officer from 1984 to 1990 and as Village Administrative Officers are his friends, those documents have been concocted for the purpose to grab the property is acceptable one. Because, in his Written Statement, then First Respondent/First Defendant has stated that in 1975, he has orally purchased the property. Because, in his Written Statement, then First Respondent/First Defendant has stated that in 1975, he has orally purchased the property. There is mutuation of records during that period. Ex.B3-Kist has been paid only in the year 1984, after DW1 became a Village Administrative Officer. Ex.B4 is also after 1984. If really, the Defendants/Appellants have purchased the suit properties and in pursuance of that, they were in possession of the property from 1975, they would have filed documents to prove the same. But, the Appellants/Defendants have not filed any single document to show that they took possession of the suit properties and they are in possession and enjoyment of the same. The mere filing of the revenue records after 1984 viz., after DW1/Third Defendant was appointed as Village Administrative Officer will not prove that those documents were given only on the basis of possession and the kist paid by them. In such circumstances, no relevance can be placed on the revenue records filed by the Appellants/Defendants. The First Appellate Court has rightly considered this aspect and come to the correct conclusion. 24. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the Appellants culled out some portion of the evidence of PW1 and submits that PW1 himself has stated that he paid the Kist amount to his relative and in turn, his relative had paid the Kist and the receipt has been obtained in their name. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the relationship between both the parties. Chellammal, mother of Plaintiff and Balaram Reddy, father of Defendants are sister and brother. So, the Defendants are maternal uncle’s sons of Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is maternal aunt’s daughter. As already discussed, from 1984 to 1990, the third Defendant worked as Village Administrative Officer and after that, though, he resigned the job, he had many Village Administrative Officers as friends and those documents have been concocted for the purpose to grab the property. So, no relevance can be placed on the documents filed by the Appellants viz., Exs.B1 to B9. Ex.B10-Partition Deed came into existence on 24.06.1992 stating that in the partition deed the suit properties have been divided between themselves. It is their self-serving document. The Respondent/Plaintiff is not a party to the self-serving document and she is not a party to the proceeding. Ex.B10-Partition Deed came into existence on 24.06.1992 stating that in the partition deed the suit properties have been divided between themselves. It is their self-serving document. The Respondent/Plaintiff is not a party to the self-serving document and she is not a party to the proceeding. Furthermore, it is an admitted case, the other heirs of Balarama Reddy have not been impleaded in the partition deed. So, the property mentioned in Ex.B10-Partition deed, will not create right on the Appellants/Defendants and extinguish the right of the Respondent herein/Plaintiff. So, the First Appellate Court has rightly rejected the same. 25. The learned counsel for the Appellants would contend that the Appellants/Defendants prescribed title by adverse possession. To substantiate his claim, he relied upon the decisions reported in Jayagopal Mundra v. Gulab Chand Agarwalla and others, AIR 1974 Orissa 173 : Tej Narain and another v. Shanthi Swarroop Bohre and another, AIR 2004 SC 5113 ; and Ramiah v. N.Narayana Reddy (Dead) by LRs, AIR 2004 SC 4261 . 26. In the decision reported in Jayagopal Mundra v. Gulab Chand Agarwalla and others, AIR 1974 Orissa 173, the Orissa High Court has held as under: “(vi) Plaintiffs have failed to prove possession within twelve years of the Suit. Article 64 of the new Limitation Act applies. Defendants 1 and 2 and their predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the disputed house for more than twelve years continuously. The principle that possession follows title does not apply to this case.” 27. In the decision reported in Tej Narain and another v. Shanti Swaroop Bohre and another, AIR 2004 SC 5113 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “6. Govind Prasad had filed Civil Suit No. 1-A of 1950 for partition of the joint Hindu family property in the year 1950 between the two branches. The Suit was dismissed by Trial Court holding that the partition had already taken place between the parties. The family had ceased to be joint and were in possession of their respective shares. Counsel for the Appellant argued that since the Defendants themselves had, in their Suit filed in the year 1950, taken the stand that the status of the family was joint, the question of their perfecting title to the house by adverse possession is untenable. We do not find any merit in this submission. Counsel for the Appellant argued that since the Defendants themselves had, in their Suit filed in the year 1950, taken the stand that the status of the family was joint, the question of their perfecting title to the house by adverse possession is untenable. We do not find any merit in this submission. In an Appeal arising in the said Suit, the High Court in its order in First Appeal No. 14 of 1960 dated 16.02.1964 (Exhibit P-11) held that the family had ceased to be joint and had separated. This finding of the Court that the families had separated in the year 1928 and were in possession of the respective shares coupled with the fact that Saligram had admitted that Govind Prasad had taken forcible possession of the house in dispute in the year 1928 clearly establishes that Govind Prasad and his successors have been in continuous possession of the house since 1928 and the Suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant in the year 1955 is clearly barred by limitation. The Respondents have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 7. Accordingly, judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is affirmed and the Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.” 28. In the decision reported in Ramiah v. N. Narayana Reddy (Dead) by LRs, AIR 2004 SC 4261 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “9. We do not find any merit in the aforestated arguments. Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 142 of the Limitation Acct, 1980) is restricted to Suits for possession on dispossession or discontinuance of possession. In order to bring a Suit within the purview of that article, it must be shown that the Suit is in terms as well as in substance based on the allegation of the Plaintiff having been in possession and having subsequently lost the possession either by dispossession or by discontinuance. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908) on the other hand is a residuary article applying to Suits for possession not otherwise provided for. Suits based on Plaintiffs’ title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within Article 65. The question whether the article of limitation applicable to a particular suit is Article 64 or Article 65 has to be decided by reference to pleadings. Suits based on Plaintiffs’ title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within Article 65. The question whether the article of limitation applicable to a particular suit is Article 64 or Article 65 has to be decided by reference to pleadings. The Plaintiff cannot invoke Article 65 by suppressing material facts. In the present case, in Suit No. 357/60 instituted by N. Narayana Reddy in the Court of Principal Munsiff, Bangalore, evidence of the Appellant herein was recorded. In that Suit, as stated above, the Appellant was the Defendant. In his evidence, Appellant had admitted that he was in possession of the suit property up to 1971. This admission of the Appellant in that Suit indicates ouster from possession of the Appellant herein. In the present Suit instituted by the Appellant, he has glossed over this fact. In the circumstances, both the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the present Suit was barred by limitation. The Appellant was outstand in 1971. The Appellant had instituted the present Suit only on 8.5.1984. Consequently, the Suit has been rightly dismissed by both the Courts below as barred by limitation.” But, as already stated, dehors Ex.B2-Patta dated 29.04.1985, there is no other document or independent witness to show that the Appellants are in possession of the property from 1975 onwards, without any interruption and they prescribed title by adverse possession. So, the First Appellate Court has considered this aspect and come to the correct conclusion that the Appellants/Defendants have not prescribed title by adverse possession. 29. The leaned counsel for the Appellants relied upon the decision reported in Rajiah Nadar v. Manonmani Ammal, 1999 (1) CTC 245: AIR 1999 Mad. 213 , wherein this Court has held as under: “25. In the background of these facts, perusal of the following judgments rendered by the Supreme Court reveal that there is no justification to construe Section 100 in a very narrow and restricted sense and the recent trend has been in favour of keeping an open eye as against the glaring misreading, misquoting or failure to consider crucial evidence. In the background of these facts, perusal of the following judgments rendered by the Supreme Court reveal that there is no justification to construe Section 100 in a very narrow and restricted sense and the recent trend has been in favour of keeping an open eye as against the glaring misreading, misquoting or failure to consider crucial evidence. These judgments will also show that the Supreme Court had not only upheld the interference by the High Court against the findings rendered by the first Appellate Court, but also as against the concurrent findings of fact by both the lower Courts on several grounds.” 30. The learned counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff relied upon the decision reported in Arumugham v. Sundarambal and another, 1999 (4) SCC 350 , wherein, the Supreme Court has held as under: “It is open to the First Appellate Court to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidence on one side or rejecting the evidence on the other side. IT is not permissible for the Second Appellate Court to interfere with such findings of the First Appellate Court only on the ground that the First Appellate Court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the Appellate Trial Court.” Relying on the above said decision, the learned counsel argued that it is not permissible for the Second Appellate Court to interfere with such findings of the First Appellate Court only on the ground that the First Appellate Court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the Appellate Trial Court. 31. As already discussed, as per Ex.A1, the Respondent/Plaintiff purchased the property and she dealt with the property and she discharged the loan. In 1975, even though, the Appellants herein/Defendants have pleaded oral sale, till the suit has been filed, they have not taken any steps to get the Sale Deed executed in their favour. As per Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, the oral sale of the immovable property for the value more than one hundred rupees is not valid in law. So, the oral sale is not acceptable. As per Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, the oral sale of the immovable property for the value more than one hundred rupees is not valid in law. So, the oral sale is not acceptable. Even though, the Appellants herein/Defendants have state that they were in possession from 1975 onwards, but, till DW1 appointed as Village Administrative Officer in 1984, there is no revenue document to show they were in possession of the suit properties from 1975, on the basis of the oral sale. But after DW1 was appointed as Village Administrative Officer, then only the revenue document viz., Ex.B2-Patta came into effect. DW1/third Defendant himself fairly conceded that he is having Village Administrative Officers as friends. In such circumstances, except the revenue document, no other independent witness or neighbours or adjacent land owners were examined to prove, who is in possession of the suit properties. In such circumstances, the First Appellate Court has considered all these aspects and come to the correct conclusion that the Appellants/Defendants are not in possession of the suit properties and they have not prescribed title by adverse possession. Per contra, the Respondent herein/Plaintiff has proved that she purchased the property and she is in possession and she dealt with the property. Hence, the First Appellate Court has considered all the aspects in a proper perspective and granted a decree. Substantial Question of Law Nos. i to iii are answered accordingly. 32. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. Hence, the decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is hereby confirmed. 33. In fine,- i. the Second Appeal is dismissed. ii. The decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is confirmed. iii. No costs.